




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THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH  
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# THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH THOUGHT

A STUDY IN THE  
ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

BY

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## PREFACE

THE following pages attempt to present a theory of history through concrete illustrations. No endeavour is made, however, to relate in detail the events of any period. A knowledge of historical facts being assumed, certain salient features of each epoch will be thrown into relief, so that the main trend of events may be distinguished from the confusing maze into which the presentation of details often leads.

English history has been chosen to illustrate this theory, because the conditions and circumstances isolating England for many centuries have made English thought more normal and more uniform than that of her continental neighbours. The advantages of England's insular position are too well known to need restatement; only the effects of this isolation require emphasis. It would be difficult to find another nation whose thought was so little influenced by foreign civilization as that of England from the Reformation to the middle of the present century. During all this time England had a vigorous, or at least an active, foreign policy, which, while it kept her in touch with external events, was the interest chiefly of those in court circles, or, at most, of the small aristocratic class that controlled the State and directed its policy. Although it would take volumes to narrate the story of the struggles, successes, and failures of England's foreign policy during this period, yet these events have no present interest because they affected but little the life and the thought of the people. The great mass of the people, unrepresented in Parliament, took slight interest in the topics it discussed, or the policies it pursued.

Foreign wars, were brought home to the people only through the tax-gatherer and the press-gang. So long as the taxes were paid, the governing class was satisfied, while the people were content to pay their taxes in order to be let alone. Thus the gulf between the official class and the people has never been more complete. This state of affairs has rendered the life and thought of the English people peculiarly favourable for study. The growth, propagation, and decay of ideas and modes of thought were unaffected by governmental interference or by foreign influence. Each new crop of ideas sprang up in virgin soil, matured, decayed, and gave way to its successor without any external interference to hinder its growth. If there are laws, therefore, governing the origin, growth, and modification of national thought, an examination of this period must be productive of results.

The theory presented is scarcely open to question, though some of its corollaries may not be evident. Survival is determined and progress created by a struggle for the requisites of which the supply is insufficient. These requisites are the goods for which men strive or the means by which they may avert evils. A group of such definite objects upon which the life and happiness of each race depends, always exists. The environment formed by this group of economic objects surrounding and supporting a given race changes with the several objects in which the interests of the race are centred. With the new objects come new activities and new requisites for survival. To meet these new conditions, the motives, instincts, and habits of the race are modified; new modes of thought are formed; and thus by the modification of institutions, ideals, and customs all the characteristics of the civilization are reconstructed. These changes take place in a regular order; the series repeats itself in each environment. In its amplification and illustration lies the economic interpretation of history.

A study like the present one has the advantage that the conclusions reached are definite and clear. How far they are applicable to the formation of a general theory of the progress of thought may be left for future discussion. Believing that concrete studies must precede broad generalizations, I shall be content if the reader accepts my interpretation of English thought, even if he regards the conditions so exceptional as to furnish an inadequate basis for a general history of thought. I am quite ready to admit that when other epochs and civilizations are studied with the same care and by the same methods, many of my conclusions will be modified and some of them, perhaps, reversed. I believe, however, that English civilization during the last three centuries has been freer from outside influences and therefore more normal than any other epoch of which we have the material for a thorough investigation. It must remain, therefore, the best field for concrete studies until some new civilization arises under conditions still more normal and hence more easily analyzed and studied.

The first chapter contains an explanation of the psychological theories underlying the whole book. Logically this should precede the concrete applications of the theories. But readers who prefer to study theory and application together may begin with Chapter II. on "The Antecedents of English Thought."

EDINBURGH, *September, 1898.*



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## CHAPTER I

### THE THEORY

#### 1. National Character, pp. 1-5.

Adjustment to the environment is effected through the mental mechanism, which creates sensory and motor ideas (1). The sensory ideas are the basis of knowledge. They are arranged and classified so that any one of them is capable of arousing a series of mental images and appropriate motor reactions (2). Races differ in their motor reactions more than in their sensory ideas (3). Character depends upon the habitual motor response to the stimuli caused by the requisites for survival which preserve the race (5).

#### 2. Kinds of Environments, pp. 5-10.

Environments are either local or general (5). In the former motor activity predominates over sensory discrimination; instinct is more important than reason (6). In the latter nice sensory discriminations become the conditions of survival; men master nature by becoming conscious, cautious, and analytic (7). To a local environment corresponds a pain economy. A pleasure economy can only develop when a race emerges into a general environment (8).

#### 3. Adjustment to the Environment, pp. 10-15.

The term "environment" in this work denotes the objective conditions of present importance to social development (10). National character is not determined by the environment in this sense (11). National character is relatively stable, although the environment is constantly changing (12). Every change in the environment tends to modify the national character, which in turn reacts against the change (13). Every marked change in the environment gives rise to a new epoch in thought (14).

#### 4. Race Ideals, pp. 15-21.

Heredity gives increased vividness to the sensory ideas arousing motor activities necessary to survival. Race ideals are visualized groups of these sensory ideas (15). Sensations and groups of sensory ideas

aroused by the same stimuli differ according to the inherited mental mechanism. Ideals grow up more readily in a local than in a general environment (17). Imitation and conversion are the means by which race ideals are made serviceable in new environments (18). Conversion consists in connecting a new group of sensory ideas to the inherited motor mechanism (19). The relative permanence of the motor mechanism is illustrated in religious revivals and in political revolutions (20-21).

5. **The Stratification of Society**, pp. 21-23.

Political changes are due less to changes in national character than to rearrangements of classes in society (21). Classifications of society based on wealth or social position are superficial (22); they should be according to psychic characteristics (23).

6. **The Clingers**, pp. 23-25.

Localities with restricted food supplies develop a timid, conservative type of man (23). They are stay-at-homes and hero worshippers and may be designated as *clingers* (24). A utilitarian calculus of pleasures and pains is foreign to such a people (25).

7. **The Sensualists**, pp. 25-27.

When the local conditions improve, a class of *sensualists* arises. They strive with vigour to satisfy as completely as possible some dominant passion, and in a developing society contribute largely to progress (25). They break away from local conditions and become conquerors. They are tribute-takers, while the clingers are tribute-givers (26). Under modern conditions no race of sensualists could thrive. The type, however, is preserved as a class in society (27).

8. **The Stalwarts**, pp. 27-30.

Highly developed societies produce a third type of men, who love dogmas and creeds and subordinate policy to principle. These are *stalwarts* (27). They represent a reaction from sensualism in the direction of asceticism. In politics they are Utopists and democrats. In all things they love clearness and simplicity, and are independent in thought and action (29).

9. **The Mugwumps**, pp. 30-32.

Increase in wealth has given rise to a leisure class relieved from the pressure of a battle for existence. In this class there has been a development of the sensory and analytic side of the mind to the neglect of the motor side (30). Such men are vigorous in thought, but weak in action. They cannot act together, but make admirable critics. They are cosmopolitans in their sympathies, advocates of

compromise in politics, and agnostics in religion, and may be called *mugwumps* (31).

10. **The Development of Classes**, pp. 32-38.

These four classes are found in every modern society. Clingers change little from age to age. Mugwumps vary too much to be a homogeneous group. Sensualists and stalwarts, however, are clearly defined and in each epoch pass through a regular course of development (32). Calvinists and Methodists represent different types of stalwarts (36). At present skilled workmen are the dominant type of stalwarts (38).

11. **Stages in the Progress of Thought**, pp. 38-50.

Economic development has increased wealth and made possible a comparison and substitution of goods. They are thought of in increments rather than as indispensable conditions to well-being (39). Combining goods is æsthetic rather than economic. The groups of goods are again thought of as wholes and excite motor reactions. In contrast with economics and æsthetics, which treat of goods, morals and religion treat of environments (40). Religion owes its origin to the tendency of men to contrast different environments (41). Increasing knowledge raises both morals and religion to higher and higher planes, but they are always kept distinct (42). The history of thought has four stages: the economic, the æsthetic, the moral, and the religious (43). Each new environment originates a new chapter in thought history, starting always with the economic and concluding with the religious. In modern times each great economic change has given rise to a new development in each field of thought (46). Though modern nations enjoy continuous national life, they differ as much from century to century as did the rising and falling civilizations of the Ancient World (47).

12. **Curves of Thought**, pp. 50-56.

It has been shown that character is enduring, while the environment is constantly undergoing change. Economic conditions do not alone shape national character (50). They give rise to habitual motor reactions, but these may be connected with some new exciting cause when the old conditions cease to be important (51). Every transition to a new environment tends to develop a new type of man and to remodel old types. From the new type arise the economists, while the old type produces philosophers (52). The former proceed on an up-curve of thought from facts to theory, while the latter move on a downward curve from theory to facts (53). In the development of English thought there have been three periods in which the great thinkers were (1) Hobbes, Locke, and Newton, (2) Mandeville, Hume, and Adam Smith, (3) Malthus, Mill, and Darwin (55).

## CHAPTER II

## THE ANTECEDENTS OF ENGLISH THOUGHT

1. **Primal Economic Conditions**, pp. 57-65.

Modern characteristics originated under primitive conditions. Land was scarce in some localities, water in others. An irregular rainfall and uncertain climate tended to develop hope, patience, and humility (57). More settled conditions taught men to oppose rather than to yield to nature. Wrath and a tendency to react vigorously against oppression or a source of pain resulted (58). Resistance taught men to cooperate, and this made them moral (59). Civilization demands a movable surplus, the desire for which caused most of the great migrations (60). On it depended the existence of a ruling class (61). A sociocracy exists when the more social elements in a community exploit the less social (62). It deems itself a chosen people and aims at peace rather than justice in its relations with inferiors (62). The instincts of primitive races are due to the conditions found in cold, wet countries, or hot, dry countries, or countries in which one race dominates another. The Germanic, the Semitic, and the Roman civilizations correspond to these three conditions. They were characterized respectively by morality, religion, and civil law (64).

2. **The Early Germans**, pp. 65-68.

They lived in a cold, damp climate, which developed vigorous constitutions and strong appetites (65). Exposure was the chief check on population. The strong, who survived, were bound together by firm social bonds (66). Religious ideas were little developed (67).

3. **The Catholic Supremacy**, pp. 68-74.

Starting as a religious institution, the Church soon became a political power (68). The Roman Church put authority and submission above inspiration and freedom (69). Its supremacy in the North was due to economic necessity rather than conversion (70). The mediæval monasteries were great centres of industry (71). They taught native peoples how to get most from the land (72). Local religious organizations were quite independent (73). But the secular clergy kept them in touch with Rome (74).

4. **The Economic Influence of the Early Church**, pp. 74-78.

The conception of a future life fostered forethought in the present life (75). The Church broke up the patriarchal family by making converts (76). It elevated women and freed slaves; made trusts more sacred and broke down national boundaries (77).

5. **The Fifteenth Century**, pp. 78-84.

Notable events were the invention of printing, the discovery of America, and the use of gunpowder and the magnet. The latter revolutionized ocean travel (78). Cheap salt and spices changed the diet of the Germans. Gunpowder broke down the feudal system (79). Other changes were the use of bricks, glass windows, beer, and woollen clothing (80). These inventions and changes made indoor life agreeable (81). The Protestant Reformers exalted family life and condemned communal pleasures (83).

6. **Political Conditions**, pp. 84-89.

The fifteenth century was a "golden age for the labourer." Fighting was less general than histories indicate (84). Germany was quite free from it except in private feuds (85). War became less horrible, because conducted by nobles instead of mercenaries (86). The Renaissance helped the Reformation, but these movements had little in common (87). The Church shrank from persecuting the new Reformers as it had Huss (88).

7. **The Church Programme**, pp. 89-91.

The ideal of the Church was peace through obedience (89). It realized its political and economic aims (90). It failed in the domain of morals (91).

8. **Crime and Vice**, pp. 91-95.

Primitive conditions developed greed and hate (91). Greed becomes vice where there is an abundant food supply (92). Christian morality makes murder one of the worst crimes (93). To escape temptation the Church advised immolation (94). This did not prevent either vice or crime (95).

9. **Indulgences**, pp. 95-97.

Indulgences rested on principles antedating the Church (96). The German considered crime and vice social offences and revolted against a scheme of commutation (97).

10. **Social Problems**, pp. 97-101.

Vice was increasing at the same time the Church was becoming more lax, and this made a moral reaction inevitable (98). Protestantism could not check vice, but evolution did (99). Protestantism was superior, because it allowed free play to natural forces (100).

11. **The New Wave of Sensualism**, pp. 101-107.

The changes described threw many new careers open to adventurous sensualists (101). The sensual reversion that resulted was in no

sense the result of the Reformation (102). Luther's mistake was to think that Hebrew morality would meet the needs of the Germans (103). The sensual reversion led to a rapid exploitation of the New World, which enriched and then destroyed the power of Spain (104). The religious wars of the sixteenth century killed off many of the sensualists, but left a breach in the Church still unhealed (106). Through the whole period development on the continent was complicated by abnormal tendencies; but in England these were less active (107).

### CHAPTER III

#### THE CALVINISTS

##### 1. Calvinism, pp. 108-112.

The dominance of the desire for peace and security yielded before three local tendencies: the æsthetic, the moral, and Calvinism (108). Calvinism took root where clannish sentiments were strong,—in the mountains and among city artisans (109-111). Its attitude was legal, not moral (111-112).

##### 2. Frugalism, pp. 112-117.

The primitive man's idea of self was synthetic, embracing whatever arms, tools, lands, etc., were necessary to his independent position as warrior, weaver, farmer, etc. (112-114). Instances of this mental attitude may yet be found, although goods are now generally viewed merely as capital (115). This synthetic or enlarged idea of self is a characteristic of the frugalist, and was prevalent in the days of Calvin (116-117).

##### 3. Word Visualism, pp. 117-122.

The art of printing placed the written word, because representative of the Holy Writ, above custom and tradition (117-118). The reader requires a higher order of mental mechanism than the observer; the stimuli are weaker, and the power to visualize must be developed. The Cavalier was an observer, the Puritan a reader and visualizer (118-119). Visualization was the Puritan's test of truth (121). The Puritan was the first modern stalwart, and his method of visualization has transformed modern life (122).

##### 4. Puritan Opposition to Vice, pp. 122-126.

Character and vice are concepts or word pictures, and the power to visualize is necessary to their perception. The Church had opposed crime, which was a concrete act; the Puritans attacked vice, for it defiled their ideals, especially that of home, which was opposed to the coarse pleasures of cominunal life (123-124). The Puritans put

to a new use the clan concept (124). Believing that the inner man was objectified in his acts, they sought to impose their standards upon the nation (125). They denounced especially the two leading sins of the sensualists: adultery and profanity (126).

5. **Merry England**, pp. 126-130.

The conditions of a progressive civilization were reached later in England than in other European countries, but progress, when it began, was much more rapid there than elsewhere (126-127). When the environment suddenly improved, gross indulgence of the appetites resulted, similar to that now seen in a mining camp (128-129). Germany furnished a marked contrast to England. Progress in the former was slow but continuous and all the people rose, whereas in England progress was spasmodic (129-130).

6. **Primitive Traits**, pp. 130-134.

England's severe climate permitted the survival in early times of only the most vigorous, those with strong appetites (130-131). The sudden improvement in the environment plunged the natural Englishman into dissipation, in which he vented the excess of his animal spirits (131). The Puritans, who lived much indoors, did not comprehend the primitive exhibitions of passion and called them idolatrous, their effects being summed up as adultery (132). The Puritans misunderstood early marriage relations. Primitive women dreaded barrenness. Not until after the disintegration of clans under the influence of economic progress, did chastity become a dominant virtue (132-133). The Church had not sharply condemned sensual indulgences (133-134).

7. **Public Amusements**, pp. 134-139.

The amusements of Cavalier England were crude, brutal, and silly. Festival days occupied nearly half the year, so eager were the sensualists to utilize the advantages of the economic revolution (134-136). Woman's virtue was lightly held because of the desire for an increase of population, the plagues having caused a scarcity of labor (138). The regularity of the Puritan's life saved him from the plague and widened the gulf between him and the sensualist (138-139).

8. **The Disappearance of the Puritans**, pp. 139-142.

It was impossible that either the Puritan or the sensualist should triumph, for the Tories and the Church party sided now with the one, now with the other, in opposition to change (139-140). Furthermore, the Puritans, lacking the idea of comfort, followed a defective economic programme and were annihilated by consumption. Their fate was hardly analogous to that of the Hebrews after

the Babylonian exile (140-141). The Puritan and his creed both paid the penalty of a neglect of economic conditions (141-142).

9. **On the Interpretation of Great Writers**, pp. 142-144.

A great thinker does not present truth in the same way that he finds it. The road to discovery is inductive, but in the presentation of truth a thinker usually adopts the methods of the popular science of the day and expresses his ideas in deductive form (142-143). The reader who wishes to know a writer's real development must not accept his own statements, but must carefully note minor details, especially variations in his forms of expression (143-144).

10. **Thomas Hobbes**, pp. 144-157.

Hobbes upheld the divine right of kings in a social theory made mechanical by a love for mathematics. The body of his books was thought out in his youth; the dogmatic form was imposed later as a result of his passion for mathematics (144-145). His idea of a state of war, commonly assumed to be his starting-point, was really an after-thought (146). Hobbes's doctrines furnished no solution of the social difficulties (147-149). In the *Leviathan* the order of his early essays is reversed (149-152). He did not study nature, and was careless about facts. His definitions of the virtues are parodies on the Puritan character (153-157).

11. **John Locke**, pp. 157-170.

Locke was in reality an economist on the upward curve from observation to philosophy (157-159). He was a Puritan plus the ideal of comfort (160). His philosophy begins with the idea that there are "things in their own nature indifferent," in which he differed from the Puritans (161-162). This principle of indifference, which led him to attack enthusiasm and superstition, was his most important contribution to thought (163-165). Analysis of his *Essay on the Human Understanding* shows that his method was at first altrospective (165-166). "New discoveries" led him to adopt the introspective method, and despite his opposition to the "inner light" of the enthusiasts, he finds in his own mind an "internal sense," modifies his views, and recognizes reflection as a source of ideas (167-170).

12. **Results of Locke's Analysis**, pp. 170-175.

Contemporary thought was affected by Locke's two great principles of indifference and correspondence, but its development was forced into unexpected channels by the discovery of the principle of the association of ideas, which had not been clearly perceived by Locke (170-172). This principle rendered Locke's analysis worthless when applied to social affairs, and furnishes an explanation of his frequent

revision of the chapter on "Power," in which he confronted the same difficulty that faces every one who analyzes a race ideal (172-173). Locke subjected race ideals to a process analogous to that of the chemist or distiller. His method is well illustrated in his *Reasonableness of Christianity*, which provoked great opposition because it destroyed the concrete pictures of the Bible (173-175).

### 13. The Deists, pp. 175-184.

Viewed in connection with the practical work of Locke, deism is a stage in the development of religious thought beginning with Locke and ending with Wesley (175). The Deists were not attacking Christianity, but superstition, their premises being derived from Locke's principle of correspondence (176). The Reformation had changed ideas with regard to the New Testament, but had not altered the primitive concept of God, and it was this which the Deists attacked (177-179). The Old Testament emphasizes a God of Wrath; the New Testament, a God of Love (179-180). Locke's emphasis of the New Testament started a revolution in religious thought, which was continued by the Deists. A concept of God in harmony with new economic conditions was the result (180-181). God was now viewed as Father of men, rather than as God of Wrath (181-184).

### 14. The Outcome, pp. 184-190.

Morality was placed upon an independent basis; and the Puritans were split into two classes: stalwarts and mugwumps (184-185). The mugwumps, of whom Locke was a type, for a long time ruled by the power of compromise (186). There was an important separation of law from morality and religion (186-187). In contrast to France, England has been stable and unrational in government, but unstable and rational in religion (187-188). Since the time of Locke, there has been practically no development of political thought in England (188-190).

## CHAPTER IV

### THE MORALISTS

#### 1. Picture of the Eighteenth Century, pp. 191-204.

Progress ceased to be a struggle against foreign influence, and resulted from internal conditions and ideas (191-192). The decline of communal life brought forward complementary home comforts (192-193). There was an important revolution in agriculture and in the condition of rural labouring classes, their diet being improved by the use of ovens and their clothing by the use of wool and cotton (193-196). The transference of industries from the cities also helped the country, especially since it tended to make women independent (197-198).

Except in the towns England was prospering, yet because old industries languished people talked of hard times (198-200). Meantime, commercial development was lowering the morals of cities, although it was ridding the nation of its sensualists (200-201). In the seventeenth century reform had started in the cities; in the eighteenth its origin was in the country (202-204).

2. **Bernard Mandeville**, pp. 204-212.

The new epoch began with *The Fable of the Bees*, the work of an observer, giving crude utterance to new ideas suited to the new environment (204-205). Contending that private vices are public benefits, because the pursuit of wealth was beneficial, he forced his opponents to make a new definition of vice and a new concept of human nature (205-207). His main thought—that spending, not saving, promotes prosperity—was bitterly opposed (207). Adam Smith's doctrine of self-interest is a refined statement of Mandeville's paradox (208). He was contemptuous, not of moral, but of social virtues, and was a genuine economist, though not an "orthodox" one (210-212).

3. **David Hume**, pp. 212-225.

Hume was the successor of Mandeville (212-213). His *Treatise on Human Nature* shows that he designed a work on social psychology, following Mandeville, and not on individual psychology, following Locke (213-215). A comparison of the *Treatise* with the revised and castigated *Inquiry* gives a clue to his development, showing that he regretted the expression of his youthful views on the Passions (216-219). Mandeville's tirade against physicians doubtless influenced young Hume and started the train of thought which led to his denial that reason had any influence upon the will, and then to the general denial of any unseen connection between cause and effect, which was to give "an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusions" (219-222). Bishop Butler's *Evidences* led him away from the scepticism of Mandeville (223-224). Hume's development had four distinct stages, and for each there was in reality an edition of the *Treatise* (225).

✓ 4. **Adam Smith**, pp. 226-243.

Smith's work continued the scheme of Hume (226). The doctrines in the *Wealth of Nations* are all found in the fragmentary literature of the preceding epoch (227). Smith's unique service was the application of certain principles of human nature to economic discussions, whereby morals were robbed of much of their traditional field (228). The notion that he borrowed his doctrines from the Physiocrats is not supported by evidence; revenue was apparently the only subject in

which he had common interest with the Physiocrats (228-229). The *Wealth of Nations* was not thought out or written in France; it grew out of English facts and conditions, and it represents two widely separated stages in the author's development (230-235). A bank failure forced home on him the difference between money and capital (235-236). Patriotism and his belief in the "divine plan" led him to develop Dean Tucker's theory as to the advantages of abundant capital (236-237). His theory of distribution originated in discussions about the improvement of land (237-238). His theory of productive labour was born of his opposition to the views of Mandeville and Steuart in favour of prodigality (239-242). The *Wealth of Nations* was a new type of natural theology (242-243).

5. **The Religious Revival**, pp. 243-248.

The important features of Methodism are those which affected other religious bodies (243). The Puritans and the plagues had disappeared together, and religion needed a new reënforcement of its claims. Old restraints had been removed and society had been forced below the normal level (244-245). The downfall of the Puritans had been followed by a suppression of religious activity and enthusiasm. Yet English labourers, their economic life having narrowed, craved intense activity in other fields (246-248).

6. **Whitefield and Wesley**, pp. 248-251.

These two men took advantage of the economic situation and gave Englishmen in religion an outlet for their suppressed motor tendencies (248). Wesley was superstitious and could not have succeeded alone (248-249). He was supplemented by Whitefield, a visualizer, who did not, like Wesley, rely on earthquakes, plagues, and wars to enforce his warnings. Whitefield alone would have caused only a temporary excitement and reaction toward earlier ideals (250-251).

7. **The Manly and Womanly Elements in Religion**, pp. 251-256.

One reason for the failure of Calvinism was that its controlling principle, predestination, induces resignation, a characteristic of women. Arminianism emphasizes man's power over the environment. The mental attitude of women is reflected in religion when society must submit to evils beyond human control (251). Women strove to break up the old communal pleasures and to substitute those of the home (252). Their eagerness for economic goods and home life added to their social importance, but their new work and activity intensified their suffering as mothers and increased their natural spirit of resignation (253). Those families thrived best in which the men reflected the feelings that inspired their wives, and thus a new type of men arose that accepted the standards of women (254). The Puritans were

"womanly men" in the sense that they strove for purity and other womanly virtues. Whitefield belonged to this class. But the new epoch demanded manly qualities, for the few evils existing were surmountable. So Methodism brought to the front manly men of strong wills, Wesley being their leader (255).

8. **Methodism**, pp. 256-264.

Wesley was an observer and emphasized psychic manifestations of conversion (256-258). Methodism utilized motor reactions for which there had been no outlet since the abandonment of communal pleasures. Revivals and love-feasts, substitutes for the old pleasures, were conducted by men, while women took a new position in the home (259). Wesley's emphasis of psychic standards created new religious ideals: the sympathetic Christ, and God as an active and interested Father (259-260). The psychic standard divided the Church into two parts, Wesley heading a quasi-clan inside the Church (261-263). Psychic standards destroy fine distinctions. So Methodism marks the decline of creed-making and sect-building (263-264).

9. **The Joint Influence of Adam Smith and Wesley**, pp. 264-274.

To comprehend the change in English thought it is necessary to unite the work of Wesley and Adam Smith. Smith transferred from morals all principles except that of sympathy, and this Wesley appropriated for religion (264-265). Morals are rationalized customs, habits, and traditions, and often prompt men to actions out of harmony with their environment (266). Of the three elements of civilization, the life and heart can be brought into harmony with new conditions, but the intellect resists adjustment (267-268). The real basis of morals is wrath, which is a result of violent reactions against pain. The "manly man" feels wrath; the "womanly" or "good" man feels sympathy (268-269). Methodism and economics both tended to create a non-moral state of mind, which has remained a marked characteristic of English civilization (270-271). While the new ideals made people non-moral, they did not make them less conscientious (273). Englishmen now ceased to be cosmopolitan, and became more individual and forceful (273-274).

## CHAPTER V

### THE ECONOMISTS

1. **The Decline of France**, pp. 275-286.

In the eighteenth century the rapid economic development of England placed France in a subordinate position (275-276). The resulting internal disorder in France was used by English prophets and moral-

ists to combat reforms they disliked (277). The struggle for command of the wheat supply was the real cause of the shifting of national power (278). This struggle was intensified by the prevalence of the theory that individual and national welfare were measured by the consumption of bread (280-281). In England the struggles for liberty, for comfort, and for equality took place in different epochs, and development therefore was orderly (281). In France the attempt to satisfy these three popular demands in one epoch led to a sharp break with the environment, and resulted in instability and revolution (281-282). The slow increase of productive power in France caused the masses to confiscate the funded income of the wealthier classes; but as this was insufficient to satisfy the new standards of comfort, attempts were made to obtain the surplus of other nations (283-285). The greater resources and prosperity of England prevented the success of this movement (285).

## 2. The Utopists, pp. 286-296.

The Calvinistic view of life was essentially feminine, fostering the "home" ideal and regarding the world as a place for trial and tribulation (286-287). The philosophy of the Utopists and the utilitarians was masculine, making human happiness the end of action (288). They believed in a far-distant social Utopia, and in the possibility of preparing every one for this ideal state through reasoning, religion, and art (289-290). The Utopists were foreign-hearted and cosmopolitan (290-291). The success of the Ricardian programme, upon which the Benthamites and the economists united, combined with the lack of sympathy with popular movements, prevented the Utopists from making any positive contributions to social progress (292-294). By increasing the definiteness of the popular bread philosophy, the economic utilitarians succeeded in convincing men intellectually (295-296). Their materialism was, however, repugnant to the Utopists, who drifted into visionary schemes for social betterment (296).

## 3. Thomas Malthus, pp. 296-303.

The application of Utopian ideals to concrete governmental problems led to a conflict between the Utopists and the defenders of the existing social order (296-297). The Malthusian law of population was repugnant to the religious feelings, because it reflected on God's plan of the Universe (298-299). It was repugnant to the moral feelings because it taught that progress meant increase of poverty (299). Thus a conflict between the moralists and the economists was aroused (299-300). The position of the economists was strengthened by the acceptance of the "bread philosophy," by the doctrine that an increase of the food supply required capital as well as land,

and finally by the formulation of the law of diminishing returns (300-301). The logical result of the general acceptance of these doctrines was the conviction that equality and progress were incompatible (302). Progress being the higher law, the English, as a progressive nation, had to favour non-moral standards, leading to the eradication of the inefficient (302-303).

#### 4. David Ricardo, pp. 303-311.

In Ricardo's reasoning the presuppositions of natural religion are absent (303). Like Mandeville, he saw only the objective England, eliminating the ideal environment to which Englishmen clung (304). His real service was in turning men's attention to new schemes of social progress more in harmony with the actual conditions of English civilization (305). He had in mind an industrial society, whereas Malthus viewed national prosperity from an agricultural standpoint (306-308). The law of rent and of diminishing returns led to the conclusion that nations are brought to a stationary state before the essentials of a high civilization are acquired (309). The adoption of Ricardo's ideas by Bentham and James Mill led to the creation of a new economic philosophy, for which Ricardo furnished the practical programme (310-311).

#### 5. The Economic Philosophy, pp. 311-318.

The general acceptance of the Newtonian principles gave to the concrete propositions of the social sciences a philosophic basis which they had hitherto lacked (311-312). Bentham was the first to give to pleasure and pain a place in social reasoning similar to that of gravitation in physical science (312). Ricardo was able to supplement Bentham's negative utilitarianism because of his acquaintance with urban industrial conditions (313). The creation of the new economic philosophy through a combination of the ideas of Bentham and Ricardo was the work of James Mill (313-314). He revived the mental attitude of a pure pain economy, characteristic of the primitive philosophy of earlier days (315-316). As a radical and a democrat, his hatred for the aristocracy was increased through his acceptance of Ricardo's economic doctrines (316-317). The shifting of political power from the landlords to the capitalists caused Mill's economic creed to be turned against the labouring classes (317).

#### 6. John Stuart Mill, pp. 318-343.

The service of John Stuart Mill was to enrich the creed of the economic utilitarians with the human traits they had neglected, and to bring their philosophy into closer relation with the history of the English people (318). He was by temperament a "womanly man"; his education, however, had taught him the standards of the "manly man"

and led him to begin life in the negative rôle of a destructive reformer (319-320). The study of Wordsworth's poetry, and the influence of Sterling and of Saint-Simon, created in him a new ideal of social progress (321). Positive ideals of pleasure destroyed his confidence in Bentham's negative utilitarianism (322). When Mill began his *Logic*, his plan was to show the similarity of method in physical science and political economy (324). We find this idea in the purely formal part of his *Logic*, in which he tries to complete the work of Hume by developing a social science based on the study of character (325-327). The real content and valuable portion of the work was the new combination of induction and deduction, traceable directly to the Ricardian method of reasoning (328-329). The new ideal of proof and reasoning which he created affected men in their general opinions rather than in their scientific studies (330-331). His attempt to make social sciences conform to the method of the physical sciences has hampered the progress of social investigations (331-334). In his *Political Economy*, Mill, instead of rigidly applying the law of physical causation, as the theory of his *Logic* would require, draws a distinction between the laws of production and the laws of distribution (335). While the former partake of the nature of physical truths, the latter depend upon the opinions and feelings of men (335). This break with the theory of his *Logic* was due to the influence of Mrs. Mill, who inspired him with a new hope of social improvement (336). Mill's own contributions to political economy are to be found in the treatment of such subjects as socialism, coöperation, private property, in which close reasoning is followed by a vivid picture of ideal social conditions (337-339). This combination of social ideals with economic reasoning is also characteristic of such works as *Progress and Poverty*, and has contributed greatly to the development of idealism (339). The permanently pleasurable and the perfectly true harmonize (340). The concrete ideal method of reasoning introduced by Mill was the result of a combination of his abstract reasoning with the tendency towards concreteness received from his wife (342). Through it social science has acquired the concreteness that Calvinism gave to religion (343).

#### 7. Charles Darwin, pp. 343-349.

Just as Adam Smith was the last of the moralists and the first of the economists, so Darwin was the last of the economists and the first of the biologists (343-344). Of the four propositions upon which Darwin's argument rests, Malthus contributed two: the limitation of the food supply and the rapid increase of each species (345). A third—the variability of descendants—was already well established (345). The fourth—evolution due to pressure of numbers—was Darwin's contribution (346). Owing to the delay in the pub-

lication of his work, Darwin is usually regarded as an inductive inquirer, whereas as a matter of fact he was a bold theorizer (347). His successors have been inductive, accumulating foreign and prehistoric facts to substantiate the principle of common ancestry (348). The effect of biologic habits of thought has been to overestimate the far-off and the foreign (349).

8. **The English Poets**, pp. 349-356.

Classicism, which dominated English literature and art, was not in harmony with native English tendencies (349). The adherence of the Puritans to English customs and ideals led them to oppose the literary and artistic ideals imported from countries where activity is disagreeable (350). English conditions did not permit the realization of these ideals (350). A new literary and artistic movement grew out of the changed relation to nature created by the improved clothing and housing of the people (351). Active life in the open air became pleasurable, and more than this, — a requisite for survival (352). New inventions widened the range of choice (352). English art thus became associated with activity and choice (353). This new attitude was reflected in the poetry of the early part of the century and affected religious views (353). It also created a belief in the possibility of innocent pleasures and destroyed the idea that non-economic activity was a waste of energy (355).

9. **The Oxford Movement**, pp. 356-359.

The ideals of the representatives of this movement were essentially the same as those of the poets (356). Their search for a new basis for the Church led them to the Church of the fathers; viz. the early Catholic Church (357). The subsequent success of the High Church party was due to the fact that it substituted praise for prayer; a change which harmonized with the conditions of a prospering nation (358). The Oxford Movement thus became one of the forces which impressed utilitarian standards on English thought (359).

10. **The New Religious Ideals**, pp. 359-363.

The Methodists in substituting the thought of a missionary Christ for a suffering Christ raised the concept to the rank of a social ideal (359-360). The qualities of a mother protecting her son from temptation came to be associated with Jesus (360). While this change was going on, the concept of God was also modified (361). The father of the English family had gradually lost his commanding authority and had come to be regarded as the dispenser of bounties (361). This idea applied to religion makes God Father and the source of all blessings (361-362). Thus, religious ideals are brought into harmony with the experience of the race and stimulate the activity characteristic of modern religious life (363).

## CHAPTER VI

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

**1. The Harmony of Religious and Economic Concepts, pp. 364-368.**

The reconciliation of economics and religion was the result of a development of thought due to the conflict between home and communal pleasures (364). Economic instincts have become racial, while religious concepts have become utilitarian (365). Religion and economics now work together; the leaders in both fields have essentially the same methods and ideals (365). The result has been to give a unity to the English race and a distinctive character to their civilization, which have aroused strong national feelings (366). In religious as well as in social life the influence of the new national ideals has made itself felt (367). The supremacy of the English-speaking race will depend upon the degree to which these ideals enable it to cope with the conditions of a world environment (368).

**2. The Influence of Science, pp. 368-373.**

The relative development of the motor and sensory powers is the real issue in the struggle between science and religion (368-369). In the present environment of the English people motor activity rather than sensory analysis constitutes the requisite for survival (370). Science has exerted its influence on methods of reasoning rather than on the content of national ideas (370-371). Through inventions and discoveries, however, science has changed the conditions of the environment, permitting a new type of man, with changed mental reactions, to survive (371). The pressure of economic conditions rather than the force of scientific exposition changes men's opinions and beliefs (372-373).

**3. Socialism, pp. 373-376.**

Socialism, having a haven of rest as its ideal, shows a tendency to over-emphasize the mechanical aids to progress (373-374). While this ideal is attractive to those who are overworked and to those who crave sensory gratifications, it is repugnant to the active members of the race, especially to those with the capitalistic instincts (374-375). English conditions produce intense racial feelings and strong antipathies, and are distinctly unfavourable to cosmopolitan socialism (375-376).

**4. Fields for Future Adjustment, pp. 376-379.**

The characteristics of the coming epoch must be sought in the further development of the economic forces that have shaped the thought and activities of the last three centuries (376). The higher standards

of our public life and the refining of our social pleasures give evidence of the advancing adjustment of the race (376-377). In morals, on the other hand, primitive standards still obtain (377). With the exception of the poetry of the early part of the century, literature and art have failed to become national (377). Philosophy and education still adhere to foreign methods and standards (378). Little attempt has been made to develop principles of politics and law adapted to the problems of government with which the English have to deal (378-379). The adjustment of the race to the conditions of the present environment is about half finished.

5. **The New Environment**, pp. 379-387.

The period since 1873 may be regarded as an epoch of cheapness as contrasted with the preceding hundred years of rising prices (379). A steadily declining price of sugar has given us a sugar diet in the same sense that the eighteenth century had a bread diet (380). This change has placed those who adhere to the liquor diet at a distinct economic disadvantage (380-381). As a result a strong reaction against drinking habits has set in (381). This change is but a part of a larger movement which is eliminating from society the overfed as well as the underfed (381-382). The evils consequent upon over-nutrition indirectly benefit the race by eliminating its less active members (382-383). Over-nutrition decreases the fertility of women, and thus creates a sterile class that gradually dies out (384-385). Fathers and mothers upon whose ideals and activities social progress depends, have not developed artistic instincts, owing to the fact that artistic tastes in their present form do not promote activity (385-386). Until the ideals of art and literature promote activity they will have no permanent influence on the progress of the race (386-387).

6. **The Triumph of Stalwartism**, pp. 387-393.

The opposition between the stalwarts, sensualists, and clingers has enabled the mugwumps to shape the political policy of the English people (387). Great economic forces represented by the influence of capitalism and the degenerating effects of liquor are gradually eliminating the clingers and will in time place the sensualists at a disadvantage (388-389). The contest for supremacy will thus be narrowed down to the mugwumps and the stalwarts (390). As the latter are men of action and thus in harmony with the conditions of progress, there is little doubt as to their ultimate victory (391). The coming stalwartism will demand general conformity to its standards. It will make character a test of citizenship, will exalt women and womanly standards, and intensify the "home" ideal (392-393).

**7. The New Thought Curves, pp. 393-398.**

The struggles of the race due to the opposition between economics and religion have now ceased (393-394). In the "womanly man" the reconciliation of the two is to be found (394-395). The "manly man" is expressing his objective, realistic standards in literature and is dominating this field of thought (395). The union of economic and religious tendencies in the stalwart represents the opposing movement in thought (396). It seems probable that the "manly man," starting in literature, will do his best work in economic reform (396-397). Likewise, the "womanly man," starting in economics, may do his best work in literature and art, for his bold, vivid ideals and visions of a future Utopia are certain in time to take artistic form (397-398). The possibility is thus offered of uniting idealistic and realistic tendencies in the same person (398).

**8. The Socializing of Natural Religion, pp. 398-409.**

The old deductive assumptions of the natural theologians are gradually losing their hold upon the English people, yet the underlying thought is as powerful as ever (398-399). The thought of the sacrifice of the higher for the lower life, which is the principle of incarnation, is becoming a vital part of English thought (400-401). A conviction is not a certainty, but something that provokes activity. Firm beliefs are based on a union of sensory and motor evidence. Sensory facts establish a probability; the motor response creates habitual activity (401-403). The capitalistic instinct which leads men to have confidence in remote results strengthens the tendency towards belief in the unseen (404-405). The temptations to over-nutrition are best resisted by those who devote time and energy to the welfare of others (405-406). All these qualities—activity, hopefulness, altruism, and confidence in the unseen—are necessary to a higher social state (406). Those possessing these qualities will be the surviving elements in society (407). The laws of life, of reason, and of economics when combined present a plan of the universe in which revealed religion verifies the premises that natural religion has established (407-409).



# DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH THOUGHT

## CHAPTER I

### THE THEORY

THE adjustment of an organism to its environment depends on the mechanism through which the mind acts. The ingoing nervous currents create the conscious ideas by which a knowledge of the environment is acquired. But this knowledge would have little value did not the outgoing nervous currents create movements adjusting the organism to what it knows of its environment. There are thus two groups of ideas : knowledge or sensory ideas brought by the senses from the environment, and action or motor ideas revealing the self struggling for those relations to objective things that ensure survival. Knowledge of the environment is increased by analytic habits of thought, to form which each part of the mind must become accustomed to act for itself ; for attention is best secured when all ideas except those under consideration are excluded from the field of consciousness. Action, however, demands that the whole organism should respond to the exciting stimuli ; a partial or slow response would prevent that prompt adjustment to environment necessary for survival at critical periods.

The mental process by which men are adjusted to an environment, therefore, is of a dual nature. First there is a growth of the sensory powers. Men become capable of perceiving more accurately the differences and the similarities in the phenomena of that part of the outer

world with which they come in contact. Each object is distinguished, classified, and named, and in this way a mass of knowledge is acquired, and bound together by associations that spring up between the ideas of which this knowledge is composed. Long sequences of ideas are formed, so related that when one of the ideas is aroused in consciousness the others follow in regular order. The greater the knowledge of the environment and the more advanced the sensory powers, the longer are the series of ideas and the stronger the probability that any one idea will be followed by all the others of its series.

Motor reactions, however, cannot be started by every sensory idea. The great mass of the distinctions and differences presented by a given environment to the senses are matters of indifference to those who live in it. Only those ideas that indicate the presence or absence of requisites of survival lead to some activity improving the adjustment of the man to his environment. Such ideas are closely associated with the motor powers that create adjustment, and, being essential to survival, they must be in the possession of every individual. The series of acts that lead to the acquisition of an object are pictured in consciousness as distinctly as the series of ideas that enable an observer to distinguish one object from another.

This sensory knowledge is merely the amplification and classification of the differences perceived by the senses. It is an orderly arrangement of the incoming stream of ideas furnished by the objective world. A notable example is the classification of plants according to the Linnæan system. The number of stamens and pistils and the form of the leaves and the roots are matters of little importance, except as marks to distinguish the different species of plants. Every development of the sensory powers making the perceptions of men clearer and more varied, tends to increase the number of these ideas. Their range and flow conforms to the differences and peculiarities which contact

with the external world creates. If all knowledge were merely sensory, a parallelism would exist between men's thought and the objects around them.

But the struggle for existence does not allow knowledge to develop in this way. Not all facts and differences have the same significance. The motor reactions become associated with ideas, not because of their clearness or their place in a systematic classification, but because of the advantages which they give to those who possess them. The slow process of adjustment and selection has created for the important ideas the proper motor reactions. These ideas are often spoken of as though they were innate or inherited. It is not, however, the ideas that are inherited, but the motor mechanisms that excite activity when these ideas are present. The motor powers respond only to the stimuli which certain ideas arouse. A man's activities are thus determined by that part of his ideas for which motor reactions have been provided. They reappear in each succeeding generation, and must be studied in connection with the motor reactions they excite. It is not what a man sees, hears, or feels that makes him what he is, but the motor reactions which these phenomena excite. Men who see and hear equally well may differ widely in their characters, because they react differently under the same conditions. The Italian differs from the Englishman, or the Frenchman from the Russian because of differences, not in the sense perceptions, but in the activities which these perceptions provoke.

For example, the newspapers of Europe, in describing the Armenian massacres, used substantially the same facts and words, and thus created the same sensory impressions in all their readers. Yet the effect of these despatches in the different countries differed widely, because the motor reactions created by the same news differed in the various countries : one nationality was indifferent, another merely grieved, while a third was angry and wished to interfere.

The sensory phenomenon lies in the news; the motor phenomenon lies in the mental reaction. It is the latter only that shows the peculiarities of the national character.

Differences in the sensory powers of men show themselves in each nation, each community, and even in each family, but they are only temporary alterations from the normal standard, and have little effect upon permanent conditions. They also tend to neutralize one another, and are thus readily eliminated. It would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to create a new type of sensory powers, because the natural phenomena of the various parts of the world are so nearly the same that they demand the same sensory power for their perception. There is, therefore, a common type of the sensory powers to which all men regardless of nationality or race tend to conform, and from which any deviation is so severely punished by natural selection as to prevent its perpetuation. There is, however, no world environment to determine the motor reactions excited by sensory impressions. While sensory impressions are determined by the bare, isolated phenomena of the external world, motor reactions are caused by the requisites for survival which the local environment furnishes. So long as the requisites for each locality and age differ, so long must there be types of motor reactions suited to the locality and the age. Character, therefore, must be local and national because many types of motor reactions survive in men. These create its peculiarities, and it must be studied through their manifestations.

While the motor reactions upon which character depends are created by the local or national environment, it should not be inferred from this that national character is the result of the present national environment. Character is formed by the long series of environments in which a race has lived. Each change to a new environment brings out new traits by creating new motor adjustments, but it does not of necessity destroy the earlier traits. Many of them

abide and are brought out more clearly by the new conditions. The English character, for example, is not the result of contact with the present English environment, nor with English economic conditions. In spite of the long residence of the race in Great Britain, perhaps the less important of their peculiarities are due to English conditions. Many of the race characteristics were fully formed at a much earlier time, and were merely clarified or given a different setting by the new conditions. The Celtic elements of the English population have been on the British Isles for a longer time than the Saxons or Normans, and yet they have the normal English character to a less extent than the latter. Had the first settlers of England retained possession of it until now, it is not probable that English character would have assumed its present form. Many of the present motor reactions of the English people would never have been excited by any of the peculiarities of the English environment. Their characters would, therefore, be less pronounced, and by so much would the nation be inferior to what it now is. To have character is to react against the sense impressions coming from the environment, and the more rigorously a race reacts, the more pronounced will the national character be.

Environments differ in being either local or general. Although there is no hard and fast line between these two, their differences are sufficiently marked to be distinguished and described. In a local environment, a race being in direct contact with the natural forces and materials of some definite locality, depends for success wholly upon the exploitation of that locality. The food, clothing, shelter, tools, and wealth are of fixed kinds, with little variety; the people, cut off from contact with the outside world, are shut out of the possibilities and variety it offers. The barriers causing this isolation may be physical,

psychical, or racial, but, whatever their nature, they are strong enough to hem in the race and force it to develop in harmony with local conditions.

Circumscribed in this way, a people have little need of increasing the number of their sensory ideas. The few objects with which their contact is vital are so prominent and so sharply distinguished from one another that they cannot be confused, and an imperfect language will describe them. A people who live on barley, whose fuel and timber come from pine forests, whose transportation depends on cattle, and who fight with spears, have little use for fine sensory distinctions, and still less for the analytic faculties and logical powers. The sharp contests for these few objects will, however, develop their motor powers. Man must struggle with man for the few gifts that nature offers. The more vigorous and active will win. A quick decision and its immediate execution are more important than a correct apprehension of the character and qualities of the objects toward which the activity is directed. Here, instinctive action promotes success. The more sharply the local environment is defined and limited, the more pronounced will the motor powers become. Men reared in such an environment have an overflow of energy and activity. Their activity usually takes the form of war and conquest, through which the motor powers are developed out of proportion to the other sides of national character.

A general environment, on the other hand, has in it a great variety of objects upon which welfare depends, and a large stretch of territory from which they are derived. By such imperceptible degrees do these objects shade off into one another that they can be distinguished only by accurate analysis. The food, clothing, and shelter come from a great variety of sources, and the materials of which they are made are many times reconstructed before they assume their final form. The coarse gifts of nature are

displaced by the finer products of human art. The production of such articles demands the widest contact with the world's material resources, and the most accurate knowledge of their location, nature, and qualities.

In such an environment the sensory powers have free scope for development. The contests upon which survival depends are between man and nature rather than between man and man. Here, careful analysis and forethought are of more importance than vigorous action, for the secrets of nature can be exposed only by slow deliberate calculation. Nature does not act with that suddenness and arbitrariness which characterize the conflicts of men. Men master nature by becoming conscious, cautious, and analytic. Their sensory powers thus become the requisites for survival, and develop with as much luxuriousness and wastefulness as do the motor powers in a local environment. Men divide and classify the surrounding phenomena endlessly until they become hair-splitters in their distinctions. Ethics and theology become so formal and discursive as to conceal the vital relations upon which they depend. Scientific facts are too minutely divided and specialized for embodiment into race knowledge. As it is impossible to have a definite motor reaction with each of these numerous distinctions, such men readily perceive the qualities in objects, and analyze them into their ultimate forms, but they act with less promptness than their more primitive ancestors, and see less clearly the few essentials upon which race survival depends. They are, therefore, more likely to act inefficiently, and to check the progress of the race by their indecision, or by their indifference to the welfare of society.

The activities demanded by the conditions of its environment determine the economy of each race. It may be so situated that its energies are mainly directed towards the avoidance of pain ; or, on the other hand, its environment may direct its greatest effort toward the acquisition

of pleasure. In an economy based on the avoidance of enemies or pain, population is likely to be sparse, and food, shelter, and other economic necessities relatively abundant. These conditions have prevailed in the early history of most races. There were fierce conflicts of race with race. The natural world was full of unknown terrors and unforeseen evils: the fierce beasts of forest and jungle could be overcome only by luck or strategy; ignorance of hygiene and irregularities in the food supply made always imminent the horrors of famine, disease, and pestilence. Under such conditions fear and the avoidance of pain are the prominent motives for action. The sensory ideas are so grouped that they give early intimation of the presence of every possible foe or evil. A prompt visualization of evils is of more value than accurate knowledge of their character and peculiarities. Men must have an instinctive fear of evil. The sensory and motor powers must unite in emphasizing any quality or person that may be the forerunner of suffering, or the means of avoiding it. Such activities and such a type of mind appear in primitive men, and wherever they are dominant a pain economy results.

A pleasure economy demands the absence of these conditions and evils. Great nations are formed, living together in a state of universal peace. Savage beasts and dangerous reptiles are exterminated, regular crops and improved transportation remove the danger of famines, increased medical knowledge and improved sanitation reduce the violence of contagious diseases; these and other necessary changes unite to remove the fear of sudden disasters, and to increase the length and tranquillity of life. A conscious calculation of utilities now becomes possible, and men delay action until they have estimated the pleasures and pains involved. The sensory concepts and motor reactions of such men differ from those of men living in a pain economy. Pleasure-getting

is promoted by an analysis of material objects, and the rearrangement of their elements in more acceptable forms. Attention is thus diverted from the animate to the inanimate world, where men must learn of the unseen chemical and physical forces which act upon them. The pursuit of wealth becomes a leading occupation, and its activities destroy the motor reactions which cause men to fear nature or one another. Thus they are left free to study those peculiarities in nature upon which their welfare depends, and to develop those feelings and activities binding men together in large societies.

This gradual transition from a pain to a pleasure economy emphasizes the effects produced by the transition from local to general environments. Each race begins its history in a local environment and a pain economy, and progresses towards a general environment and a pleasure economy. Both of the former promote the motor development of men, while both of the latter aid his sensory development. The sensory powers are so enlarged in the final epochs that they divert the attention and activities of the race from the few essentials of existence to the innumerable elements into which the senses divide the world. Such, in brief, is the history of many nations, and would, perhaps, be the history of all of them if each civilization developed in a single environment. The enduring nations are kept progressive by the repeated transition from one environment to another, in each of which the process of development and adjustment is renewed. Some part of the population, being pushed out of its old habitation into a new one, develops its motor energies once more in the struggles which the occupation and utilization of the new locality make necessary. In the more advanced races there may not be a change of locality at each period, but there are at least important modifications in the economic environment exerting the same motor energies that are demanded in new localities. Either of these transitions

aids the men with developed motor powers, and places at a disadvantage those in whom the sensory powers are dominant.

Great economic changes, or a migration to a new environment, mark the beginning of a new epoch and the rise of a new type of men. Upon this basis a new civilization develops, which, if its growth is not checked or diverted from a normal course by some outside force, goes through all the stages of progress in regular succession. The same law is manifest in each economic epoch. It may be obscured by a few irregularities, but it shows itself when these are brushed away.

When it is said that organisms are adjusted to their environment or that their development is due to their environment, the word "environment" means, not the sum of natural phenomena which the world now exhibits, nor that which it exhibited at any one age, but the grand result of the natural phenomena of succeeding ages. Again, the word is used in a somewhat narrower sense, and means the few general characteristics of nature which are so universal as to be present at all times and places. The word is used in this sense when it is said that the environment dominates man, and determines his activities. Not only the present world exerts this influence, but the natural phenomena of past ages also have a part. A third meaning, still narrower, calls to mind the definite group of conditions that is essential to the welfare of a race, and that determines the conditions of survival at the present time. In this sense there are many environments in different parts of the earth, and a long series of them in the history of the world.

The first two uses of the word do not differ from the way in which the word "nature" is used, except that nature is often personified or at least so unified as to obliterate its parts. The word "nature" brings up the

idea of a whole, which is usually conceived of as a unit. The word "environment," however, brings up a series of particulars, and thus harmonizes with a more inductive way of regarding the universe. Nor does it imply any teleological concept or design. In this there is an advantage, but it still lacks the definiteness demanded by science. It is better, therefore, to use the words "nature" and "natural conditions" to designate the sum of objective influences which have made men and other organisms what they are, and to use the word "environment" only in the sense of the objective conditions at work at the present time, and to which the present modifications in society, and in the characters of men, are due. The more general and vague use of the term may be necessary in biology, but it is a source of confusion when applied to history. The development of those social qualities in men which have shaped human history is recent, and so peculiar that a crude application to social progress of the general principles of animal evolution is the source of many errors. The doctrine that men are adjusted to their environment, and that their characters, qualities, and activities are due to it, is a general truth hardly worth disputing so long as the word is used in a vague, general way. But those who attempt to apply the theory of evolution to history pervert this doctrine by using the word "environment" in a narrower sense — make it mean the national environment, or the sum of the natural conditions which now surround a given race of men. It is one thing to say that man's development is due to natural conditions, that his actions are subject to natural laws, and that his character was formed through a gradual adjustment to external conditions; but quite another thing to say that the present man has had his character and activities formed by present conditions, and that he is adjusted to the present conditions that environ him. Yet it is this latter doctrine that is expressed or implied

by many who apply the current biologic theories to the development of man. This view errs either in assuming men to be more mobile than they are, or in assuming that natural conditions determining men's characters are of so general a nature that they continue from age to age with little change. Perhaps there is a mixture of these errors in current discussions; most of the statements bearing on this point are so vague that they may be interpreted either way.

I wish to emphasize an opposite concept concerning both the character of man and his environment. Men's characters are enduring, and difficult to modify. They change their environment, repeatedly, seldom living under one environment long enough for it to exert its full influence. Men in progressive nations are never adjusted to their environment if this word is to be used in a definite way, and made to mean the sum of natural conditions which at a given time obtain in a nation. On the contrary, the striking features of every progressive nation are due to the breach between the national character and the present environment. Character is formed by the motor reactions which are created by the perception of certain sensory ideas. These motor reactions are the result of a hereditary adjustment. They are slowly formed, and still more slowly changed. Many of them were created ages ago under natural conditions unlike those that now exist. Once formed, they have continued through a long series of environments, because the new conditions contained nothing to interfere with their activity. They remain unmodified or are modified only in ways that make them stand out even more clearly.

While character has the permanence of heredity and is modified only by slowly working causes, the national environment changes with each age. The force it exerts is tremendous, but not enduring. It is too transitory to

bring men's activities into harmony with its demands, for it is displaced before many motor readjustments are affected. Through these modifications it leaves its influence on the race; but only to widen the breach that will exist between men's characters and the next environment in which they live. Character has thus a persistent, forceful activity along channels that have been fixed by heredity. It seeks to realize certain tendencies that have been wrought out by past conditions. Instead of a passive acquiescence in the conditions set by the present environment, it is persistent in its endeavour to modify them. It seeks to master nature, and to change the direction of natural forces. Thus the conscious modifications of external conditions increase in number, and the motor reactions become more pronounced and more difficult to change.

The forces generated by the present environment are, therefore, not the only forces that determine the actions of the men who live in it; past environments may be said still to exert a force through the modifications they have made in the national character. These two forces are always in conflict. The ideas holding over from the past give through their motor reactions the tone to a civilization. The remodelling influence comes from the conditions set by the immediate environment, and through them the economic forces get their power. This interplay of the character forces in men and the economic forces in their environment causes progress.

Two elemental forces are thus always at work, — those due to the national character, and those due to the present economic conditions. If these two elements harmonize, the race is adjusted to its environment, and remains static. If the two are out of harmony, a period of transition ensues, in which a readjustment takes place between the important objects in the environment and the inherited motor reactions which make up the national character. When this adjustment is imperfect, the race

ideals must be modified, or freed from the particular associations which earlier conditions have imposed on them.

When economic conditions are regarded in this way, as the causes that modify national character, the economy of the nation must be made to include every object towards which the motor energies are directed. It consists of the activities by which the limiting aggregates of the environment are created, modified, or destroyed. In this economy the food supply and other national goods are important, but not the sole, elements; it may have for its end the avoidance of pain and evils as well as the securing of pleasure and goods. The national character may also impose ideals whose connection with pleasure and pain is indirect and difficult to trace, but in any case a fixed direction is given to the national activities, and thus an economy of effort results.

Every marked alteration in these dominant aggregates, by changing the activities of a nation, starts a series of changes that create an epoch in the national thought. Each nation has as many epochs in the development of its thought as it has marked changes in its environment. In tracing the history of national thought, attention must first be directed towards the epochs in its economic progress, for they give the basis for the changes of each epoch.

If a nation remained in an environment until all the changes possible in that environment were wrought out, the history of each epoch and the comparison of different epochs would be simple. It often happens, however, that a new economic environment is entered before the changes of earlier epochs have been worked out. In such cases two sets of influences are at work at the same time, each modifying the national thought in particular fields. Although such conditions complicate the history of thought, they do not invalidate its laws, nor change the order in which the

different groups of concepts and ideals are modified. Each epoch has all the stages that the complete history of a nation would have if it developed in one environment. If a nation passes through a series of environments, it is compelled to repeat these stages as often as the economic conditions change.

Since the enduring elements in national character come from the motor reactions inherited from past generations, it is necessary to trace the connection between these reactions and the sensory ideas that excite them. The sensory powers themselves must be so modified by heredity that they give increased vividness and clearness to those ideas, and especially to those persistent groups of ideas, which are the starting-points of motor activity. A purely sensory development tends to give an equal emphasis to all the ideas coming from the outer world. Such ideas are clear and definite, but they are not vivid enough to influence the motor reactions. Ideas are clear when they indicate accurately the differences existing in the environment ; they become vivid only when they emphasize those elements, objects, and relations that are requisites for survival. To effect this result certain groups of ideas are so blended and unified that they seem to be one. The presence of any one of these ideas starts a fresh sensory activity that brings up all the other ideas of the group. Survival depends upon the visualization of those phenomena that aid in the quick perception of the requisites. Race ideals, then, are the visualized groups of ideas which this peculiar development has created. Through this visualization the sensory side of the mind is brought into harmony with its motor side, and is made to emphasize objects and relations that can be made, through motor reactions, to contribute to the welfare of the individual and of society. Heredity thus creates both the ideals of a race, and the motor reactions through which

they may be realized. National character depends not merely on the number of these motor reactions, but also on the vividness of the ideals towards which national activities are directed.

In this way each nation acquires a number of race ideas and ideals, which determine the activities of its members through the motor reactions accompanying them. Every one feels the force of these ideals, and strives for their realization; each new environment tends to clarify them, and to unite them into groups. Thus the economic, the æsthetic, the moral, and the religious groups of ideas and ideals become distinct, and capable of classification.

Pure sensory ideas arise when the environment presents the proper stimulus to create the sensations on which they depend, and they can be indefinitely increased in number by any one who will shift his position often enough to come in contact with all the stimuli contained in the environment. Every one, through contact with the external world, must experience these sensations for himself. They come and go with each individual, and with each generation. Language helps to keep them stable, but it does not free any one from the necessity of experiencing them for himself. These simple ideas are the material on which heredity operates to form composite, unified groups of ideas, each of which indicate some limiting aggregate upon which race welfare depends. As these race or primal ideas have motor reactions connected with them, they cannot be felt by any one to whom heredity has not given the proper motor mechanism. The activity demanded by each limiting aggregate becomes instinctive, and thus creates organic modifications, which pass from generation to generation.

Each race ideal is the means of creating adjustment to some limiting aggregate, and it is acquired at a time when the race is in such intimate contact with this aggregate that it becomes a requisite for survival. Heredity unifies

this group of conditions into a race ideal, and develops peculiar motor reactions which will aid the race in utilizing or in avoiding it. Local environments therefore are the places most favourable to the generation of race ideals. In these a few aggregates of natural forces, of animals or of men, become so prominent that adjustment to them is of more importance than an increased adjustment to the more ordinary objects in this environment. These limiting aggregates become the basis of classifications; words are coined to designate them, and in the end a psychic concept is created, unifying them and making them appear as simple and fundamental as are the sensorial ideas stimulated by single sensations. A dominant aggregate thus ceasing to be thought of in connection with its parts becomes a peculiar unit exciting motor reactions. So completely destroyed is the connection between the whole aggregate and its parts that a race usually resents any attempt to dissolve its race ideals into their elements, or even to trace the origin of its ideals. The more peculiar the combination, and the more insignificant its elements seem to a people, the easier it is for them to isolate the whole from its parts, and to make of it a race ideal with vigorous motor reactions. For example, a storm in a desert is such a peculiar manifestation, and presents phenomena so different from what its elements exhibit on other occasions, that, the elements being lost sight of, the whole is unified in thought and becomes a source of activity.

Race ideals once created endure, even if the race migrates to a region where their cause is absent or is manifested in some other way. The motor reactions created by the original aggregate, which are inherited by the race in its new location, are associated with some modification of this aggregate or with some new aggregate of more present importance. Vigorous motor reactions can always be put to some good use, and once acquired, they are never lost

by a progressive race. Although the race ideals that excite them are modified by the influence of new environments, these modifications exert no influence on the motor reactions except to make them more pronounced.

National character depends, therefore, on the peculiarities of the locality in which the race was formed. If a few limiting aggregates were all-important, the motor reactions are vigorous. A migrating race will have a more marked national character than a settled race. Passing through more environments, the limiting aggregates of each will leave their influence on the national character in the motor reactions they create. In a happy mixture of races, the motor reactions of both races will be inherited by their descendants. This series of environments is, at best, too imperfect for a high civilization. To ensure continuous progress, each race must receive from other races ideas not developed by its past conditions. The primary source of this propagation of ideas is imitation. The basis of race ideals is the motor reactions that particular conditions have produced and heredity continued. When a race with these motor reactions comes in contact with races having other motor reactions, each race imitates the useful actions of the other, and thus stimulates the development of those motor reactions which its own past conditions did not bring out. Migration alone would hardly develop these motor reactions, but imitation creates the desired motive. To it are due those minor peculiarities in the national character which are not caused by a dominant aggregate in the environment.

The prominent race ideals, however, are due more to conversion than to imitation. Conversion is best known as a religious phenomenon, yet its causes are universal and manifest themselves in every change of ideas or opinions. Its explanation is to be found in the loosening of bonds between old groups of associated ideas, leaving certain motor reactions without any exciting cause. Race ideals

are a composite, due to the blending of a group of simple ideas with certain motor reactions, by means of which a quick response is obtained to any indication of the presence of an important limiting aggregate necessary for welfare. A change of environments, however, may put a race in conditions where this limiting aggregate either is absent or shows itself in such different forms that its presence is not indicated by the same group of sensory impressions. In such cases we have an inherited motor mechanism without any means of exciting it. There is thus inherited a possibility of activity that remains dormant until some means of exciting it is acquired. Conversion is the act of connecting this old motor mechanism with some new group of sensory ideas. This new group may indicate a new requisite, or it may be merely some new form in which an old limiting aggregate manifests itself. In either case a dormant motor mechanism becomes again active, and modifies not only the thoughts and ideas of the convert, but also his activities. Conversion is thus a phenomenon of heredity which only those with a developed mental mechanism can experience. Weak minds may learn through imitation, but they never manifest those sudden changes in character which indicate a conversion.

The possibility of conversion thus depends on the fact that the groups of sensory ideas creating race ideas are less permanent than the motor reactions which they excite. Sensorial ideas, corresponding to the distinctions in the immediate environment, quickly disappear, or lose their former associations when the aggregates in the environment change their form. The motor reactions are organic, and would disappear, if at all, only long after the exciting causes were removed. They are, therefore, capable of being aroused by new stimuli, and when revived are capable of performing services different from those to which they owe their origin.

The loss of the old ideas, with which these dormant motor powers were associated, may be due to a variety of causes. A change of environments may remove or modify some important aggregate. The activities may also be restricted or modified by the appearance of some new limiting requisite. A new enemy, for example, may be so dangerous that every energy must be exerted to resist it. A period of war is apt to produce similar effects on national life. In such cases old activities are interrupted and new qualities are developed, until the old race qualities seem to be extinguished by the new growth. A period of peace, however, will show that even if old ideas have died out, the motor reactions they provoked are still capable of being excited by new ideas. As a return to peace favours the spread of new ideas, at such a period, conversion is likely to be a widespread and striking phenomenon.

The orderly development and differentiation of society, by imposing a new set of restrictions upon individuals frequently cause motor powers to become dormant. The differentiation of occupations confines within narrower scope the activities of individuals. A change in the form of government, particularly the rise of a despotic government, acts in the same way. It has often been pointed out how frequently the growth of art has been coincident with the rise of a despotism. A change in the religion of a people, in their moral ideas, or any modification in their consumption of goods, produces similar results. When the motor powers of a people are limited in one way, they find new avenues for exercising them. Converts are noted for the zeal with which they espouse the new cause. They also hold the new ideas in a more abstract form than they would if they had acquired them directly through contact with the original environment. A dormant motor power is also apt to be too vigorous to fit the new ideas that excite it, and thereby leads the convert to exaggerate their

importance, and to distort his life in order to realize them. Race ideals thus become more vivid and abstract the farther they are removed from the conditions that created them. In their primal home they are bound up with and coloured by the particular circumstances under which they arose, and, by these limitations, are checked in their growth. In environments without these limitations, and coupled with motor reactions which they did not originate, they have free scope for growth.

The French Revolution furnishes an appropriate illustration. Most of the ideas that created it were of English origin, but the particular conditions surrounding their origin kept them within proper bounds in England. France, however, lacked these limitations, and in addition the activities of the French had been checked in many important respects by the despotism under which they lived. Powerful motor reactions were thus rendered dormant, and to these the new ideas became attached. Acquiring in this way a greater clearness, they prompted a more vigorous activity than they had done in England, and so caused a transformation of national ideas and character that no environment, however exaggerated its peculiarities, could have produced. The propagation of ideas by conversion is thus an essential element in the acquisition of clear race ideals. Without it many of the marked characteristics of modern nations would be inexplicable.

The public decisions and even the form of government in a mixed society may be unstable, and its history show an apparent fickleness in the national character, and yet the social groups may persist, and manifest the same peculiarities. Changes too slight and too temporary to affect the character of any group may alter the relations of the groups to one another, and thus disturb the working of public institutions without altering the character of individuals. The French character, for example, has been

but little modified during the century. The fickleness of the popular will has been the result of peculiar conditions, which have given now to this, now to that, class a control of national affairs. In government the dominant class makes the history, and whenever a new class obtains control a break in its continuity occurs. The displaced class persists, however, and retains those personal qualities which it has inherited from its ancestors. Every age has a variety of such types, which are easily discernible, and are often described. Many of them, however, being merely varieties of certain more fundamental types that are found in every age and nation, are of too little importance to gain a place in a history of national thought.

The popular classifications of society are defective, because they group men, not according to their psychic traits, but according to their positions in society, their wealth, and their party affiliations. When we speak of the upper, middle, and lower classes we judge men rather by their success than by their psychic peculiarities. A group of miners looking for gold have almost identical psychic qualities. A few only will find rich mines, and these will form a new upper class whose social position will differ from that of the unsuccessful. When the distinction is drawn between labourers and capitalists, their social positions differ far more widely than do their psychic traits. An aristocracy, having long had wealth, is still more widely separated from the common people, and yet the traits of the former are not different in kind from those of the latter. So, too, the difference between liberal and conservative is explained by causes external to the individuals and not by their mental characteristics. No class is more readily distinguished than the clergy, and yet its members are usually drawn from the common people, and have the same inherited traits. Their marked peculiarities are due to their training and education. These distinctions and differences are at best short-lived. Even

an aristocracy breaks down unless its membership is recruited from the classes below it.

A complete classification of society will be possible only when social science nears its completion. In the meantime it is better to study particular societies and make classifications suited to their present conditions. In economics, for example, the division of producers into landlords, capitalists, and labourers was the result of the peculiar condition of English industry during the last century. It has a basis no more enduring than the society from which it was derived. The economic conditions of other nations, however, have so nearly resembled the English that this division has also a value for them. Yet at best it applies only to modern societies, the outcome of ages of past development. The same method will, I believe, prove productive of results in social psychology. The enduring types in the English nation are not primitive. Some of them at least are quite modern, and all of them have antecedents that can be readily traced. The last two hundred years is merely a moment in history, and yet for us it is of vital importance, for its divisions and peculiarities determine our present society and its immediate future.

In most nations, and especially in those of primitive times, the sources of food are limited to particular localities. Immense tracts are either useless or so difficult to subdue that settlements must be made in a few favoured regions. An oasis brings up too clearly the idea of a desert to represent fully such localities, yet the concept is helpful in describing the economic conditions of any partially developed country inhabited by people with limited resources. In such regions the tendency to imitate develops a type of men strongly attached to their birthplace. They hold to what they have, and will not trust themselves to the general economic conditions which would be involved

in a migration. They know little of the outside world, and follow the customs and traditions of their fathers rather than risk a worse fate in the unknown world. These traits are further modified and developed if their country is subject to invasion and conquest by foreign foes. The outside world, being associated with the terrors that fierce enemies excite, seems still more dreary and undesirable. The inclination to accept any conditions that give them immunity from outside disturbance is thus strengthened. They submit to taxation and oppression, become attached to their conquerors, and accept the laws and religion imposed upon them. When conquered nations become a class in a mixed society, they feel helpless in the presence of aggressive foes, and develop a disposition to accept as leaders persons outside of their own class. They admire that decision and aggressiveness which they lack, and look for redress of wrongs to persons above and outside of themselves.

In this way a species of hero-worship is developed. The Cæsars, Napoleons, and Cromwells find their faithful followers among this class, whose great admiration of power shows itself not only in social and political life but also in religion. Their primary instincts make them power worshippers; their gods, like their heroes, must manifest great energy and deliver them from all those evils before which they are helpless.

It is easy to describe this class, but it is hard to find a name that will fitly apply to it. Its members have the same lack of completeness that vines have, which need some sturdy tree to twine about, in order to rise into the sunshine. The name *clingers* therefore may be appropriate, because of the characteristics which make them depend on others for support and leadership.

A peculiarity of this class is the crude way in which they conceive of pleasures. Those whose first thought is to cling to what they have, regardless of consequences,

have little inclination to sum up their pleasures, or to compare their pleasures with their pains. The philosophy of content or of misery is not utilitarian. In either case all outside considerations are excluded. Such persons may at times have a surplus of pain, and at others a surplus of pleasure, but they hold too tenaciously to local conditions to calculate about any new outcome of their lives. Bad economic conditions, or the oppression of rulers, may deprive them of all but a mere tenacity to life. Doubtless, occasional periods of relief, bringing intense satisfaction, create the basis of long periods of hope; yet, as a whole, a disposition to calculate would make their present lot seem undesirable.

When the local conditions improve so that the passions can be gratified, the attention of men is directed towards a few dominant pleasures, and these are indulged in until their utility is completely exhausted. Activities that increase the supply of goods upon which these gratifications depend are encouraged, and thus mental traits are developed that make persons of this class aggressive and independent. They break away from local conditions, because these afford but a partial gratification of their appetites and passions. They become adventurers and warriors, for thus they most easily gratify their intense desires for particular goods and pleasures. It is only in periods of national decay, when wealth and power are already acquired, that individuals indulge indiscriminately in passions and appetites. The typical sensualist develops in restricted local conditions where the opportunities for excess are limited. Indulgence along certain lines is possible only when accompanied by a strict discipline in other matters. Vigour and aggression are thus necessary traits of a sensualist; they must develop and assert themselves in order to create the conditions making continuous gratification possible. These laudable traits create the pro-

gressive movements for which the class is noted, and are lost only when a retrogression sets in.

Sensualists, therefore, show characteristics opposite to those of the clingers. The sensualists break away from local conditions, seek better regions, and become conquerors and rulers. Strong passions drive them from their native locality, where the sources of gratification are few, and can be obtained only by the greatest exertion, or by a fierce struggle. Mountain regions, arid plains or deserts, are the places where such races arise. They move thence to the fertile valleys where the surplus is great, and the means of gratification are many. Here they come in contact with the class of clingers with which these regions abound, and thus create a complex society in which they are the rulers, and the clingers the subjects. As they are not workers but exploiters, they take from the region and from their subjects all the surplus produced, often by their short-sightedness ruining both these sources of revenue. The sensualists are as naturally tribute-takers as the clingers are tribute-givers. The two classes thus supplement each other, and it is not possible for the one class to develop without the other.

In the ancient world we find repeated illustrations of the rise of new nations of sensualists, under restricted conditions where discipline and energy are demanded. When these qualities are acquired, they break over the narrow boundaries of their birthplace, migrate, and conquer the fertile regions and their dependent population. A brief period of civilization follows, in which leisure and culture are obtained through the tribute they exact from their subjects. The final episode is one of decay and degeneration, at the end of which the conquerors are themselves conquered by some new race coming from regions fitted to generate warriors and adventurers. Thus ancient history repeated itself without much net gain.

In modern times, where social conditions are more stable,

the sensualists have not been distinct races, but a class growing larger or smaller as conditions have been favourable or not. They are risk-takers and adventurers. In the struggles incident to the settlement of America, in the opening up of the Eastern trade, and in the conquest of India, a class of adventurers found opportunity to indulge to the utmost their sensual propensities. In all periods of social struggle, or of great economic changes, they become leaders in movements that involve risk. When the great prizes are in the industrial world, they become the organizers of industries, and if successful, great capitalists. In all these spheres they show the tendencies for which their class is noted. They are born adventurers, natural rulers, and tribute-takers. A single motive may suffice to drive them on to success or failure. They have few pleasures, but these they seek to gratify to the utmost. Members of this class do not always seek low forms of gratification. It may be merely a love of power that excites their ambition, or it may be the gratification of some single noble aim. But they are ever ready to risk, to struggle, and to crush; and must, therefore, be put in the same class with persons whose sources of gratification are sensual in the narrower sense.

The two classes I have described are prominent in the early struggles of all nations. A third class appears only in the more advanced nations. These new men were possibly a differentiation from the sensualists, but in modern nations they show such opposing traits that they must be put in a class by themselves. I shall call them *stalwarts* from their love of doctrines, dogmas, and creeds, and from their inclination to subordinate policy to principle. In opposition to the clingers they are utilitarians in the sense that they measure and calculate. They can sum up pleasures and pains as well as the sensualists, and have as keen an appreciation of their import. A sensual-

ist exploits his few pleasures to the utmost : he drains and gorges until no further stimulation is possible. A stalwart draws arbitrary lines beyond which he never goes. He is so afraid of indulgence that he tends to become ascetic. He is constantly proscribing pleasures simply because in some of their forms they may become evils. He is a lover of principles, for by their means he can set exact limitations to his conduct, and mark out lines that he must never cross. He has a group of ideals and utopias that he seeks to realize, and a number of cardinal evils that must be avoided at any cost.

In religion the stalwarts make a fetich of their creeds and dogmas. They follow the letter of the law, interpret the Bible literally, and draw sharp lines between what is orthodox and what is not. Their morals consist of a long list of "Thou shalt nots." In politics they are democratic and utopian. They have vivid ideals of equality and fraternity, which they are apt to push to the disadvantage of practical measures. In industry they are frugalists rather than capitalists. By this I mean that they love frugality for the type of activity or the form of asceticism it permits, rather than for the leisure, comforts, and luxuries that flow from it. A vivid concept of the future makes them value the tools, implements, and lands that augment their permanent welfare ; but their dread of vice and indulgence keeps them from transforming the capital goods that contribute to this end into a capital fund that might support them. The frugal have a keen appreciation of the visible concrete things that increase their industrial efficiency, but they lack that adventurous spirit which converts their more pushing neighbours into capitalists.

Stalwarts are always impressed by ideals that are clear and simple, by principles that are bold and definite, by creeds that are rigid and exact, and by platforms that are plain and unmistakable. They are apt to be carried away

by sounding phrases that seem to embody principles, and are easily induced to enter upon rash schemes which offer to realize some of their ideals. They are missionaries for the cause they believe in, and expect to live up to all their doctrines, beliefs, and ideals. There is, therefore, a natural gulf between them and the other social classes. A stalwart will convert if he can, but if he cannot he is willing to crush. He dislikes people who differ from himself and feels justified in restricting their liberties, or even in driving them out of society. Unlike the clingers, the stalwarts maintain a sturdy independence. They are not lovers of power, and depend for success upon individual or coöperative activities more than upon heroes, forces, or leaders outside of their class. They dislike middlemen of every sort, whether they be in trade, politics, or religion. They hold strictly to the Bible, the constitution of the state, and the moral laws, but interpret these for themselves, and read into them their own principles and ideals.

The first type of stalwarts was found in the early ascetics. But their violent discipline was destructive. A type cannot be enduring unless it promotes activities and habits that continue it. A pure religious stalwartism does not do this, for the tendency to celibacy diminishes numbers. This class appears again when new conditions favour its rise, but die out as readily when the religious enthusiasm abates. An enduring class of stalwarts can grow up only on the basis of frugality. It creates an economic superiority and inculcates a discipline and mode of thought favourable to survival. The Puritans were of this class, although in their case the religious element was too strong for their permanent success. The Presbyterians and the Quakers furnished a more happy combination of frugality and asceticism, and in the following century the Methodists created an even better blending of practical prudence and religious enthusiasm.

In the eighteenth century, stalwartism became a politi-

cal force through the democratic ideals which developed in harmony with frugal ideas. Somewhat later the same class became nationalists, and through the force of these two groups of concepts the aspirations and ideals of the present political world were formed. Thus, in various ways, stalwartism has developed, always keeping in touch with the frugalism from which it springs. The blending of these various elements is not complete, yet it is plain that they are in harmony, and that the stalwarts will endure as long as frugalism is advantageous.

The three types of men thus far described are the result of the moulding influence of the environment. They reveal three modes of survival, made possible by different economic conditions. Men in direct contact with nature have a few leading traits that are easily recognized, and the motor element being dominant, definite motor reactions keep them in touch with the requisites for survival. In advanced societies, where wealth and leisure abound, a fourth type of men arises, in whom the sensory powers are more developed than would be possible in a life in direct contact with nature. In their case ideas coming from the outer world do not start reactions that create adjustment. The possession of leisure and wealth makes an immediate response to the demands of nature less essential. They can, therefore, sift and analyze the ideas they receive, and study their connection and relations. They are inclined to separate objects into their elements, and to emphasize the differences they discover: the world is not looked upon as a group of aggregates, each of which is a requisite for survival, demanding some instinctive action to secure or to avoid it, but as a mass of elements capable of indefinite combinations, each of which may become an increment of welfare.

The ideas of such men are clear and definite. They are acute in perception, vigorous in thought, and strong

in reasoning ; but they are weak in activity, and seldom carry out a policy or plan with the vigour necessary to success. Such men, being of an analytical temperament, give an equal emphasis to all their ideas. It is, therefore, more difficult to determine what ideas will influence them under particular circumstances, or to foretell what line of conduct they will take. I do not mean that the mental machinery of this class runs less regularly than that of the other classes, but that they lack that correspondence between the external movements and the internal ideas which the other classes manifest. Where many ideas have about the same strength, each in turn may become dominant, and thus prevent the steadfast pursuit of single aims. This peculiarity reduces the efficiency of group activity, and makes it impossible to predict what a group of such men will do. They tend to thwart each other, and thus to balk the plans in which they are interested. They are better critics than actors, and exert more influence by modifying the actions of other persons than by their own undertakings.

It is hard to find a name for this class. They are recognized more readily in individual cases, in special epochs of transition, or as iconoclasts, than as an enduring class with given tendencies. I shall call them *mugwumps*, a name they have acquired in American politics because of the differences between them and the dominant elements in the republican party.

This same class has, however, long been a factor in English thought, and was the dominant element in eighteenth-century rationalism. Its members are cosmopolitan in their sympathies ; advocates of compromise and policy in politics ; sceptical in thought ; and agnostic in belief. They dislike ideals, creeds, and utopias, and are ever ready to expose the shams and cant in which other people disguise their sentiments. Naturally recruits to this class come from those whose vocations free them from

that bitter struggle with external conditions to which ordinary men are subject. They come mainly from the salaried class, and from those who have fixed incomes. The conditions of professional life also tend to create an attitude favourable to mugwump concepts. As a body, they exert an influence out of proportion to their numbers, and often paralyze a strong majority by their scathing criticism and ruthless dissection of popular idols.

It will thus be seen that there are four enduring types of men, each of which has certain traits by which it can be easily recognized. In their evolution the members of each class pass through certain stages with sufficient regularity to enable observers to recognize not only the type, but also the stage of development of the individual or class. These variations are most easily seen in nations that suddenly change their environment and burst forth into a new civilization. In the ancient world there are numerous examples of the rise, progress, and fall of nations, in each of which the same succession of stages repeated itself. From them the cycle, or curve, of the sensualists can be easily obtained. The stalwarts are a modern type, and their curve is most clearly seen in English and in American life. The curve of the clingers is less apparent because in modern nations they are a static type, who survive through inherited imitations. To study their origin and development demands investigation into types of civilizations too early to be of much present importance. Their characteristics are plain but unchanging, and hence capable of description, but not of orderly arrangement. The mugwumps have no class curve. Their peculiarities are too individual to make the curve of any number identical. If the class should grow in size and come more fully under the influence of environmental causes, it would doubtless become more compact, and its curve of progress would be more discernible.

I shall, therefore, take my illustrations of class curves from those formed among the sensualists and stalwarts. Here the data are so abundant that a number of distinct curves can be constructed. They follow the same general plan, but are modified by the economic conditions under which the class develops. These conditions create a rigid discipline, by the aid of which definite motor reactions are acquired. From this starting-point the curve of the class begins, and its direction depends upon the peculiarities of the motor reactions, and the length of time that the class continues in the new environment. When the motor reactions are lost, a period of degeneration sets in, and the class is absorbed in the mass of characterless individuals of which mixed societies are composed. The modern types are more persistent, because nations are now more enduring. Instead of whole nations rising together and going through a common curve in unison, each class continues by receiving a series of individual recruits. I shall express these curves in words, and shall then try to explain the meaning of each one in any case of doubt.

## SENSUALISTS

1	2	3
Warrior	Ritualist	Workman
Adventurer	Ascetic	Exploiter
Knight	Dogmatist	Capitalist
Golden-age Moralist	Zealot	Gentleman
Aristocrat	Reactionnaire	Conservative

## STALWARTS

4	5	6
Workman	Workman	Artist
Abstainer	Frugalist	Constrainer
Frugalist	Democrat	Co-worker
Calvinist	Humanitarian	Methodist
Liberal	Utopian Moralist	Nationalist

Of the sensualists there are three classes, — the warrior, the priest, and the capitalist. The subsequent stages develop by experience and discipline. The warrior breaks over local barriers, seeks new regions, and there develops an aristocracy. His bearing is chivalrous or knightly, generosity and good will marking all his social relations. When the period of decay sets in, he seeks to resist it by a revival of old usages. I call him, then, a golden-age moralist because he idealizes the distant past, when his type was in its full vigour. This type of morality forms a marked contrast with the utopian morality of the democratic stalwart (5). The latter would destroy the old, and seeks to construct a new morality out of the abstract elements which his ideals furnish. He looks to the future for the realization of his dreams as confidently and as eagerly as the golden-age moralist looks to the past. Neither of them is likely to rise above this state to a truly religious attitude. The rapidity of decay, when it once sets in, prevents further progress.

The companion of the warrior is the priest. His discipline is due to isolation. He is early taught the ritual of his religion, the necessity of a strict obedience to authority, and the formal observance of all rites and traditions. This discipline is aided by ascetic tendencies, which hold in restraint his natural proclivities to sensual indulgence. In matters of creed he becomes a dogmatist; in those of public policy a reactionnaire. His eager desire to force his belief on others makes him a zealot, and from this state he is easily transformed into a fanatic and a persecutor. The priest who is here described must not be confused with the missionary. A priest has some interest to defend or some change to prevent. He is a persistent tribute-taker, and is as much interested in his tithes as the warrior is in rents and taxation. The missionary, on the contrary, has some change to bring in. Being a prophet and reformer, he wishes to lead the people away from custom and tradition,

to higher ideals. Such men are stalwarts, they depend for their success upon their own exertions, and are out of sympathy with the tribute-taking propensities of the priests.

In modern times these classes (1 and 2) are largely displaced by the capitalists (3), who show the same propensities, but in a more refined form. The typical capitalists are lovers of power rather than of sensual indulgence, but they have the same tendency to crush and to take tribute that the cruder types of sensualism possess. The discipline of the capitalist is the same as that of the frugalist. He differs from the latter in that he has no regard for the objects through which his productive power is acquired. He does not hesitate to exploit natural resources, lands, dumb animals, and even his fellow-men. Capital to such a man is an abstract fund, made up of perishable elements which are constantly replaced. These elements have no interest for him except as sources of income. They make no more impression upon him than do the drops of water in a waterfall. The capitalist is refined, not by his work, nor by the concrete goods that pass through his hands and make up his wealth, but through the use he makes of his income, and the associations it permits. He becomes a gentleman in that meaning of the word which makes it a class distinction. Susceptibility to the æsthetic comes too late to have a formative influence upon his character. As his circle of interest narrows, he becomes a conservative, and often a tory.

The frugalism of the stalwart types stands in marked contrast to the attitude of the capitalist. The frugalist takes a vital interest in his tools, in his land, and in the goods he produces. He has a definite attachment to each of these. He dislikes to see an old coat wear out, an old wagon break down, or an old horse go lame. He always thinks of concrete things, wants them and nothing else. He desires not lands, but a given farm ; not horses, cattle,

and machines, but particular breeds and implements ; not shelter, but a home ; not food, but bread, meat, or some other definite article of diet. He rejects as unworthy what is below this standard, and despises as luxurious what is above or outside of it. He visualizes the future in present forms ; his angels must have wings of a given shape ; his heaven must be paved with a particular kind of stones, and be laid out with the regularity of his farm. Dominated by his activities, he thinks of his capital goods as means to particular ends. Income is secondary to efficiency.

The discipline of the stalwarts is in their work. The curve of each type gets its initial direction from its peculiar industrial vocation. The earlier type (4) increased their discipline by becoming abstainers. They limited their activity and pleasure by many arbitrary lines drawn with the idea of suppressing sensualism. After becoming frugalists, they develop into liberals. This term I use in the ordinary political sense to represent the attitude of the great middle class who are eager to reduce the higher classes to their level, but are not so willing to share their privileges with the classes below them. They want to be guardians of the poor, rather than their equals. A liberal is not willing to fraternize with those who have not acquired his qualities. To him economy is the only gateway to political rights and freedom. I have used the term "Calvinist" to describe the religious feelings of this (the fourth) class, and the term "Methodist" for those of the sixth type. The one class might be said to conceive of themselves as the sons of God, and the other as brothers in Christ. By this I mean that the first regard themselves as favourites, having an inherited position and rights such as sons have. They are the "elect," and contrast themselves sharply with the unregenerate who lack their privileges. God's treatment of the Jews favours such concepts, and the religion of the old liberal was derived more

largely from the Old Testament than from the New. In the concept of brothers in Christ the bond between men is conceived to be not one of blood but of grace. Such a bond is more democratic than that of Calvinism, and holds together men of a widely different character. The fifth type represents the utopian democrat so common in the eighteenth century. Such a man has the concepts and ideals of the frugalist; he is a democrat only because he is blind to the differences between himself and others. The true cosmopolitan is the mugwump who does in Rome what the Romans do. The pronounced democrat wants the Romans to do as he does, and attributes their not doing so to the tyranny and oppression of rulers. He is willing to sweep these obstacles away, but expects in return a universal conformity to his ideals and creed. Such a man is naturally humanitarian in his sympathies, but does not readily become religious, because he seeks to realize his ideals in human societies and through the natural impulses of men. The eighteenth-century enthusiast expected not merely the perfection of man on earth, but also his immortality. There is no need of religion where utopian schemes seem so easy to realize.

The stalwarts of to-day tend towards the sixth type. These are artists as well as workers, for they get pleasure from their work. Their æsthetic feelings, however, manifest themselves in what common people call nice rather than in what professional artists call beautiful. The farmer who is irritated at the sight of waste land and stony fields, and who judges of his neighbour's character by the neatness of his fences and the straightness of his rows of corn, has an æsthetic element in his nature. So has the engineer who loves his locomotive, or the sailor who loves his ship. This class also get satisfaction from the quality of implements, animals, and products. Their frugalism takes the form of house-building, of home decorations, or of insurance. In public life they are nationalists, taking

pleasure in every manifestation of national power and greatness. They do not perceive so much the utility of these objects as their inherent excellence. To them a war-ship is not a thing of use, but of beauty. They take more satisfaction in the ships that carry the flag around the world, than in art galleries, and would tax themselves more willingly for the former than for the latter. This may be a low form of art, but it is widespread, and because of it the political feelings of to-day centre in different objects from those of a century ago. Nationalism is more concrete than the old type of democracy, but it affords more intense objects of gratification and creates a stronger bond of union.

I use the term "co-worker" to indicate their social longings. They do not like to act by themselves, but always in concert with others. They form all kinds of societies to assist each other, and to stimulate mutual endeavour. They join unions when they work, prefer prayer and class meetings to individual worship, and when they save they do it in clubs with weekly dues, instead of buying stocks or bonds as capitalists would do. The older type were abstainers, and punished offenders by excommunication, exclusion from the "elect" being the greatest of punishments. The new type do not hesitate to constrain those that differ from them or fall below their standards. No one outside of their societies is safe from interference, even in his most private affairs. All these peculiarities are due to the growth of social feelings, by which the new stalwarts are to be distinguished from their prototypes in preceding centuries.

In primitive times the stock of national ideas was blended into one group. The requisites for survival were few in number, and not so sharply set off from one another as to allow each of them to have a definite influence on the national character. Some one aggregate exerted so

dominant an influence that all the activities were stimulated by it, and thus forced to run in a channel too narrow to admit of a separation of the exciting motives into groups. In time, however, the number of limiting aggregates increased, and the importance of each of them diminished. They now exert their influence in succession, and thus a regular order of progress is acquired. A conscious calculation of utilities is the distinctive mark of this stage. The aggregates, or goods as they are technically called, are numerous, and in many ways interchangeable. As many different kinds of goods supply the same want, substitutions are so frequent as to be the rule. It becomes possible, therefore, to think of goods as made up of increments, each of which gives the same amount of pleasure. In a strictly economic world there are no aggregates of so much importance that they cannot be valued by the utility of their increments. The acquisition of a mass of new goods capable of being substituted for goods hitherto indispensable, destroys the absolute utility of the older goods, and takes from them the special motives that led to their acquisition. They are now thought of as isolated increments, each of which has the same influence in the summing of utilities. Economic doctrines relate to objects viewed as increments capable of substitution, and they must change with the increase or decrease of those objects which can, without loss, be split up into parts and substituted for one another.

It is, however, soon found that some groupings of goods create more pleasure than others. Some articles have a greater utility when consumed together than if consumed separately, while the joint consumption of other articles decreases the sum of pleasure they are capable of creating. The harmony of consumption thus becomes an important consideration, and to it is due the growth of those æsthetic feelings that give a special value to particular combinations of goods. These æsthetic groups of goods are

formed in food products, in clothing, in home furnishing, and in every other way in which goods are consumed. The power of substitution is thus curtailed; large aggregates, once more becoming important, are valued as wholes, and have special motor reactions excited by their appearance. A new use is found for those special motor mechanisms formed by the dominant aggregates of the old environment, and thus the growth of concepts and ideals is favoured, through which alone an adjustment to large aggregates is possible. An economic attitude dissolves aggregates into their parts; an æsthetic attitude merges them again into larger wholes. The one promotes conscious calculation and a summing of utilities; the other emphasizes particular groups of goods, and creates special motives for their acquisition.

The æsthetic aggregates are large, but they are not absolute nor indispensable. Like the economic aggregates, they are goods or groups of goods. In both fields the thought is centred on the particulars of the environment, and not on its general and essential features. In morals and religion, however, the necessary relations between beings in an environment are emphasized. They deal, in short, with environed beings. Time relations, space relations, and permanent advantages are fully utilized only when clear concepts of environment are created, in which each being stands in definite relations to every other being. Without such place concepts, religion and morals would be absent, or at least too vague to create epochs in history.

Thus economics and æsthetics treat of goods, while morals and religion treat of places or environments. Yet from another standpoint, morals should be classed with economics, and religion with æsthetics. Morals and economics deal with equal increments. There would be no economic science if goods could not replace each other, and be valued by some common standard. There could

be no morals if beings were not in one environment, and so nearly alike that they could exchange places. Every moral rule depends on reciprocal relations. It demands that the actor should put himself in his neighbour's place and thus feel the effects of his own acts. No one can appreciate the Golden Rule unless he thinks of others as being like himself. The thought of equality and the possibility of substitution runs through all things moral, just as the equality and the substitution of goods are essential ideas to economics. They both have convertible units, but of different kinds.

The æsthetic and the religious units are aggregates so dissimilar that substitution is impossible. They cannot be dissolved into increments without losing their character. Æsthetics would disappear if all goods were increments capable of complete substitution. We should lose religion if all beings were identical and placed in one environment. If, as Bentham claimed, push-pin were as good as poetry, there would be no æsthetic feelings. So, also, there would be no room for religion if the growth of scientific knowledge should destroy all hope of another world, or of any relations between our planet and other parts of the universe; men without such hope gravitate naturally towards a moral standpoint, just as men like Bentham become economists. A single environment can develop but one type of men, and the longer it endures the more crushing will be the forces that make men alike, with duties and pleasures capable of complete substitution. In religion there is a comparison of environments with beings having unequal powers and different pleasures and duties. Gods are by nature different from men, and the position and duties of the two classes are not interchangeable. Religious goods are never paid for in kind. We do for beings with other natures what we do not expect them to do for us, and we expect of them what we could not do ourselves. In morals there is no heaven or hell.

Moral relations pertain to men in one environment. Men acquire religious motives and ideals only after they have learned to picture other environments than that in which they live.


Religion and morals are thus in their nature distinct, although at present the two seem to be blended into one group. This blending is the result of the enlarging of the moral environment until it includes the whole world. In earlier times moral relations were local, or at best national. Race isolation and antagonism were so great that the people of one nation did not recognize those of other nations as equals and brothers. They had no feeling of identity, no consciousness of kind. Such dissimilar units can be brought into harmony only through religion, for by it alone are beings with different natures made to feel their dependence on one another. At the present time, however, the unity of the human race is so manifest that it has become a race ideal. As unifying tendencies become more powerful and weld the race into one dominant type, the relations between men come more fully within the field of morals; heaven and hell are no longer thought of as local environments to be found somewhere on earth, and God is no longer the ruler of a nation or of the earth, but of the universe. The units of the religious world, no longer localities or nations, become planets and solar systems. Morality thus tends to supplant religion in human relations, while a larger field with more profound differences is created for religion. By these changes, however, neither morality nor religion is altered. They are confused with each other in the popular thought, because the field of morality is now co-extensive with the former field of religion. But such a confusion can be only temporary, and will be followed by a clearer separation of the two than has ever before been possible.

It will thus be seen that the history of thought has

four stages, each of which has peculiarities of its own, and must be studied by itself. The economic stage comes first, because its aggregates are the smallest and most capable of substitution. The æsthetic stage follows, in which the increments of economic welfare are united into harmonious groups. Later, the environment is conceived of as a unit, and its relations, when perceived, become moral rules. And finally other environments peopled with dissimilar beings are recognized, and upon this basis religion grows up. When a new environment is entered, this series of changes repeats itself. They cannot, however, appear in so simple a form as at first, because the concepts and ideals of the preceding epoch remain, and are displaced or modified only with great difficulty. The economic stage now becomes doubly important. New economic goods which extend the opportunities for substitution make it possible to group them in other ways. The larger aggregates of the æsthetic, moral, and religious worlds must be dissolved into their increments, or at least have their power of cohesion thoroughly tested. An economic attitude is primarily opposed to other attitudes because it tends to reduce all objects to infinitesimal increments of equal importance. A new economic epoch at first narrows the scope of the higher forms of thought, and may seem to exterminate them. But new aggregates are formed as readily on the new basis as on the old one. In time the dissolving tendencies of the economic stage are checked, and the new aggregates displace or blend with those of the earlier epoch. The victory of economic thought is thus but temporary. It is followed by a reaction which may give to the higher forms of thought an even greater place than they had before the transition to the new environment. I shall attempt to illustrate these facts by a diagram.

Let A, B, C, and D represent the succeeding economic environments through which a nation passes. In the

epoch created by the environment A a body of economic doctrines and ideas will be formed, which we will call  $a^1$ . Subsequently a body of æsthetic ideas will develop which can be designated by  $b^1$ ; then will grow up a body of moral doctrines represented by  $c^1$ , and finally the religious ideas of the epoch will appear in  $d^1$ . The epoch will thus create a body of doctrines in each of the four fields, and the order of progress will be represented by the line from A to  $d^1$ . These ideas will remain until the new environment is entered at B. A new development will now take place in the same order as before, creating doctrines and ideas represented by  $a^2$ ,  $b^2$ ,  $c^2$ , and  $d^2$ . The third environ-



ment C will in a like manner create  $a^3$ ,  $b^3$ ,  $c^3$ , and  $d^3$ . Each succeeding environment will in the same way create a new series of economic, æsthetic, moral, and religious ideas which will have their basis in the economic conditions of the epoch. The history of each epoch is thus practically independent, starting from its own conditions and developing in its own way. In studying an epoch, the economic conditions must be studied first, then the economic doctrines that flow from them, and last the æsthetic, moral, and religious ideas which the epoch produces.

The different groups of ideas cannot be traced independently, because the ideas of each epoch do not grow out of the similar ideas of the preceding epoch, but are formed anew from the new conditions. The economic group  $a^2$  does not develop out of  $a^1$ , but out of the condi-

tions of environment B. Only after group  $a^2$  has been formed is it possible to blend it with group  $a^1$ , or with that part of  $a^1$  which, being in harmony with the new conditions, endures in the second period. So also  $b^2$  springs from  $a^2$  and not from  $b^1$ , while  $c^2$  springs from  $b^2$  and not from  $c^1$ . New ideas in any group seem at first to be opposed to the old group of ideas, because they spring from other conditions. None of the ideas of the old group can become a part of the new group unless they harmonize with the new conditions and would have naturally grown out of them. If ideas in harmony with the new conditions have been worked out in earlier epochs, they merely hasten the development of the new epoch, but do not change its ultimate form or character.

A history of æsthetic, moral, or religious thought, each taken independently, is impossible, because the later epochs do not grow out of the older epochs, but out of new material. In passing, for example, from  $c^1$  to  $c^2$  and  $c^4$  breaks would be encountered that would render it impossible to trace a logical order of development. Such a history would be merely an aggregation of isolated facts. History, to be valuable, must be studied in epochs, and each group of ideas be connected with its roots in the underlying conditions, and not with its antecedents in the same group. The blending of the old and the new groups of ideas happens after the new conditions have exerted their force, or at least have brought out what is most peculiar to them. This blending should, therefore, be studied after it is known what old ideas harmonize with the new conditions.

The theory illustrated by this diagram will be more readily recognized if it is made to represent the development of a series of nations, instead of epochs in the progress of a single nation. Let, for example,  $a^1-d^1$  represent the development of Greece,  $a^2-d^2$  that of Rome,  $a^3-d^3$  that of the German race, and  $a^4-d^4$  that of Eng-

land. Then it will be seen that Greek ideas grew out of their own economic conditions, or those of preceding races. Rome developed from its own basis groups of ideas in each of the four stages, and these were later blended with those coming from the Greek civilization. The early Germans passed through the four stages independently, and at a later period their ideas were modified by those coming from Rome. In the same way England had its peculiar development, and the ideas thus acquired in isolation were afterward blended with those of the German race.

Before the rise of modern nations progress took this form. Each nation rose out of the peculiar conditions of its environment, developed groups of ideas in each of the four fields, and then through contact with other civilizations received ideas from them which were blended with those acquired in its own history. Each nation, after thus passing through one epoch, lost its vitality by decay. A new nation, following it in another environment, received from its predecessor a civilization which it made its own by blending the older groups of ideas with those peculiar to its own conditions. In modern times, however, nations are more stable and enduring. They survive through several epochs as distinct as were the national civilizations in earlier times. New conditions give to them in each epoch the same impetus to progress that in former times they gave to new nations.

The stages of progress are repeated in the same order, and in the end the same tendencies to decay appear. This degeneration, however, does not, as in earlier times, destroy the nation, but ends in a reversion to a more primitive type of men, more capable of an adjustment to the new conditions. Then the nation is ready for a new epoch of progress. In each new environment a new nation grows up almost as distinct from its predecessors as were the new nations of ancient times from the nations

that preceded them. Changes that do not destroy the traditions and continuity of a race are less striking than those produced by a revolution or a conquest, but they are no less radical. The transition from environment to environment is now more costly and destructive than before, but its effects are diffused throughout the nation without jar or eruption; less blood is spilled, and fewer people are expelled from national boundaries, but more graves are filled and more people turned out of doors. Short migrations may be as significant, and produce as powerful effects as those taking people over continents or seas. Therefore, if attention is given to the right phenomena, no more difficulty is experienced in tracing the epochs in the progress of a single modern nation than in tracing those epochs of ancient civilization which were created by the rise and fall of nations. The England of to-day differs nearly as much from the England of the last century as Rome differed from Greece, or Egypt from Assyria.

If a nation were so completely unified as to have but one type of citizen, the changes in economic conditions would affect every one alike, and be apparent to all. In a nation with classes the changes affect the different classes unequally, and at different times. Some classes decay, while others gain in strength and assume a more prominent place. The nation as a whole may have changed but little in its general position or characteristics, and yet the history of some one class may show all the stages of progress that new economic conditions can bring about. The nation as a whole may be influenced by the new ideas only after this class progress is practically complete. Then takes place that blending of the new and the old ideas which represents the final stages of an epoch of progress. Thus, the changes that brought Methodism into prominence affected at first only a particular class, which for some time developed along its own

lines quite independent of the tendencies prominent in the national thought. It was only at a later time that these ideas permeated the whole society and became a part of the national thought. The Puritan reformation had a similar history, and its ideas modified national thought only with the greatest difficulty.

Sectional differences in a nation have the same effect as class differences in obscuring the changes due to a period of transition. In every large nation these differences are quite marked, especially where they indicate intensity in the economic life of each section. Many country places are little affected by modern development, and even in the cities certain classes live and act as did their ancestors of many ages ago. Again, these obscure parts of the nation are often the places where the new conditions create the greatest changes. In them new ideas take root, have a rapid development, and may reach their ultimate goal before the more advanced and conservative parts of the nation are aware either of the changes, or of their effects.

The eagerness with which new ideas are seized by certain classes, and the intensity of their effects in certain localities, make the phenomena of a new period resemble those that accompany sudden changes in atmospheric conditions. There are storm centres of thought as well as of rain. Every new group of ideas finds some class to which they are especially attractive, and some place where they are particularly congenial. Here they develop often in grotesque forms, yet with the new truth sharply accentuated. From this centre they spread to other regions or to other classes, where the same causes are at work, but in a less pronounced form. The storm finally loses itself in distant regions where other conditions are dominant, or among other classes whose interests and feelings are centred on other problems. Few, if any, ideas are universal. They have a broader or narrower range of influ-

ence according to the extent of the region in which the conditions exist that produce them. Religious, political, or social ideas of any sort meet insuperable barriers as soon as they reach the limits of the environment in which they were produced ; and long before this limit is reached they are usually so weakened and diluted with foreign matter as to lose most of their force.

The writers who exert the greatest influence in spreading ideas usually represent not the constructive epochs in national thought, but only the period when the ideas of the new epoch are blended with those of the older epoch. The really constructive books are often the unsuccessful efforts of earlier writers who have failed, not because their ideas were unsound, but because their attention was too much concentrated on the new conditions to value properly the enduring elements of past civilizations. These primitive leaders blend together certain ideas fitted for the new conditions with certain old forms of thought, the survivals of earlier times. Even the new ideas are looked upon as revivals ; hence the emphasis is placed upon a return to the old rather than upon an advance to the new.

Periods of transition thus tend to revive a host of discarded ideas, which are so blended with really new ideas that they seem to have one origin. All sorts of crazes and "isms" appear and obscure the real issues. Conservative men reject the new ideas and despise the new leaders, because the revivals of the old cannot be distinguished from the beginnings of the new. It takes time and the efforts of really great men to disentangle the two elements, and thus to allow the new to be merged in the stock of ideas. These great men deserve all the praise they get, yet it must not be forgotten that their work does not make a complete history of thought. A valuable part of this history lies in the work of obscure writers whom society too often has good reason to dislike. They may have been short-sighted, blunt, and outspoken, but

they gave to the new conditions an emphasis that started new trains of thought, and brought new ideas to the front. They make, therefore, the starting-point of each epoch, and their writings must be studied to find the sources from which the later writers derived their inspiration.

I have tried to show that the environment influencing and controlling the actions of men is not the sum of those enduring external agencies which we call physical laws or matter in general. This environment rather consists of certain definite objects and forces in a concrete form, which at a given time are the requisites for survival. An economic epoch lasts as long as a given group of these requisites continues, and when this group is succeeded partly or wholly by another an economic pressure begins, which promotes the growth of new motor reactions suited to the new conditions. Thus there exists not one perpetual environment, but a series of temporary environments, each of which has given to the race certain characteristics that become a part of the national character. And thus character is the one enduring growing element in a civilization; all else when compared with it is temporary and fleeting.

Although the economic conditions are the primary source from which all elements in the national character arise, it would be a mistake to think that the national character is nothing more than the ruling motives of the economic world. Economic conditions create the primary motor reactions, but subsequent transformations put them to new uses and give them a form quite different from that they have at the outset. So long as certain conditions remain requisites for survival, the motor reactions of a given environment must respond to these conditions. But when new conditions become requisites for survival, there is no longer the same need of definite responses to the stimuli of earlier requisites. Since the motor reaction is now excited

not merely by these stimuli but by others of a similar nature, in time a group of ideas gradually becoming more abstract and clear is substituted for a definite and objective condition. A well-formed motor reaction may be thought of as a store of energy, ready for discharge ; if the stimuli causing the reaction are not applied, the strain is relieved through a discharge which takes place as a result of contact with other similar objects. Even the thought of an object or of associated objects may produce this effect if the strain is increased by a long delay. The consequence is that a motor reaction, after losing its primal economic importance, responds to abstract instead of concrete phenomena. The conditions arousing it are idealized and modified so as to harmonize with the requisites of survival of the new epoch.

Reversions always take place in periods of transition. If the concepts created by motor reactions do not harmonize with the new conditions, the type disappears as do other temporary aberrations ; but if they do harmonize, then these modified concepts become ideals, making the reactions of the new epoch different and more effective than they otherwise would be.

A conversion is a further step in this change. When a motor reaction is so far removed from its specific stimulus that it is aroused only by an association of ideas, this group of ideas may be displaced by another group, and the motor reaction be aroused by an entirely new set of conditions. The concrete conditions stimulating a given motor reaction may disappear ; old associations of ideas may die out, but the motor reaction itself remains as an enduring part of the mental mechanism, after the exciting causes are gone. When new conditions arise, this unused mechanism is readily appropriated for the expression of new ideas. Though hard to create, motor reactions once formed do not fall permanently into disuse. When the old conditions fail to excite the reactions, ideals steal in, as

it were, and appropriate the nest others have built. With no power in themselves to create motor reactions in this way, they obtain motor reactions through which to express themselves.

This fact makes the development of thought in each epoch different from what it would otherwise be. The new conditions give an advantage to a new type of men, who begin a natural development from the concrete and present to the abstract and distant. But the older type of men, put at a disadvantage by the new conditions of survival, do not give up the contest without a struggle. They are the class whose characters are most developed, and whose motor reactions are most in harmony with the past conditions that created the national character. Feeling, therefore, the absence of the old stimuli that aroused their motor reactions, they are forced to find new stimuli, if they would profit by the advantage that their superior characters give. If they are successful in finding new means of arousing all the motor reactions of which they are capable, the superiority of the new type of men is transitory. When they are enabled thus to survive, men of the earlier type often become a dominant element in the new society.

Men who are capable of advancing thought belong to one of two classes. The class in whom race instincts and ideals are strongly developed become, according as the special conditions of their period determine, philosophers, moralists, or prophets. I shall call them the philosophers because this class of thinkers has had the greatest influence in England. ( The other class is the economists, whose first interest is in the concrete conditions by which they are surrounded, and who therefore seek to understand national and social affairs through a detailed observation of particular events. These men have keener powers of observation than the first class, but in them the race instincts and ideals are less firmly implanted.

After a radical change of environment the economist has an abundance of new material. He piles up immense stores of facts which will be of little use if he be a mere observer. But as old generalizations now become defective, it will be easy to make new ones of much greater value. He will, therefore, be induced by the richness and abundance of his material to leave the field to which he has formerly devoted himself and become a thinker, and in the end a philosopher. A man of this kind moves on an upward curve in spite of himself. He does not start with a problem and a method, but these are forced upon him by his own progress into an unexplored field. He startles the world some day by showing that he is a thinker, and comes to be regarded as a philosopher, although he is in reality an economist gone astray. Travelling on curves turns people around without their suspecting it.

The true philosopher under these conditions has an opposite development. He will also move on a curve that takes him out of familiar regions. When a man with strong race instincts finds himself in a new environment, he misses the concrete stimuli that aroused his more vigorous motor reactions. Only a part of himself is called into activity by the new conditions. He seeks, therefore, to find other concrete stimuli to arouse the disused motor reactions, and thus to regain that completer self he had before. A man to be a complete person must exist in a situation that arouses all his potential energies, and if he finds himself in a situation where but part of them are active, he seeks for new stimuli capable of arousing the inherited motor reactions. Old implanted instincts respond to new stimuli, and old ideals get a new content.

In the seventeenth century, for example, the thought of God was aroused by the serious calamities then prevalent. Men saw God in the plague, the famines, the earthquake, the wars, and other evils. They always trembled at the

thought of Him, and saw Him only as a God of wrath. In the next century, however, these evils, at least in their worst forms, had passed away. Men had a motor reaction that could be excited by the thought of God, but they had no concrete phenomena of the old kind to make it active. The economist under these conditions talks much of happiness and gives statistics about prosperity; but the philosopher misses the old stimuli and seeks for new means of arousing the old motor reactions. To do this he must find a new way to the thought of God out of the material now on hand. The new stimulus is found in one of the most common events of the new industrial world. The artisan is continually producing objects from the material he possesses. These objects, wherever they go, reveal the existence and skill of the artisan who made them. The philosopher who recognizes these facts now sees in God an artisan on a large scale, whose handiwork is everywhere revealed in nature. He no longer needs earthquakes and famines to bring up the thought of God and start his motor powers into activity. He finds the concrete stimuli in human and material mechanisms, in all objects where an exact adjustment of parts is demanded. Internally this eighteenth-century man is just like his predecessor of the preceding century. The difference lies in the concrete stimuli that arouse his instinctive feelings and longings. The philosopher, therefore, when he faces such radical changes as those of the eighteenth century, becomes concrete in spite of himself. He starts on a curve that leads him to the world of facts, and having discovered their importance he becomes an economist, poses before the world as a man of fact, and gets the credit of being a great observer.

It is this conjunction of circumstances that makes a forward movement in thought. Philosophers are compelled to become observers, in order to get the facts they need, and the observers are forced to become philosophers

in order to form generalizations in harmony with the new facts. Philosophers might wait for ages for observers to note the particular facts they need, and observers would wait equally long if they waited for thinkers to generalize on the new facts the observers had collected. Both classes are therefore compelled to change their occupation, and through the influence of thinkers on observers, and observers on thinkers, all have their methods, ideas, and modes of thought modified. Progressive thought always moves on these curves, and when they cross each other an epoch in national thought is ended. There are still details to be worked out, and the relation of the new thought to the old must be determined, but as a whole, national thought will be stationary until a new economic environment forces men to repeat the process.

If we view English thought from this standpoint, there are three clearly defined epochs. In the first, Hobbes states the problem of the age without solving it; Locke is the economist on the upward curve; Newton is the thinker on the downward curve. In the second, Mandeville states the problem; Hume is changed from an economist into a philosopher; and Adam Smith from a philosopher into an economist. The third epoch, beginning with Malthus, ends when Mill is transformed into a philosopher, and Darwin into a biologist.

If we compare the work of the three thinkers on the downward curve with that of the three economists on the upward curve, a peculiarity of English thought is revealed. The thinkers on the downward curve do their work much more thoroughly than the economists on the upward curve. Newton, Smith, and Darwin complete their tasks, leaving nothing but details for their successors. Locke, Hume, and Mill are not so successful, and in each case there has ensued a movement in continental thought to complete what they failed to finish. Locke sets problems for Leibnitz and Rousseau; Hume awakens Kant; and Mill has

stimulated a host of continental writers both in logic and socialism. It does not lie in my plan to discuss this foreign movement in thought created by the shortcomings of English thinkers. It is, however, necessary to call attention to it for the explanation it offers of the curves of thought, and the reason why continental writers see English thinkers only as the initiators of their own thought. Kant is not the only German that Englishmen have aroused from "dogmatic slumbers." This is the peculiar province of Englishmen, and it will continue to be such as long as English economic conditions are so far in advance of those of other nations that new facts force themselves upon the attention of men in England sooner than elsewhere. Perhaps in time Englishmen may be able to complete their own upward curves, but until then the same relations between English and continental thought will exist.

There is another peculiarity of these upward curves that is worthy of attention. They do not continue upward to the end, but after a certain rise curve back again toward the economic level. Locke turns back to write on money; Hume, on social topics; and Mill returns from logic and political economy to write on socialism and politics. An economist's interest in philosophy is not a general, abiding interest due to a love of its subject-matter. It is an interest in some particular problem which has had its birth in his own province. When this problem is solved to his satisfaction, he returns to more congenial fields. This fact adds to the difficulty of correctly interpreting the work of these writers. They should not be judged by their whole career, but only by that part of it which is represented by the upward curve.

## CHAPTER II

### THE ANTECEDENTS OF ENGLISH THOUGHT

To discover the primal economic conditions which called into being the elementary race instincts, we must seek those simple enduring relations which have the vital importance needed to arouse reactions. Some of these relations, found in all primitive races, are so well known that they scarcely need mention, yet as their effects on English thought and character are not obvious, it is necessary to take them up somewhat in detail.

One type of civilization develops where land is plenty and water scarce; another where water is plenty and land scarce. Water in the one case, land in the other, is the limited requisite and determines the character and direction of social progress. This difference of condition is made apparent by contrasting southwestern Asia with northwestern Europe. The latter is a region of almost perpetual rain. Water is usually a superfluous article — a disutility. Much of the best land is rendered useless because of its abundance; crops are often damaged by it, but seldom by drought. A growing civilization finds its limit in the lack of available land. The great economic problem is to improve the land by freeing it of trees, swamps, and other results of copious moisture. Where the drainage is well regulated, vegetation is almost spontaneous. In southwestern Asia, on the other hand, where water is the limiting requisite, most of the land is a dreary waste, a desert dotted by a few oases. The thought of men, therefore, must be centred on securing water. Without it crops are uncertain and perhaps impossible. Long

periods of drought result from deficiencies in the rainfall, and periods of plenty and of starvation alternate with considerable regularity. The rainfall is so uncertain that men can do little to relieve their situation. ¶ Such an environment develops hope, patience, and humility. The littleness of man is constantly contrasted with the greatness of the dispensing powers above him. ¶

In a more favoured agricultural region, however, nature dispenses heat and rain with such regularity that man's attention may be directed to other matters than the rainfall, particularly to such obstacles as can be overcome. Where the limitations to progress, and especially the sources of pain, are not the dominant aspects of nature, but are a combination of smaller forces and obstacles, these can be attacked in detail and removed or modified. ¶ Contact with the great forces of nature over which man has no control develops a feeling of helplessness and humility; contact with smaller difficulties creates a temper of opposition. ¶ Wrath, anger, a stubborn resistance to aggression, and a vigorous reaction against any source of restraint or pain, thus become essential instincts. The northern man conquers nature, while the southern man yields to it.

This difference is accentuated by another closely related circumstance. The source of the food supply in wet, wooded regions is mainly large game, so vigorous and often so fierce that a single man cannot hunt it successfully. Where men must act together, they become more social in their inclinations. Animals that hunt large game, like the dog, develop social instincts, which those that hunt small game, like the cat, never display. If this be the case even among the lower animals, we may expect a race of human hunters also to be social and coöperative. If they are rovers as well as hunters, they find still more advantage in coöperation, and develop an even greater harmony of interests. Where success depends on mutual help, there grows up also a feeling of the solidarity of

responsibility which is the basis of morality. The causes of failure and success lie within the group; the wrath and enmity of the group are directed against those who cause failure, and its approval is given to those who bring success. Certain standards are acquired obligatory on all, which are enforced by instinctive feelings common to all. The feeling of the solidarity of responsibility thus harmonizes with the tendency to react strongly and effectively against the sources of pain. The combined development of the whole group is the characteristic of the civilization of cold, wet countries, where nature acts with such regularity that the attention of men can be directed to secondary obstacles.

In the cultivation of the cereals and of root crops we find another primal distinction closely allied to those already indicated. The cereals grow where it is damp and wet, and most of them in a cold climate as well, for their roots, being short, require a frequent rainfall. As they suffer severely in periods of drought, they are not good crops for dry regions. Root crops, on the contrary, penetrate deeply into the earth, and can therefore endure a drought. They grow best in clear hot weather, and will not mature properly where it is rainy or cloudy. Moreover, the cereals are easily transported, while the root crops are so bulky and perishable that they must be consumed near where they are grown. Now a movable surplus is necessary to any extensive civilization. States must remain small and provincial until they find a food product capable of transportation. ¶ It might be said that the radius of an empire is fixed by the distance that its food products can be transported. ¶ If a nation extends its boundaries beyond such limits, it soon becomes unstable and falls apart. Since a conquering nation exists by the tribute it exacts, this tribute naturally takes the form of the movable surplus of the conquered countries. The cereals become the tribute money that the conquered

pay to their conquerors. Root crops, as they must be consumed near home, become the food of the conquered. The value of a locality to its conquerors is measured by the amount of its product that can be carried away.

When both cereals and root crops are produced, a society is formed having two distinct national characters, the tribute-takers and the tribute-givers. In cold, wet countries, where the cereals alone are produced, society remains homogeneous, and common standards are retained; but in warm, dry regions the possibility of forcing the cultivators to live upon root crops opens up an inviting field for invasion and conquest.

This fact provokes the frequent migration of nations from cold to hot climates. Character and energy are formed by the conditions of the north. A large movable surplus is to be found only in the south. These two essential conditions to civilization can be brought together only by migrations from the cold, wet north, where there is energy without a surplus, to the dry, warm regions of the south, where there is a large surplus but no energy.

The ruling class so formed develops and retains certain motor reactions to make its rule enduring, and these traits become a part of the mental inheritance of subsequent ages; for a large organization cannot be maintained without developing an instinctive love of law and order. Rules once made must be adhered to, and leaders once chosen must be implicitly obeyed. Before a nation can enter upon a period of conquest, obedience to recognized authorities, subordination to leaders, and love of internal peace must become dominant traits. A nation of good fighters must entertain a respect for property and a feeling of equality. A man fights best with his peers, and no body of peers that do not regard each other's property rights can hold together. They may dispossess the con-

quered without scruple, but they must respect each other's rights.

The ruling class in a large nation must also develop a sense of equity. Tribute-takers live off the proceeds of other people's industry, and the conditions that keep these people industrious must be respected. To crush the subject is to stop the tribute. So rulers set limits to their own aggression. When, in addition, they become masters of many localities with differing local traditions, laws must be devised to promote intercourse between their dependencies. A higher equity thus arises from the amalgamation and generalization of various local usages, and respect for the law becomes innate.

To retain its superiority, the dominant class must also maintain a sharp distinction between its members and those of the subject class. In a developed form this distinction creates a ruling class founded on material wealth. The difference upon which success originally depended, however, was one of character, and not of property or inheritance.

Professor Giddings has made familiar another characteristic,—the consciousness of kind. This instinct to recognize likeness, to honour as equals those who have the same mental qualities, and to shun others is necessary to any ruling class. Nations that have it also possess a more or less developed concept of citizenship. They accord freely certain rights to those whom they recognize as being of their kind, and deny these rights to others. Citizenship is at bottom a quality of character depending on the recognition of a consciousness of kind. It creates, or at least renders effective, the fighting qualities that bring success. The distinctions in regard to property that come after success may efface or dwarf the feeling of citizenship, and thus create an aristocracy or a caste, but we should remember that the earlier society was based on a superiority of character. A progressive, energetic race

naturally becomes a sociocracy<sup>1</sup> in which character is judged by race qualities or ties of blood. In this way a line is drawn between the superior who is a freeman, and the inferior who is not. A group of freemen or citizens are democratic among themselves, but when they come in contact with inferiors they rule, as well as work or fight. Therefore, among them there exists a sense of superiority without which no nation could become conquerors, rulers, or industrial leaders. The sociocracy, to which the concept of citizenship is due, assumes many forms, but always comes when income is acquired and not earned.

Tribute-takers and plunderers feel themselves to be an especially favoured class, and they attribute this to their own merits, to their ancestors, or to God. When a tribe calls its members the sons of a great chief, or of a god, it implies that its members are specially favoured because of their sonship. To be sons in this sense involves having tributary dependents. The Hebrews, for example, when they were a pastoral tribe, worshipped the Elohim, who was not attached to places or persons; but when, after their return from Egypt, they became aggressors, plunderers, and conquerors, they worshipped Jehovah, who made them a favoured nation. The Hebrew sociocracy which thus arose gave to the nation many of its peculiar traits. The Hebrew became superior to the Gentile, just as later the Greek did to the barbarian. Tribute-taking always has the same effect on the national thought: it transforms the nation into a favoured body, and ends in creating a citizenship and a body of privileges from which the lower classes are excluded. When the power to seize

<sup>1</sup> I use this term to represent an actual social state, and not, as Mr Ward does in his *Outlines of Sociology*, to represent an ideal one. A sociocracy exists when the more social elements in any way exploit the less social. A primitive clan, a guild of the Middle Ages, a modern trades-union, and the present organizations of political parties furnish examples of sociocracies in the sense in which I use the term.

is esteemed more than the power to earn, a body of law will grow up that respects the former more than the latter. Law is more than a collection of customs—it is custom idealized by the transition from a state of earning income to that of taking tribute. Neither the customs of the conquerors, nor of the conquered, are adequate. † The law aims at securing peace, not justice. † Hence, property rights are vested in things possessed, not in things earned. †

These concepts of peace and obedience do not come naturally to people living in hot, dry countries, where nature is arbitrary. They acquire hope and humility from their environment, but the instincts of peace and obedience are embedded only after they become subject to foreign powers, and tribute-givers. A people living in a capricious environment look upon the world as a place of sorrow and tribulation. As their privations seem to be due to their shortcomings, they develop readily the concept of sin and of a fallen nature. But peace they do not look for, and obedience they do not yield. On the contrary, they have inclinations toward a life of asceticism and individual freedom. Among these people there is no powerful priesthood and no concept of God except as a being to fear and avoid, for those that serve God think of Him as a social being who rewards as well as punishes. The native gods of regions where nature is capricious do nothing but punish, and hence do not give peace or demand obedience. It requires, therefore, a double set of conditions to develop the group of concepts we call religious. These concepts unite only when a tribute-taking nation, with a developed law, superimposes peace and obedience upon a nation that nature has made hopeful, humble, and conscious of its shortcomings. Such people accept a ruling class readily, and give tribute cheerfully, as though it were an enactment of nature. Under these conditions, a class of clingers is created who look up to their superiors, are hero-worshippers, and feel lost

when they have no guiding hand to direct them. When these instincts and conditions become idealized, a purer religion follows, with a God who rules as well as punishes.

This study of primitive races shows that their instincts are due mainly to three groups of economic conditions. In wet, cold countries, natural forces act regularly, and the social surplus is small. Here men unite into strongly knit social groups, with a well-developed feeling of the solidarity of responsibility. Vigorous and aggressive, they react promptly against sources of pain. In hot, dry countries natural forces are too irregular and overpowering to permit the idea of a natural law to develop. People yield to forces they cannot resist or regulate; their trust in the higher power that they believe controls nature produces hope and humility. Tribute-takers create a third group of instincts. Where a movable surplus makes large nations possible, a sociocracy forms, which develops law and creates the concept of citizenship. The first group of conditions gives the basis of morality, the second that of religion, and the third that of civil rights. These three groups of instincts and their resulting habits of thought correspond in a general way to the differences which distinguish the German, the Semitic, and the Roman civilizations. No one of these civilizations, however, is of a pure type; for each of these groups of instincts is developed to some degree in all three races. The main thing is to determine which of these is the fundamental group to which the type will revert when a period of transition permits the ultimate instincts to assert themselves. If a German civilization reverts towards morality, a Semitic towards religion, and a Roman towards civic duties and rights, they are distinct enough to be used as types of the primal economic instincts which are to be found in a more or less developed state in all nations. The development of these three civilizations is also of

especial value in the study of English thought, because it is from them that the English have acquired their main characteristics.

The character of the early German was due mainly to the influence of the damp, cold climate in which he lived, and the meagre food products upon which he subsisted. He was little influenced by outside ideas. The non-migrating German is the ancestor of the German of the later period; for the migrating Germans are lost or blended with the races they conquered. All accounts agree that the early Germans had vigorous constitutions and strong appetites. A cold, damp climate necessitates a large consumption of food, for people who live out of doors keep warm by eating. The internal combustion of oxygen and carbon must be increased when it is cold and damp, and still further augmented if the shelter and clothing is poor and meagre. The appetites of the Germans, vigorous because of their environment, were strengthened also by self-imposed hardships. They seem to have bathed in icy water, and to have prided themselves on their power to endure all sorts of exposure. Under such conditions only those can survive who have strong appetites. But sensuality is not a vice until men come into economic conditions where they can eat more than the internal fire can consume. It is the clogging of over-nutrition that causes the degeneration against which men in improved economic conditions must guard themselves.

Where climate and habits cause a high death-rate, strong passions are needed to keep up the population. And as the suffering falls mainly on the weak, a selective process goes on which raises the standard, keeps the social group intact, and prevents that opposition of interests resulting from an over-population. There are three ways in which an equilibrium between population and the food supply is maintained. First, by pressing against nature as the

Germans did, so that the weak and inefficient fail to fulfil the conditions for living. Second, by pressing against men; in this way wars, feuds, and individual conflicts carry off the surplus population. Here the strong, rather than the weak, are killed off, and the race degenerates. Third, by pressing against disease, as when men, in search of food and comfort, move into unhealthy regions where the economic surplus is large, and pay the penalty in the suffering that disease causes. As this evil strikes indiscriminately, no selective elimination results; society remains stationary, and its standards are low.

In Germany the equilibrium of population was maintained by the first of these means. The German character has few of those traits which war and disease create. Germans are noted for the ease with which they lose their nationality; having no strong hatreds, they amalgamate easily with other nations, and are without clannish ties. These characteristics imply that the early struggle was not between man and man, but between man and nature. Nor do the Germans show that hopeful fatalism which men acquire where nature is arbitrary, and rational action affords no protection against natural evils. Their migrations seem to have been actuated, not by starvation, but by greed. The rich border-lands offered to these sensualists a temptation that they could not resist.

The non-migrating German thus had broad areas within which to roam, and was not checked by conflict between groups. No contest could arise over a concentrated economic surplus. Each group was in this way self-centred, and, if the standards of the group were maintained, could succeed. The fight with nature demands social solidarity, and to maintain this the solidarity of responsibility must be keenly felt. A moral tone results, which imposes severe penalties on those that violate the social standards.

The religion of the early Germans was little more than

personified nature. Their environment lacked the conditions giving rise to those peculiar concepts which make religion a force. Servility, humility, and sin were undeveloped concepts. Innocent greed and a love of freedom were dominant passions, while a dislike of town life kept the population from concentrating. There was, therefore, no concept of the luxury that an economic surplus brings, nor of the civic unity that precedes the thought of a ruling God. Surplus and luxury make states; the pomp and dignity of rulers help men to picture a heavenly kingdom and an omnipotent ruler. The early Germans knew neither places of terror from which to build a concept of hell, nor a developed civilization from which to construct the ideal of heaven. Had they thought of heaven, they would have pictured it as a "happy hunting-ground" rather than as a large city paved with rubies and diamonds. Men must know luxury before they can appreciate the beauties of a new Jerusalem. It is often forgotten how great an influence marked contrasts had on the formation of religious ideals. The contrast of a paradise and a purgatory would not occur except in a country where there were a few oases of great fertility, compared with many dreary wastes burned by torrid heat, and swept by fearful storms. In arid regions gardens of Eden are a present reality, and also burning hells that inflict endless suffering, but not death. In such countries heat and fire are God-made phenomena.

To a German, living where it is cold and wet, fire is a manifestation of man's power. Since heat is man-made, it cannot bring to the German the same thoughts that it brought to the Semites. Cold, wet countries have too much dull uniformity to suggest the contrasts that are transformed into religious ideals. In such conditions punishments are social, not physical; men become outcasts and outlaws, but not tortured criminals. The burning of men is felt to be an act of injustice, for fire is thought

of as man-made, and to torture with it is the work not of God but of bad men. Men of northern morality naturally react against the causes of physical pain, and have a feeling of repugnance for schemes that make it a means of purification.

A study of the social condition and mental state of the early Germans will disclose what ideas and habits sprang from their own environment and what arose as a result of contact with the Roman and Semitic civilizations. This later and external influence was mainly exerted through the Church; its history and development show how the new ideas and habits of thought were acquired. The Church itself had been formed by the amalgamation of Semitic and Roman ideas. In the beginning, while the Semitic ideas dominated, the Church was primarily a religious institution, but as it became more definitely organized under the Popes, the civil side of the Church gradually predominated. This change of emphasis was the natural result of the disturbed social conditions: the Church took part in the political contests, and guided the weaker civil powers. It became a civil institution to save society from complete disorganization.

In the early centuries of the Christian era, the line between the civil and the religious sphere was very loosely drawn, because of the influence of Hebrew ideas and precedents. The Hebrews surrendered to their conquerors only a few of the civil functions, most of them being still administered by the local, which meant the religious, authorities. The Hebrews always looked forward to the time when the local religious authorities would again be entirely supreme. When Christianity arose, this state of affairs had great weight in forming the ideas of the Church fathers, who submitted to the powers that were, and willingly gave unto Cæsar the things that were Cæsar's, but had very hazy ideas as

to what was Cæsar's and what was God's. Thus, the relation that grew up between the Christian Church and the Roman Empire was much the same as that which had existed between the Hebrew Church and State. It was a state within a state. Perhaps it would be better to say that the Pope and the Emperor divided the sovereignty between them, each becoming the dominant element as time and circumstances favoured him. The victory of the Church of Rome over the more democratic churches of earlier days was due to the need of order and authority. The great ecclesiastical hierarchy that the Roman Church established was not designed to promote spiritual aims, but to secure harmony, order, and peace. From the very beginning the Bishops of Rome, avoiding theological questions, devoted themselves to matters of organization and administration. They always stood for authority and subordination; they taught humility and submission as the cardinal virtues. In a struggle between inspiration and revelation on the one hand, and law and order on the other, the Roman Church won, because the civil needs of the age were more pressing than the spiritual. Thus, by placing order and discipline above feeling and liberty, the Roman Church established the supremacy of Christianity in Europe, but this emphasis of civil ends was at the expense of some of the best elements in Christianity. A reformation was to be expected as soon as the demand for peace and order had been satisfied. Institutions that have for their main end the establishment of law and order are in reality civil, no matter what name they bear. Churches doubtless need some kind of an organization, but in so far as they subordinate religious to governmental ends, they are civil institutions, and should be judged by civil and not by religious standards.

It is necessary to bear these circumstances in mind if one would judge impartially the influence of the Church in Germany and other northern countries. When these

countries accepted Christianity, the Church had already become a political power and had lost much of its early spirituality. The dispersed population of the cold, wet north needed discipline more than inspiration and revelation, and hence the Roman Church was able to do for it what scattered missionary effort had failed to do. A steady, severe discipline continuing for several centuries stirred up new motor reactions, which had been absent in earlier times. The qualities of the Roman and the Semite were thus grafted on a new stock, and as a result we have the complex mental mechanism of the modern man, with the independent motor reactions of a Roman, a Semite, and a German.

The supremacy of the Church in northern regions was not the result of a conversion, but of an economic pressure by which new motor reactions were formed. The Church succeeded, not as a spiritual power, but as an economic force. For conversion takes place when old impulses are turned to some new use. The Germans had no motor reactions that prompted them to be obedient, reverent, and servile. They loved liberty and freedom too well to submit tamely to an oppressive discipline. The old gods had not ruled with a heavy hand nor demanded humble submission as the price of prosperity. Arbitrary gods who follow their own sweet wills do not prevent mortals from following their inclinations. It was only a new economic pressure that could impose the qualities that the new civilization demanded, and the northern nations had to submit to it for many weary ages, before their primal inclinations could assert themselves.

In picturing the early Church we are wont to think only of the ecclesiastical organization that represented its civil side, and to overlook the monastic orders that represent its economic side. The modern concept of dark, gloomy buildings filled with men who spend their time in prayer, meditation, and fasting, keeps us from realizing the functions of

the early monasteries. Only after their industrial function had ceased were the monasteries filled by the recluses, who are now associated with monastic life. The early monks were not supported by the laity, but were, rather, industrial undertakers whose enterprise set the pattern for others to follow. The balance sheet between them and the outside world was largely in their favour. A short-sighted race, living from hand to mouth, had much to suffer, if not relieved by the forethought and kindly care of those who followed a more orderly life.

The early monasteries, then, were not religious organizations, but agricultural colonies with socialistic tendencies. They did for the country what the guilds of the Middle Ages did for the town. Before their time north Europe was a dreary waste covered with woods, swamps, and moors with openings here and there where a few half-starved people were huddled in miserable hovels. No regular industry existed, many people did not even know how to fish, and hunting without horses gave but a precarious support. Into these regions the missionaries forced their way, and they succeeded, not by preaching doctrines, but by teaching the natives regular ways of life. The successful missionary was thus the monk who earned his own living and had enough surplus to help others in times of need. Doubtless the monks had a religious motive, but their love of solitude and quiet industry was an even stronger motive. They did not, therefore, push out and proselytize as modern missionaries do; they drew the natives to them by the bounties they dispensed. There is no proof of God's power more convincing to a primitive mind than the sight of food provided for the hungry and of relief given the distressed. A new economic régime thus began, which endowed the northern races with new industrial qualities.

These monks accomplished the agricultural transformation of England and Germany. To them work was wor-

ship, and they followed their toilsome worship so faithfully that great forests were cut down, swamps drained, and tractless wilds brought under cultivation. The transfer and readjustment of population changed the whole face of the country. These monastic colonies were not under strict rules like the modern religious orders, but were a loosely organized family or clan, often headed by some noble who sought in retirement to pay penance for youthful misdeeds. Often these colonies were mere pretexts to escape from taxation and the burdens of military service. Again they were centres of refuge for those who were harassed by warlike neighbours, for these social settlements had a sanctity that gave peace and safety in the midst of wars and internal strife. Thus many motives helped their growth, all of which were necessary to stimulate an industrial transformation and to inspire a love for steady work and for the quiet pleasures of an industrial life. Doubtless these religious brothers were good livers, and perhaps even sensual, but if so, it was at a time when feasting and sensualism were necessary inducements to industry.

Between the Church and these monastic colonies the bond was very loose; they were more often opponents than allies. The monks represented the missionary element in the Church, and numbered among them all the discontented, restless spirits. As the Roman Church stood for law and order, they stood for zeal, inspiration, and direct revelation. The early missionaries in England came from Ireland, not from Rome, and the Irish Church, for a long time independent of Rome, emphasized the spiritual rather than the civil ends of religion. English missionaries in turn converted north Germany, and carried with them the spirit and methods of the Irish. The early Church of northern Europe emphasized the economic and social side of life far more than the civil. Even after the authority of Rome was generally acknowledged, its control over the

monasteries was slight and spasmodic. Only at the death of a prior or abbot could it interfere, and then merely to appoint his successor. Activity and enterprise were domestic. People turned to Rome to decide disputes, not policies, and its hand was felt only when success had given something to dispute over. Centuries were to pass before the Pope and his officials could interfere in the details of monastic life and lay down rules for its government. The supposed peace and harmony of the Church of the Middle Ages is a mere myth. There were constant struggles between the various orders of the monks, and again between them and the representatives of the Pope's power. The civil Church centred in Rome was imposed from above upon the semi-independent and more or less turbulent local organizations whose energy had extended the influence of Christianity. Rome did not create anything. It simply brought order and peace to an already successful movement.

We should have a better notion of the Middle Ages if we would picture the monks and other religious bodies as related to one another somewhat as are the Protestant sects of modern times. There was the same diversity, the same controversy, the same opposition of interests. New orders were developed to meet new emergencies, just as the Salvation Army and other organizations now arise. The difference is that the mediæval litigants referred to Rome disputes of the kind that now find their way into the civil courts.

The heterogeneous character of the early Church, especially the contrast between the local religious life and the centralized power at Rome, has been lost sight of because the local orders have been suppressed or shorn of their wealth and power. The monks were called the regular clergy; the representatives of the Pope who administered directly in his name were called the secular clergy. The latter were organized only after the former

had made many converts, and the need of more definite organization had shown itself. The regular clergy were the converting force because their example and productive power made Christianity attractive. The secular clergy were the commanding force. They ruled in given regions, compelled every one to conform to church usages, and created that uniformity and harmony which later was so marked a characteristic of the Church. The Church thus had two distinct social aims, the one civil and the other economic. The regular clergy cared for the economic wants of the people. They improved agriculture, fed and sheltered the poor, founded hospitals and gave relief from pain. The secular clergy cared for the civil wants of the Church. They organized a hierarchy which gave peace and instilled obedience. The Church lacked, however, corresponding moral agencies. Certain religious orders and many individuals, to be sure, furnished models worthy of imitation, but these standards were not enforced by the authority of the Church. Herein lay its weakness and the cause of its disruption.

We should not conclude, however, that the Church was consciously an economic institution. The Church fathers had only religious ends in mind; they had no economic programme except such as was forced upon them by the situation in which they found themselves. But as the religious transformation could not be accomplished without marked industrial changes, they met each new situation with new economic measures. In this way they created an economic programme in spite of themselves, and in time this programme so dominated the Church as to turn it into an economic organization. It is plain, for example, that the early monks did not plan an agricultural transformation of northern Europe. Desiring isolation and seclusion, they sought the depths of the forests, where the normal life they led, to the exclusion of other forms of activity, aroused motives that found expression in an

industrial life. The dignity the monks gave to labour came not from any preconceived ambition to set a new pattern for living, but simply from a desire for activity which could find no other outlet. Success made the imitation of their ways both possible and necessary, and thus a new concept of life grew up which has left its impress upon subsequent ages.

A marked influence in this direction came from the emphasis on a future life. The northern races had no contrasts out of which the great religious ideals could grow. Differences in time were not impressed upon them as they were on races in regions where famine and plenty alternate. They had hazy ideas of every time but the present, and no strong motive to think of other than immediate needs. The ideal of a future life, so vividly set forth by the missionaries, created a contrast equally useful as an incentive in this world and as a preparation for the next; for thrift and accumulation of capital depend upon the same motor reactions that make vivid the difference between the present and future life, and similar pains and punishments follow a neglect in either case. The one ideal cannot be thoroughly inculcated without the creation of the other. Thrift and economy were thus encouraged by the Church, to the increase of capital and enterprise. ▲

Another incentive to industry came from the new doctrine of the sacredness of life. Even with a high birth-rate, population will not increase unless there is a motive to preserve the young. This motive was created by the thought that children had souls and that an early death deprived them of the hope of eternal life. Infant damnation may be a hideous doctrine, but it had the effect of making parents care for their children, and thus stimulated their industry. The pressure of population is the great inducement to work and the prime cause of the elimination of the unfit. No society can advance without some force of this kind. A religious doctrine seemingly

opposed to social morality thus became an agent of progress.

The family groups were much larger in early times than they now are. There was no age limit after which sons and daughters became their own masters. The family, with the addition of many dependents and followers, held together as long as the father lived. Where ties of clan and tribe were strong, the whole group was practically one family, and had many common rights and duties. The family was thus a political and an industrial unit, lacking those intimate bonds of affection that bind together the smaller families of to-day. The Church broke up these family groups, because it was to her interest to defend the right of industrial converts to change their religion and to control their persons and actions. The Church fathers taught their followers to break away from all customs, local as well as national, that in any way interfered with the exercise of their religion. The Church also depended largely on women for services and contributions. No matter how much the dominion of the husband was emphasized in theory, the Church was compelled in practice to defend the liberty and rights of women. Precedents were thus established that gradually elevated women and gave them a higher social status. As a result, the old type of family was displaced by the smaller, more closely knit family of modern times.

The gradual manumission of the slaves was due to the same circumstances that elevated the position of women. The feeling that all were equal before God and the law could not but check the aggressions of masters, and give to their slaves certain rights that would in the end make slavery unprofitable. In theory the Church was not opposed to slaves, but it was opposed to any such crude exploitation of them as would degrade their characters, injure their health, and unfit them for a future life. It thus set conditions to which masters could not comply without rais-

ing the cost of slave labour above that of freemen. When it became profitable to commute services, slavery gradually disappeared and men were put more nearly on an equal footing.

An increased fidelity to trusts also arose, because of the increased sacredness attached to oaths and visions of an enduring punishment for those who violated their promises. It thus became possible to make contracts with people in distant places, who were out of the reach of civil law. As commerce depends upon the sacredness of contracts, its transactions must be limited if there is no strong feeling impelling men to carry out their agreements. Although, doubtless, the purely civil contract of modern times is stronger than the early contracts, which, if violated, brought only religious penalties, yet the economic ideas and doctrines upon which civil contracts are based could not well arise until experience founded on the earlier system had prepared the way for them.

Unconsciously the Church fathers were intense cosmopolitans. Not sharing in national events and local festivals, they disregarded nations and localities. Furthermore, the shortness and uncertainty of life, and the need of constant exertion to prepare for the future life, turned men's attention from the customs and habits of earlier times. The only common bond was in Christ through whom all men became brothers. The feeling that Christ was man as well as God fostered a feeling of brotherhood which became the basis of a social coöperation broad enough to include all who were fit to enter it. This socialistic element had important economic effects. The doctrine that he who would be master must be a servant gave new motives for humble social work. All the monastic societies show the effect of this spirit, and through them labour acquired a dignity that it has ever since retained. No steady social progress was possible until work and service became motor ideals, and thus drew off into use-

ful channels the energy that had been wasted in war or dissipation.

The fifteenth century was a period of change and progress. The marvels of the nineteenth century are still too fresh in the memories of the people of this generation for them to judge fairly of the relative merits of these two periods. Our accounts of the earlier century have, moreover, been coloured by partisan writers more interested in theological controversy than in industrial progress. An age, however, that invented printing, discovered America, and brought into use gunpowder and the magnet, must have an industrial history worthy of study. These events could scarcely have happened without radical changes in the structure of society. To them was due in great part the political, social, and religious transformation of the sixteenth century.

The use of the magnet caused radical changes in commerce. The great commerce of the Middle Ages had been with the far East, and, since the sea route to India had not yet been discovered, all Eastern wares were brought by caravans to the shores of the Mediterranean, and thence by sea to Italy. Germany had obtained a share of these goods by land routes from Italy, but the Alps were too great an obstacle to permit much trade. The unsettled condition of the country which the traders had to traverse was an even greater barrier. Robber bands had infested the roads, and local princes checked trade by high imposts. Such obstacles had been too great to allow any systematic development of trade, and Germany could not have a normal development until freed from these burdens. The long sea voyages which the magnet made possible put these northern regions into direct contact with Italy, and opened up a safe and regular route for the transportation of goods.

Influenced by modern ideas, we are apt to underestimate the value of Eastern trade to northern Europe. Spices

seem unimportant if not harmful, while Eastern luxuries are accounted the source of many of our present evils. It must, however, be kept in mind that the North Atlantic slope is a damp, cold country, which the Gulf Stream makes a region of perpetual rain, thus preventing the ripening of many of those crops which are the mainstay of warmer climates. The diet of the people of northern Europe was made up of starchy foods, which could not thoroughly ripen because of the damp climate and the short seasons, or of meat, which could not be preserved. Eastern spices and cheap salt were necessary to make such a diet wholesome or even endurable. Before their introduction, Germany was settled mainly in the uplands of the south, where a comparatively dry and warm climate permitted a natural drainage, the better maturing of crops, and the cultivation of many southern plants. With few exceptions, the north Germany of the fifteenth century was a new country, opened up by the North Atlantic sea route, and made tolerable by the new conditions. Even in the time of Luther the north Germans were regarded as mere barbarians. It was to the advantage of the Protestants that they lived in a country unknown, and hence not thought worthy of much attention. The Church did not recognize the importance of the new movement until it reached south Germany and France.

At first thought it may seem that gunpowder does not belong in a list of economic inventions. War prevents industry and checks trade and commerce. A glance at mediæval conditions will show, however, that gunpowder was an efficient agent of peace, and thus a promoter of industry. The great disturbers of peace were the country nobility, who were continually engaged in private wars, in plundering the neighbouring cities and towns and the traders that passed through their estates. Their castles and strongholds were on hills that were inaccessible until the invention of gunpowder increased the power of the attack-

ing party. After these marauding nobles had been brought under control, and a general peace established, a great extension of trade and commerce became possible. Then for the first time could Germany be called with truth a civilized country.

While these changes were going on in the political and foreign relations of Germany social changes of equal importance were in progress. The old houses of wood, or mud and plaster, with thatched roofs, were sources of constant danger from fire and disease. The re-discovery of the art of making brick led to the displacement of such houses by others better suited to the needs of family life. Glass windows now for the first time admitted sunlight into houses, and thus better sanitation became possible. With the introduction of chimneys each room could have its own fireplace and smoke find an exit without interfering with family comfort. Chimneys also made it possible to have ovens in houses, and thus baked food and raised bread displaced the stews, broths, and porridges to which ancient cooking was confined. Dry foods and foreign spices created a demand for new drinks, and as a result modern beer was perfected. Some forms of beer, it is true, date from an earlier period, but beer made from hops came into general use at this time. The dryer the food and the hotter the seasoning, the greater was the desire for beer, and the more marked was its improvement. Equally great changes occurred in the clothing. The early German was clothed in furs, skins, and leather, materials that make rough and uncomfortable garments. In the fifteenth century these rude garments were displaced by those made from wool. Although the presence of wolves still limited the production of sheep in Germany, it had become easy to import wool from England, and thus a great industry was made possible in the German cities.

The economic effects of the discovery of America show

themselves a little later, but are so intimately connected with the changes of this period that they deserve mention in this connection. Sugar and many kinds of sweets soon came into general use. While southern fruits are sweet, northern fruits are acid, and for their utilization sugar is a necessity. Thus the introduction of sugar in northern Europe helped to create a revolution in the diet of its inhabitants.

Many more economic changes belong to this epoch, and those that I have mentioned might be explained in greater detail. Enough, however, has been said to show that a new civilization had begun. The older civilization was communal; its activities were shared by all alike. To do anything or to enjoy anything demanded the presence and coöperation of a large number of persons. Pleasure and work alike were sought out of doors; houses were not homes, but mere places of refuge from storms and darkness. The early German disliked towns, hated houses, and associated everything pleasant with the free, open air. Hunting, fishing, working, and fighting were activities to his taste, and for enjoyment he sought the tournament, the village fair, and sports. Beds were mere smothering, sweltering boxes from which to escape as soon as possible. The life on an Atlantic liner presents the best picture of the instincts and feelings of the early German. The cabin is tolerable only when meals are served. Every one dreads to go to his berth, and rejoices when the break of day allows him to regain the deck. The only pleasant associations on a ship are those with the upper deck, where light and air abound. The inventions and changes of the fifteenth century made indoor life agreeable, and created a new man, who disliked the open country as much as his ancestor disliked the confinement of town life.

The new conditions for the first time made family life possible. Women in Germany had always occupied a

place of esteem. A cold climate makes a man much more dependent on his wife for comfort than a hot climate. He is thrown more in contact with her and gains more by her good-will. Children are also more difficult to rear, and more attached to those who defend and nourish them. And woman's independence was greatly strengthened by the economic transformation which made the house the centre of pleasurable activities. The woman, as mistress of the house, had charge of the clothing, the fire, the cooking, the bedding, and all that pertained to the cleanliness and health of the family. Man produced necessities; woman changed them into comforts. To have a wife and home soon became the desire of many men, and the new situation modified their conceptions, plans, and ideals.

To understand the changes created by these new ideals, family pleasures must be contrasted with the communal pleasures of earlier times. Under earlier conditions each town or village formed a self-contained group, whose members shared with each other the bounties and pleasures that nature bestowed. The events to which all looked forward, and in which all participated, were the festivals and the fairs, which came at frequent intervals and were accompanied by feasting, dancing, singing, and sports. Every event that needed emphasis was celebrated by some sort of a festival, not the same in the different nations and tribes, yet all of the same general character. There was a festival at the opening of spring, at harvest time, at the vintage, the shearing of sheep, or the gathering of any crop. The appearance of each new moon was also celebrated, as were events in the religious or political life. At these times each one brought what he could, — meat, bread, wine, or milk, — and of the rude plenty everybody glutted himself. Many of these festivals were continued during the Catholic supremacy as saints' days, while others, much worse in character, were kept up by local usage. To this holiday list should be added the numerous fairs where

produce was bought and sold, and at which many primitive customs were retained that were not tolerated at other times and places.

I do not denounce these occasions, nor assert that they perpetuated all the looseness and debauchery of heathen ages. To understand these earlier times, however, we must know what evils were continuing, and what were banished or modified by the new economic conditions. The German Reformers thought that this moral degeneration was a new phenomenon, and attributed it to the influence of the Catholic Church. But prophets are bad historians. The really new characteristics were the virtues they were praising and not the evils they were denouncing. The Church did not make the festivals, but merely changed their names and toned them down a bit. So long as these communal pleasures were the only relief from the monotony of a hard life, they were a necessity, and were continued in spite of the attendant evils. Men must have amusements, crude ones if no others are at hand.

The development of the modern home gave a new direction to social life, and enabled men to satisfy in a more refined way the natural longing for pleasure. One class emphasized home pleasures, the other, from choice or necessity, clung to the crude communal pleasures. Thus there arose a differentiation in society and a basis for natural selection. The moral life of the people became more and more associated with family life, and those in whom these ties were strongest gradually withdrew from the communal pleasures, and formed more exclusive groups of their own.

Such persons naturally looked on the communal life as degrading, and soon denounced its amusements as vices. Doubtless the withdrawal of the more cultivated classes from the communal pleasures lowered their tone, but at the same time freer contact with foreigners brought in new vices and weakened the restraints that had kept old

customs from being injurious. The greater plenty of the new epoch also enabled those so inclined to indulge more freely in dissipation. A type of sensualism thus arose which, while containing no new elements, combined in a more striking way the degenerate tendencies of older times. It is this differentiation of society, with the contrasts it affords, that gives rise to the moral problem of the new age. One social class was rising and working its way towards better standards, while another class was going to the dogs with astonishing rapidity, and in a way that caused disgust and alarm. No society could long remain quiet under such conditions, and the violence of the subsequent eruptions showed how deep was the chasm that separated the two contending classes.

There is then good reason to believe that the economic condition of northern Europe during the fifteenth century was rapidly improving. Food was plentiful, comforts were general, and productive power was greatly increased. It was, as Rogers says, "the golden age for the labourer,"<sup>1</sup> especially for those of the better class. A general impression, however, exists that this age was lawless, that wars, murders, robberies, and other disorders were common, and that the people were deprived of that protection and security necessary for prosperity. This impression has been created partly by the demands of subsequent theological controversy and partly by the fact that history has seldom risen above a chronicle of wars and disasters. History as a register of wars and blood-thrilling events leaves the feeling that men have no occupation but war, plunder, and murder. Yet in so large a region as western Europe a constant series of wars might be waged without serious effect upon the great mass of its inhabitants. It is true that in the fifteenth century Germany was often embroiled in war, but it must be remembered that the Germany

<sup>1</sup> Rogers, *Work and Wages*, p. 326.

of that day was the Holy Roman Empire, of which modern Germany was but a part and north Germany but an insignificant part. The German Emperor claimed to be the ruler of Europe and was trying to enforce his claims in Italy and against France. There was no internal contest; the fighting was done in Italy or on the French border. Naturally the Italian cities suffered greatly, while the German cities gained by this destruction and could well afford to pay the small war tax the Emperor imposed. The only other enemy of Germany was the Turk, but as the Turkish army never got farther west than Vienna the losses it inflicted on Germany were slight and confined to a region in which the Reformation had little influence. There were no invasions of Germany such as those of the Thirty Years' War or of the Napoleonic period, nor did Germany become the battle-ground of Europe until the sixteenth century. Before that period the Germans suffered nothing from invasion and only slightly from taxation. The Emperor was too rarely at home to secure more than nominal obedience, and gladly accepted what funds and men were offered to support his foreign pretensions. This much sacrificed, each little state went its own way, enforced its own laws, and enjoyed the proceeds of its labour. The bane of Germany was private warfare among the nobility, and the robber bands that infested the highways. Even these evils were greatly reduced; the perpetual peace of the Diet of Worms ended the one, and the use of artillery the other.

There is also an exaggerated notion as to the amount of suffering that the Middle Ages imposed on the people.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Writing of the English wars of this period, Rogers (*Work and Wages*, p. 334) says: "During the struggle between the rival houses, it seems to me that the people were absolutely indifferent. It was not a war of sieges but of battles, in which the combatants appear to have sought out some secluded spot and to have fought out the combat. I have never seen or read of any injury done to neutrals, except the outrages of Mar-

The fighting was restricted to the nobility and their retainers, and while the defeated army suffered severely, the common people, who were non-combatants, suffered little. New rulers might give them pain by destroying the feeling of loyalty that had grown up between them and their former rulers, but the new rulers did not disturb them so long as they paid their taxes and rents. The chivalrous feelings that influenced the nobles reduced the evil of pillage to a minimum. Even robbers respected the private property attached to land; they were terrors to merchants and traders but not to the farmers.

The pillage and ruthless destruction of non-combatants was introduced at a later period, when gunpowder made mercenary armies a necessity. A low type of men, often degraded sensualists without any feeling of honour, displaced the fighting nobility of earlier times. These new soldiers made fighting a profitable trade. Their ravages, therefore, were unlimited, especially as their numbers enabled them to devastate any region through which they passed. It is these later scourges, unknown until after the Reformation, that created the popular impression of the horrors of war.

It is often stated that the Reformation was an offshoot of the Renaissance, but this implies a misunderstanding of the social forces that were reconstructing society. In a reversion the motor reactions of longest standing create the dominant motives, and force into a secondary place the newer motor tendencies that are the outcome of the economic pressure of the preceding epoch. The German

garet's northern army in the beginning of 1461, — deeds which led to the instant deposition of Henry and the coronation of Edward. The war, as I believe, was as distant from the great wars of the English people, and was as little injurious in its immediate effects, as summer lightning is. If it was followed by any destruction of human life, the loss did not fall on the working people of England, but on the nobles and professional *condottieri*. It had no bearing on work and wages."

reversion, therefore, became moral, while the Italian reversion was æsthetic. The Italian ideal was sought in Greece; the German took his ideal from the early Christians. The leaders of the Renaissance were rational, literary, and æsthetic. Sympathizing with the Church, they sought to reform its abuses and to give it a new tone. Between them and the German Reformers there was an impassable gulf. Such doctrines as justification by faith and the infallibility of the Scriptures were despised and ridiculed by the humanists, who also had too little regard for family ties to sympathize with the stern morality of the northern nations. Self-indulgence was one of their leading traits, and this alone was enough to make them disliked by the moral purists. Luther talked of presumptuous human reason intruding itself in the region of faith, and looked on Erasmus as a doubter, a scoffer, and an Epicurean; while Erasmus in turn regarded Lutheranism as an injury to good morals as well as to good letters. A union of these forces could be but of a temporary nature.

Through its influence on the Church, the Renaissance materially aided the Reformation. During the preceding century the Renaissance had created a new tone in the Church, and had given new aims and ideals to its leaders. The harshness of earlier times had been softened; the reason and the culture of the higher circles overcame the brutal domineering spirit often exhibited by the Dominican monks. The Inquisition had fallen into disuse, and the popes had become church builders and picture buyers, using their money to make Italy artistic and beautiful. With such ideals there was less papal interference with the civil affairs of Europe; and so long as the flow of money into the papal treasury was uninterrupted moral controversies disturbed Rome very little. Such a régime as the popes of the Renaissance administered was hard on the pocket-book of the German people, but it left them

quite free in other matters. No notice of the Reformation was taken at Rome until the revenues of the Church were threatened, and then there was great willingness to compromise, or at least to overlook those theoretical points which were under dispute. Luther and not the Church brought matters to an issue. A slight modification or recantation on his part by which the authority of the Church was recognized would have left him free to work and preach for reform. The Church wanted German money, not German blood.

The change in the tone of the Church can be easily seen by comparing the treatment of Huss and of Luther. Huss was burned in violation of solemn pledges, without a hearing or even a protestation. He faced a cold, heartless tribunal, the members of which seem to have had no touch of that humanitarian spirit to be awakened in the following century. Nor did his death serve to strike one spark of feeling or sympathy out of all Europe. Luther's journey to Worms seems to have been more like a triumphal procession than that of a condemned criminal. He received repeated ovations, preached frequently, and had the air of a man who knew that he was both right and safe. He was evidently an elephant on the hands of the Diet, which was puzzled to know how to escape from the difficulties created by his presence. The streets were crowded with applauding friends, who regarded him as the champion of their cause. It is said that the representative of the Pope thought himself in greater danger than Luther.

It took the Diet a month to get rid of Luther. His case was referred from tribunal to tribunal in the hope that some method could be devised to relieve the strain of the situation. No one wanted to take the blood that Luther was willing to give. The Diet desired anything but a martyr. It was willing enough to burn books, but not men. It took a century to undo the work of the

Renaissance and prepare the way for the night of St. Bartholomew; a drop of blood would have shocked a world given to singing idyls of peace, harmony, and love. So in the end, much to Luther's disgust but to the relief of everybody else, he was lured into a forest, seized by friends, and confined in a lovely castle where he could work undisturbed except by foes that vanish before an inkstand. This solution pleased all except the Dominicans, whose wrath was impotent so long as the Pope, the Emperor, and the Diet were indifferent and winked at the failure of their own edict.

Judged by Protestant standards the Church of the fifteenth century was a failure. Yet these standards are partial, and those that use them judge an old civilization by the standards of a new one. Judged by the old standards, the Church of that time may be regarded as a success. At the beginning of the sixteenth century a Catholic writer with a philosophic bent of mind might have made out a good case for the ecclesiastical organization. There were, indeed, many able persons who thought the Church was just entering the final stages of its triumphal progress, and congratulated it upon the complete accomplishment of the social aims for which it had struggled.

To view the Church of that period primarily as a religious or a moral organization puts it in a wrong light. At bottom it was a civil institution, and it should be judged according to its civil and economic programme. Each age has its aims and ideals, and if the Church of the Middle Ages realized the social programme set by the conditions of its time, it may justly claim to have been a success. The ideal of the Church was to secure peace, and it rightly demanded obedience as a means to this end. The first duties of men were unquestioning obedience and humility in the presence of Church authorities. It would

have been impossible for the Church to awe nations, to restrain rulers, to prevent local quarrels, and to check the aggressions of the strong except by educating every person to be obedient and humble when the authority of the Church was interposed between him and the objects of his desire. Obedience is the first lesson in social progress, and this lesson was well worth learning, even though it took centuries to make it an instinctive motor reaction. By the steady pressure of authority the Church was modifying the very brain tissue of the Christian world, and inculcating habits of thought which lie at the basis of social progress. The Church may perish, but the psychic qualities it created will endure as long as European civilization.

At last Europe was obedient, and as a whole it was at peace. If the Church failed in the latter respect, it was not because it had not quelled the old disorders, but because the national spirit was now rising, and with it a new type of struggles. Ages lap over one another; the world does not wait for one epoch to be absolutely finished before beginning another. To the peace and obedience that the Church secured, the softening, humane spirit of the Renaissance must be added as a further victory for the old religion. It was a triumph of the higher and better element in the Church over the lower and sterner element. Protestantism in the end gave the control of the Church back to this lower element, but the fault, if there be any, was not that of the Church; it was the result of an irreconcilable conflict which no wisdom could avoid.

The economic aims of the Church were also fairly well realized. It provided food and shelter for the workers, charity for the unfortunate, and relief from disease, plague, and famine, which were but too common in the Middle Ages. When we note the number of the hospitals and infirmaries, the bounties of the monks, and the self-sacrifice of the nuns, we cannot doubt that the unfortunate of that time were

at least as well provided for as they are at the present. If the workmen were well fed, warmly clothed, and comfortably housed, surely the economic aims of the age were fairly well realized.

The cause of the failure of the Church, since it lay neither in the field of politics nor in that of economics, must be sought in the domain of morals. Protestantism had a positive moral programme. It consecrated the Sabbath, put the ban upon communal pleasures, enforced the ten commandments, and induced men to cultivate the harmless pleasures of home life. This programme may have been narrow, but it was at least effective. On the other hand, the moral programme of the Church was essentially negative. Regarding the world as the abode of sin, the Church admonished those troubled about the salvation of their souls to enter monasteries and convents. ¶ The Church succeeded better in taking people out of a world of vice and dissipation than in helping them to live in it. ¶

To understand the real cause of the new difficulties a return must be made to the primitive traits shown by all races. The local environments in which primitive races dwelt so long tended to develop two passions,—greed and hate. Of these greed became the dominant passion if a scanty and irregular food supply compelled men to have strong appetites in order to exist. The passion of hatred became the leading motive and determined the relations that existed between men and nations if the struggle was with other men for the possession of the few choice places which the region afforded. Greed thus arises from a struggle with a niggardly nature and hate from a contest with men for the gifts of nature. Every man contending for these gifts of nature is at war with every other man. Societies when formed restrain these unsocial tendencies and make rules to check the passion of hate.

When the social element becomes dominant, improving the industrial conditions and creating social standards, a new evil arises through the strong appetites inherited from earlier times. To exist at all, an unsocial man under primitive conditions needed strong passions. An irregular food supply cut off all who could not gorge themselves and take on fat in times of plenty in order to endure long periods of starvation. Lack of clothing and shelter made food the only source of heat. The diet was usually composed of very few articles, of small nutritive power, — a fact which necessitated a still further increase of appetite. Where the death-rate was high a tribe would soon disappear if the sexual instincts were not vigorous. In short, every increase of the difficulties of living increased the strength of the passions. Men lived only for the moment; they acted quickly and fiercely. They gorged and indulged themselves without limit in the short interval when the bounties of nature were opened to them.

The evils of greed do not show themselves until the food supply becomes regular. Vice comes from it, just as crime comes from under-nutrition. A society improving its economic condition must restrain greed, just as a society increasing its social tendencies must check crime. The standards of the less passionate are imposed on the whole society; those who fail to restrain themselves suffer the resentment of society; those who conform to the social standard not only rejoice in its approval but also in time resent any intimation of the possibility of their violating social standards. When a society reaches this stage its members have characters, and whatever tends to lower character standards is vice. The material objects leading to over-indulgence are luxuries. Under this head must be put articles of which the consumption makes action less prompt and effective than the conditions of society demand. Over-nutrition brings on a lassitude which prevents those vigorous reactions against opposing obstacles

admired by character builders and moral purists. Social ostracism eliminates such persons and keeps society progressive.

In primitive societies crime was an individual affair. To kill an enemy of the tribe was a virtue and brought no punishment. To kill a member of the social group created a blood feud between the murderer and the next of kin. It was the duty not of society but of some particular person to avenge a violent death, and with these blood feuds the law did not for a long time interfere. When the feuds became unlawful, a fine or composition of some sort was regarded as sufficient punishment. The penalties for crime were therefore much less than for vice. As the punishment for vice was always a social affair, it was severe. The whole group, and not a single individual, inflicted the penalty. The culprit was stoned to death, drowned, outlawed, or subjected to some other equally violent and effectual punishment.

The introduction of Christianity changed the relative emphasis upon vice and crime. The early Christians were devoid of national or clannish feeling. They felt themselves mere sojourners in this world, with none but religious ties. The national or clan distinction between an enemy and a friend disappeared. All men became brothers, and every murder carried with it the penalty attached to the killing of a fellow-citizen. In addition to this, the new doctrine that life is sacred made murder one of the worst of crimes. The early Christian thought not merely of the suffering and the disturbance that the killing caused, but also of the eternal welfare of the victim. The wrong done was not so much the depriving of life but the pushing of the victim into the future world unprepared. On the other hand, the millennial doctrines of the early Church tended to lessen the importance attached to vice, or at least to lighten its social punishments. The race would soon be before the Eternal Judge,

and since He was to punish misdeeds, they were of less concern to men. When virtue is thought to consist in a separation from the world, men have less interest in what takes place in the world, and use less energy to reform it or to restrain its evils. People, too, who believe in a speedy destruction of the world have less interest in their distant descendants. Children were preserved not to keep up a family or to perform certain religious rites, but because they had souls to save. These doctrines lessened the emphasis placed on vice by earlier nations, or at least turned the attention to other problems, thus leaving the vicious with fewer social restraints. If a man did not fear future punishment, he had no effective restraint to his strong passions. It is true that the Church took upon itself the punishment of vice, but its power was in no way equal to the earlier local sentiment which it displaced. The greater part of this power, however, was used for other ends which the exigencies of the times made more important. The Church offered no thorough remedy for vice. To a man weary of the struggle against his passions it gave a place of refuge in monasteries, but for him who remained in the world it offered no relief. The feeling that men were totally depraved took the spirit out of every efficient plan to help them. It was natural, therefore, that the civil side of the Church should receive emphasis, and that crime should receive the commanding attention that formerly had been given to vice.

These facts are the source of one of the great differences between the Protestant and the Catholic worlds. The Catholics gave their first thought to the suppression of crime. The Protestants, on the other hand, exerted their greatest efforts to restrain vice. It so happened that the parts of Europe dominated by the Catholic Church — Italy and Spain — were torn by civil discords, and there the need of peace was the greatest. Protestant

Germany and England had already secured the blessings of peace, and were forced, therefore, to grapple with the vices of the new epoch. Moreover, it is natural that the Pope should have looked at the world through Italian eyes. While Italy was the centre of contending armies and of violent social eruptions the old need of peace seemed to make the doctrinal quarrels of German monks trivial incidents. The north and the south of Europe were too far apart in their economic conditions to be content with one social programme. The split was the inevitable and salutary outcome of circumstances that neither Pope nor Church could prevent.

The Protestant revolt against the evils of indulgences arose out of the difference in the emphasis placed upon vice and crime. The steady pressure of the Church in Germany for several centuries had created a class of clingers, who looked up to the Church as the sole source of authority. They accepted submissively whatever was advanced in its name, and looked to it for guidance rather than to their instinctive feelings or to primitive German customs. To this class vice was a secondary form of crime, and hence a matter of relative disutility, and not, as formerly, a matter of absolute morality. Vices, like crimes, were matters of fine or composition. The ordinary individual, who could for a few pence avoid the moral penalty, found dissipation easy. The authority of Rome was held in such awe that its remission of the penalty for vice had too much weight to be set aside.

It is wrong to suppose that the simple peasants who paid for indulgences had committed any great crime. They were not robbers, thieves, or murderers, nor did they suppose that their fathers had been. The consciousness of having violated inherited social usages gave them an uneasy sense of guilt from which they desired relief. The old internal feelings prompted them to act in one way;

the new economic conditions with their numerous luxuries prompted them to act in another. They knew they had not continued the simple ways of the fathers nor followed the precepts of the early Church. Their longing to reconcile the conflicting moral and economic tendencies made them welcome Church indulgences for vice.

It is often assumed that these indulgences were devised by the popes to further their corrupt enterprises. The principle, however, is an old one, which had been acted upon constantly from earliest times. The Church simply utilized certain instincts and tendencies that earlier conditions had formed. Both in theory and practice penances are older than Christianity. When nations were converted, these old remedies were incorporated into the Church's scheme for the suppression of crime. Civil punishment was obligatory, and fell upon any one who committed an unlawful act, whether intentionally or unintentionally. The primitive mind saw no difference between accidental and intentional violations of law. Killing, for example, was murder, and must be avenged even if the act was unavoidable. Submission to civil punishment, however, did not wipe out the social stain. If the social standards of the community were broken, the offender had not merely to submit to the civil punishment, but also to reestablish his good character by some act of penance. A self-imposed penalty alone could restore the offender to his former position. This gratuitous suffering proved his respect for the social standard he had lowered. Pilgrimages, self-mutilations, flagellations, and other forms of personal penance were the outcome of this spirit. By these means the character of the offenders was vindicated and their social position restored. Upon this feeling among the German peasants the agents of the Pope relied, when they offered to commute a personal penance for a money fine. We cannot assume that the peasant was versed in Church lore and knew the learned distinc-

tions that scholastic writers had drawn. He had simply an innate feeling that something should be done to restore his social position, and a Church indulgence seemed the readiest and surest means to this end.

This solution of the difficulties that vice was creating did not appeal to the sturdy moral tone of the early German character. As vice demanded a social punishment, the solidarity of responsibility was lost if the individual could elude social penalties through the intervention of a foreign power. Had the agents of the Pope merely given indulgences for crime, they would probably have avoided condemnation. As it was, they forced an issue between the moral feelings inherited from early German conditions and the new group of feelings that Church activity had aroused. The clingers, who accepted every act of the Church, were a new class created by the economic pressure that marked the supremacy of the Church in Germany. Opposed to the clingers were those in whom the old spirit of liberty and morality was still dominant. Doubtless both groups of feeling were strong in every one. Many, like Luther, prided themselves on their humble, submissive spirit and were a long time in determining which element in their nature to follow. A crisis had come, and Germans had either to revert to their earlier condition or follow blindly along a path that would crush out the earlier race instincts. It was not possible to be both clingers and Germans, and the transformation of thought that followed the conflict of these elements led to the Reformation.

We now have the key to the social side of the Reformation. The bettering of economic conditions in the fifteenth century increased the evils of the communal pleasures and also improved the unity and intensity of family life. It thus brought communal and family pleasures into marked contrast, making the dissipation of the former a crying

evil. Moreover, north Europe had enjoyed peace and good government for so long that peace and order ceased to be of prime importance. It was ready to undertake a moral crusade to limit or suppress the growing dissipation and vice that threatened family life.

Unfortunately for the Church it was lax in matters of vice, and just at this time the need of money drove the popes into the sale of indulgences. A means that had been designed to soften the harsh punishment of crime was used to reduce the already meagre penalties for vice. At the time when greater punishment for vice was demanded, the Church used its power to give social standing to persons against whom the indignation of the local communities was aroused. A moral crusade, that would otherwise have found vent in opposing dissipation and communal pleasures, was turned against the power that made these evils respectable and gave to those who indulged in them assurance of eternal happiness. If it had not been for considerations of a future life, morality could have gone its own way and fought its own battles; but religion had too strong a hold for men to care much for an immediate moral disadvantage, if their eternal advantage was secured. The moral wave was thus turned against the Church, and new religious notions were created to harmonize with the moral demands of the time. The civil virtues that the Church had inculcated were put to the test. The newer virtues—humility, submission, and a love of peace—were contrasted with the older virtues of independence and a free conscience. A reversion toward the older type of character set in and morality was restored to its old place. Viewed in this way, the Reformation was the opening skirmish in the war which civilization is still waging against vice. Luther had high hopes of the moral regeneration that was to follow his endeavours, and no one was more disappointed than he at their immediate effects. He denounced repeatedly the

increasing vice about him. But it was in vain. Not justification by faith, the inspiration of the Scriptures, the doctrine of election, nor any new belief was successful in stemming the rising tide of dissipation.

Protestantism was no cure for vice, and in many respects it was even more of a failure than the old religion, which at least mitigated the evil. After an erring Catholic had committed some dastardly crime a half-dozen times, he had a heavenly vision, which so terrified him that he left his evil ways and sought refuge in a monastery or expiated his crime by working for the Church. Protestantism had no such hold on its followers. The path of vice and crime, once entered, was followed to its legitimate end, — the destruction of the sinner. There was no middle ground between virtue and vice. Either virtue exerted a greater restraining influence than before, or the way of vice was followed so persistently and so long that the resulting weakness, disease, or crime eliminated the evil-doer from society. The immediate effect of Protestant liberty was bad, because it left the violator of social standards freer to follow his natural inclinations. The good it did came from the elimination of bad elements in society after they had run their natural course. The early Church, by checking vice and crime, retained the evil-doers in society and thus prevented the elimination that is necessary to social progress.

Social evils start either from over-nutrition or from under-nutrition. Lack of food leads to violence, war, and crime. A plethora of food results in over-stimulation, dissipation, and vice. In a progressive society both extremes must be avoided, and those who have strong inclinations toward either vice or crime must be eliminated. Starvation and over-indulgence are the two forces that rid society of those whose inclinations do not harmonize with public good. Starvation, disease, and similar evils rid the world of those whose productive power

is too small; vice and over-indulgence remove those whose appetites and passions are coarse and crude. The normal man must reach the point of complete nutrition to avoid one group of evils, but he cannot pass this point without falling a victim to the other group. Thus a particular type of men in each age is normal, and society suffers if social regulations, ideas, or doctrines prevent the elimination of the abnormal. Protestantism was superior to the old Church, not because it put a greater restraint on vice, but because it allowed a freer elimination of the unfit. More sharply contrasting virtue and vice, it made it harder for the vicious to remain an integral part of society.

Each successive age thus acquires a higher standard of morality, but the struggle with the vicious is more severe, because they are more completely severed from society and less interested in its welfare. Economic progress is also accompanied by dissipation, because the increased productive power allows a greater satisfaction of bodily wants. The normal man of the new conditions must have weaker appetites and passions and a greater willingness to use his productive power for the advantage of others. The more passionate and selfish must be eliminated to restore an equilibrium. The only remedy for vice is elimination. Those ideals that represent the highest type of men as possessing strong appetites and passions under firm control are based on false premises. This control is possible only in primitive conditions, where strong appetites and passions are necessary. Such primitive notions must be displaced by sounder ideals before steady progress is possible. Protestantism, born at a time of moral revival, and influenced by early ideals, tried to do an impossible thing. Luther had strong sensual inclinations, and tried to harmonize wine, women, and festivals<sup>1</sup> with a high

<sup>1</sup> *Wein, Weib, und Gesang.*

morality. It was only natural that he should fail, and that Protestantism should be put through the mill of disaster until the communal part of this programme was replaced by quiet home pleasures, outside of which there is no sound morality.

Much of the brutality attributed to religious zeal, therefore, was in reality the outcome of the sensualism that the improved economic conditions had made possible. The new ties that held men to morality were largely those of family life. Those who preferred the more convivial pleasures of public places were left freer than before to follow their natural bent. A class of men arose who were not restrained by the ordinary rules of life, but prided themselves on their liberty, and grasped even the most unscrupulous means of satisfying their abnormal cravings. The discovery of America opened up new avenues for people of this class. They became adventurers and fortune-seekers. A taste for a free, untrammelled life once acquired soon spread in all directions, and took possession of all the dissatisfied, who threw off the old restraints and entered on careers of shameless dissipation. They were willing to resort to desperate means to secure a livelihood, and the breaking up of old social conditions offered them many openings. The new armies offered on land a career fully as adventurous and unrestrained as foreign trade offered at sea. The use of gunpowder had broken down the old military system, by which the national battles were fought by men of honour who prided themselves on their chivalry. The new soldiers followed war for the plunder and license it permitted, fighting for the masters that paid, and willing to change sides for a consideration. Armies were lawless and undisciplined, and devastated the countries they conquered. The soldiery of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was one of the worst scourges ever put upon mankind. The musket gave the control of the world

into the hands of brutes, and they exploited their new power to the utmost. The modern soldier is the product of long training and discipline.

The pressure and power of the large class of adventurers characterized the wars and struggles that followed the Reformation. Much that is attributed to religious zeal was due to the depravity of these adventurers. As soon as these dogs of war were let loose, their ravages hardened the spirit of every one, and made men condone outrages that before would have shocked them. The humanitarian spirit of the first part of the sixteenth century was lost before the century ended, and in its place reigned a bitter, remorseless spirit that would have done credit to an Indian tribe. For this change neither the Church nor religion was responsible. A fortuitous fate had combined a moral upheaval with a sensual reversion. Both were due to economic conditions, and both were necessary steps to the higher levels of modern society, but it was an accident that they were cotemporaneous. There was not the slightest connection between Protestantism and the invention of gunpowder and the discovery of America. Columbus and Luther might have done their work centuries apart; gunpowder might have come to western Europe in some other age. Discovery brought the evils of the century; morality, its benefits. Had the evils got a little more start of the benefits, the history of subsequent centuries would have been very different.

The Reformation was a premature movement forced on Europe by temporary causes, before society was ready for the change. It became, therefore, involved with and subordinated to the civil changes through which Europe was then passing. The time was ripe for the economic development of northern nations, and that necessarily changed the balance of power in Europe. The north already had equal economic strength and greater physical vigour than the south, and in any case would have been

the conqueror in the inevitable contest between the new and the old.

The sensualism aroused by the new economic tendencies should normally have led to a fresh invasion of the south, for the sensual always move towards the point of greatest economic surplus. The German conquests of the first centuries should have been repeated, German civil ideas scattered throughout Europe, and the domination of the State over the Church asserted. Columbus and Luther prevented this normal progress by changing the local environment of western Europe into a world environment. Columbus brought Europe into contact with new nations and problems, while Luther made nations feel the force of ideas foreign to their own conditions. By this I mean that Luther always reasoned on the hypothesis that the primitive Christians were the ancestors of the Germans of his day. Thinking of himself as a Christian rather than as a German, he assumed that the Church fathers were race fathers as well. He assumed further that the lives and actions of these Church fathers were once the standards of his race, and that moral and religious purity demanded a return to these early standards. But the primitive Church did not offer an ideal toward which the German race could revert. A vigorous, sensual German could not be turned into a puny ascetic. Reversions move toward the primitive characteristics of the race, and not along the line of religious development. For the latter to be possible a religion would have to be purely indigenous, without any mixture of foreign ideas. But the Christian religion assimilated by the German of that day was a group of foreign ideas impressed upon the German consciousness by the pressure of economic conditions. The sensualism of the German people was not caused by the Church; it lay in their nature and was sure to show itself as soon as economic conditions permitted. The false idea of parentage inculcated by Luther aided him in his con-

test with the Church, and caused the break to come earlier than it normally would have come.

The enlarged physical and mental environment disturbed the normal development of Europe and changed the natural course of events. The discovery of America and of the southern passage to India should have aided the northern more than the southern nations. It did so ultimately, and would have done so immediately but for the discovery in America of the precious metals. Trade in goods with America and Asia helped the north because the foreign goods were necessary supplements to those at home. The products of the north were too meagre to create a high civilization. The south, however, needed ready money to hold and to cement the power that earlier conditions had given it. Money came from the new regions more rapidly than goods, and thus the immediate effect of the discoveries was to strengthen the south and to weaken the north. This changed the direction of the sensualistic movement then rising. The sensual move naturally toward goods, and thus they ultimately created the international trade of modern times; but for the time they were willing to serve the possessors of ready money in the south, selling their northern heritage for a mess of pottage. When the struggle came between the north and the south, the northern sensualists helped pillage their old homes, and thus the south invaded the north, although normally the movement should have been in the opposite direction. When the inflow of goods counteracted the inflow of money, the north reasserted its supremacy and the Spanish power was quickly broken. The Reformation could not have happened at a more unfortunate time. Had it started a century later, the power of the Church would have been as completely broken as was the Spanish power with which it was associated. The religious transformation that would then have followed would have affected all parts more nearly alike.

The difference between the moral and the sensual wave of the fifteenth century must be clearly recognized, in order to see what was the legitimate effect of each. The moral wave would not of itself have led to a disruption of the Church. The economic conditions had already created great differences between the north and the south of Europe, and the time had come for a break-up of the old German Empire. In the ensuing struggle the sensual had opportunity to show their qualities and to exert their energies. The Church had nothing to gain and much to lose by taking part in this struggle, while in a peaceful contest between the Protestant and the Catholic forces, the latter would have won. Before the religious wars began, the Catholics had already regained much of the ground they had lost. Protestantism, being a moral movement directed against particular abuses, would naturally have been short-lived. Even in the most rugged natures, like Luther's, the spirit of subordination to the Church was strong, and in the princes and the common people it had become a second nature. The moral reformation effected by the Council of Trent would have satisfied the great majority of the Germans, if time had been given them to perceive how the new morality would work. A steady pressure on a nation that had become clingers by instinct would have gradually won them back to the Catholic creed. <sup>^</sup> Even in England, where the clinger instincts were less prevalent, it took two centuries to make the people Protestant by instinct. <sup>^</sup> The old feelings reasserted themselves at every national crisis and often came near winning the day. The Catholics needed peace and delay; the Protestants, on the other hand, needed new instincts and new animosities with which to counteract the old regard for the Church. The religious wars created the necessary new feelings. As soon as devastating, sensual armies began their work, all hope of religious union vanished.

The north was too strong to be conquered, and the mercenary troops that fought for the south, having no interest in Catholicism, did not hesitate to tarnish its good name for their private ends. The rising moral movement in the old Church was obscured by the vices of a sensual soldiery. Thus while the sensualism of the age was largely of northern origin, the south and the Catholic Church had to bear its odium. There were no religious armies in those days. Cromwell's army was the first to fight for principles, and to reflect in their actions the religion they professed. The so-called religious wars had no religion in them. They were merely wasteful methods of ridding society of its sensualists, only equalled since then, perhaps, by the crude justice of mining camps, where the peacefully inclined finally gain control after the sensual have killed each other off. The religious wars freed Europe of much of its sensualism, but they left a stain on religion, and caused a split in the Church which a peaceful development would have prevented.

I state these conclusions neither in a spirit of regret over the shaping of events, nor as an idle surmise of what might have been. There can be no philosophic interpretation of history unless the legitimate effects of each cause can be traced. Only confusion results from judging social movements by the subsequent events, which are usually the effects of complex causes, of which the given social movement was only a subordinate part. In judging the sixteenth century, this mode of reasoning is particularly unfortunate. The sensual and civil interests were so dominant that their effects are mistaken for the natural results of a moral reaction and of religious zeal. Early Protestantism and the prejudices and hatreds of more recent Protestants are the abnormal results of these complex conditions. It has taken centuries to counteract the effects of this queer combination of circumstances. The normal religion and morality of northern nations did not

appear until much later, and then only after a severe struggle with the abnormal types of thought that came out of the confusion of the Reformation period. It is difficult to trace normal tendencies amid so much that is abnormal. In this case it could not be done if it had not happened that English history and development were largely isolated from those of the rest of Europe. I shall, therefore, turn to England, and in the progress of its national thought shall try to show how the abnormal was gradually weeded out and the normal planted in its place.

## CHAPTER III

### THE CALVINISTS

FOR several centuries the great need of western Europe was peace, and the common impulses created by this first requisite of civilization brought the Church to the front as the one institution that produced the conditions of progress. But when this end had been attained, and the secondary wants of each nation made themselves felt, there was no longer such unanimity in the desire for peace and security. The dominant needs of each nationality began to shape national institutions. There was a general impulse to throw off the restraints of the old régime; the primitive instincts of each nation asserted themselves, and caused a reversion subordinating the common ideals of all Europe to more local ones.

Of these local tendencies three are worthy of note. In the south the æsthetic spirit became dominant, and the reversion was toward Greek ideals. In Germany a moral reversion asserted itself; while in the mountain regions of Switzerland and Scotland, and also in the cities, Calvinism found a home. From one point of view Lutheranism might be called a phenomenon of the plains, and Calvinism of the mountains; from another, Lutheranism belongs to the country, Calvinism to the towns; from a third, it might be said that the Lutherans are Germans and the Calvinists Celts. None of these statements is altogether true, yet they show the deep cleft separating the two movements, and the impossibility of any permanent union. In reality, there was no Protestantism, but two separate *isms* that appeared at the same time.

It seems strange that Calvinism should appeal to two social classes so widely separated as the mountaineers and the city artisans. It took root among the most advanced and among the least advanced, leaving a middle class to the other forms of Protestantism. The explanation lies in the fact that Calvinism is congenial to those in whom the clannish spirit is strong. Clans are closely united groups, that think of themselves not as common beings, but as the sons of some one who exerts special powers in their favour. Sonship implies a position of honour and the receiving of favours that are denied to the less fortunate. All who are not sons of the protector are looked upon as existing for the benefit of the sons. From this special relation to the father, the sons always have a surplus beyond what their merit demands. Outsiders, however, have a perpetual deficit; they earn more than they receive, and have a place only as bondsmen of the favourites. A clan is the earliest form of sociocracy, and is due to a cleft in society by which some get a surplus and possess qualities denied to others. The clan lives on its inferiors, who are without the rights of sonship, or upon its neighbours, who are looked upon as natural prey. No clan is a self-contained integral unit; the favoured have dependents at home or inferiors abroad from whom tribute is due.

Every clan, consequently, has a strong feeling of the solidarity of responsibility. The first thought must be for the group. The favoured position can be maintained only so long as the duties of sonship are fulfilled. Violations of these duties are severely dealt with, for the neglect or wrong-doing of any member may inflict a punishment on the whole group and a loss of their privileges. Every privilege implies a standard to which all must adhere, and every favour a duty it is a sin not to fulfil. Favours, duties, standards, and sins are thus bound together, and without them, and strong feelings to enforce them, no clan could exist.

Clannish sentiments and ideas are natural to regions where resources are limited and the conflict is sharp between man and man, or between groups of men. The few resources at hand appear as gifts, and those who succeed in appropriating them seem to be favoured by higher powers. Similar feelings were developed in the cities of the Middle Ages by the guild system. Artisans were bound together in groups, just as are the members of a clan. Each guild occupied a favoured position in the city, and appropriated to its own use a large part of the social surplus. At home the members were surrounded by dependents; outlying regions they exploited by trade as fully as the clans did their inferior neighbours by war. There was also the same feeling of solidarity of interests. Each member of the guild suffered from any defect or fault of the others. They had standards to maintain and duties to perform which it was a crime to neglect. They felt keenly the responsibility their privileges gave, and acquired those notions of superiority and common interests that create a sociocracy.

Thus two quite different sets of conditions had the same general effect on character. The members of the clans and of the guilds possessing the same ideas and feelings were attracted by the same scheme of reform. Calvinism spread where one or the other of these was dominant, reaching its limit when these classes had been won over to its standard. Only the privileged, the chosen ones, the elect, became Calvinists. The ordinary man, who took the world as it came, felt no special responsibility in maintaining race standards, and so was not drawn to Calvinism. No one who thinks he earns what he gets, and that he can do as he pleases with his own, ever becomes a Calvinist. A self-made, self-reliant man, if he is to reach heaven, must travel by some other road. The Calvinist believes he has more than he deserves, and because he is so favoured he must put upon himself certain restraints

that would not otherwise be demanded. With exceptional privileges go exceptional duties, and he must be as zealous in finding the one as in enjoying the other. His first thought is of the duties these privileges impose, and in this he differs from the German, whose first thought is of the morality of acts. Privileges are gifts; morals are rights that depend on an adjustment to nature and a willingness on the part of every one to meet the natural conditions, and to take his share of benefits and evils alike. A Calvinist, however, expects more than his share of nature's products, and in return he is willing to conform to the conditions that the giver of these favours sets. He wants first of all, not the moral rules of the natural world, but the law and will of his superior. He assumes that conditions are attached to favours, and he searches for manifestations of the higher power from which they come. He studies, therefore, not Nature but Will, and assumes that its expression is so plain that it can become a guide to duty.

The Calvinistic attitude is at bottom not moral, but legal. It was not an accident that Calvin had been educated for the bar. No one without legal instincts would have developed such a system as his, nor could any other system have had the influence his had with the peculiar classes for which Calvinism has a charm. It is sometimes said that the difference between Luther and Calvin is, that the one assumes that he can do anything the Bible does not forbid, while the other asserts that nothing should be done that the Bible does not expressly command. Luther expected to be taught by nature and to conform to nature, except where divine revelation had given a higher law; he thought the instincts and the appetites of men were sound, and would guide them in the ordinary affairs of life. Lutheranism, therefore, held that there was a large group of acts outside the bounds of religion to which the moral code alone applied. Cal-

vinism recognized no such indifferent acts. God's law applied to every phase of conduct. The covenant between Him and His favoured children, argued Calvin, contains the rules by which the privileges of sonship are to be retained, and these rules, when studied and developed, will apply to every situation in which a son finds himself. For the sons, therefore, the natural rules of living are superseded by God's more definite ones, which, properly interpreted, will always afford a rule of action. In this way the legal instincts of Calvin found expression. A lawyer assumes that there is always a rule whereby to settle a disputed point. Courts never throw out cases because the established rules will not apply. Calvin, acting on the same plan, found in the Scriptures rules suited to every act and situation. Decisions could be based on the original covenant between God and man, just as a court draws its decisions from the general principles of inherited law or the original civil contract between man and man.

Before ideas can take root, especially in a foreign land, the soil must have been prepared by the presence of suitable economic institutions and activities. Bold and idealistic as was the scheme of Calvin, yet it was the natural outgrowth of the economic ideas of the age, and can be readily traced to such an origin. The activities of the people had formed a peculiar race psychology, and this psychology was used to propagate certain social and religious concepts and ideals.

Here again we find an illustration of the fact that motor reactions formed by the economic pressure of preceding ages may be appropriated for higher ends. Primitive men differ from modern men in having an enlarged concept of self. This self expands or contracts according to the circumstances under which men live. There may be a synthetic self, so enlarged that everything seems a part

of it. Man then identifies himself with all things agreeable or useful. Again, an analytic self is dominant, and men put so much into the non-self that the self becomes a mere abstract concept with no material accompaniment. Neither of these extreme positions is often taken. Men usually identify themselves with their bodies, and with whatever in their environment is essential to their needs and prosperity. The ordinary man is not bound by any philosophical system, but draws the line between the self and the non-self according to his practical needs. As a rule, however, this line is fixed by the immediate environment, which determines what things are so closely coupled with the self that a contrast is useless, and what things are so adverse that a contrast is essential to prosperity or even to existence.

The self of man was more synthetic than analytic in these earlier days, and consequently the goods essential to welfare were thought of, not as things, but as qualities of men. A man was not a man unless he had certain possessions, tools, or supplies. To be hospitable implied a stock of goods; to be efficient implied certain tools; to be a warrior implied the possession of arms; to be a free man indicated the ownership of land. People did not think of men *plus* their possessions; the attention was concentrated on the man, and the accessories were regarded as his qualities. When, for example, we think of a painted house, we have a thing and a quality; but when we speak of a house covered with paint, we have two things in mind. In the first case the paint has lost its identity and become absorbed in the concept of a house; in the second case it remains an independent thing. So in the terms "warrior" and "knight" the arms and the horse have lost their identity and have become mere qualities. A warrior without arms is not a warrior, nor is a knight who is horseless a knight. They become something else by losing the quality of having arms or a horse. A freeman

is not a non-slave; the word is a contraction for a freeholding man. A freeman was more than a tramp. There was a state below him which he shuddered to think of entering. His character and social position depended upon his arms, tools, lands, or other possessions. Without these objective qualities he ceased to be a man and became a slave, a serf, a labourer, — that is, something less than a freeman. No one thought of himself as a man, but as a weaver, a farmer, or a warrior. The tools, stocks, and external paraphernalia of each determined the class into which he was put, and a change in the character, quality, or amount of these externalities altered the class of their possessor.

We have all read in *Mother Goose* of the old woman who thought she must be somebody else, because while she slept some one cut off the bottom of her petticoats. Strange as this mental attitude may appear, it was the prevalent one in earlier times. Not only the petticoat, but the ornaments of the head, the colour and the cut of the clothes, and other minor details helped to determine the personality of the wearer. The internal created the external. As character revealed itself by its objective accompaniments, it was thought to have changed if there was a change in its external indices. That a man is a man in spite of externals is a democratic concept which our forefathers lacked. They could not conceive of a man apart from the social status that his goods created for him. Under these conditions a man's goods are an index to his character, for it is assumed that they partake of his nature, and would be different if his character were other than it is. These goods are supposed to be of his workmanship, and reflect, therefore, the character of him who made them. A defect in the goods of a man reveals, it is thought, a defect in his character. Before the period of exchange, the goods and possessions of a man gave an accurate account of his energy and skill.

Each tool, horse, and farm was a monument to its possessor, and its qualities and appearance enabled others to measure the man who created and owned it. Each one prided himself on the superiority of his goods, and felt hurt and degraded if others did not recognize the virtue of the owner in the excellence of what he produced and owned.

This feeling that the products and possessions of a man measure his excellence is strong even at the present time. "How far does my land go?" repeated a farmer, indignantly. "Just as far as the weeds are cut by the roadside." This man measured his character by the perfection of the productive instrument he used. His farm was of his own making, and he believed himself as much superior to his neighbours as his farm was superior to theirs. He could not put himself in the same category with those whose instruments of production were inferior to his. He thus created a sociocracy of character to which no one could rise, unless by an equal superiority of goods. The woman's character is reflected in the home-keeping even more than the man's in his occupation. The woman who looks at the shirt-bosom of a neighbour's husband to see if it is clean does so with the idea that poor washing and ironing reflect upon the character of the laundress. The wearer of the offending shirt is not lowered in her estimation, but her blame falls entirely on the untidy housewife.

This mental attitude of the Middle Ages is so different from the prevalent modern one that it is hard to put ourselves in the place of primitive men and see their economic belongings in the light that they did. Now all look at goods from the capitalist's standpoint. To him, goods are a moving series of things, of which the particulars are of no interest except in their power to multiply. If inferior articles yield a more rapid rate of increase, a capitalist has no objection to exchanging better things for

them, and if he did not make the exchange his neighbours would think less of him. His goods have thus become mere objects that do not in any way reflect the character of their owner. A labourer has also become a mere man, who loses nothing by the lack of tools or of goods. He takes what is given him by his employer, works for economy instead of excellence, and feels in no way identified with the product of his efforts. A mere workman is thus the complement of a capitalist with mere goods. Industry was formerly carried on by persons whose personality was so prominent that their products were viewed merely as qualities showing the character of the worker. The industry and the workman were one and the same. Now there are three distinct elements: mere workmen called labourers, mere things called goods, and mere savers called capitalists. The earlier industrial state can be best named "frugalism," because that quality was the general characteristic of industrial activity. The frugalist has an interest in all he possesses, makes his possessions reflect his personality, and feels degraded if he lacks anything necessary to complete industrial independence. This enlarged personality must be destroyed, and the elements that made it objectified, before the industrial world can be transformed into labourers, savers, and capitalists.

There was nothing our ancestors so despised as being merely men. A mere man was a beggar, a vagrant, a thief, or even worse. Every one thought of himself as a farmer, a weaver, or a smith, because character always transformed a mere man into something better. The natural man was depraved, vicious, and sensual; the favoured man was upright, and possessed the character that the natural man lacked. Later, as men grew more analytic, this favoured man became an artificial concept. The natural man, unrestrained by character, heredity, or social environment, now becomes the ideal; nature is

man's only teacher, and his own instincts are his only guide. When all these new concepts have been acquired, society is ready for a capitalistic régime, but even if we like this latter state better than that of our ancestors, we must not forget that many of our highest concepts and ideals are based on their views of the industrial world.

It may be said that the Reformation in England was due to three sets of ideas : frugalistic concepts, the feeling of the solidarity of responsibility, and the influence of the Bible. The first was acquired from the immediate economic environment, the second was inherited, the third imported. To put the same facts in another way, the Reformation was the result partly of economic, partly of moral, and partly of legal ideas. The first two were indigenous ; the last was foreign. The Bible did not create a new concept of morality. The revolution resulting from its translation was at first confined to law and government. Only after it had transformed men's ideas in these fields did it make its influence felt in other quarters.

To understand the influence of the Bible, it should be remembered that its translation and general use was one of the first results of the art of printing. It became at once a primer, a history, and a law book. Previously, people had obtained their ideas either by talking or observing, their history from tradition, and their law from custom. To all these fields a new avenue was opened through the printed page, which was regarded as sacred because representative of the Holy Writ. Previously, the evidence presented by the senses had the highest value, the customs and traditions of a race came second, while written records took a third place. This order was now reversed, and the written word assumed an importance surpassing what men saw or heard. The wise fathers of the race, with their legacy of customs and traditions, sank

into insignificance before the interpreters of a printed text translated from a foreign tongue.

The art of printing made possible a new way of acquiring ideas. In reading, ideas arise not by the direct presentation of objects, but by arbitrary signs that arouse associated mental images. No person can obtain ideas readily from a printed page unless his mental associations have created groups of ideas so well cemented together that the arbitrary sign exciting one of them brings up the whole group. In actual sight each of the various stimuli arouses its proper idea, and thus the act of uniting them into one vision is simple, even if the objects in the vision are complex and multitudinous. In reading there are no such aids. A single weak stimulus must arouse a group of ideas and blend them into a unity as readily and as quickly as the many stronger stimuli do in the case of sight.

This can be done only by a change and development of the mental mechanism. There must be a multitude of ready-made, vivid associations capable of being visualized in a body as soon as any one of them arises. The mental mechanism of a reader must be of a higher order than that of a mere beholder, and his mental reactions prompter and more vivid, in order to make up for the greater weakness of the stimuli. The differences between mental pictures excited by words and those excited by colour any one can recognize. To see colours, intellectual activity must be stopped to permit the full activity of the senses. The intellect does little; the senses do much. In other words, to see well, mental associations must be broken up and only the more animal attribute of attention developed. The reader, on the contrary, must develop and clarify these intellectual associations, and by visualizing them in groups make them vivid enough to become motor stimuli.

The reader and the observer differ mentally as well as externally. The one has a stock of ready-made associations. Ideas come forward in groups and in a fixed order,

whenever any member of the group is excited. The ideas of the other come only in the order that he has seen things in nature, and he can picture things only as he has actually seen them. The actual and the historical represented in the present are to him the important verities, which he reverences, and from which he would think it a crime to deviate. The observer became the Cavalier, and the reader the Puritan. The Cavalier had seen the king and the courts, the bishops and the cathedrals, and he could not picture these other than they were. The very details and externalities seemed vital parts of the institution, for through them he had acquired his ideas, and without them king, court, or bishop had no reality. The king said "no bishop no king," because he had never seen a king without a bishop; his followers added other details to the picture and held them all to be essential. Words and books were the only means by which other pictures could be formed. The king and his followers, who lacked the power to acquire ideas in this way, came into conflict with the book readers, who could visualize what they had not seen.

The Puritan had not seen the King he served. The law he respected and the government he admired had been in actual operation only in a distant land and at a much earlier date. Neither had an actual present being. The record of their successes and failures could be learned only from a book that told of a race which had long since lost its political identity. The court by which the Puritan expected to be judged no man had seen, or could see until the day of final judgment. Yet the Puritan derived a vivid concept of this court from the sacred book. His religious ideals were word pictures illustrating things and ideas so foreign to English conditions that ordinary sense impressions could not originate them. The Bible thus encouraged the development of a new type of men, inspired by the vivid word pictures of the Old Testament. The law, the government, and the social life of the

Hebrews all have a picturesque clearness, with the principles so prominent and their corollaries so plain that they can be readily applied to other conditions and in other places. It is no wonder that these word visualists found in the Old Testament a rule for every action, and that their conception of God's government and final judgment was so vivid as to discredit the actual government of England, that had nothing but tradition and custom to support it.

> Calvinism came into England as a complement of two qualities so ingrained in the English people as to become a second nature. The frugalistic concepts had given them an enlarged personality, and a feeling that their actions were a part of themselves and an index of their character. They had also a strong feeling of the solidarity of responsibility, which emphasized the evils inflicted on the whole people by the wrong acts of individuals and the need of national unity. The unity of the people and the character of the individual were concepts too vivid to need further emphasis. The people had, however, very hazy ideas of how to preserve individual character and to avoid national injury from individual depravity. Inherited customs, habits, and laws were no longer suited to existing needs. They neither set high standards for character nor checked the growth of sensualism. In this situation the central thought of Calvin's theology — the covenant between God and man — supplied a pressing want. It defined what were the highest standards of purity, and it laid down rules by which the evils of human depravity could be avoided. Through the concrete picture suggested by the thought of a covenant, law became objectified, unified, and visualized, and was no longer regarded as the creation of capricious sovereigns or the heritage from antiquated customs. The law is not a thing to be made, but to be discovered and expounded. Calvin wisely held fast to this thought, and enforced it with such vigour that it became a vivid

concept to all his followers. In this way he not only created a new ideal, but he also strengthened the power of visualizing, and thus assisted in transforming the Bible into a series of word pictures.

The Puritan creed was not merely a series of logical propositions demonstrated by quotations from the Bible, but a group of pictures aroused by words which, when visualized, were as real as external facts. The Puritan made the power of visualizing the test of truth. He never doubted what he saw clearly; a vision was an inspiration. A logical proposition, if true, forms the foreground of each one of his creed pictures, yet there is a background as well, which a mere logician is likely to overlook. The background is as important in a word picture as in a colour picture, and modifies its meaning fully as much. No one would regard a striking group of colours as beautiful unless they were modified and harmonized by the dimmer outlines behind them. So with creed pictures; the logical proposition in the foreground may be impressed with vigour and stand out as clearly as do the vivid colours in the paintings of a modern impressionist. But this is not all. There are other truths faintly outlined, yet so closely related to the main proposition that they blend with it and modify its meaning, making the whole a vivid, harmonious picture that becomes a motive to action and an inspiration to a higher life. Dead creeds only are hardening and narrowing. In judging the Puritans we forget the freshness of their creed and the nearness which they felt to God. God's people, His law, His final judgment, the fall of man, and similar concepts were all painted in fitting words and made so vivid that they became real. If even Hume, a century later, made vividness a test of truth we cannot blame the Puritans for accepting this test at a time when word visualization was so new that it seemed like a revelation. The long sermons to which they listened so

eagerly did not become dry and tedious until a new generation had grown up, who were so familiar with the new creed and its pictures that they did not need that description in detail required by their fathers.

Word picturing has become such a matter of course and has been used in so many ways that it has lost its peculiar attractions. We should not forget, however, that the Puritan was the first form of the modern stalwart, and that he deserves attention on this account as well as for the revolution his advent created. As a revolutionist he failed, at least partially; but as a stalwart his success was permanent. Ideals and word pictures have transformed modern life, and made men more earnest than they could have been if colour pictures and other appeals to the senses had remained as dominant as they were in the Middle Ages. The colour sense in the northern nations was too little developed to be used as a means for their elevation. Without the new method of visualization they would have remained stupid sensualists, with no higher thoughts than those excited by greed or fear.

When the visualizing power of the Puritan is coupled with the enlarged sense of personality that the economic pressure of preceding ages had created, the reason for his opposition to vice becomes apparent. During its supremacy the Church had exerted its energies against crime. The uplifted hand, the dagger, the falling victim, create definite sense impressions, and a feeling of horror at such deeds may be instilled into the simplest minds. Vice, however, lies not in a single act, but in relations between a series of acts. One cannot see vice as he sees crime. Each act by itself might be innocent and proper, and yet a series of them might become a heinous vice. No cup of wine, no single movement in a dance, no play, sport, or game is of itself bad. Vice is a mixture,—a series of inharmonious relations; it is a stain on the

character rather than an injury to the person of the actor. To see vice, therefore, one must first visualize character and be able to blend into one picture the long series of acts that constitute vice. If there is no consciousness of character there is no consciousness of vice. No one ever saw character; it is but a word picture. The same is true of vice, which comes into being only when men are able to picture a long series of events and perceive the evils that flow from them.

To the Puritan vice was no abstract concept founded on definition, but the series of concrete acts that lowered and defiled his ideals. Many bad things escaped the notice of the Puritans, but they guarded with zealous care their homes and their relations to God. Heretofore people had houses, but no homes. Home is not an aggregate of goods possessed, a mere sum of material things, but a concept due to the existence of certain relations, depending even more on what is not there than upon things present. In fact, the essence of the Puritan concept of a home lay in the *not-theres*; for man made a home mainly by keeping out of other social relations. There is no tyrant like a home, nothing else demands such implicit obedience. A home must also be distinguished from a family. The original family was a clan, a unit that presented a solid front to strangers, but had loose and unsatisfactory internal relations. The welfare of the whole prevented the concentration of interest on the smaller groups which is necessary for their development.

To the external world the clan was made up of fighters; viewed internally, its members were feasters, revellers, and often brutal sportsmen. When clans were united into a nation they lost their fighting qualities, yet their type continued in the communal pleasures that were the life and joy of each locality. The old clannish feelings clustered about festivals and fairs, and were kept alive by them. The thought of a home does not come from these sources;

it is created by a mental process that excludes all these elements. Both economically and socially the home and the communal life stand opposed to each other. Economically, because the income spent at the fair and the festival is demanded by the home; socially, because the pleasures of these places lower men's standards and taint the purer atmosphere of the home. Its more intimate relations demanded a total abstinence from the coarser pleasures in which the communal life abounded. As soon, therefore, as economic conditions made English homes possible, the seeds of Puritanism were sown. Little by little the antithesis between the home and communal life grew stronger, until at length a fierce hatred arose between the classes.

The country of the Puritans was not England, but a pictured gathering of God's elect. The concept of a country as a stretch of land comes later, when men get their ideas through geographies. The people who visualized themselves as standing in God's presence and judged by his laws needed no such material background. In this intimate thought of God the old concept of the unity of the clan is enlarged and put to a new use. Under God's judgment the people are as one man. Here, as of yore, the solidarity of responsibility is a vivid reality. God's wrath falls not on men, but on the people; every one suffers from violations of the covenanted law. God-sent calamities are natural, and the innocent suffer with the guilty. This vivid concept of the unity of the people and of the solidarity of responsibility could not but excite intense opposition to social shortcomings and lead the Puritan to purge the nation from pollution and vice.

Thus, when the old conditions were broken down and the historical clan life ceased, the Puritan utilized the clan concept and feelings to form the enlarged concept of the people standing in definite relations to God. The Puritan still had the clan concept, but by thinking of the relations between men and God as those of a clan to its leader, they

freed the thought of all historical dross, and made it stand for the purest relations then conceivable. The common life of men became their purest life, and hence religious. Everything outside of their common life was regarded as idolatrous, and sure to bring calamities.

But when the social reorganization came, the more indulgent neighbour gave up to the nation the best elements of clannish life, and retained in the concept only the dross, the coarser pleasures associated with earlier days. To him common life meant carousals, free fights, drunkenness, adultery, and other indulgences to which primitive men were inclined. Both parties, therefore, tried to revive and reanimate the old clannish feeling, but their mental development was so different that they were brought into a contest to be decided only by a bitter struggle.

The Puritan believed that every expression and action was an index of character. The inner man, they felt, was always objectified in acts. There was no need of looking into men's hearts when its condition was reflected in all they did. It is not that which goeth into a man that defileth him, but that which cometh out. In this mood men guarded every word, look, and act, and lived constantly in the thought that any deviation from the objective standards of law and morality revealed the depravity of men's hearts, and thus exposed them to the penalties that every violation of the covenant evoked. When the mental life of the people is visualized, the acts of each man become the acts of all men, and his defects become their defects. According to this reasoning, there could be no purity except national purity. ✓

The non-Puritan fully recognized the connection between the outer act and the inner man, but he wished to appear bad so that he might seem forceful. Men of energy resort to many devices to appear passionate and resentful. The man who shows passion upon slight provocation and violates the conventional rules of behaviour gains a posi-

tion among simple people that quieter methods cannot secure. The vigorous sensualist, therefore, had a purpose in violating the rules of conduct that the Puritans held dear. He used the accepted connection between the inner thought and the outward expression to impress his importance on his inferiors, and make them more submissive to his will. The readiest means of vigorous expression are oaths, and resort to them is always had by those who seek to terrify others into doing what they have no right to command. Those who made free use of God's name were as far from being idolatrous as were the Puritans. They simply desired to impress their importance and enforce ready obedience. Both these ends could be gained by a string of oaths, which cost nothing but the opposition of the Puritans. The use of oaths thus became the distinctive mark of a certain type of men.

The Puritans opposed all who bore this mark, and hence they gave this test an importance that cannot now be understood without some explanation. Adultery and swearing were regarded as the two great evils, because they were the ready tests by which the sensual and depraved could be distinguished. Hobbes is not far from right in saying that the Puritans only knew two commandments, — the third and the seventh. But why seek many tests when one or two simple ones will answer? If the simple tests of the Puritans sufficed for their age, they did well to neglect evils that are the outcome of other ages. When adultery and swearing had been curbed other evils could be attacked. For the time at least, the lesser vices were bound up in the greater, and could be fought through them. Adultery violated the home; swearing broke the sacred covenant. Could honest men be silent when their most cherished ideals were at stake?

The marked peculiarity of English civilization is the suddenness of its advent. When other nations were ris-

ing in civilization by a much slower process, England had lain dormant, a land of savagery and brutality, feeling outside influences only occasionally and spasmodically. The early history of England is a series of partially made conquests, not thorough enough to establish a foreign civilization, and too violent and too frequent to permit development from internal sources. Not until the Norman Conquest were the conditions of progress acquired, and even then there were many obstacles against which more favoured nations had not to contend. It may seem a long time from the Norman Conquest to the Puritan Revolution, but a century is to a civilization as a day to a man's life.

This earlier England can best be understood by comparing it with the Ireland of more recent times. For centuries the English have been at least the nominal rulers of that land. Had they been more brutal, and rid the island of its earlier inhabitants, new settlers might have secured for it an honoured place in history. Had the rulers been more mild, this might have been accomplished by the inhabitants themselves. But as a fact neither of these policies was pursued, or, rather, both of them were followed, but so irregularly and with such sudden changes from one extreme to the other that each counteracted the good the other might have done, and together they destroyed even the few virtues that earlier times had instilled. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at that the Irish have become an example of unthrift, and that primitive passions which have disappeared from other lands still hold sway over them.

In just this way early England was the football of circumstances. The conflict between external and internal forces was so evenly balanced that neither could accomplish their legitimate effects. The good was destroyed before it could become thoroughly rooted. The bad was never more than checked, and was often so assisted by

circumstances that it had the luxuriance of weeds. In such conditions the primitive evil endures, and assumes forms more noxious than simpler conditions would permit. There is no evil so great as an irregular, insecure social environment. It promotes the gambling spirit with which primitive men are tainted, and brings to the front those strong passions that demand immediate indulgence.

Suppose the channels of trade and commerce to be suddenly so changed that Madagascar became the most favourably situated island in the world, and that inexhaustible internal resources were opened up there which gave to industry an advantage not possible in other lands. It is quite easy to predict what changes we might expect in its inhabitants. The mass of the people would use their advantage to satisfy carnal appetites; the chiefs of local tribes would be changed into a flashy nobility eager for every foreign gewgaw, and the king would sit on his throne feasting, laughing at straws, and thinking of nothing higher than of the supply of women that he and his court were to debauch. This is human nature as it shows itself whenever unexpected economic conditions suddenly pile wealth into anybody's lap. We should not find fault with the Madagascar savages under these conditions, nor should we condemn the English when they suddenly found themselves in a similar position.

Perhaps the best of all places for examining the native tendencies of human nature is in a mining camp, or in any region where new resources capable of immediate exploitation are opened up. America has had a series of these exhibitions of character, and from them can be obtained the best pictures of how men act when fortune suddenly smiles on them. Men of this sort are the constant laughing-stock of people with more refined tastes. They throw their money about in a careless way, are pleased with simple things, and run into extravagances and debaucheries. Their pleasures are not less striking

than the glass beads and other gewgaws of the savage, and their vices are as low as those of their more primitive brothers. They love strange sights and striking spectacles, and satisfy to the full any simple longing of their earlier days of innocence and restricted income. "Coal-oil Johnny" was a striking example of this class. Suddenly made rich by the discovery of oil on his lands, he expended his money in running a circus. Nowhere else could he find the few things he enjoyed so vividly presented and so harmoniously united. Here he cast his lot as long as his wealth held out, and then sank back to the level from which he sprang. If we had a thousand such men governing an island, we might call them a nobility, but their actions would belie the title, for their pleasures and vices would be simple and vulgar. The island might be called merry while they ran circuses, promoted street fights, held carnivals and fairs, and danced around May-poles, but it would be a merriment ending in debasement and degradation. Only after this mad carnival ended could any refinement or civilization appear.

A comparison of German and English civilization will further illustrate this thought. Germany has had a steady development running through many ages. It has had no sudden spasms of progress followed by relapses into sensuality. Until after the Reformation the country was never overrun by foreign foes. The external forces were too weak to subjugate her, or even seriously to impress themselves on her. The upbuilding forces were, therefore, all internal, and they worked so gradually as to affect all classes alike. As a result, the Germans in all parts of society have the same characteristics. If the peasant were transferred to the palace, he might be uncouth and take some time to acquire polish, but he would never sink to the brute's level and run circuses or promote street fights. Every German carries upon him the impress of his civilization. He has the same quiet ways, loves the same

innocent amusements, has the same affability to strangers, and dreads the violence and stir that rude men enjoy. You may not admire the type, but at least it has been made universal by the pressure of slowly working social forces, and can be relied on to show its traits in all classes.

The striking thing in England is the gulf between the upper and the lower classes. No one can deny that the better class of Englishmen is civilized; many think that it furnishes the highest specimens of nobility and enterprise that modern civilization affords. But in passing below these men whose character is thoroughly fixed there is a sudden drop to the plain of mere brutality. The stages between character and sensuality do not exist. The man who is not refined likes street fights, gambling, gin, horse-racing, and is as eager to promote vice as were his primitive ancestors. There are whole classes whose lives would disgrace the South Sea Islanders, and whose vices could not be paralleled except among the rudest savages. This state of affairs is merely an index of the newness of English civilization. England has never enjoyed those steady upbuilding forces that eliminate the vicious and give to all survivors the same definite marks. The Puritan struggle is the only one in which the evils in question were consciously grappled with, but its duration was too short and its resources too few to destroy them. At other times the brutal have had their way, and the vicious have run their natural course towards degradation. Even by such processes the destruction of the bad takes place, but it will require time to weed out the brutal and the vicious from England.

To understand the primitive conditions that still survived in the time of the Puritans, we must study the traits of primitive men, and also the peculiar effects of English climate. The latter determined the constitution of those who survived. England is wet and breezy. Damp air,

which is one of the best radiators of heat, is the cause of perpetual chilliness. Such a condition is a great drain on the system, and can be guarded against only by warm clothing or by rich food. As primitive men lacked warm clothing, it was necessary to keep the internal furnace hotly burning, and those whose constitutions were so weak that they could not maintain their vitality were weeded out by exposure and disease. This climatic strain was further increased by the habits of the people. It is said that they plunged their new-born children into lakes or rivers to test their constitution. They went bare-limbed without inconvenience, and sought opportunities to display their vigour and hardihood. Even a century ago men enjoyed washing out of doors in winter, and loved to throw ice-water over their bare shoulders. The internal furnaces raged so fiercely that only by such means could they be rendered bearable. Picture the early English clothed in linen instead of wool, and then you will begin to realize what constitutions they had. Among a race of men so inadequately clothed, those who suffered from weakness and poverty simply disappeared.

There is no better way of showing the results of economic changes than to take this man of nature and put him into heavy, woollen clothes, build him a comfortable house, and set him by a blazing fire. The fierce internal combustion and the vigorous appetite will not only be useless, but positively injurious. The fires must be banked and the appetites reduced. Changes like these cannot take place in a day without evil results. The dissipation that Englishmen plunged into was largely due to the suddenness of the economic change. What could not come to the surface went to the heart and corrupted it. In contrast to this natural Englishman, we must think of the Puritan as a man needing warm clothing and a comfortable, heated house. He wore mufflers and fur gloves when out of doors, and used pills instead of exercise to promote his

digestion. To have slept on the grass or to have danced barefoot around a May-pole would have killed him.

If such was the constitution of the early Englishman, what were his traits and vices? Here, as I have said, it is better to picture the typical savage; for an Englishman was only a savage held over. The primitive man likes feasts, sports, and gambling, and enjoys childish spectacles and strange sights. The Puritans did not understand anthropology, and hence they thought their enemies were possessed of devils. It was, however, only such devilry as comes of forcing natural spirits into wrong channels. All these exhibitions of primitive nature the Puritans called idolatry, and the effects of passion were summed up as adultery. The facts were indeed bad enough, but these terms misrepresent them. The trouble lay in the crudeness of the national sports, and in the lack of those concepts upon which the ties of modern marriage rest. The Puritans are not to be blamed for their ignorance of early marriage relations, but we know enough now to understand what the trouble was. In primitive times sexual matters concerned the tribe, not the person. The end sought was the preservation of the group, and against it no individual had rights, nor were his inclinations and feelings ever made the basis of duties or virtues. Where parentage is unimportant promiscuity is the rule. Especially in fighting clans it was necessary to offer every inducement for child-bearing. Festivals, feasts, and social gatherings were designed to provoke the passions.

Under such conditions the first thought of a woman was not to guard her chastity but to escape barrenness. She knew that her position and probably her life depended upon her fertility. Chastity became a dominant motive only after economic welfare had progressed so far that clans began to disintegrate. Before that time barrenness was the dread of every woman, and she would resort to any means to avoid it. There is probably some truth in the

assertion that a woman is more fruitful if she enters into sexual relations when very young and indulges in amusements that create sexual excitement. At least savage races act on these assumptions and incorporate them in their religion. The gods that primitive women worshipped most eagerly were those that prevented barrenness, and these gods were sure to demand of women licentious acts as a means of securing their favour. The sacrifice of chastity was an early form of worship, and sacred prostitution is an element in primitive religions. The story of Hebrew progress told in the Bible shows how hard it was to weed out these practices, and the Puritans were not wrong in seeing a similarity between vice in England and in Palestine, but they mistook the causes. The English had not fallen from a higher and purer state, they simply had never risen out of the natural condition of all primitive races. When Christianity was introduced, the old festivals with which so much licentiousness was associated were not abolished, but were continued under other names. This was the conscious policy of the Church, and was commanded by Pope Gregory.

It must be remembered that the Church was in reality a civil organization whose main end was peace and security. Its clergy did not, therefore, express that condemnation of sensual indulgences which modern opinion demands, but were content if no breaches of the peace occurred, in the belief that the nation was safest when the attention of individuals was diverted from public affairs by opportunities to indulge their passions. Little was done to improve the character of local festivals and other social gatherings. Doubtless some of them were gradually bettered, but there was still a taint about all communal pleasures, and some were really vile. The social standards fell very low, if they were not completely broken down. Girls then accepted as matters of course what under other conditions would have made them recoil. Thoughtful parents recog-

nized the dangers and withdrew their daughters from temptation, until in the end only the worst social elements indulged in the communal pleasures. Therefore it should not be a matter of wonder, if, as the Puritans charged, the greater number of the maidens who danced about the May-poles lost their virtue. Just this loss of virtue was the original purpose of such gatherings, and they were continued to give an outlet to the carnal appetites of men and to promote the growth of population. It was hardly possible that these ends should have been suddenly lost sight of, and that events having so many vile associations should have become innocent, æsthetic pleasures.

One might fill a book with descriptions of the crude, silly, and brutal amusements of Cavalier England. The May games were a single feature, and perhaps the best of their kind. There were also a great variety of festivals, fairs, and carnivals, in which the brutality and licentiousness of earlier days had full swing. Each saint's day, of which there were forty or more, gave a new occasion to lay aside respectability. There were also pageants, processions, and church fairs to attract the innocent and unwary. Even now church fairs in the frontier towns of America are bad enough, but there is no attempt to compete with inn-keepers in promoting drunkenness, as the English churches did at their Whitsun-ales. In addition to all these sports there were public dances, — morris dancing, masked balls, and the like, — where too often the mirth was at the expense of common decency. Then came the less public events, — bridals, christenings, wakes, funerals, and birth-days, — in which the lower self was again free from restraint. For shows the taste of the day demanded puppet plays, hobby-horses, jugglers, and jesters, with a sprinkling of local plays and interludes in which sacred things were lowered and evil exalted. When these attractions failed, resort was had to cock-fighting, bull and bear baiting,

throwing at cocks, or other forms of torture, and by way of variety some sporting nobles would offer a hat to the man who knocked down the most people in an open street fight.

Looked at from a distance, these events may appear natural and merry, but they did not seem so to sober people who had to live among them. The money for their support was obtained by methods little short of terrorism, and if all else failed, thieving helped out. Picture a community that was outside the law about half the time, and where public sentiment was about as elevated as it was in those portions of Missouri which Jesse James terrorized, and one can realize the power that promoters of these events had, and the distaste felt by the more respectable. At Christmas, and often at other festivals, a master reveller was appointed, to whom for the time all the honours of a king were paid. When this Lord of Misrule — a title that certainly fitted his deeds — had appointed his subordinates and formed a procession, they went about the town disguised and acting like madmen, forcing people to give them food and drink to get rid of them. Finally, when tired of other mischief, they went to the church, broke up the service, made themselves merry among the pews, and profaned the churchyard by turning it into a dance-hall, where they disgraced the night. At other times Friar Tuck, Maid Marian, Robin Hood and his outlaws, were brought in to lead the festivities.

Vice is the same, however dressed, and its devotees care little for the outer garb so long as the reality is secured and enjoyed. Very thin disguises will serve as occasion for assembling the clans of vice. Perhaps the most amusing, certainly the most absurd, of all these devices were the pageants and processions of which both people and nobility were fond. It seems hard to realize that our ancestors of only three centuries ago liked to ride hobby-

horses, and to look upon a motley procession of nymphs, fairies, satyrs, dragons, and devils, accompanied by a host of giants, knights, buffoons, dwarfs, and naked boys. With these were intermingled crude representations of ships, castles, gardens, and forests. Yet vast sums of money were spent on these childish spectacles, and royalty itself participated in them. These displays of pomp and absurdity revealed how much of the savage still remained in the English nature. Little that was pleasing or æsthetic could be found in a five-shilling hobby-horse or in the monstrosities and strange figures that filed along the streets. They simply indicated a deficiency of taste and a primitive longing for activity and excitement. They also gave the relief that savage natures crave from the monotony of a dull economic life.

When all these events are summed up, we see that sports, holidays, and festivals occupied full half the time. To begin with there were fifty-two Sundays, some forty saints' days, and numerous national holidays; then came all the local events, — Christmas fairs, festivals, anniversaries and the like, — to which must be added the more private celebrations, as christenings, bridals, wakes, and funerals. In fact, one might have a perpetual holiday if he distributed his time by passing from town to town. Thus the sensualists were using the advantages that an economic revolution put in their way. Surely there was need of some movement to stem the swelling tide of vice and to raise the people out of the primitive conditions that still continued.

The evidence of these facts does not come from Puritan sources alone. The economic tracts of the time tell the same story in even plainer language. They show how impossible it was to keep men at work while the old customs were observed, and so many opportunities for indulgence offered temptations to idleness and vice. Unfortunately, neither the nobility nor the rulers offered

any hope of better things. In earlier days there had been nobles worthy of their rank, but they had found their way to the halter or the block. The monks, too, who by their example had led others to industry and right living, were gone and their lands given to the new nobility. Instead of restraint coming from above, the influence of the newly exalted helped to revive primitive conditions and to call out the brutal and licentious elements in human nature. Nor were the rulers in a mood to appreciate the situation. The Tudors were primitive both in action and taste. "Good Queen Bess" could laugh at a straw as heartily as any savage. Admire her public policy as we must, her virtues ended there, and were replaced by traits such as we associate with wandering gypsies. She wanted not a wise, sober people, but one that would minister to her caprice and tickle her vanity. This put her in the wrong attitude towards social issues. The side she saw of the old sports and amusements appealed to her too strongly to be dispensed with because of sentiments she did not feel. And the Stuarts added fuel to the flame by their Book of Sports, which permitted the revival of old abuses, and made Sunday merely a day of amusement.

The key to the situation lies in the once universal notion that the popular sports and amusements, by exciting the sexual passions, promoted the growth of population. The loss of virtue that the Puritans denounced in the May games was to the ruling class an argument in their favour. The noble who debauched the wives and daughters of his tenantry did not think that he did wrong; on the contrary, he told himself that he was doing the nation a service. It quite accords with primitive thought to lament the loss of a sister's or a daughter's virtue, and yet to advocate seduction as a principle. It should also be remembered that Malthus, two centuries later, was the first to oppose an unrestrained increase of population, and that he had to convince not only the ruling class but the

clergy ; forevery one believed that the illegitimate children, even of a pauper, were a national blessing, helping to make the nation greater and more prosperous. It is no wonder that such deeply rooted notions created a wrong social policy and brought on a desperate struggle.

It must be admitted that there were some reasons why statesmen should desire an increasing population. The great plagues were coincident with the rise of Puritanism. Labour had grown scarce and wages high. The burden of this change fell on the upper classes, who were naturally irritated by the innovations in manners that went with the better economic position of their dependents. The great plagues also had a bad effect on the lower classes. There is no worse enemy to regular living and industry than the feeling that life is a lottery. The primitive man lives in the realm of chance, and to this fact are due his reckless disposition, his willingness to take hazards, and his love of gambling. These tendencies are subdued or eradicated only when a regular economic life becomes possible. The promise of a long life and three good meals a day are the best means for creating regular habits and continuous industry. Yet it was England's misfortune that when improved economic conditions made a regular life possible, the plague destroyed for her people the security that economic prosperity promotes. The lower classes, being thus prevented from feeling the steadying effects of the new conditions, retained the reckless disposition that earlier conditions had developed in them.

The Puritans, however, were aided by the plagues, just as they had been by the new economic conditions. They were well housed and lived in a cleanly manner. The plagues gave them additional incentives to improve their homes, their cleanliness, and the regularity of their lives. A great calamity makes a steady man more regular and an unsteady man more reckless. Each takes the way out of the difficulty that is suited to his nature. The plague

appeared to the Puritans to be a God-sent calamity; it harmonized with their notion of how the principle of the solidarity of responsibility should act. Every calamity, since it fell mainly on the careless and sensual, fired them with a new zeal, and widened the gulf between them and their sensual neighbours.

In the preceding sections I have pictured the economic changes and the social conditions that brought on the struggle between the Puritans and the sensualists. From the start the conflict was irrepressible, and the conditions made it impossible that either party should gain a decisive victory. The result was not Puritanism nor sensualism, but something better, — the formation of the English character. It matters not, therefore, how many lives were lost, how many kings beheaded, or who gained this or that battle. All these facts have an interest in themselves, but they do not help us to learn how the conflict provoked a rapid development of English thought. For this we must look in other quarters. First, however, we should review the classes existing at the time of the conflict, and see why the seeds of further progress lay in none of them.

I have called attention to three types of English character, which, if we name them from their psychic manifestations, are the sensualist, the clinger, and the stalwart. The sensualist is the original unmodified Englishman who retained the dross of primitive times. The clinger is the result of the qualities engrafted on English nature by the supremacy of the Church. The stalwart is in the concrete the Puritan. The conflict was a three-cornered fight, in which either the sensualist or the Puritan was the aggressor, while the clinger joined in with the defensive party.

This defensive policy of the clinger made it impossible for either the sensualist or the stalwart to retain the supremacy. They had the greater energy, but they were

at length worn out by the steady persistence of the clinger, who wanted to have things let alone. On the other hand, it was impossible for the clinger to keep matters as they were. Neither the Puritan nor the sensualist agreed with his desire to have things let alone, and between them they were sure to disturb any compromise. Although the clingers as a class owed their existence to the supremacy of the Church, they should not be identified with the Catholic party. Every one who wanted peace and security, who believed in the divine right of kings, or who was in heart an eighteenth-century Tory had had these feelings drilled into him by the Church. Although widespread and deep-rooted, these feelings were not universal, and even if they had been they could not have resisted the dissolving force of economic changes. They were therefore merely a steadying power, which must in the end have weakened and disappeared.

Desirable as it was that the Puritan should succeed, his success was as impossible as that of the Catholic party. If it be asked what became of the Puritan, the proper answer is, that he died of consumption. In this crude way I mean to indicate the defect in his economic programme that caused his overthrow. A child of nature can sleep in the gutter or wade barefoot in the snow without injury; but a well-housed man must avoid extremes, and be sure that he is always comfortable. But with all their power to create visual concepts, the Puritans lacked the thought of comfort. They pictured themselves as living in tents on the plains of Palestine, instead of being housed as they were in the vigorous climate of England. The prophets of Israel always coupled luxury with idolatry, because both of them were due to foreign influence. The Puritan was misled by this theory, and having that inherent love of activity which all Englishmen inherited, he worked and exposed himself as though he were a primitive Englishman, and did not secure for himself those material com-

forts which his new economic position required. Comfort, however, is essential to the well-housed, and those who are not instinctive comfort-seekers soon suffer poor health. Consumption is the disease of the well-housed, just as the plague was the disease of the alley and the slums. When the plague stopped, consumption began its work, and it hit the Puritan as hard as the plague had his uncleanly neighbour. ✓

It will be interesting at this point, especially as the Puritans made so much of it, to compare the history and development of the Hebrew with that of the English. Up to the period of the Babylonian exile there is a close parallel between the history of the Hebrew nation and that of the English up to the middle of the sixteenth century. But after that the parallel ceases. According to the Hebrew analogy, some dire calamity should have swept off the wicked and left the pure to inherit the English land. But right at this point the plague ceased, and the wicked not only went unpunished, but even waxed fat on the cream of the land. The poorly housed and the riotous liver increased in number, while the well-housed, abstemious Puritans died off with great rapidity. For a whole century consumption cut down the best element in society, and left the dregs. Morality was at a discount! Sensuality was above par.

Such was the fate of the Puritan. No matter how much he dominated others, he was doomed to failure, because the word "comfort" was not in his vocabulary. ✓ Both he and his creed suffered from the same disease, and before long they were reduced to mere skeletons, unable to take an aggressive part in the English world. It was a fearful penalty, but economic conditions are a hard taskmaster and show little favour to those who violate their rules. Neither the Puritan nor the Catholic party could succeed. They were bound to disappear, because of their economic shortcomings. The three-cornered fight

of which I have spoken had to go on until some solution could be found other than those these parties could offer. A new type of men was demanded, a type endowed with mental qualities different from those Englishmen then possessed. I shall now turn to thinkers of this new class, to see what solution they offer for national difficulties.

Before examining these solutions, however, I must take up certain problems of interpretation which will arise again and again. There is a marked difference between a thinker's method of finding truth and his method of presenting it. The new truth is not discovered in any predetermined way. It generally turns up in some unexpected corner, and may surprise the finder more than it does his reader. But when he tries to present it to the world, he is governed by ideas due to his education. Each age has certain notions about rules of evidence; some science or particular mode of thought dominates for the time. If the people fancy the Hebrews or the Greeks or Romans, they demand that the evidence be taken from the Bible or the classics. An author, therefore, will not present the facts that lead him up to the truth, or use the logic that convinced him. It pleases both himself and others to arrange the facts and logic to harmonize with prevailing notions. Let geometry, physics, chemistry, history, or biology be the favourite study, and new truths will be brought into line, and have the appearance at least of being a part of it. Discovery follows a natural track, but expression has all the errors of current education. The result is that a writer reverses the order in which he discovered his ideas. If he saw A first, then B, and then C, in presenting them he will start from C and deduce B from it, and A from B. Moreover, the accepted science is usually the most advanced science of the time, or probably more advanced than the one in which the new truth is discovered. This fact lures the author into

expressing his ideas in a more deductive form than that which he used in his own studies. Men on the road to scientific discovery see the new at first in some concrete form; then gradually get a clearer sight of it, until finally they realize its full import. But once grasped, it seems so simple and clear that the earlier and more concrete views of it appear as mere corollaries. There is, however, no deductive road to discovery; concrete studies always precede it, and if an author does not begin with them, he is deceiving the reader and perhaps himself as well.

A reader who would be critical must be on his guard against these devices of writers to pass off their products for more than their face value. He must seek to get behind the author's own statements by examining certain minor details which the author has overlooked in restating his ideas according to preconceived notions. All great writers are lazy. This is natural when the sustained effort necessary for writing a long book is considered. The result is that the tired author, although he feels that a given chapter ought to be rewritten and turned end for end, is usually content with a few changes. Perhaps he carelessly alters the order of his chapters, and neglects to note that the earlier chapter has something in it that depends on the following chapter. He will also be careless about restating his ideas in their best form. When a new truth is first perceived he has not a fixed vocabulary by which to express it, and is compelled to resort to roundabout, involved sentences. Finally, however, he stumbles upon some short, expressive term or phrase, and in justice he should go over all he has written and insert the new term or phrase. But he will not do this. It would take too much work.

All writers are fond of their first half-truths and the spontaneous mode of stating them. It seldom happens that a writer thinks he has done as well in the full expression of his truth as when he merely half expressed it.

It is desperately hard for a man to throw away his first evidence that he is becoming an original thinker. He holds on to it with the greatest tenacity, and rolls it over in his mouth as a sweet morsel. He will always feel touchy and irritated if any one suggests that this is not the greatest thing he ever did. The reader will not have to go to great writers to find this peculiarity. If he happens to have friends who have written, or has followed the career of any living writer, he will have near at home the evidence of what I say. If you want to please, never suggest that a writer is improving his expression, or that he saw merely a half-truth a few years ago. This weakness affects great men as well as small, and leads them to retain parts of the first statement of their ideas, and thus gives the critic a ready clue to the order in which they really developed.

The first English philosophical writer worthy of careful study is Thomas Hobbes. His central thought is the power of the king and his right to absolute sovereignty. It is a doctrine of complete non-resistance, and on its face is a mechanical theory of society, resulting from the application of the laws of motion to social affairs. According to this analogy there must be certain initial social forces acting on men as simply and as irresistibly as the laws of motion act on matter. In reality, however, this mechanical shell was an afterthought conceived when Hobbes was fascinated by the study of physics and geometry. To get at the real development of his doctrine we must go behind the formal presentation that he is fond of giving.

At an early period Hobbes wrote, or at least thought out, several essays on social topics. It was not the custom then as it is now for writers to rush into print. As there were no outlets for essayists such as we now have in magazines and reviews, it was practically a big book or nothing.

Hence a writer would show his essay to a few friends and then lay it aside. In this way we must suppose Hobbes to have been accumulating material until about his fortieth year, when by accident he saw a geometry and became interested in its proofs. This incident created a revolution in his mode of thinking, and gave him a new method of proof. The subjects in which he had been interested — theology, history, and the like — seemed to him now to be dogmatical. The higher truth, the only one which is free from controversy and dispute, is mathematical, and this latter relates only to figure and motion. Thereafter Hobbes applied himself to mathematical studies with the greatest zeal and absorption. Although an old man, he worked with the ardour of youth for over forty years to advance mathematics and related sciences. Those versed in mathematics say he did nothing of importance in this field, but it at least occupied his attention and gave him his methods of proof.

So absorbed was he in this new work that we should probably never have heard of his earlier essays in the realm of dogmatism had he not conceived a plan of writing a complete scheme of philosophy, which included the older realm that he had abandoned in his ardour for the new. He now did a very natural thing. He took the old essays, trimmed them up a bit, wrote a new preface and some introductory remarks, and then incorporated them into his scheme for the new philosophy. Hobbes wrote many books on social topics under divers titles, but if the new settings be removed and the introduction omitted, the body of all these books is that of the old essays written in his youth. He was merely attempting to transform social studies from dogmatical into mathematical sciences, and the matter was, therefore, of much less consequence to him than the logic and the form of presentation.

Hence we must separate the old body of these essays from the new externals. In the main body there is little

change ; in the latter, however, there is a development of thought. Hobbes was infatuated with the laws of motion, particularly with the new doctrine of the parallelogram of forces. He was led, therefore, to seek for similar forces in the social realm. One of these he had already described in an old essay ; the other is the thought underlying his famous "state of war."

This idea of the state of war is generally assumed to be the starting-point of Hobbes' thinking. It was really an afterthought used to bring the social sciences into harmony with his philosophical scheme. One will look in vain for it in the body of his work ; it is to be found only in the husks and introductions, which were a part of his living thought at the time his books appeared. We may discard all that Hobbes says about a state of war without affecting the body of his essays. They lose their originality by this process, but he was not yet original when he wrote them. He was merely restating the thoughts of others with minor modifications.

A proof of the newness of Hobbes' notions about a natural state of war lies in his way of stating it. If he had started with it, he would not have forgotten about it as soon as he was through his introductory remarks. His first works would have contained the same clear, concise expressions of the idea which are found in the later writings. In his earlier works, however, he talks only of the condition of war, or sometimes advancing a step farther he speaks of an estate of war. In the *Leviathan* the nearest he comes to it is in the phrase "man by mere nature."<sup>1</sup> It is only in the *Philosophical Rudiments of Government and Society* that the thought is fully expressed, and there he has a note explaining its meaning, a clear proof that the thought in this form is new to him, and therefore requires explanation.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Molesworth's edition, Vol. II, p. 115.

<sup>2</sup> Works, Vol. II, p. 9.

The difference between a condition of war and a state of war may seem to be slight. But there is this distinction: A condition of war is a quality of something—of a nation, a group, or a man; while a state of war is a picture, a concrete reality in which the nation or man is placed with all the belongings necessary to his existence. A condition of war means that men and nations sometimes quarrel and fight, or at least show a disposition to fight.<sup>1</sup> A state of war means that for a given period in the history of the world all the relations into which men entered were determined by their persistent opposition to one another. There is, therefore, a great distance between the thought of a condition of war and that of a state of war, and Hobbes was a long time travelling it. In fact, one may say that he never travelled it, because it is evident from the note to which I have called attention that his change of position was forced on him by his opponents. Such expressions were natural to the Puritans and harmonized with their mode of thought. A slight glance at their writings, the Confession of Faith, for example, will show how frequently and fondly they talked of “states,” and of passing from one state to another. They had states of innocence and of guilt, of purity and sin, of glory and shame, of life and death, of grace and condemnation. These states were not qualities of men, but what we should now call complete environments. In passing from a state of innocence to one of guilt, the whole set of conditions making up the environment, and the whole group of internal motives, were changed. Nothing of the former self or its motives remained. So, when men were purified and entered a state of glory, they left behind them every element of their former state.

Men with these habits of thought naturally saw Hobbes' doctrine in a light far different from that in which the

<sup>1</sup> Works, Vol. III, p. 113.

unimaginative Hobbes himself saw it, and they, it is likely, put it in its final shape. But Hobbes could not picture in the Puritan fashion; he saw things only as qualities of other things. He never assumes that a state of war makes a period in human history like the Garden of Eden, seen so clearly by the Puritans. In the note to which I have referred, he says children are never in a state of nature. On page 109 of the same volume he shows how hypothetical his concept was. "Let us," he says, "return again to the state of nature, and consider men as if but even now sprung out of the earth, and suddenly, like mushrooms, come to full maturity without any kind of engagement to each other."<sup>1</sup>

The boy Locke was to talk in a very different tone before the end of the decade. Here is his picture of the Roman Commonwealth. "Romulus, at the head of a numerous colony from Alba, was the first founder of the Roman state. This colony was, in the original state of nature, free, and independent of any dominion whatsoever, and only chose Romulus for their leader till their new city was built; and they were at liberty to consider what form of government they should resolve upon."<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Bourne in commenting on this passage says that it shows the influence of Hobbes. He evidently had not studied the writings of Hobbes closely, or he would have seen that Hobbes had not imagination enough to create such a picture. On the contrary, it shows what we know from other sources, that Locke was a Puritan, and had all their power to make pictures, and to believe that what he pictured corresponded to the reality. He was merely visualizing the civil world as they did the religious world,

<sup>1</sup> The nearest that Hobbes comes to conceiving the reality of a state of war is in speaking of the American Indians, B. III, p. 114. But here he speaks of it as a present reality, and not as the primitive state of all men.

<sup>2</sup> Bourne's *Life of Locke*, Vol. I, p. 148.

and he turned to Rome instead of to Palestine for his material.

Even if Hobbes could have visualized the origin of Rome, he could not have glorified its constitution as ideal to the extent that Locke did. Hobbes did not believe in ideal states, or that leopards could change their spots by mere washing. In his opinion, human nature had permanent tendencies, which, although checked or counteracted, were ever present and would show themselves as soon as opportunity permitted. If men could pass from a state of war to a state of peace as the Puritans pictured such states, then there would be no need of a king in a state of peace. But Hobbes did not carry his doctrine so far, nor did his logic demand it. He merely meant to say that men had a disposition to fight, to invade, and to be greedy, and that this source of discord could be avoided only by men giving up their wills and accepting the will of a sovereign. Thus interpreted, Hobbes' concept has meaning and validity, even though it does not furnish a solution to present difficulties. The Puritans, however, believed that an entire eradication of the carnal motives was possible, and hence a state might be attained where kings were needless. There was no possible compromise between this view and that of Hobbes. Hobbes could influence English thought only through the king's party. To judge what power he has had, we must examine the contents of his early essays.

In the *Leviathan* Hobbes has reversed the order in which his early essays were written. The fourth part, or essay, is an attack on the Pope, written in a style familiar to Hobbes' boyhood, when the Pope was looked upon as the Anti-Christ. As a mature man Hobbes must have known better than to make such charges, and the essay would probably never have seen the light but for a reason I shall explain in another connection. The third essay also deals with the Catholic problem. It contains, how-

ever, an important discussion which shows clearly where Hobbes made his first start in independent thinking. In 1610 Cardinal Bellarmine published a book on the power of the Pope, in which he presented the doctrine of the indivisibility of sovereignty. He contended, as Hobbes did subsequently, that there was but one commonwealth,—the Church,—of which kings and popes, clergy and laity, were but parts. From this it follows that the spiritual power is supreme, and that kings, like their subjects, must take orders from the Pope. Hobbes accepts this concept of a commonwealth, but denies that there is a single commonwealth to which the whole race belongs. There are, he contends, several commonwealths,—France, Spain, Venice, etc.,—each of which is a complete unit with a sovereign at its head. These individual sovereigns have the supreme authority in their own states, and the Pope has no power but by their consent. Having assumed this bold position, Hobbes goes a step farther, and denies that there is any spiritual realm on earth, and finally declares that Christ gave no authority to His disciples. They were to be servants, not masters. These ideas are enforced with much good logic and an abundance of Scriptural quotations. Hobbes has evidently his main thesis well in hand. Bellarmine's book was the right stimulus to bring it out.

In the second essay we arrive at the period in his life when Puritans are making their influence felt. From them he gets a new thesis. The Puritan picture of a covenant represents the people assembled before Mount Sinai making an agreement between themselves and God. To their mind, government is of divine origin; covenants are sacred and their violation is punished by God. The Puritans have no king in their picture. Kings are a mere incident of later origin; they have no independent place, and are useless in a state of grace where all relations are direct between the people and God. The Puritans empha-

sized the unity of the people, and pictured themselves gathered in a body at the foot of the sacred mount. Hobbes, however, wants good government to be only a bond between men. A government must have force and a will, and this is possible only when the mass of men submit to the will of one person. We thus get the picture of the great Leviathan, a purely artificial body of secular origin, with all the qualities of the natural body and an equally strong will.

This picture does not need an antecedent state of war to make it vivid. The emphasis lies in the secular as opposed to the sacred origin of government, and in the need of force and will to make it effective. The Puritan concept needs neither of these in a human form. The wrath of God thundering from the sacred mount is always sufficient to indicate the right path. God fights the battles of the righteous, and punishes, rather than rewards, man's efforts at self-help. If Hobbes would controvert the Puritan position, he must search for natural motives strong enough to induce men on their own account to submit to government. At this juncture he brings to his aid the law of nature, which had recently been developed and expounded on the Continent.

In the *Leviathan* the discussion of the law of nature is put in the first essay, but in his earlier works Hobbes put it in the essay on covenants and forms of government. This shows that before he had thought of the state of war he found the natural motives for submitting to government in the love of peace, and in the economic motives that the love of well-being creates. Hobbes never lost sight of the economic motives, and he must have seen their importance before he thought of the fear of war. To say the least, these laws of nature as they lay before him in his early writings had this form, and to apply them as they stood was an easy task as soon as Hobbes conceived of government as natural and due to

human motives. How he would subsequently modify them is the important point to be studied in the essay on "Man," which was evidently written after he became infatuated with geometry and physics. The laws of nature had already been formulated, and from them he got much of his material. Together, he says, they form the group of motives that make men love society. To get the parallelogram of forces needed in his mechanical theory of society, Hobbes had only to introduce fear as a motive to submission to the will of a superior. A very slight change — a single addition to the conventional laws of nature — suffice to give what was needed. Then his whole book assumed a mathematical air, and the old essays had a new meaning. It is marvellous how easy it is to transform youthful performances and partly proved inductions into rigid deductions.

But will this solution satisfy any of the parties involved in the great crisis? I have already pointed out why it could not satisfy the Puritans, and the opposition between Hobbes and them is only increased by the argument in the second essay. The first and second essays might have appealed to the king's party; the third, however, could not but arouse violent opposition.

It must be remembered that most of the king's friends belonged psychically to the type I have called clingers, who held tenaciously to old forms and fought every innovation. The drill of the Church had caused them to give the first place to spiritual leaders. They were not yet even ready for the doctrine of the divine right of kings. To give up all their cherished notions was impossible, even for their king's sake. The king himself could not look at the matter through the eyes of Hobbes. The favourite maxim of his house — "No bishops no king" — implied that bishops made kings, not that kings made bishops. The king might endure Hobbes, but he could not help him or accept his solution of the difficulties.

What, then, did Hobbes hope to accomplish? Did he deceive himself into believing that his logic was more convincing than it was? He has at different times offered several explanations of his motives in issuing the *Leviathan*, but only one of them has any degree of probability. Hobbes had given up hopes of the king's succeeding in the conflict. He therefore advised submission to the inevitable. The book was addressed not to the Puritans, nor to the scholar, but to his own vanquished friends. Viewed in this way, it is easy to see why the old Catholic controversy was revived. Hobbes knew that numerous members of his party were friendly not only to the king, but also to the Pope. He advised them, therefore, to yield to the inevitable, both in politics and in religion. The Puritans were masters of the situation in both fields. One wronged neither his king nor his religion by making the best of what could not be helped. Both were lost causes. This position could not be displeasing to the Puritans even if the second essay was not to their liking. While they were in power, Hobbes could freely boast that he had won over a thousand gentlemen to the Puritan cause, and it certainly seemed for a while that he had furnished a solution of the difficulties. But almost with a flash the situation changed, and then poor Hobbes was forced for the rest of his life to keep devising new explanations for the form in which the *Leviathan* appeared.

Hobbes' solution could not have been an enduring remedy for the existing evils, even if the Puritans had succeeded. So far as his works pretend to be a study of human nature, they border on the farcical. If the early essays are thrown out, the rest of his work is very fragmentary. Instead of studying human nature at first hand in the actions and characters of his countrymen, Hobbes was content with mere definitions of the leading springs to action. His lists of them were very incomplete,

were compiled without any plan, and did not harmonize with each other. Each time he wrote, he evidently jotted down whatever motives he happened to think of, defining them as he wrote. There is not one fresh study of human nature in all his volumes, nor one analysis of which he could be justly proud. It must be admitted that he had the right attitude. The trouble is that by the time he was capable of doing good work he had acquired a taste for mathematics, to which he gave all his energy. In trying to do what he could not do, he failed to do what he might have done well. Nor do I think it is any excuse to say that he was the first to enter a new field and therefore could not be expected to do more. The history of great thinkers shows that the real battle is in getting into the right attitude for work, and not in getting material to work with. Locke, with no better advantages, did splendid work simply because his heart was in it.

The worst of it is that Hobbes' careless work has been the curse of psychic studies ever since. Good thinkers have been thrown off the track, and prejudices created which centuries have not destroyed. Psychology is just beginning to recover from the blow he gave it. I do not object to a mechanical way of looking at human nature. No matter what may be the final conclusion, the beginning must be rigidly mechanical. The vice of Hobbes was that he was looking into the air and not at human nature at all. There is no excuse for his pretended analysis of English character. To live among the Puritans and then to assert that their only motives were fear of men and vainglory shows that he consulted his prejudices more than his eyes. Nor did he hesitate to deny the plainest facts if they were against him. When, for example, he says that the Pope has no power except what the sovereigns of the various countries give him, one can but wonder where Hobbes got his history.

Had he never heard of Canossa? The very instincts of obedience and love of peace, on which he prided himself, were due to the power whose existence he so boldly denied. As compared with the rule of the Pope, the rule of kings was, in Hobbes' time, merely a thing of to-day. Even the strongest of kings trembled at the thought of the Pope's anger; and Hobbes' premature birth was, according to his own story, due to the terror that the Pope's power inspired. And yet he boldly denied its existence.

To illustrate more fully Hobbes' careless methods, let us examine his famous analysis of motives into glory and fear. Pleasure, as a motive, he tells us, causes one to approach the things that please, while pain creates a desire to withdraw. Glory is the triumph of approach, while the withdrawal from pain is fear. Two particular passions are thus raised to the level of primary mental states and coördinated with them. His underlying assumption is that all pleasure excites a feeling of glory and all pain excites fear. But this is not good psychology. The feeling of pain can create a shrinking called fear, but it may equally well excite that kind of approach we call wrath. Wrath and fear are both the effects of pain, and we cannot be sure which motive will be excited until we know more of the mental mechanism of the suffering creature than Hobbes' analysis supplies. If pleasure excites approach, wrath excites a violent approach, — a kind of approach arousing fear not in the one approaching, but in the thing or creature approached. We thus have the tables turned, and a reaction caused by pain becomes a more important phenomenon than pleasure or pain in any other form. There was nothing in the primitive world so dreadful as wrath. It is a phenomenon of first rank among animals as well as among men, and from it spring all the important primitive motives. Of course both men and animals exist to whom pain is the cause of

fear, but men of this type did not make the society in which Hobbes lived. The very first instinct of an Englishman was to rap over the head anybody who displeased him. Hobbes' career was a patent example of how pain creates wrath. His opponents did not shrink or run when hurt by his words or mode of thought. They had their weapons out the moment he spoke, and did not cease their wrathful approach until long after he was dead.

The motives that led primitive men to enter societies were due to the evils of wrath. Every primitive man or clan was eager to resent pain and to strike indiscriminately at any person or group who appeared to be its source. The men who made early societies did not fear each other. The covenant they made was to be careful in wrath, and to let the proper vengeance be executed not by themselves but by their chosen leaders. The restraint of wrath and revenge, not protection from fear, is the first step towards social unity.

This same wrath has been a prime factor in religion. The Hebrews pictured God as a God of wrath because they conceived Him as possessed with motives and feelings similar to those of men. Had not their first instinct been to react against pain, they would not have made the wrath of God so prominent an element in their religion. Even after the prophets taught that God was a God of justice, the fact was still emphasized that God was a God of wrath. Justice is intelligent, well-directed wrath. Religion and morality are thus offshoots of wrath. Bravery, liberty, and good government are all based on wrath, not on fear. Every state seeks to turn pain into a motive of approach, and to brand with disgrace any shrinking through fear. The reactions due to pain thus created the leading marks by which to determine character in primitive races. Pain created their virtues as well as their defects.

Hobbes' definitions of virtues and motives, when a little more expanded and concretely applied, become parodies on

the Puritan character. I suspect him of having utilized material with which he had amused his friends during his long exile. This may wrong him, but, to say the least, such misrepresentation of Puritan virtues was at that time the common stock of wits. It only remained for Hobbes to transform it into philosophy. Being at this time particularly anxious to please the Puritans, he eradicated all concrete illustrations that would stir up old rancour. Thus he got himself out of present difficulties, but by passing off a caricature of the Puritans as a picture of human nature, he created new difficulties of a more serious nature.

There were in the world races of whom Hobbes' descriptions would have been true. Timid or oppressed races in the difficulties that troubled England, would have embraced Hobbes' philosophy. They would have had the motor responses needed to carry such a philosophy into effect. An Englishman, however, did not have a mental mechanism capable of responding to such stimuli. It only aroused his wrath and made him more stubborn than before. Hobbes did not, therefore, solve the difficulties of his day. The three parties kept up their triangular fight, and wearied every one by following their own instincts without regard to consequences. Hobbes merely added fuel to the flame by creating a bitter prejudice against reasoning—the only remedy for the evils of blind instinct. Conscious thought will, however, do its work in spite of obstacles. We must now turn to the work of a man who really studied human nature, and see how he finds a solution in the very field where Hobbes failed.

The Germans, who were the first to recognize the importance of the history of philosophy, naturally interpret it in the light of their own history. A foreign writer gets a place in their scheme for the influence he exerted not at

home, but with them. This attitude is legitimate for a German, but not for an Englishman who wishes to understand the mental development of his own countrymen. Unfortunately English philosophers, having obtained their ideas from Germany, try to make Englishmen look at the development of thought through German eyes. Professor Green, for example, says that every true philosopher is the mouthpiece of a certain system of thought determined for him by the conditions of philosophical progress, and the philosopher starts out with a "problem" and a "method," the problem to be solved by the method.<sup>1</sup> When this scheme of philosophical interpretation is applied to Locke, it is found that the problem from which Locke starts is the origin of "ideas" and his method is that of "looking into his own understanding and seeing how it is wrought." But is it not a little odd to find a man who starts with so clear a plan and so simple a method using up a whole book before he thinks of looking into his own mind at all? In the first book of the *Essay* Locke makes no examination of the contents of his mind. He is trying to find what other people think of certain current notions. He turns therefore to children, savages, and idiots, supplementing what he observes in these cases by the reports of travellers. In this book he is merely a social psychologist; it is only in the second book that he becomes a self psychologist with no material but his own ideas. Between the two books there is an immense gulf which represents years of development. Had Locke started with philosophical problems and methods as Professor Green asserts, there would have been no Book I., and his proof would have been defective unless the other parts had been rewritten and new arguments devised. It is this transformation of a mere observer of other people into a close observer of himself that makes his development interesting and valuable.

<sup>1</sup> Works of T. H. Green, Vol. I, p. 6.

Had he started from the origin of ideas, he might have built up a more consistent system, but he would not have won the place he now holds in the history of thought.

Professor Green has simply turned Locke's development the other way about. Locke does not begin with a "problem" and a "method"; he ends with them. Locke's influence in Germany begins at the point where it left off in England. He penetrates the German world with the problem and the method, the perception of which ended his career as a thinker in England. For English thought the question is how did he acquire this problem and method? for German thought the question is what is to be done with them? Judged from this and similar cases, it has been the task of English thought to start problems for Germans to settle. In our analysis therefore of his work we ought not to use German methods of interpretation.

Locke's great book on the Human Understanding, it must be admitted, furnishes little evidence in support of my assertion that he was an economist on the upward curve from observation to philosophy. The most that can be said is that in the first book he had not yet abandoned the method of an economist, the facts presented being still social. There is, however, other satisfactory proof. Here is Locke's view of life as given in his journal: "So that if we will consider man as in the world, and that his mind and faculties were given him for any use, we must necessarily conclude it must be to produce him the happiness which this world is capable of, which certainly is nothing else but plenty of all sorts of those things which can with most care, pleasure, and variety, preserve him longest in it; so that, had mankind no concernment but in the world, no apprehensions of any being after this life, they need trouble their heads about nothing but the history of Nature, and an inquiry into the quality of the things in the mansion of the universe which hath fallen to

their lot, and being well skilled in the knowledge of material causes and effect of things in their power, and directing their thoughts to the improvement of such arts and inventions, engines and utensils, as might best contribute to their continuation in it with conveniency and delight, they might well spare themselves the trouble of looking any further; they need not perplex themselves about the original frame or constitution of the universe, drawing the great machine into systems of their own contrivance, and building hypotheses, obscure, perplexed and of no other use but to raise dispute and continual wrangling.”<sup>1</sup>

This passage, which is one of many like it, gives the key to Locke's view of life. Apart from religion, the end of man is to secure “a plenty of the good things of this world, with life, health, and peace to enjoy them.” The standpoint is thoroughly economic, and if nothing had disturbed his peace of mind, he would doubtless have enjoyed these good things, and continued his economic reveries to the end of his days. Fortunately for us these reveries were interrupted, and he was forced to grapple with problems, the solution of which he had condemned as useless.

Locke, it must be remembered, was by education and sentiment a Puritan. The vigour of his imagination has already been shown in his picture of the origin of Rome. Had he been a man of strong constitution he might have forestalled Rousseau and led the Puritans on to new victories. But consumption, the bane of the Puritans, was fastening itself upon him, and dragging him out of the active world. As his energy was gradually reduced, he lost his taste for vivid pictures, and no longer sympathized with those who were moved by their mental visions. Locke, in short, was a Puritan plus the ideal of comfort. Little as this addition seems, yet it created an impassable

<sup>1</sup> King's *Life of Locke*, p. 88.

gulf between him and other Puritans. In defending comfort and the material means upon which it depends, Locke is compelled to assume a position opposed to that of the Puritans. To justify recreation he says: "In things not absolutely commanded or forbidden by the law of God, such as the material part of recreation, He, in His mercy considering our ignorance and frail constitution, hath not tied us to an invisible point, nor confined us to a way so narrow that allows no latitude at all in things in their own nature indifferent; there is the liberty of great choice, great variety, within the bounds of innocence."

This position, to which Locke is forced by his "frail constitution," is the starting-point of his positive thought. In fact, it might be said that this sentence expresses in a concrete form his whole philosophy. Having once grasped the idea that there are "things in their own nature indifferent," that is, acts that are neither good nor bad, he never loses sight of it. Puritanism had no third category. All was bad that was not good, and the more strict went even farther, and said that all was bad that was not commanded by the Word of God. Their intense conviction that nothing is really indifferent was the source at once of their strength and their weakness. Their vivid consciences made their character and gave them their power; but when conscience became over-conscientiousness, their downfall was near. Locke does not use the term "over-conscientiousness," but he implies it in the word "enthusiasm," which is coupled with superstition as the two mental states to be avoided. Enthusiasm includes all that he believed to be the vice of Puritanism, while superstition represented the failings of the class I have called clingers, or more concretely, the Catholic party. Locke rarely alludes to superstition, but he is never weary of attacking enthusiasm. In an early letter from Germany describing the Calvinists (who, he says, "differ very little from our English Presbyterians"), he writes, "I met

lately, accidentally, with a young sucking divine, that thought himself no small champion; who, as if he had been some knight-errant, bound by oath to bid battle to all comers, first accosted me in a courteous voice; but, the customary salute being over, I found myself assailed most furiously, and heavy loads of arguments fell upon me until passion and want of breath made him weary." No wonder Locke disliked displays of enthusiasm, for the quiet life his health demanded could not be secured until some safeguard had been erected against these assaults.

Locke's philosophical development, however, does not begin with this necessary defence of himself, but in his endeavours to relieve his friends from the burdens imposed on them by their beliefs. His primary office was that of a conscience soother. His early letters show that he was continually appealed to by friends conscience-stricken over some supposed failure to do their full duty. In this office he develops the doctrine of indifference which is the real basis of his philosophy. A perception of this doctrine is to him the great requisite to a healthy training of the understanding, and without it no calm reasoning is possible.

But from the Puritan standpoint there could be nothing indifferent. This position harmonized with the word pictures created by their vivid imaginations and with their concept of personality. Their goods, their social position, and their actions were regarded not as objective things, but as indexes of character. There was only one way of acting in each particular situation. Not even the cut of the hair or the shape of the coat was a matter of indifference. Any slight deviation was looked on as an index of greater failings; the innovator became conscience-stricken, and suffered as severely as if he had broken a commandment. An enlarged personality, vivified by a quick imagination, makes all little things assume great proportions. The spirit of the law is lost sight of in the letter.

It was this mode of thinking that Locke tried to destroy, and he never rested until his efforts were crowned with success.

The doctrine of indifference assumes that the field of morality is not coextensive with human activity. In addition to the good and the bad, there is a third category, — the *adiaphorous*, or indifferent. This thought inevitably leads to an entirely new concept of morality and of social relations. The old morality was based on the solidarity of responsibility, and while it remained a vivid concept nothing was *adiaphorous*. The interest of the individual was subordinated to the public interest, and any indifference on his part to the general welfare brought evils not only upon him, but on the whole community. Locke had no slight task to perform, but he did his work so skilfully that public opinion was transformed, and a new moral attitude acquired without any one realizing how much was involved or what was sacrificed.

The doctrine of indifference is best worked out in the essay on "Toleration." Here Locke had the coöperation of the latitudinarian churchmen, but he carried the thought much further than they did, and enunciated principles that they could not have accepted if they had clearly understood them. The same doctrine is prominent in the *Conduct of the Understanding*, and also in the third book of the *Essay*, which is doubtless one of its oldest portions. It may seem far fetched to connect the doctrine of indifference with Locke's attack on the loose and indefinite use of words, but an inaccurate use of words was always associated in his mind with that "enthusiasm" which he so much dreaded. In his opinion, enthusiasm was due to a vivid imagination adding indefinite, general meanings to words. Word picturing was a marked trait of the Puritans, so that a word with some simple connotation called up a complex picture of

a host of things not properly in the meaning of the word. A vivid imagination causes a kind of visual overgrowth, — everything coming out of the mind in a different form from that in which the elements went in. Locke found that an accurate use of words was the most effective means of curing these imaginative tendencies of the Puritans.

The principle of indifference appears also at the end of the second book of the *Essay*, in the chapter on the association of ideas. According to Locke, the association of ideas is a great evil due to bad education. By continually putting together things that have no inherent connection, the different philosophical and religious sects create wrong and unnatural combinations of ideas, which make their followers unable to pursue the truth sincerely. "Some independent ideas, of no alliance to one another," he says, "are, by education, custom, and the constant idea of their party, so coupled in their minds that they always appear there together, and they can no more separate them in their thoughts than if they were but one idea." The cure for this evil lies in a cold isolation, so that it is a matter of no consequence to the thinker in what combinations ideas enter. This he holds is the only method of reasoning clearly and distinctly; those who follow it will have no pangs of conscience due to the wrong association of ideas. All things of reason are matters of indifference, and hence outside of religious control. Conscience (the inner light) is, in Locke's opinion, as bad as Romanism.<sup>1</sup> Conscience stands for the false combination of ideas formed by enthusiasm, and Romanism for those formed by superstition. A complete indifference to all opinions avoids both these evils and allows the dictates of reason to assert themselves.

The influence of this principle of indifference on Eng-

<sup>1</sup> King's *Life of Locke*, p. 103.

lish thought makes it by far Locke's most important contribution; yet if he had not opened a second campaign against the mental habits he disliked, he would not have contributed much to the development of philosophy. At some period in the growth of the *Essay*, it probably contained little more than a pronounced attack on the evils of enthusiasm. If the second book *On Ideas* — undoubtedly the last to be written — had been left out, and the *Conduct of the Understanding* inserted in its place, the practical value of Locke's work would have remained about the same. The change would have been in the direction of increasing, rather than diminishing, the immediate effect of the work. Locke's troubles all arose from "the new way of thinking by ideas," which gave so good a basis for theism. But this new way of thinking could scarcely have been avoided. The natural curve of his thought is obscured by the usual interpretation of his system, which makes him start as a full-fledged introspective philosopher with a problem and a method. If this interpretation is correct, it is hard to connect Locke's practical work with his theoretical standpoint. The connection is plain, however, if the introspective method is thought of as representing not his starting-point, but the goal which, after much difficulty, he had attained.

Readers of Locke are misled by assuming that his primary interest is an examination of his own subjective states. Locke had no qualms of conscience. He was troubled neither by enthusiasm nor by superstition. His note-books contain no indication of those internal struggles which are so frequently found in other writers, and which were especially common and severe in his time. His troubles arose from other people's attacks on him, and from the qualms of conscience that disturbed the peace of his friends. The proper analysis of these difficulties compelled him to study not his own mental states,

but those of other persons in whom the phenomena in question were more pronounced.

Locke, therefore, should be interpreted as if he were talking to a troubled friend and putting himself in his friend's place. It is the art of making persons interpret the phenomena of their own conscience in the same way that Locke himself interprets them, that makes him a persuasive reasoner. The method is not introspective, but altrospective. We look *out* when we investigate other people's minds; we look *in* when we investigate our own. In altrospection we have as material the external things that impress themselves on the persons we observe, and we have their actions, words, or looks, which indicate the effects of the external impressions and the resulting mental activity. The impressions are the causes, and the expressions (using this term in its broadest sense as a correlative of impressions) are the effects. If we make use of one of Locke's primary axioms that the mind is a blank, — a *tabula rasa*, — then the expressions should just equal the impressions. In fact, if we adopt a mechanical view of the mind, they must be exactly equal. Locke, however, does not draw this conclusion, for his interest is in the phenomena that spring from a surplus of expression. It is clear to observers that the sum of men's expressions exceed the sum of their impressions. Locke believes this surplus of expression to be bad, and holds that a rational man makes his expressions tally with his impressions. The cause of this surplus of expression is, therefore, either superstition or enthusiasm. Cut off all this excess, make words (which are to him the signs of ideas) correspond to sense impressions, and all superstition and enthusiasm will disappear. Thus Locke gets a new and better method of attack on his old enemies, and acquires a firm basis for the second book of his *Essay*.

We are the more prone to take a wrong view of Locke's

starting-point because it is hard for us to realize how crude were the notions about the mind then prevailing. Even the best thinkers assumed that objects impressed themselves directly on the mind, and Locke talks as though insensible particles pass from objects to the eyes and thence to the brain, thus bringing the mind into direct contact with the things creating its impressions. This naïve realism makes the object present to the observer identical with the impression felt by the recipient of the sensation. The impression thus becomes the external exciting object rather than the internal feeling itself. If "the archetypes of ideas really exist in the bodies themselves," the observer has the same data that the recipient of the sensation has, and can judge as well of the correspondence of the impression with the expression.

If this seems too crude a doctrine for so great a thinker, it should be remembered that we have to do not with a nineteenth-century philosopher, but with a man who in his natural philosophy could gravely explain how stones grow. Locke is in a state of transition from an economic standpoint, and he has no other knowledge of the mind than was common to other observers. He was not even well read in the philosophy of the day. What little of science he knew was confined to medicine, and this knowledge tended to confirm those altrospective habits of thought which are of use in social studies. A physician does not feel the pain of his patient, but sees only certain objective causes that create internal feelings, and the outer manifestations of these feelings in words, looks, or gestures. The premises of a physician are completely altrospective, and in so far as they influenced Locke, they strengthened the habits of thought he had already acquired. Although I have not used Locke's own language in what I have said of his original doctrine, yet what I have said of it harmonizes with the opening statements in his "commonplace book." In this well-known passage, Locke shows

no recognition of reflection as a source of ideas, nor has he any suspicion of the inadequacy of introspective methods. All ideas are held to be derived from the senses, and the mind to be a *tabula rasa*. The ready inference from these premises is that the expressions should correspond to the impressions, or to use Locke's more concrete terms, words which are the "signs of ideas," should correspond to sensations. He thus gets a short, easy way of ruling out his opponents, which is as concise and forcible as Hume's famous argument about miracles. It is no wonder that when he sat down to write out his views on the subject which he confesses he had never before considered, he expected to put all he wanted to say on one sheet of paper. Indeed, the whole doctrine can be put on a sheet of paper, and if Locke had held consistently to the premises from which he started, a book would have been useless. New discoveries, however, as he tells us, led him on until at length he had a book on his hands.

When we understand his original position, it is not difficult to see what these "new discoveries" were. They were due not to a development of his first doctrine, but to a modification of it due to his passing over from an introspective to an introspective standpoint. When he decides that any surplus of expression is either superstition or enthusiasm and hence bad, he has cut himself off from any further development on an introspective basis. The doctrine can be questioned only in two ways, either by finding what justification people give for this excess of expression, or by the observer of others turning from them to himself and seeing whether there is any cause in his own mind for an excess of expression.

To both these methods Locke resorted, and with different results. When enthusiasts were asked what other source of ideas they had than their sense impressions, they replied that they had an "inner light," a direct revelation from above, which in no way depended on the

senses. Put this statement in more abstract language, and we have the doctrine of innate ideas. It is a mistake to suppose that Locke had the doctrines of Descartes or other abstract thinkers in mind when he denounced innate ideas. He was thinking of his old enemies, the enthusiasts, and he wanted to obviate the difficulties that their claims of an "inner light" put in his way. It is, of course, true that Locke's statement pitted him against the philosophers as well as the enthusiasts, but his opposition to the former was purely accidental, and became important only in later times, when his ideas were contrasted with more advanced views. In the first book of the *Essay* he had only practical problems in mind, and he was content when he had met the objections raised by the advocates of an "inner light." His reasoning remained purely altrospective; this would not have been the case if he had had in mind those abstract concepts which introspective philosophers claim to find in their minds.

It was not, therefore, the objections of his opponents that caused Locke to modify his position. He would have been only too glad to have destroyed every support on which their opinions and beliefs rested. The outcome was different, however, when Locke turned to his own mind for a confirmation of his views, for there he found a surplus of expression, due to neither superstition nor enthusiasm. When he began to classify and arrange his ideas in groups, and to compare them with the original sensations, he discovered a large class of ideas that did not come from the outer world, but from a source wholly within each man, which he called an "internal sense." The mind by reflecting on its own operations got ideas which had "nothing to do with external objects." The recognition of this fact caused Locke to modify his original doctrine, and to admit reflection as a source of ideas. Thus Locke found a legitimate origin for the surplus of expression which he thought at first to be wholly bad.

The second book of the *Essay* was a development of this thought, and the deeper he went into the discussion the more introspective he became. He took his last step toward introspection when he distinguished between the primary and the secondary qualities of objects, the latter being wholly in the mind, and, like the ideas of reflection, being created by its operations. Thus in the end only the primary qualities remain as sensations coming unchanged from the outer world. In regard to them he never abandoned his original altrospective habits of thought. We must wait for Berkeley to complete the work Locke began, and to give to the world a consistent system based wholly on introspective methods.

The further development of Locke's philosophy has no present interest. We must now see what was its influence on the practical problems for which he sought a solution. Two principles had been clearly enunciated, which slowly but surely changed men's ways of thinking, and gave them the means of testing and measuring those impulses that encourage partisanship. By the principle of correspondence men could measure the excess of expression over impression, and thus know wherein their activities and expressions were greater or more impulsive than the facts demanded. The principle of indifference separated from each doctrine or impulse all disconnected facts that had been erroneously joined to it. A third category—the indifferent—is thus created, into which all things go that are neither good nor bad. With these principles recognized, Locke hoped that "truth and quiet" could be obtained and the evils of enthusiasm remedied. It certainly looked as if the basis of any visual overgrowth had been destroyed. Henceforth words—the signs of ideas—must tally with sense impressions and be unaffected by the operations of the mind.

This view, however, has not been verified by subsequent

progress. The simple analyses of Locke were soon found to be defective. The discovery of a new group of facts forced the development of thought into an unexpected channel. I do not wish to make the mistake of assuming that the new principle was clearly seen by Locke or by his immediate successors. One of the great difficulties in interpreting the thought movement of this period is that while they knew an obstacle had been encountered, neither the followers nor the opponents of Locke knew what or where it was. We can, however, separate the principle involved from the many incidental matters about which discussion turned, and thus reach the heart of the controversy with an ease that was then impossible.

The new principle that gradually emerges is the association of ideas. According to Locke's analysis the simple ideas of the mind stand apart from one another, and all complex ideas are formed by combining these ideas as a chemist combines elements. The principle of indifference assumes that these ideas can readily enter into any combination, and that a thinker who has them in given combinations can separate them and put them into other combinations as readily as a chemist combines and dissolves material bodies. This method, however, of joining and dissolving mental concepts fails. Men cannot unite and divide ideas at pleasure. They come up in groups and depart together. Modern psychologists, recognizing a fact outside of Locke's calculations, speak of inseparable associations. In the end he dimly saw the principle involved, but naturally condemned it because it rendered his analysis valueless. He recognized in the association of ideas the basis upon which enthusiasm and superstition rest, and by calling attention to it hoped to get reasonable men to guard themselves against these weaknesses of human nature. When subsequent writers emphasized the good side of this principle its importance was readily appreciated.

In referring to the principle that associations of ideas

are inseparable, I wish to separate the facts upon which it is based from the philosophy with which it is joined. It is one thing to state what the facts are ; it is quite another to show why they are so. To separate the two is the more important in this case, because the facts are obtained by altrospection while the theory is introspective. It is customary to speak of the association of ideas as an introspective doctrine born of a simple inspection of the contents of consciousness, yet it is hard to see how pure introspective evidence can prove it. Such evidence could show that given ideas occurred together on particular occasions, but this is far from showing that they are inseparable. The writers using this principle evidently obtained their evidence in support of it by observing other persons, and not by inspecting the operations of their own minds. The first interest of this school of psychologists lay in social matters, and they were better judges of other people's motives and actions than of their own. Beginning with studies plainly altrospective, gradually by the force of their own development they slipped over to an introspective standpoint, carrying with them principles that had an altrospective origin ; yet they talked of these principles and argued from them as if they were introspective. Good observations are thus mixed with crude theorizing, and the reader is deceived as to the real origin of the doctrines and as to the evidence on which they rest.

This principle of the association of ideas renders Locke's analysis worthless as soon as the latter is applied to social concepts. If his interest had been in simple combinations of colour, taste, or sound, the explanation might have been satisfactory. But his real interest was in the higher ideals of the race, and these resisted his efforts to decompose them. It was not outside criticism, for example, that made him rewrite so often the chapter on "Power." The trouble lay in his own mental associations. These made it impossible for him to see in the elements into

which he analyzed the concept of power the same vivid reality for which the concept itself stood. He wanted to put the abstract concept of power in the same relation to the world of effects as that held by the concept of God. Try as he would, he could not make the two correspond.

The same difficulty faces every one who attempts to analyze a race ideal; it doubtless has constituent elements and an origin, but its present reality differs so much from the elements in isolation that no substitution of them for the ideal itself is possible. A race ideal differs from its elements or from an abstract concept by having a motor reaction united with it. We recognize the ideal not by its sensory qualities, but by the activity it excites. Neither the elements nor the abstract concept can arouse a motor response. Although from a purely sensory standpoint they appear to be alike, they do not affect the mind in the same way. No one, therefore, would think them to be the same unless he lacked the race ideal himself, and judged it solely by the sensory manifestations of those who have it. Locke, however, did not lack race ideals. He was doing much to create a class of men who did lack them, but his own concept of the race ideals was too vivid for him to be content with a purely sensory description of them. Therefore, while he tested them by his new method, he stopped short of destroying them.

I have called attention to the fact that writers do not state the proofs of their doctrines in the same way they were discovered. Current beliefs and prejudices influence men as soon as they begin to write. Locke talks as if he were a chemist analyzing and combining ideas in a physical laboratory. To use a more exact analogy, he should be called a distiller rather than a chemist. A distiller does not unite certain simple elements to make liquors, but permits nature to combine these elements in the form of fruit, and from the ripened fruit extracts certain com-

pounds. The distilled liquor is as different from its elements as it is from the fruit out of which it was taken. The concrete form of the fruit is gone, and with it much of the substance, but its essence is still there. Its effects are brought out more sharply by the change and its stimulating power is much greater. Locke subjected the race ideals to an analogous process. They were imbedded in a mass of historical facts, customs, and ceremonies, which were doubtless necessary to their origin, but which had grown so thick about them as to obscure them. The race ideals resisted decomposition because they were groups of indissoluble ideas. The historical facts, customs, and ceremonies, however, yielded to Locke's method, and became a mass of isolated data which could be tested by their correspondence with sense impressions. The only change that could be made in the race ideals was to isolate them. The deistic controversy, for example, was due to an attempt not to degrade the Christ-ideal, but to separate it from the God-ideal. Those who could not hold the two ideals apart took one side of the controversy, while on the other side were those who separated them, and believed them to have different origins. The latter were enlarging Locke's principle of indifference by carrying it into a new field.

A good illustration of how Locke's method worked in practice is to be found in his book on the *Reasonableness of Christianity*. He read the four Gospels without the aid of notes or comments, and became convinced that the one essential doctrine is a belief in Christ. He thus obtained a clearer concept of Christ's mission than if the details were retained. The opponents of Locke could not bring themselves to this view. All the doctrines of the Bible were indissolubly associated in their minds, and if one of them was dropped out of sight they all went. Edwards, Locke's chief opponent, lays great stress on this unity of all Scriptural doctrine. The fall of man, for

example, is to him an essential belief without which the mission of Christ would have no meaning. Locke did not deny the fall of man or other doctrines, but he did desire to separate them, to clarify their meaning, and to test them rationally. This kind of analysis many people could not endure. They resented the destruction of their concrete pictures, and refused to subordinate familiar doctrines in the way that Locke's method demanded. A long controversy followed, with little immediate result, because neither party saw clearly the real issue involved. Had Locke seen the importance of the association of ideas and modified his method of analysis accordingly, he could have expressed his thought so as to avoid opposition. But his shortcomings in this respect strengthened the cause of his opponents, and forced his followers into bolder positions than would otherwise have been necessary. Locke opened the road to the deistic controversy, but did not follow it far enough to see where it would lead.

It is usual to regard the position of the deists as a stage in the development of religious thought reaching from Locke to modern Unitarianism. From one point of view this interpretation is correct, although often far fetched. If we follow the development of abstract thought subsequent to Locke, the contributions of the deists cannot be overlooked. But it is more important to look on the practical side of Locke's work and see how the deists are connected with it. Viewed in this way, they make a stage in religious development that begins with Locke and ends with Wesley. Both these men emphasized the reading of the Scriptures without the aid of notes or commentaries. This was also the attitude of the deists, who, not being scholars, were forced to take this stand. Reliance on the English text and a plain, common-sense interpretation of difficult passages gave them much of their power, and saved them

from the tendency of learned men to emphasize history and tradition more than gospel truths.

It is a mistake to suppose that the deists meant to attack the truth of Christianity or the divinity of Christ. Some of the titles of their books have this appearance because they used the word Christianity in a broader sense than is now customary. *Christianity not Myste-rious* and *Christianity as old as Creation* look suspicious, but in the sub-title of the first, John Toland claimed to show that "there is nothing in the Gospel contrary to reason"; and in the second, Matthew Tindal asserted that "the Gospel is merely a republication of the religion of nature." To bring out the real meaning of these titles, "revealed religion" should be substituted for "Christianity." If these books are to be regarded as attacks on religion, they are attacks on God and not on Christ, for they reject the old concept of God, but make no attempt to alter the concept of Christ. The sole topic is the relation of natural to revealed religion. Do they have the same end, and are their precepts the same? If so, revealed religion and the concept of God must be stripped of much of their historical and traditional attachments. Natural religion is simple, plain, and perfect. To tally with it, revealed religion can have no mysteries, nor can God's conduct ever be so questionable as to demand explanation or defence.

The premises of this position were derived from Locke's principle of correspondence, according to which all excess of expression over impression should be eliminated, and from the principle of indifference, according to which reason was the only rule in matters relating to sense impressions. But in the application of these principles, he had only the enthusiasts in mind. The twin evil of superstition he seems to have thought of only in connection with the Catholic Church; and in his day controversies with it were almost lost sight of in the more

urgent evils of enthusiasm. In the next generation the emphasis is reversed. The Puritans were forgotten, while the dogmatic, arrogant actions of the Established Church became a pressing evil. Locke could not forget the controversies of his youth, but his followers quickly saw that superstition, and not enthusiasm, was the real foe of reason. They used, therefore, the edge of the sword that Locke had sharpened but had not wielded. It cut sharply and deeply, making important changes in religious thought.

The Protestant Reformation altered men's notions of religion mainly in regard to the New Testament. The reformers demanded a return to the primitive Christianity of the first centuries, and a destruction of all the later myths and traditions. As a step to this end, they destroyed all pictures of Christ and the Apostles, and degraded the Virgin Mary and the saints from their lofty position. This movement tended to elevate the ideal of Christ and to give it a unique position, by separating it from the superstitious observances sanctioned by custom and tradition. But, while this change was going on, no corresponding alteration took place in the concept of God. The Protestants, especially the Puritans, had primitive notions of God and his activity. By emphasizing the Old Testament and following it literally, men were led to suppose that God was continually interfering in their affairs, and that famines, plagues, wars, and other evils were the result of a subversion of the laws of nature. God's hand was seen in every trifling circumstance, and this activity was so arbitrary that God's actions could not be accounted for rationally. Religious instructors emphasized the mysteries of religion because there seemed to be no other way of accounting for the multitude of disasters to which the human race was subjected.

Besides these crude notions of divine interference,

there was a widespread opinion that all religious and civil institutions, customs, and ceremonies were of divine origin. Even trivial matters of ritual were made sacred and given as much emphasis as the essentials of religion. Locke and the latitudinarian churchmen endeavoured to make church government and ceremonies matters of indifference, but the strong reaction after the Restoration carried everything before it, and reinstated the primitive notions. The divine right of kings, the passive obedience of subjects, the supremacy of the Established Church, and all other Tory doctrines had their boldest advocacy during this period. It is true that there was no real persecution, and that the opponents of the established order were in little danger of life or liberty, yet in a thousand irritating ways the arrogant majority made its power felt. Whoever departed from accepted views became a social outcast, suffering all the ignominy that the servile spokesman of public opinion could inflict.

It was this practical condition that provoked the deistic controversy. The deists, to maintain their position and the right to free thought, had to attack the prevailing concept of God, and sweep away the crude notions of His continual interference in the affairs of men. This meant also to deny that God is a God of wrath, or that he ever delegates His power to any one. Reason was the only standard they could accept. Even in the days of Hobbes it had been asserted that Christ had not given any power to His followers. A candid interpretation of the Gospels favours this contention, but even Hobbes had not denied that God delegated His power to human rulers. The statements of the Old Testament were held to be too plain and abundant to leave the matter in doubt.

A more thorough-going criticism of the Old Testament is necessary to the denial of God's interference in government and ceremony than in the case of Christ and the

New Testament. The deists were compelled to put the evidence of reason and natural religion above that of revelation, and to assert boldly that the latter could not add anything to natural religion, and that any assumed opposition of the two would prove that the Scriptures were wrong. Their main complaint was that in attributing certain motives to God we "clothed Him with our own infirmities." All the mysteries of religion grow out of the assumption that God interferes in the government of the world. By putting government, ceremony, and worship on a natural basis, the concept of God is stripped of its dross, and natural and revealed religion are brought into harmony. The only end that God could have in interfering in the affairs of men is their good. It can, therefore, be inferred that any form of government or worship that diminishes the happiness of men is not of divine origin.

These doctrines affect the concept of God only by making it stand out more clearly. But they have also important practical effects. Famines, diseases, wars, and other human ills are assumed to have a natural origin. Natural religion has no place for such evils, and revealed religion is defective in so far as it connects them in any way with God's activity, since He interferes in the affairs of men only for their good. All evil, therefore, is caused by man, or is due to unavoidable conditions, and human happiness is the only test that can justify institutions or ceremonies.

Bold and heretical as these doctrines seem, they are but a natural phase of religious development. Two distinct methods of interpreting the Scriptures are possible. If the emphasis is placed on the Old Testament, the wrath of God becomes the central doctrine: He is believed to be constantly interfering in the affairs of men and punishing them for their shortcomings; He is the great source of fear, and safety from His wrath is assured only by the

strict observance of certain ceremonies and ritual. If a God of wrath and ceremony is made the central thought of the Bible, and it is desired to convince men that God's wrath is still active, the interest in the New Testament is centred mainly in the fulfilment of the prophecies of the Old Testament. It is assumed that if God has been so careful to fulfil His promise in the past He will be equally careful now, and hence follows the certainty that the wicked will be punished, and that any violation of ceremony or priestly prerogative will kindle anew the divine wrath. The main elements of such a religion are wrath and fear, and its object is to develop instincts of obedience and the observance of religious forms. But if the emphasis is placed on the life of Christ, the Old Testament is important mainly for its predictions of His coming. In this light Paul and the other Apostles regarded the Old Testament. Its story is condensed until little remains but the prophecies. This view of the Bible reveals a religion of love and hope, which stands in marked contrast to the religion of wrath and fear that the other view presents.

When, therefore, Locke began the new way of reading the Scriptures and boldly put the four Gospels in a position of supreme importance, he was starting a far greater revolution in religious thought than he supposed. He meant merely to put the doings and sayings of Jesus above the doctrinal portions of the New Testament. The creeds were founded mainly on the Epistles, and Locke hoped to reduce their severity by subordinating them to the Gospels. But the same method carried a step farther reduces the importance of the Old Testament even more than it does the Epistles. The prophets expound a religion of love and hope only in so far as they anticipate the life and sayings of Jesus. The gospel of wrath that they so often preach sinks in importance when the gentler side of their work is emphasized. If Locke's analytic

process be rigidly carried out, the many details of the Old Testament will be lost sight of, while the resulting essence will contain nothing but what bears on the mission of Christ and the hope it brings the world.

God, from the old point of view, was like the ruler of a province. He united in Himself all the various functions that such a government demands, and was at the same time not only ruler, judge, lawgiver, and jailer, but also an interferer in natural processes. A dozen different concepts were thus bound up together and more or less confused with one another. But the change in economic conditions created a new concept of God. When the highest ideal of men is to become makers and producers, they put God in the same economic category. Just as warriors and clansmen think of God as a warrior and ruler, it is also natural for men in industrial relations to think of Him as a creator. This new concept the deists emphasized so strongly that other concepts of God sank into insignificance, and were finally thrown aside as derogatory to the new ideal. The Christianity of the New Testament was made "reasonable" by the elevation of the Christ-ideal above the doctrines of the Epistle, while the Old Testament was made "reasonable" by thinking of God as a creator instead of as an interferer in natural processes. The deists thus brought the concept of God into harmony with the new emphasis placed upon the Gospels. And the old notions of religion were changed, not by lowering or destroying anything, but by elevating to a supreme position ideals that had grown up in the new industrial world. The rational process did not reduce men's faith in God or Christ, but it raised certain concepts of them so high above others that the lower concepts were regarded as unworthy of divine beings. Religion was thus transformed from a belief in concrete pictures, ceremonies, and traditions into a love of race ideals too lofty and too severe for every-day use. It is, in

fact, a strain on the imagination to think of a God who could create the world and then become so indifferent to it as to abandon it to its own devices.

This cold concept of the Deity, by which he is farther removed from the world of fact than the remotest star, could not have had much influence had it not been supplemented by a new view of the universe. Fortunately, just at the time when the deists were pushing God back out of the every-day world, Newton was working out a concept of the universe that would allow a distant God still to be effective. Of this aid to their theories the deists do not appear to have been aware. If they had recognized its importance, their doctrines would have been differently developed, and their errors reduced. While deism had a great immediate effect, a century elapsed before the law of gravitation was thoroughly understood, and its importance recognized, a fact which made religious progress one-sided and isolated its phenomena. Now that harmony has been restored we can treat the work of Newton and the deists as complementary and put them into correct relations to each other.

In the old concept of nature, space was thought of as chaos, and God was at best the ruler of a few oases in a vast desert filled with disagreeable obstacles. The universe was thus pictured as an Arab would picture his desert home — a few pleasant spots in isolation among vast unconquered realms. Milton's picture was of this type. He thought of movement in space as of travelling in Sahara. Heaven, earth, and hell, which are the only spots where law has force, are separated by a dismal journey of enormous extent that only the most daring would undertake. It was impossible to picture distance except by visualizing the obstacles a traveller would meet. Distant things could not be connected except by a series of concrete steps. Even heaven was closed in by gates to guard against the terrors of uncontrolled space. All this was

changed by the law of gravitation. Through it, bodies widely separated could be pictured as influencing one another. Empty space now became a distinct concept, which drove out the dread and even the thought of chaos. Our present concept of nature is chaos reduced to law. The universe conceived as an interesting mechanism becomes an object of admiration, reflecting more credit on its creator than any other of His acts. The plan of creation gets a deeper meaning, for it is intelligible how a God, distant both in space and time, can nevertheless exert a controlling influence on the affairs of men. A God who can, at the beginning, so arrange the universe that His will is sure of realization is much greater in men's estimation than one who must always interfere and patch up the defects of His own scheme.

Modern optimism was made possible by Newton's law, by means of which both God and men are elevated to a higher plane than old concepts permitted. If the deists had not been so hopeful, they would not have dared to strip the concept of God of its historical attachments or to remove Him so far from the affairs of men. Their confidence in human nature made them believe men so perfect as not to require the interference of God in their affairs. But the God they so carefully removed to a distant throne did not remain there, and when he came back he had lost his old attributes and acquired new ones. He disappeared as a God of wrath and returned as a God of love.

According to the Puritan view men changed all their attributes when they passed from one state to another. A man in a state of grace was entirely different from what he had been in a state of sin. Even more radical than this change is the difference between the old concept of a God of wrath and the new one that made him the Father of men. The old God seemed to think only of revenge and punishment. He visited the sins of fathers on their

children, if no other victims could be found. When he reappeared in a new garb he was as eager to bestow favours as he had been before to punish. Any slight sign of repentance brought the sinner into favour, and put within his grasp all the means of improvement that heaven could devise. We now have a concept of God that harmonizes with the picture of Christ given in the Gospels. One important step in this change was due to Locke, a second to the deists, and a third to Newton; but it was not completed until Wesley had done his part. We must, therefore, leave this subject in an unsatisfactory state until the influence of the next epoch is considered.

Before turning to this new field it may be well to restate the changes that have occurred. Introspective analysis has encroached on the old concept of personality, forcing people to think of their ideals, institutions, and immediate belongings more objectively. The self is now reduced to a mere point connected with the outside world by a series of sense perceptions. Morality has been transformed by the principle of indifference; and in the new field, the "adiaphorous," is placed everything of which reason is the judge. Subjective analysis has failed in the case of those inseparable associations we call race ideals, which, resisting an analysis into sense impressions, were yet capable of a distillation that freed them from their historical and traditional surroundings. They were also isolated from one another, so that each rested on its own basis and was brought into activity by its own motor reactions.

The earlier type of men may be thought of as having but one motor reaction for all stimuli. Every motive was so bound up with others that any need of action roused all possible motives and thus brought the whole man into activity. Men's minds could not act in parts; either all was active or all was passive. The isolation of race ideals

and the growing field of indifference altered this condition. Religious and civil ideas then acquired distinct associations with separate motor responses. Religion itself was at least partially divided, because the concepts of God and the Christ were put on distinct bases, and aroused different motor reactions. As a result of these changes morality also obtained an independent position. It was so intimately associated with the new monarch, reason, that its ideas were pushed forward into a first place; and for a time, at least, it looked as if its rule would become as absolute as had been that of the Puritan conscience. But the older ideals were too thoroughly imbedded in English character to allow morality such supremacy. So no decisive victory was gained; but Englishmen became definitely separated into types, whose characters were determined by their dominant race ideals and the motor reactions that made these active principles. Before the time of Locke there were three types of Englishmen—the Puritan, the clinger, and the sensualist. Locke's analysis had split the Puritan party into two parts. One section was transformed into stalwarts, who placed race ideals above reason and sense impressions, and the other into mugwumps, who made the opposite choice. Although the latter class are called rationalists, they have no more right to this title than the other classes. The real difference lay not in the reasoning itself, but in the axioms from which men reasoned; and these axioms were determined in all cases not by a rational process, but by the relative clearness of the different race ideals and the strength of the motor reactions. The physical constitution of men and their relative vigour was a far greater factor in determining their class than were their reasoning powers. The reasoning of mugwumps is not superior to other modes of reasoning, but is simply an endeavour to make word concepts correspond to sense impressions. Setting bounds to the vagaries of the imagination, it keeps men

in close touch with the practical side of their environment. In this sense of the term Locke was the first mugwump and a typical man of his class.

Physically the mugwump presents an example of reduced vitality. He puts peace, quiet, and comfort before all else, because he cannot stand the hardships and vigorous activity that pleased the older type of Englishmen. The first cause of the rise of this class was the prevalence of consumption. The well-housed were its victims, and they could not avoid its ravages except by adopting a life of comfort and moderation. The type was developed by the prevailing notions of education which made an active life distasteful to the educated class, forcing them to enter sedentary occupations where they were protected from the evils of the outer world. As soon as Puritanism was on the wane, the city churches offered the mugwump class an attractive field. They became favourites wherever intellectuality was more highly esteemed than piety and vigour. But the places for which they were best fitted, and in which they did the greatest service, were the fields of government and law. Their spirit of compromise and their intense love of peace and security made them excellent arbitrators between the other classes, who by themselves could find no basis of union. In a nation where no one class was strong enough to dominate, compromise was the only principle of action. The new type of men, although weak numerically, was thus able to rule the others, and to get its principles accepted. From this time the English race knew of no government except expediency and compromise.

The separation of government and law from religion and morality is of importance because of the conversion to new uses of old instincts and motor reactions. Thus far the religious and the moral motives had been dominant in the race, but after all they exhibited a practical sort of religion and morality whose main end was to secure peace

and order. We might say, therefore, that the chief motives were always connected with government, this being in form, however, religious and not civil. Certainly, the influence of the Church lay mainly in fields that we should now regard as civil, and to the Church the love of peace and order was due. When government and religion became distinct objects of thought, it was the peculiarity of English development that the old motor reactions were appropriated not by religion, but by government and law. In other words, instincts due to the supremacy of the Church became civil instincts, while religion and morality were forced to appropriate, or at least to try to appropriate, the less developed motor reactions due to later economic forces.

At first sight this view seems strange, but it will bear investigation. France has been perfectly stable in religion because the old well-established instincts are still bound up with the Church. The government of France, however, has been unstable for lack of these early instincts. The French have been trying to find or to develop new motor responses which will give to their political ideals the same stability possessed by their religious ideals. In England, on the other hand, political ideas have the stability of French religious ideas, while religion and morality have to face difficulties similar to those which have confronted politics in France. The religious and moral struggle of the eighteenth century in England was the result of this instability. Every one felt the insecurity of the religious and moral ideals, and tried to obtain for them a new basis.

This unsettled religious condition would have been impossible, if in the separation of government and religion the latter had secured the effective motor reactions that in earlier times both of them had utilized. The development in religion and morality has made Englishmen rational and ideal in those fields, just as their development in

politics has made the French rational and ideal in that field. In each instance the transformation was so great that the race lost the power to excite the old motor reactions, and was forced, therefore, to seek new and more fitting ones. If an Englishman wishes to know how a Catholic feels, he has only to examine his own feelings when he is aroused in politics. He then acts with the same mingling of stupidity, obstinacy, dislike of change and love of security, that Catholics often show. The motives and motor reactions in the two cases are the same. The feelings relating to government and law are the most instinctive and least directed by reason of any that an Englishman has, and in these fields the least change is possible.

Since the time of Locke there has been practically no development of political thought. The only serious attempt to rationalize law and politics was made by Bentham, and it resulted in failure. There is really nothing on which the English race can base the claim they so often make, that they have a peculiar aptitude for the development of political institutions. They have been too conservative to develop institutional life beyond the needs of a primitive society. Peace and security come not from Anglo-American institutions, but from the instincts inculcated during the supremacy of the Church, the favourable economic conditions, and that spirit of compromise which has been forced on the race by the presence of opposing types of men. Given these instincts and conditions, almost any institutions would be successful. Where these conditions are lacking, the failure of our institutions is lamentably apparent, and the inability to remedy them even more obvious.

This political conservatism is the bad side of the otherwise good results which came from the appropriation of the older motor reactions by government and law. The motor responses that make for peace and security can-

not be aroused except by the concrete causes that first created them. The more primitive the standpoint and the cruder the concepts presented, the more vigorous is the response of an English or an American political audience. A new principle or a new situation, no matter how important, fails to attract attention or to receive consideration if it requires any modification of old premises. The same blind conservatism shows itself in other fields. We have a dozen forms of church government, each claiming to be of divine origin. I know of no religious body that has altered the form of church government imposed upon it by the accidents of its origin. For like reasons, social organizations of all kinds are short-lived. They usually appeal to a class and contain a dominant element which does not feel bound by the rules of compromise that are effective in public bodies. This is also apparent in political parties. They represent classes, and an organized class always has dominant elements that override the minorities in the rudest way. The caucus and the political boss are illustrations of how institutionless the race is when social organizations are formed among people bound together by similar feelings from which they are not likely to break away. Happily for the race, it has had no dominant class for the last two centuries, and this fact has enabled it to prosper under conditions that would otherwise have demanded a development of its institutions.

I state these facts not from a desire to enter the domain of political theory, but to excuse the absence of any discussion of political affairs in the following chapters. Where conditions are so firmly established as to prevent change, there can be no development of thought. English progress, especially in the eighteenth century, is as divorced from political life as if the nation had been paying tribute to some foreign power. It mattered not what wars or policies its rulers undertook, so long as

the tax rate was unaltered. Every one regarded government as a necessary evil, and thought the less he had of it the better. This attitude by itself proves that the governing class was divorced from the nation at large, and that the acts of the former are of no consequence to the progress of the latter.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE MORALISTS

WHILE in the seventeenth century English development was a struggle against outside influences, in the eighteenth it became normal and proceeded from indigenous causes. The Catholic and the Puritan were alike in that they impressed upon English character and civilization traits and ideals of extraneous origin. The one was as plainly a Roman in his tendencies as the other was a Hebrew. Puritanism, moreover, affected most the foreign emigrants, who settled in the industrial centres, and those associated with them. It dominated the old English stock rather than transformed it, and the yoke of bondage was thrown off as soon as possible. Protestantism, which was a reaction against foreign influences, spent its force when the several states interested secured their independence and cast out the doctrines and ideals that had no basis in their own conditions. The eighteenth-century man was an Englishman rather than a Protestant, and saw the world coloured with the peculiarities of his local environment. A reverse movement had set in, and, instead of resisting and protesting against outside influences, he was now trying to impress his ideas on others. Foreigners came to England not to conquer but to get object-lessons.

Catholicism had left as a legacy to the race a love of order, a desire for security, and a willingness to submit to authority. To these qualities Protestantism had added toleration, willingness to compromise, love of liberty, a demand for representation. All such qualities affected the

public relations of men and made it possible to attain the peace and security demanded by the older ideal. But of far greater importance than any of these influences was the new, economic ideal of comfort. The other characteristics were, in fact, but concrete expressions of this one dominant thought. No one can understand the new race of men unless he knows what was meant by comfort. In earlier times pleasures were communal and out of doors. They demanded more or less activity; for the damp, harsh climate of England made rest and repose in the open air disagreeable and even dangerous to health. When Puritan zeal destroyed communal life, more emphasis was thrown on the family measures which could be enjoyed indoors.

The key to English progress lies in the opposition between communal and family life. The destruction of the former in the seventeenth century elevated the family to the supreme place, and around it the amusements and pleasures of the eighteenth century were clustered. English families at this time lived an isolated life. Church-going and the hunt seem to be the only communal interests that survived, and too much is usually made even of them. They should be looked upon more as incentives to the good meals and other home pleasures that exercise made enjoyable than as ends in themselves. The dangers, uncertainties, and privations that in earlier times had attended hunting had disappeared. It meant merely a fine morning ride followed by a good dinner. The military air of the nobility had also disappeared. The squire sold his pistols and sword to buy a bathtub. It is hard to overestimate the importance of the introduction of so simple an article. Other people bathe to keep clean; an Englishman bathes because it is enjoyable. Bathing has become an end in itself, and his house and daily life are pivoted around it. Much of the sensuality of earlier days was due, not to a bad disposi-

tion, but to an overplus of energy and warmth of blood. A cold bath remedied this, and left the bather in a normal condition for the rest of the day. An unbathed Englishman is a sensualist; a bath turns him into a gentle optimist. The bath-tub is the parent of that English optimism of which the last two centuries have seen so many examples.

The advent of the bath-tub, however, is only an index of many other changes that tended to emphasize family life. The new fashion of tea-drinking came in because hot drinks were grateful after the blood had been cooled off by a bath, and were also delightful after exercise or exposure in a damp, chilly climate. Tea-drinking thus became a pleasing complement to bathing and outdoor sports, and added to the charms of home life. The habit of smoking and the increase in all kinds of reading matter strengthened the same inclinations. The library became a necessity in a gentleman's house, and with it were associated not merely reading and study, but also smoking, conversation, and a host of other innocent home pleasures. Slippers and a dressing-gown were more essential than spurred boots or a military coat, and by displacing the ruder habits and customs of earlier days gave a more important place to women. So many of the new pleasures were due to women's activity that woman exerted a controlling influence in the family, and checked the brutality and coarseness of the men.

In these descriptions I have in mind more especially the country nobility. They were the initiators of good movements, and set the standards that Englishmen still follow. We often hear of the corruption and impurity of the upper classes in the eighteenth century, but these charges are true only of the court society and the wealthy inhabitants of the towns, with whom the country gentry had little to do. The latter went seldom to London, and then only after the most formal preparation. And as the

new dynasty was not popular with the Tory nobility, the isolation naturally characteristic of country life was intensified. Each country home was thus a miniature type of the civilization of the day, those things being emphasized that could be best enjoyed in a home environment. It was fortunate, therefore, that when on account of the great industrial changes men of new wealth began to appear, they imitated the country gentry and not the corrupt court party. They bought estates, isolated themselves after the prevailing fashion, and by building new houses on a more modern plan they helped to augment the pleasures of home life and to increase its influence. It matters little, therefore, what the court party did. They were merely a phenomenon of the moment. The country gentry succeeded and survived, and thus made general the ideals of home life that their peculiar conditions created.

The landed proprietors promoted also a revolution in agriculture. Early in the century a craze for improvement broke out, due, no doubt, to the monotony of country life. Having reconstructed their own houses, the gentry interested themselves in their tenantry and in everything relating to their estates. Waste land was enclosed, swamps were drained, the cultivation of root and grass crops was encouraged, and the various domestic animals were so much improved that they became in reality new breeds. These changes were greatest in the regions far from London, where the gentry were most isolated and felt most keenly the defects of country life. The north of England was transformed into a new country, and the way opened for the industry which has since made this region so well known. The old England had centred in the higher lands of the south; the north and the great coast swamps had been almost unoccupied. The latter were now filled up with a busy population living under conditions quite as new as those which now charac-

terize the Western states in America. Many traditions, habits, and customs were carried from the old regions to the new, but an extensive migration necessarily broke down many old survivals, and prepared the way for the adoption of new ways of living. It was fortunate for England that this internal movement of population happened at a time when foreign commerce was introducing many new articles, and when the development of internal industry was cheapening old ones. These simultaneous changes enabled new ideas and ways of living both to secure adoption and to avoid the opposition that they would otherwise have encountered. The great changes appeared in unknown regions, and did not attract general notice until they were too securely rooted to be opposed.

The condition of the labouring population of the newer country districts was altered even more than that of the nobility. The improvements in agriculture gave labourers regular employment, and often increased their wages. Their houses were reconstructed on a better plan, and the introduction of coal and glass made it possible to heat and light them properly. The use of tea and sugar became general, thus providing the working people something warm at each meal when they returned from outdoor exposure in the fields. In earlier times the labourers had little warm food except porridge. Now this and similar dishes were displaced by baked foods; so long as food had been cooked in a pot over an open fire only watery dishes could be made, but ovens made dry foods possible. Bread and meat could now be cooked in more palatable forms than formerly, and these when supplemented by the new drinks, like tea and ale, furnished a really wholesome diet. The oven, the brewery, and the tea-pot were all factors in the transformation of the labourer's life. The beverages were the natural supplements of the new oven diet.

While these changes in diet were in progress, others of

equal importance were being made in clothing. A damp climate like that of England necessitates a free use of wool. In earlier times the poor had been clothed largely in leather or in linen; wool was used, if at all, merely for outer garments. Woollen underwear was practically unknown among the poor, and what little wool they had was utilized in a very ineffectual way. The weaving was bad, and even the best of garments left much of the body exposed. Only their coarse, heavy diet and vigorous constitutions enabled the poor to withstand the evils that resulted. In early times most of the English wool was fine, and was used to make broadcloths and other goods that the rich alone could afford to purchase. The coarse wools, such as are now used in underwear and ordinary clothing, came into general use only after the improvements in sheep breeding. When mutton became valuable the coarse-woolled sheep displaced the fine-woolled sheep that was valuable for its fleece alone. This change made it possible to clothe the English people properly.

Another important industrial development that tended in the same direction was the use of cotton and especially the introduction of calico printing. The outer garments then began to be made mainly of cotton, while the underwear was woollen. The outer suit gave the appearance of neatness, protected the wearer from dirt, and bore most of the wear and tear, was easily washed, had much endurance, and could be readily replaced. Such a suit alone would be unendurable except in a dry, warm climate; but when used with a suit of woollen underwear it furnishes ideal clothing for the working classes of a cold climate. Each garment is efficient for its own end, and supplements the defects of the others. These double suits were adopted by the poorer classes only after calicoes and other cotton goods came into use. The external suit of cotton could be kept neat, and calico printing gave for the first time that variety of colour and pattern

which makes the cultivation of taste possible. Village maidens could then make their dress attractive, and those who were clever enough to utilize the new material found in it a decided advantage.

The country people were also greatly benefited by the transference of industries from the older towns to the country districts. The finer goods were still town-made, subject to the regulations of the local guilds, but the demand for poorer, coarser goods became so great that it was profitable to employ the unskilled country labour in their production. Industries moved away from the skilled and more highly paid labour of the towns, and settled in regions where labour was at best but partly employed. This change offered the country people, much to their advantage, by-industries which occupied their leisure time and employed the idle women and children. Detrimental as it was to the town artisans, it brought about a great improvement in the country at large. On the one hand it gave employment to the great mass of unskilled labour, and on the other it created a mass of cheap goods which were consumed by the labourers themselves. These goods, it is true, were of an inferior quality, but the better, town-made goods would have been too costly for workmen to purchase.

These new industries were also of especial importance because of the employment they gave to women. A dime in a woman's hands is of more importance in the upbuilding of family life than a dollar in the hands of a man. Not only does all of the woman's dime usually go for material that elevates the home, but she adds much to the value of the material by her own work and skill. Homes are not possible until women have incomes. Woman's purity also depends upon her economic independence. Incomeless women are always subject to the caprice of men; they secure power only by pandering to men's passions. No revolution can be of more impor-

tance than one which gives to women the power to earn enough to free themselves from coercion. This the industrial changes of the early eighteenth century accomplished, and the evils they brought are small in comparison to this one gain.

During the whole of this epoch the condition of England was rapidly improving, except in the towns and in a few of the older country districts. Security and good order had followed immediately after the revolution of 1688, and a single generation had been enough to efface the effects of the earlier disorders. Although the violent prejudices of earlier times were retained, they were of little consequence, because both the Puritan and the Catholic parties were practically extinct. Every one was optimistic, and made it his chief end to be comfortable. The evidences of prosperity were visible on every hand; wages were higher and work steadier. The lower rate of interest and higher rents show how general were the improved conditions. The increased supply of capital made great agricultural improvements possible, and these in turn permitted higher rents to be paid without increasing the price of food. The labourer's food, in fact, cost him less than formerly, on account of the greater economy and better cooking. Potatoes and other vegetables which came into general use reduced the need of the more costly bread and meat. A well-clothed, well-housed family does not need half the food required by those who are constantly exposed to the vicissitudes of a damp, raw climate, while warm foods and drinks still further reduce the consumption of food. English writers have the queer notion that the welfare of the labouring classes can be determined by the quantity of wheat their wages will buy. No standard could be more fallacious when great changes in consumption are taking place. In such cases the dearer articles are driven out, or at least their use is much diminished. It is quite possible, therefore, for staple articles

to be rising in value, and at the same time for the labourer's condition, his whole consumption being taken into account, to be improving. Estimated in this way, the satisfaction that a country family derived from its earned income had certainly doubled by the end of the first quarter of the century, and the improvement in the next forty years was almost as great. There was, however, some loss in public advantages due to the enclosures and other aggressions of landlords, but these losses did not become real grievances until later.

The two marked changes in the eighteenth century, of which people were conscious, were the improvement of family life and of agriculture. Both of these were mainly due to country influences, and especially to the changes in the newer districts. At that time no one was conscious of the industrial revolution of the period, that being a discovery of the present century. The pamphlet literature of the eighteenth century voices one long wail of hard times. This mistaken alarm is especially noticeable in the woollen industry, which every one regarded as ruined. At first sight it seems unaccountable that there should have been so many complaints in this industry at a time when the production of wool was increasing rapidly, and most of it was made up in England. Industrial revolutions, however, always break down staple industries in well-established places, and create new ones in new quarters. The public are so accustomed to measure their prosperity by the industrial condition of old, well-established trades and centres that a decline in these regions is mistaken for a general stagnation of national industry. The old centres of trade in England made fine goods, and did not adjust themselves readily to the new demand for coarse, cheap goods. In the manufacture of these new goods, the skilled labour of the old centres had not the same advantage they enjoyed when the wool was finer in quality and made up into better and more durable cloth. It

was a long time before the new centres attracted public attention; and in the meantime the decline in the trade of the old centres was naturally looked upon as a national loss. The evils of great changes show themselves quickly, because they happen under the public eye, while their benefits declare themselves only to succeeding generations. Thus the so-called hard times of one century may come to be regarded by the next century as marvelously good times. English people were as blind to the improvements of the eighteenth century as nations now are to the industrial progress of the last thirty years. Think how odd it will seem to people of another century to read of our complaints of the abundance and cheapness of wheat, or to see on one page of a newspaper an account of our increased poverty, and to learn from the advertisements on another of the increased variety and extent of our daily consumption.

I have pictured this improvement in the conditions of country life in order to contrast it more clearly with the decay in national character and life that was going on in the towns. Reports of town life, especially in the great seaports, show that it was full of degradation and corruption. The moral influence of the growth of commerce was as bad for the cities as the influence of the agricultural improvements was good for the country. This is not strange when we understand the causes. During this period England made many-conquests in foreign lands; France and Holland were driven from the seas; the American colonies were developed; and substantial progress was made in the conquest of India. These foreign regions afforded an outlet for adventurous spirits. The risks of trade and enterprise were great, but the rewards were great. Risk-takers and adventurers are the more sensual part of a nation, and England was fortunate in having an outlet for men of this class. It withdrew from her home population, especially

from the country districts, an element that might have formed a serious obstacle to progress. The moral upbuilding of the nation was largely due to the removal of members of this class, who were attracted to foreign lands, and there found vent for their passions. The mass of these adventurers never returned; and those who did return came in contact with and corrupted only the great seaport towns, where the gains of foreign trade were poured out and dissipated in the way that all easily earned money goes. Mandeville's celebrated *Fable of the Bees* pictures the activity of people of this class and the influence they exerted on home industry. In a town thriving on the ill-gotten gains of sailors and foreign adventurers, it is strictly true that private vices are public benefits, and that trade and industry would decline if men became virtuous. England thus had a double gain from her foreign conquests. She lost some of the more sensual members of her population, while at the same time the wealth and industry of the home population were greatly increased by the expenditure among them of the large gains of adventure. The only resultant evil was the lowering of the moral tone of city life, and even this was of a temporary character. The steady upbuilding of country life established standards that the cities were finally compelled to adopt.

As a result of the new social conditions, the position of country and city was reversed. In the seventeenth century the cities were the home of religion and morality, and the country was full of vice. The Maypoles, festivals, and fairs, that were the Puritans' abomination, were country events. Every little village retained some primitive customs that lowered the moral tone of its inhabitants. Puritanism was a raid of the town on the country to put a stop to these evils. The force of the Puritan movement was spent when they had been abolished. In the eighteenth century, however, we find

comparatively little vice in the country. The sensual were then drawn from it to the towns and to foreign lands. Country life was pure, but the towns were full of prostitution. Moral and religious movements began to originate in the country. Even the city clergy were a lifeless body, often corrupt and vicious. Country moralists were, therefore, compelled to turn their attention to city vice; and they strove as earnestly to eradicate it as the city enthusiasts in the preceding century had striven to suppress country vice.

These facts give a clue to the causes shaping the development of thought in the eighteenth century. It was not a continuation of the work of the preceding century, but a new movement which did for the country what Puritanism had done for the cities. One section of the English people moved forward in the seventeenth century, the other section in the eighteenth century. The whole nation was not transformed and the two sections blended into a harmonious unit until both movements were complete. The present characteristics of the English nation appeared only after the city had first invaded the country to destroy its superstitions, and sensual practices, and the country had then, in turn, forced the city to adopt its new concept of family life.

To treat these two movements from a psychological standpoint, we must return to the distinction between the observer and the visualizer. An observer of men makes his eyes the main instrument in his collection of data. He sees the outside of things, and judges other people, not by their internal states of which he has no direct evidence, but by their looks and actions. He is thus entirely *altrospective*, seeing only the impressions that excite mental activity, and the expressions through which this activity impresses itself on outer objects and persons. The visualizer, on the contrary, is concerned mainly with his own mental states. His mental mechanism creates for him

visual or word pictures, which he follows in his own activity. He also strenuously endeavours to influence others with the ideals and principles he has developed. The visualizer thus lives in an abstract, ideal world, while the observer lives in a concrete world. The one looks inward for his motives, the other looks outward, and is influenced by the actions of those about him. The one, therefore, tends to break down social customs and standards, while the other helps to create them by imitating other people, and by striving to reach the level of his superiors. The perception of ideals makes an individual indifferent to the ordinary habits and customs of society and often opposed to them, while the more concrete methods of an observer tend to strengthen these habits.

The differences in the thought of the two centuries depend upon the differences between these two types of men. Normally the observer should have preceded the visualizer. Men naturally observe objects and act on the data thus obtained before they become introspective enough to elevate their subjective states to the first place. Country life also should influence civilization before city life. The rapid development of city thought and character however was due to foreign influences, and to peculiar economic conditions. The progress of the country had also been retarded by the strength of its sensual impulses. The cities thus injected into national life an abnormal type of men, who implanted certain impulses and ideals in the national character before correct habits of observation had been acquired. These defects the development of the country population in the eighteenth century remedied, but to apply the remedy in a natural way it was necessary to start from a simpler standpoint than that of the preceding century. Only observed facts were admitted as evidence. The background where fancy and imagination work was rigidly excluded. The attitude of the observer had fully as many defects as that of the visu-

alizer, but the discredit into which the latter had fallen helped to make the observer oblivious of his own weakness. Men so placed have naïve confidence in the strength of their position, and do not leave it until they are forced on by the pressure of their subsequent development. The great writers of the eighteenth century were country bred and looked at social problems from a country standpoint. Even Hume and Adam Smith never doubted the ordinary axioms of country people. To them as to others the country was the backbone of the nation; it embodied the purity and the morality of the nation. Country prosperity was national prosperity, of which the growth of rent was the best index. Men imbued with these ideas would find little to sympathize with in the earlier writers who emphasized the virtues and the importance of city people. The new generation, therefore, was compelled to collect its own data in economic as well as in other fields. Only after the work of observation and inference was well advanced did it learn to appreciate the work of its predecessors. The two currents of thought did not blend until the end of the epoch, and even then the union was not complete. ✓

The visualizing power of the preceding epoch had reached its highest development in Milton and Bunyan. The new epoch takes its humble start in the famous *Fable of the Bees*.<sup>1</sup> Mandeville's standpoint is not to be regarded as a degeneration from the higher level of the Puritan writers, nor yet as a reversion to some earlier type of thought. It represents the attitude of a new man just rising to self-consciousness and judging the

<sup>1</sup> This pamphlet in doggerel poetry was first published by Mandeville in 1705 and was called *The Grumbling Hive, or Knaves turned Honest*. It was republished in 1714 under the title of *The Fable of the Bees, or Private vices Public Benefits*. The essay on Charity and Charity Schools appeared in 1728. Mandeville died in 1733.

world solely by the evidence of his own eyes. Could a man be born full-fledged without education, tradition, or racial impulses, he would be more like Mandeville than any other writer. Study men simply with the eye, and only skin, flesh, and structure are seen. Observe their activities, and the one obvious fact is that various passions in succession control the actions of men.<sup>1</sup>

The *Fable of the Bees* would have attracted little attention had it not contained a few striking doctrines which the poetical form helped to make paradoxical. The sub-title asserted that private vices are public benefits, and every page emphasized this thought or others equally repugnant to the ordinary concepts of morality. The book, therefore, seemed scarcely worthy of notice, yet it had a lasting influence because it introduced several doctrines which were to be the centres of controversy throughout the century.

When great changes are taking place in national thought the old forms of ideas remain unaltered. Long after their activities have been modified by new conditions, people continue to think according to the old formulæ. Suddenly some bold thinker discards these formulæ, and startles the world with ideas in harmony with men's activities, though not with their words and ideas. Mandeville's book has the merit of showing how the inherited ideals and the conventional use of words were no longer suited to the conditions of English society. The shock that his crude utterance gave is due partly to the failure of old ideas to satisfy new requirements, but most of all to one of those unobserved changes in language by which words have new meanings forced upon them without at the same time losing their former conno-

<sup>1</sup> "I believe man (besides skin, flesh, bones, etc., that are obvious to the eye) to be a compound of the various passions, that all of them, as they are provoked and come uppermost, govern him by turns, whether he will or no." — Preface to the *Fable of the Bees*.

tations. An earlier generation would have made short work of the statement that private vices are public benefits. They would not have joined issue with Mandeville as to what private vices are, but would have flatly denied that such acts could ever produce public benefits. The strength of Mandeville's position lies in the assumption that the pursuit of wealth is beneficial to public welfare, and that trade and industry are the criterions of national greatness. Earlier moralists would have denied this. They would have said that the love of money is the root of all evil, and that it was harder for a rich man to enter heaven than for a camel to go through the eye of a needle.

Mandeville's description of the fraud, crime, and vice of an industrial society was not new. These were the commonplaces of every pulpit orator, and denunciations of these evils much stronger than his can be found in the writings of the churchmen. There was, therefore, in the old tirade against the love of wealth, a ready-made answer to all that Mandeville had said. But the change in the national thought is shown by the fact that no one denied that the pursuit of wealth was beneficial. Mandeville's criterion of national prosperity was accepted by every one taking part in the controversy excited by his book. In this noteworthy fact lies the key to the whole discussion. To meet existing conditions, his opponents were compelled to alter the meaning of the word "vice," and thus to modify their concept of human nature. So long as man in a fallen state was thought to be totally depraved, all motives prompting his activities were looked upon as vicious. Every natural impulse was to be repressed, while every gratification strengthened the evil tendencies in men and reduced the hope of an escape from the curse of sin. Religious concepts of this type cannot be reconciled with the idea that the pursuit of wealth is beneficial. In Mandeville's time every one admitted that the pursuit of

wealth was perfectly natural. The prophet, the priest, the moralist, and even the warrior might feel an inspiration and claim to be doing God's work ; but the merchant, the trader, and the artisan were working merely for men, and could not be given a high place except by exalting man's concept of human nature.

The moralists had always defined vice as any gratification of the appetites, and under such a definition the pursuit of wealth was certainly to be condemned. Mandeville, therefore, had his opponents on the horns of a dilemma. They had either to denounce wealth-getting or to modify their concept of vice. After much delay and bitter controversy a narrower meaning was given to the word "vice," and the ordinary economic motives were admitted to be innocent and useful. The difficulty lay in the lack of a clear discrimination between comfort and luxury. Necessities and luxuries were contrasted, but no clearly defined middle point was perceived such as the word "comfort" now conveys.

Mandeville's main thought, repeated in his work again and again, is that spending makes trade lively, while frugality causes industrial stagnation. Honesty, contentment, and frugality are suited to an indolent society ; but the necessities, the vices, and the imperfections of men are the sources of all the arts, as well as of industry and labour. Extreme heat and cold, bad seasons, treacherous waters, violent winds, and fire are regarded as benefits because they make men work and keep trade lively. The burning of London was advantageous because it increased the demand for labour. A hundred bales of cloth sunk in the sea aided the poor in England as much as if every yard had reached the consumer. Such doctrines, even apart from their moral bearings, could not but excite opposition. The challenge was accepted by the believers in frugality and morality. The long discussion did not end until the opposing doctrine was formulated in Mill's fa-

mous fourth proposition that a demand for commodities is not a demand for labour. This proposition is the essence of economic orthodoxy, and there is scarcely an economist since the time of Mandeville who has not done something to strengthen this bulwark defending the usefulness of frugality and the indispensability of capital.

It is often said that we owe to Adam Smith the doctrine that the self-interest of men prompts them to actions that harmonize with public welfare. It is even said that the greed of individuals promotes the interests of society through the competition and rivalry it excites in trade. However the doctrine may be stated, it is but a refined form of the paradox of Mandeville that "The worst of all the multitude did something for the common good." Mandeville thought that trade was promoted by the gratification of the desires and passions. The drunkard, the thief, or the harlot, by creating a demand for goods, promoted industry. Their spending, as much as that of any other class, promoted public prosperity. If a man robbed a miser "the nation would be the better for the robbery," and the benefit would be as great and real as if a philanthropist had given a like sum to the public. Crude as this doctrine is, it yet contains the essence of that economic optimism which at a later time became so popular. To refute it there was needed a doctrine of capital making the saver a better man than the spendthrift. If it can be proved that spending impoverishes and saving enriches a nation, then only capitalists are public benefactors, and "the worst of all the multitude," unless he is a capitalist, ceases to be a benefit to his fellows. It is the self-interest and greed of the commercial and capitalistic classes that the optimistic economists have in mind when they assert that these motives harmonize with public interests.

Mandeville's bluntness is shown in the way he handles the labour problem, and here as elsewhere he anticipates the doctrines of the later economists. Cheap food, he

tells us, is the basis of national prosperity. The wages of labour should vary with the price of provisions. The poor should be kept from starving, but they should receive nothing more because the surplus above the cost of labour is the source of national prosperity. He anticipates Adam Smith by stating the doctrine of the division of labour, and he sees clearly that the economy of labour thus produced is the cause of the social surplus enjoyed by the upper classes. But in this prosperity he would not have the labourers participate. They should be left to endure poverty and its hardships as best they may, for a knowledge of economic comforts would not make their lot better, but worse. The labourer should be contented and cheerful, getting his pleasures from his work and from the life that goes with it. The more rigidly he is separated from the luxuries and vices of society, the more pleasant will his lot appear. A taste of luxury spoils the labourer, raises prices, and checks industry. If the labourer has plenty of work and the upper classes plenty of luxuries, trade will thrive and prosperity increase.

These thoughts are expressed in the essay on "Charity Schools." Mandeville opposed the education of the poor on the ground that a multitude of poor persons is needed to do the drudgery demanded by industry and trade. The poor can share the free goods of nature and the pleasures of social intercourse; for the enjoyment of these no education is needed. Education destroys these natural pleasures without supplying enough others to take their place. Thus the supporters of charity schools do not aid the poor by their charity; they merely increase discontent and create barriers to industrial progress.

This exclusion of workers from all share in national prosperity is a characteristic of eighteenth-century thought. The expressions of the economists are, as a rule, less brutal than those of Mandeville, yet they start from the same assumptions and reach the same conclu-

sions. The growing feeling among labourers that they were being wronged enabled them and their sympathizers to use Mandeville's main argument in a way that he certainly did not foresee. And yet this modification lay on the surface of his theory, and only needed writers with a more humanitarian spirit to bring it out. Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees* emphasizes the contrast between the workers and the leisure classes, and makes the usefulness of the latter depend on the need of luxury and vice to maintain trade. The upper classes he mentions are the rulers, the priests, the soldiers, the lawyers, and the physicians. Their sloth, lust, avarice, and pride provide the work for the labourers. With these classes pictured together in this unfavourable way it was easy to throw them indiscriminately into one group, and represent them as the drones that feed on the honey gathered by the bees. The hive thus becomes separated into the workers and the drones. Mandeville is responsible for this forcible contrast; it was his illustration that brought this picture of society into popular use. Why should not the workers eat their own honey and drive the drones from the hive? This is the philosophy of revolution, and springs from another view of the same facts to which Mandeville first called attention.

While Mandeville, in common with all others of his day, was brutal in his attitude towards the labourers, it is unjust to charge him with moral laxity. He did not think that all virtue was a sham. It was only the social or industrial virtues that provoked in him a feeling of repugnance and contempt. We are prone to misinterpret eighteenth-century writers because we use the term "moral" in the sense of ethical, while they made it the equivalent of what we now call social. When Mandeville inquires into the origin of moral virtue it is plain that he has in mind the virtues of a social character—those that fit men for an industrial world. These virtues, he held,

merely cover up with a thin veneering the depravity that is natural to a fallen man. The passions of men still exert their full force, even though they are slightly veiled by the artificial effects which the feeling of honour and shame can produce. The doctrine was not new, and in accepting it Mandeville showed how orthodox his religious ideas were. He was careful to say that the men he described were neither Jews nor Christians, but merely men in a state of nature.

This view of man coincided with that of the theologians, who believed that the power to do right did not lie in man, but must come from above. They would not admit that an irreligious man could be virtuous. The more he conformed by his outward acts to moral standards, the more were they convinced that these pretences were a sham, hiding the corrupt tendencies of the natural man. Mandeville had plenty of good company in his contempt for the pretended virtues of unregenerate men. It is necessary to call attention to this fact because the sensation that Mandeville created was due much less to the novelty of his views than to the change that men's concepts had undergone. The humble Christian of earlier days had been displaced by a new type, who had more confidence in himself and a stronger belief that his actions had merit *per se*. Industrial success bred this confidence, and those engaged in industry were loath to acknowledge that their inclinations were not as pure and noble as the inclinations acquired in other vocations. Mandeville's assertions, though seemingly of a general nature, were directed specially against the industrial classes, and their representatives felt bound to take up the issue that he offered.

Although later economists wished to disguise the doctrines of Mandeville and to disown any connection with him, yet it must be admitted that he was an economist, and that in his works are to be found nearly all the impor-

tant doctrines that made up the body of the new science. The antagonism of later economists resulted from a repugnance not merely to Mandeville's moral ideas, but also to his specific economic teachings. He was an economist, but not an orthodox economist. The creed that gradually crystallizes into economic orthodoxy first appears in the replies to the *Fable of the Bees*. It took the joint efforts of Hume and John Stuart Mill to free economic thought of its scepticism and crude empiricism, and of Adam Smith and Ricardo to make it respectable and practical.

Mandeville's immediate successor was Hume, whose first book, the *Treatise on Human Nature*, appeared in 1739,<sup>1</sup> when he was but twenty-eight years of age. The traditional interpretation of this work arises from Hume's place in the world's thought rather than in English thought. The Germans, being creators of the history of philosophy, naturally bring Hume and other English writers into their scheme only in so far as German thought is affected. In this way Hobbes, Locke, and Hume are grouped together as the originators of that sensational school of philosophy which resulted in the scepticism that aroused Kant from his "dogmatic slumbers." This grouping of English writers was justified so long as the history of modern philosophy was in reality little more than a history of German thought. English writers, however, should be more critical, and separate the history of English thought into epochs illustrating its own development. Unfortunately this has not been done. Partly from tradition and partly from the effects of a foreign education, but more largely from a lack of appreciation of the inherent importance of the development of English

<sup>1</sup> In 1748 Hume's revised views appeared under the title of *An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding*. He wished the latter work to displace the former, and even advised against reading *The Treatise*.

thought, native writers, following the plan of German writers, have put Hume into the same group with Hobbes and Locke. In this way a single thought of Hume's is emphasized at the expense of those earlier ideas through which alone his development can be understood. He is presented thus as a pupil of Locke, and the principles which Locke had more or less clearly enunciated are shown to have been carried to their logical results by Hume.

In my opinion, the final blending of the philosophy of these two writers was an accident, and not the result of any design on the part of Hume. New philosophies develop out of new economic conditions, and not out of old theories. In the end the philosophies of two epochs may blend, but this blending is an afterthought, and is not due to the second philosophy having sprung from the first. If my interpretation is correct, the starting-point of Hume's development lay in the writings of Mandeville. Let us see what evidence supports this position.

Unfortunately the data for an interpretation of Hume's mental development are meagre. His great work, the *Treatise on Human Nature*, was written when he was young, and there are no earlier essays to throw light on the path he followed. A few of his letters have been preserved, in which are found some traces of his early growth or of his later recollections of it; for the most part, however, we must rely on a critical examination of his writings, where there is considerable evidence as to the order in which his ideas developed, and of his struggles to give them correct and clear expression. The advance in terminology and in the clearness of his contrasts shows plainly what parts and chapters were written early, and what changes he was making in the plan of his work. In one place Hume says that his work was planned before he left college and written not long after; in another that it was planned before he was twenty-one, and composed

at twenty-five. We know, however, that the *Treatise on Human Nature* was composed largely in France at a later period. I take his statements to mean that the thought of such a work occurred to him very early, and that even at college he collected material, and perhaps wrote some parts of the book. The plan, however, was from time to time modified, the parts rewritten, and the emphasis shifted from one topic to another, until the printed book was very different from Hume's early anticipations. The title, preface, and introduction throw light on these changes. The title reads: "A Treatise on Human Nature; being an attempt to introduce experimental methods of reasoning into moral subjects." These moral subjects, however, are not what we now call ethical, but more nearly what we call social. All the eighteenth-century writers contrast the moral with the physical. Hume makes it include "the nature of the government, the revolutions of public affairs, the plenty or penury in which the people live, the situation of the nation with regard to its neighbours, and such like circumstances." It is also plain that he expected to use "experimental methods," and this would naturally lead him into the study of concrete topics. The discussion of cause and effect, space and time, and other abstract topics was evidently an afterthought, involved in his scheme but not consciously foreseen.

The use of the term "human nature" in the title is another indication of his attitude. Human nature meant then, as now, men as we know them through their concrete relations and activities. To be a good judge of human nature implies that a person is a careful observer of men in every-day life, and has a knowledge of their peculiarities. If Hume had designed to write a book on abstract psychology, he would have called it a treatise on the human mind. The mind is internal and reached only by inference. The natures of men have external manifes-

tations, and these alone can be studied by experimental methods. In short, the design of Hume was to write a book on what we would now call social psychology, and not on individual psychology, as a continuation of Locke's work would have involved. This fact is proved by the closing sentences of Hume's introduction. "We must therefore," he says, "clear up our experiments in this science (moral philosophy) from a cautious observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common course of the world, by men's behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures. Where experiments of this kind are judiciously collected and compared, we may hope to establish on them a science, which will not be inferior in certainty, and will be superior in utility, to any other of human comprehension."

In the closing sentence of his *Essay on the Passions*, he says: "It is sufficient for my purpose, if I have made it appear that, in the production and conduct of the passions, there is a certain regular mechanism, which is susceptible of as accurate a disquisition, as the laws of motion, optics, hydrostatics, or any part of natural philosophy." These passages show that Hume intended to write, not a philosophy, but a book on social science, and that he thought the key to the systematic study of such topics lay in the observation of the human passions as displayed in every-day life. Following up this thought, I infer that the book on the *Passions* was the first part written, and that he designed it to be an introduction, as he tells us in his preface, to "an examination of morals, politics, and criticism." That Hume never gave up this plan in spite of the fact that his own development spoiled it, is shown by his revision of the *Treatise* into *An Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding*, so that it could be made a part of his essays on morals and politics. He tried to cut off the overgrown parts of the *Treatise* so that the unity and proportion of the whole would not be destroyed.

We can, moreover, get at the same results in another way. Just before the publication of the *Treatise* he writes: "I am at present castigating my work" by "cutting off its nobler parts" so that "it shall give as little offence as possible." What then are these nobler parts which he hesitates to express? He is evidently becoming conscious that youthful enthusiasm has led him to make some extravagant statements. That this pruning was kept up as his enthusiasm for early ideas abated is shown by a letter written after the publication of the *Inquiry*, in which he advises a friend not to read the *Treatise* because the *Inquiry* contains all its principles shortened and simplified.

By comparing the two works we can see what parts have been shortened and made simple, and what parts have been eradicated or reduced because he came to see that they were crude and defective. I infer that the same motives, leading him to tone down the *Treatise* into the *Inquiry* influenced him in the early castigations of which he wrote, and that the same parts were affected in both cases. If this inference is correct, the castigation was applied to the book on the Passions, and the book on the Understanding was being simplified. In the *Inquiry*, the part on the Passions is a mere skeleton of its former self, while the part on the Understanding is, as he says, shortened and simplified. It should also be noticed that in connection with its defects and errors Hume always speaks of the early age at which the *Treatise* was planned and written. This shows not that the whole book was written as early as he states, but that the parts of it which his maturer judgment condemned were planned, if not written, at that date. He never shows any sign of repentance for having printed his ideas on cause and effect, nor for any of the doctrines of the understanding; they stand out more clearly with each rewriting. It must, therefore, have been the doctrines about the passions that

were written so early, and for which he has so many times expressed regret.

In one of the sections that was evidently written at a very early date and which escaped the castigation it deserved, additional light is thrown on what the youthful Hume was trying to do. I have transposed some of the sentences in order to avoid the florid rhetoric. "When I look abroad, I foresee on every side dispute, contradiction, anger, calumny, and detraction." He was evidently thinking of the controversy Mandeville started. "Every one keeps at a distance and dreads that storm which beats upon me from every side. I have exposed myself to the enmity of all the metaphysicians, logicians, mathematicians, and even the theologians; and I can wonder at the insults I must suffer; every step I take is with hesitation, and every new reflection makes me dread an error and absurdity in my reasoning."

This is the tone of one who expects to make startling revelations which will excite universal condemnation. All the metaphysicians, logicians, and mathematicians could not be aroused by any particular doctrine, but only by something which would attack the existence of all current doctrines. The theologians come in only secondarily, evidently only in so far as they belong also to one of the other classes. He must, therefore, have in mind something more sweeping than his doctrine about miracles or even that of cause and effect. The former might excite the theologians, but neither of them would affect to any extent the other classes.

A glance at the book on the Passions shows what this bold doctrine was, and although toned down, it is still, as Hume admits, "somewhat extraordinary." "Reason," he says, "has no influence on our passions and actions." "Reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will." "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions and can never pretend to any other office than to

serve them." There are many such sentences. What do they mean? Hume, it should be remembered, had planned to write on moral topics, using experimental methods, and getting his data from the conduct of men in every-day life. Such methods and such material make a social psychologist of the observer. The external stimuli that excite men to action can be seen and recorded. So also can the response in the shape of motor reactions and activity. But what happens within the men observed by the social psychologist cannot be seen. If this internal activity can be disregarded, and the external stimuli can be put into causal relations with the response in activity, so that when men are excited in a given way they respond by given activities, then the conclusions of the social psychologist are valuable, and his work can have the precision of "any part of natural philosophy." There is, therefore, a strong temptation to ignore the internal activity of men, or at least to emphasize those sides of human nature where the response can be most easily predicted. An observer soon finds that the response is most regular in the case of the passions, and that these are most dominant in the type of men called sensualists.

These facts create a temptation to call all men sensualists, and to affirm that they are ruled by their passions, for in this way the task of the social psychologist is made easy. Mandeville had taken this short road to success, and affirmed that men were only skin, bones, and passions. But this crude position is controverted by the evidence of self psychology. Internal sensations and a will come between the visible stimulus and the resulting activity. A wise observer usually admits this, but saves his science by denying the freedom of the will,—a denial which is one of the logical necessities into which the thoroughgoing social psychologist is forced. Had Hume been content to take this position he could have completed his appointed task in an approved manner, but his doc-

trines would not have been in the least "extraordinary." The logicians and mathematicians would have been pleased with such a position, and the metaphysicians and the theologians had already heard it too often to become excited at hearing it again. The peculiarity of Hume's position was the sweeping way in which he proposed to establish it. It was generally admitted that the will was influenced by reason and by passion. If it were denied that the reason had any influence on the will, then the passions must dominate it, and the opponent of the freedom of the will had an easy case. Optimistic writers like Shaftesbury had affirmed the opposite doctrine. They assumed that man was so intellectual that the reason ruled the passions and thus was master of the whole man. In robbing reason of the mastery, and making it merely a slave of the passions, Hume was setting the traditions of the age at naught. No wonder he expected general opposition, or that he regretted such utterances after he had come more fully into touch with the spirit of his age.

With this clue to Hume's development we can picture its stages with some accuracy. In the university, or certainly very early, he formed the plan of writing, from an inductive standpoint, a systematic treatise on social and moral topics. At that time, however, he was under the influence of the classic authors, and the essays he wrote were such as these writers would naturally suggest. We probably have the remnants of this scheme in the essays on the Epicurean, on the Stoic, and the like. When he came under the influence of Mandeville he saw that experimental methods might be applied in modern societies much more effectively than the material furnished by the classics would permit. By simplifying the scheme of Mandeville and removing its absurdities, he was enabled to use its leading ideas as a basis for the book on the Passions. The phenomena of pride and humility thus secured a dominant place, while those of sympathy and self-interest were

almost equally important. The problem of free will became pressing when Hume attempted to utilize this study of Passions as an introduction to his general scheme.

It was here that Hume's originality began to show itself. He was about to pass into fields untrodden by Mandeville, though he got one more lift from his intellectual godfather. Hume at this period was ill and despondent. From a letter to a London physician we know something of his disease and his mental attitude. It is often asserted that this correspondent was Dr. Cheyne, by whom a well-known book on nervous diseases had been written. Mandeville had also written on this subject,<sup>1</sup> and if Hume was interested in such topics he was as likely to run across Mandeville's book as Cheyne's. Mandeville's book was a tirade against deductive physicians, that is, against those who reason about cases instead of following purely experimental methods. In this everything not pure induction was denounced; the mathematicians were ridiculed in Mandeville's usual style. Such denunciations of physicians are likely to impress a sick man favourably, especially after he has tried in vain a great variety of nostrums. It may have seemed possible to Hume to generalize Mandeville's crude statements into the general proposition that reason is "wholly inactive" and "utterly impotent." To say the least, there is a resemblance here between Hume's and Mandeville's positions similar to that to be found in other parts of the book on the Passions.

With Mandeville it was easy to strike off such propositions, and then let them drop; but the more logical Hume found that his position involved a series of other doctrines

<sup>1</sup> *A Treatise on Hypochondriack and Histerick Passions*, 1711. In it Mandeville says: "What I am against is the speculative part of Physick. . . . It is the observations and not the reasoning that constitute the Art; and the latter is no more necessary to physicians than the false lights to shop-keepers which we know are only contrived to make their goods look the better." p. 60.

which drove him into a field he had had no intention of exploring. The product of this development was the book on the Understanding, the evolution of whose central doctrine, that of cause and effect, was slow, the end having been reached only after much groping in the dark. During his sojourn in France, the turning-point in his thought was reached in a discussion on miracles. At this point, a particular proposition developed in connection with the study of the passions was converted into a general one. In order that moral and social problems might be free from that uncertainty which resulted from the admission that internal states influence the action of men, Hume had denied that reason influences the will. The social psychologist can see the causes that stimulate men to activity and the results that follow. If the relation of cause and effect exists between these two classes of phenomena, morals becomes an exact science.

This particular proposition, devised to meet the needs of moral science, can be made a general proposition by denying the influence of any unseen or secret powers in the case of any phenomenon. Causes are observed and so are effects. What binds them together? The usual reply is that they are held together by unseen forces. But if reason can be set aside and man's actions predicted from the motor stimuli, why cannot the Author of the universe and the unseen powers and forces that are supposed to reside in matter be also ignored? Cause and effect would then follow one another in regular order, but with no unseen connection. In this way we get a sweeping proposition, to which the absurdity or impossibility of miracles is a corollary. Hume might well flatter himself that through this generalization he had given "an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusions." If the influence of the unseen world was to be ignored just as reason had been, certainly the whole basis of superstition was destroyed. Hume's use of social terms in describing

the doctrine of cause and effect shows that it was derived from the more special doctrine about the dominance of the passions in men's activities. While Hume generalized his proposition, he did not generalize his language. Before his time, the words "custom" and "habit" were used only in a social sense. Such terms would never have occurred to him if he had not been enlarging a proposition which had first become apparent in the social sciences. What he really affirmed was, that a principle of human nature created for social ends has become so pronounced and so general in its effects that it compels us to use the categories of social phenomena when we are thinking of non-social events. Custom and habit thus rose to the character of universal laws.

Another indication that Hume's starting-point was social is the use of the phrase "association of ideas." When he denied that reason affects activity, the world of ideas lost its direct connection with the world of activity. There might be a parallelism but no causal relations. Unless some new relation could be found between ideas and actions, philosophy would be a chaos. Order was restored by thinking of ideas in the same terms as those used in thinking of men. The units of the mental world were thought of as associating with one another and as forming binding relations just as men do in the external world. In this way the laws of the mental world, the physical world, and the social world were reduced to common terms. Custom was thought of as the ruling element everywhere, or at least this one trait of human nature dominated all other concepts of the three worlds and forced them to run in the same grooves.

When Hume's attention was diverted from the passions to the more general proposition about cause and effect, he was compelled to divide the original essay into two parts. He became conscious that many of the propositions he was discussing belonged more properly to the under-

standing than to the passions. The book on the Understanding is an overgrown preface into which Hume threw the material for which he found no place in the book on the Passions. In the latter parts of the new book, which were evidently written first, he is more sceptical and less definite, and thus has a tone more in harmony with that of the book on the Passions. Hume is not moving toward scepticism, but away from it, and the latter part of the book on the Understanding would not have been written as it was if he had already had the ideas in as clear a form as they are expressed at the beginning of the book. He has evidently reversed the order in which the parts of the book were thought out. In Part Four he says that all knowledge resolves itself into probability. This is the first step out of the general scepticism of the book on the Passions, where he says that the reason is "utterly impotent." Bishop Butler had just published his *Evidences of Christianity*, in which probability is made the basis of all reasoning. Hume had evidently been reading this work, and under its influence he took the upward step away from the general scepticism of Mandeville. In Section Eleven of Part Three another important advance is made. He now assigns reason to three fields: knowledge, proofs, and probabilities. But he hedges a little, and implies that after all the first two are kinds of probabilities. His scepticism is not cured until he writes the First Section of the Third Part. Here he boldly contrasts knowledge with probability, and at last modifies the title of the part so as to make it no longer a discussion of probability alone, but of knowledge and probability. Algebra and arithmetic now become exact sciences, with the claims of reasoning perfect, but of geometrical reasoning he remains sceptical until he writes the *Inquiry*. In it geometry becomes a science, every affirmation of which is "either intuitively or demonstratively certain." Propositions of this kind are discoverable, he says, by a mere operation of thought,

without dependence on what is actually existent in the universe. Though there never were a circle or a triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would forever retain their certainty and their evidence. Surely Hume had at this stage no reason to fear the enmity of the metaphysicians, logicians, or mathematicians. Reason had finally secured a place from which it could not be dislodged. Hume looked on it as a mild passion which controlled men when they were not under the influence of some dominant motive.

It is only in Part Second of the book on the Understanding that the influence of Hume's predecessors becomes apparent; in it he discusses propositions foreign to his original scheme. He recognized at length that this part was out of harmony with the rest of his work, and did not insert it in the *Inquiry*. Part First is mainly made up of material taken from the book on the Passions. When he began to cut down this book he transferred to the beginning of the other the propositions which had become too general to be limited in their application to a discussion of the passions. His interest was thus centred more and more in the Understanding, and the book on the Passions was gradually reduced in size either by omissions or by transferring its material to the first book, until it became a mere shadow of its former self. In the *Inquiry* it would doubtless have been omitted if Hume had not still clung to the notion that the passions were subject to laws quite as apparent as those of the physical world. By this time he had, however, lost all sympathy with the sensualism of Mandeville, and he bitterly regretted the youthful ardour that had led him to express notions so opposed, not only to common sense, but to the spirit of his age. The spirit was rational, and too strong for Hume to resist. The more he came in contact with his contemporaries, the more did he accept their tone and method, until at last in his history he lost

himself in current topics, and the controversies involved in them. His original plan was a complete failure because he found it impossible to move forward on its lines. On his upward curve he became too abstract to be of service to English thought, and on his downward curve he became a mere Tory.

Judged from this standpoint, Hume's philosophical development was composed of four stages, and for each there is an edition of his *Treatise*. At Ninewells he made a start, but of this edition the only extant fragments are a few essays that show the impress of the classic authors he was fond of reading. The book on the Passions is the second edition somewhat abridged; that on the Understanding is the third, and the *Inquiry* is the fourth. At the start Hume combined the sensualism of Mandeville and the scepticism of his favourite classical authors. Out of this condition he gradually arose until in the end he was able to give over to Kant a definite problem to solve. It is not correct to assume that Kant studied Hume's doctrine in its original form in the *Treatise*. In this work the contrasts are not sharp enough to stimulate an opponent. The clearest expression of the ideas to which Hume had then attained are at the beginning of Part Third of the Understanding, and here he recognizes "seven different kinds of philosophical relation." Only in the *Inquiry* has he arrived at a settled position capable of being clearly stated. He now divides objects of human inquiry into two classes: *Relations of Ideas* and *Matters of Fact*. The knowledge of the one is derived from reason, that of the other comes from experience. From these clear statements Kant easily got his point of departure, and continued to its legitimate end the upward curve on which Hume started. Here, however, we must break off our discussion. Kant's development and influence lie outside English thought, and to discuss them is beyond the scope of the present work.

The work of Adam Smith follows so closely after that of Hume that it may be called part of the same scheme. What Hume failed to do because he was diverted from his main thought by encountering philosophical difficulties, Smith accomplished, although he did not carry out his plan in full. As a result political economy obtained a recognized place, and through its influence the whole group of social sciences became distinct objects of inquiry, and were thus isolated from other branches of learning with which they had been confused. The evolution of Smith is more easily traced than that of Hume, for it proceeded more slowly, and was due more largely to the objective conditions that surrounded him. Hume's evolution was subjective, and ran its course rapidly and quite independently of events and persons. Smith, however, had gone through the main stages of his mental development before he began his great book.<sup>1</sup> He entered upon this work with fixed ideas, and was seeking to give them a concrete expression by illustrations from the world about him. Hume read before he wrote, and thought while he wrote; Smith thought before he wrote, reading and observing as he wrote. These facts make Hume's environment of little importance to him, while to Smith his environment was of the greatest importance.

In harmony with this interpretation of development, I

<sup>1</sup> The *Wealth of Nations* appeared in 1776; Smith's first book, the *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, was published in 1759. At that time he was professor of moral philosophy in the University of Glasgow, but he gave up this position in 1764 to travel abroad with a private pupil. He returned in 1766, and spent the next ten years in private study at Kirkcaldy, near Edinburgh. While in France he met the Physiocrats, whose doctrines were beginning to attract attention. The lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue, and Arms were first published by Mr. Edwin Cannan in 1896. They are the notes of a student who heard Smith's lectures just before he left Glasgow. They are of value mainly because they show what Smith's opinions were before he came in contact with the Physiocrats and other later influences that made the *Wealth of Nations* assume the form it did.

express the opinion in advance that the doctrines found in the *Wealth of Nations* are not original with Adam Smith. They are to be found in earlier writers, by whom in many cases they are better stated than by Smith. His originality consisted in bringing a mass of isolated doctrines and facts into harmony with his own ideas, and in making them contribute to the ends he had in view.

There was a school of political economy antecedent to the work of Smith, but its merits were not recognized because of the isolated way in which the discussions of different problems had been carried on. The oldest portion of economic science related to money and trade. Quite apart from these was a series of valuable discussions on the industrial condition of England. The finances of the nation, and the causes of the relative strength of England and her rivals formed another distinct group of problems. In addition to these, problems relating to the improvement of land had received much attention. It is often forgotten how important were the agricultural changes of the eighteenth century, and how much more attention they attracted at the time than did the industrial changes that we now emphasize. Eighteenth-century writers did not recognize the industrial revolution, although they were aware of the great agricultural changes of the period. This fact made the literature on the land problems of much more importance to Smith than that on the industrial situation.

Of prime importance to Smith were the discussions started by Mandeville, and continued by Hume, Hutcheson, and other moralists. Smith's first work lay in this field, and from it came the doctrines about human nature which became the backbone of subsequent economics. Before Smith's time economic discussions had been ephemeral, because the topics and events exciting them were always changing, and each new topic seemed to demand a new treatment. As long as public interest was centred

in the events of the day, there were no net results; but when it was recognized that the same human nature operated in all these events the presence of relating principles was recognized. The work of Adam Smith consisted pre-eminently in taking these principles of human nature out of their moral setting, and making them do service in the realm of economics. He robbed morals of much of its traditional field by limiting its scope to the manifestations of sympathy, but this loss to morals was more than offset by the clear way in which the other principles of human nature were applied in economic discussions. Self-interest was now put into a field where its merits could be recognized.

In saying that Smith's doctrines did not originate with him, I do not mean to imply that he obtained them from any one source, or even from any one school or group of thinkers. There is a strong tendency to associate him with the Physiocrats, as if he were inspired by them and owed to them the fundamental concepts of his book. But his recently published *Lectures*, which were delivered before his trip to France, show that many of his ideas had been acquired before he became acquainted with the Physiocrats. It is natural, however, to assume that ideas acquired after his departure from Glasgow were due to French influence, and this is the opinion of many readers of the recently published *Lectures*. Although I admit that there is much to be said in its favour I cannot accept this judgment. The *Lectures* show that at the time they were given Smith was still a moralist and viewed economic topics as part of a larger field. The one economic doctrine that he had clearly in mind is the connection between cheapness and plenty. This is discussed under the general heading of Police, and shows that he was primarily not interested in industry, but in its regulation. This interest arose from a desire to emphasize the importance of the principles of human

nature. He believed that these principles sufficed to direct human energies in the right channels, and that the government never could improve upon their dictates.

If an English economist of that day had gone to France, any change in his views we might reasonably attribute to French influence; but we have no reason to believe that Smith was familiar with English economics, or that he recognized its importance. What, then, we must ask, did he learn not only from the French, but also from the English? In the *Moral Sentiments* published before going abroad, he had said that "the two useful parts of moral philosophy are ethics and jurisprudence." He promises a new work, not on economics, but on "the general principles of law and government," in which he proposes to treat of "justice, police, revenue, and arms, and whatever else is the object of law."

In this programme there is only one point — revenue — that he has in common with the Physiocrats, and it is this common interest that seems to have bound him to them. What knowledge we have of his intercourse with them shows that it was confined mainly to discussion of practical affairs. There is nothing to prove that Smith had any concern in the general Physiocratic theories, or even that he troubled himself to understand them. The French influence is visible enough in Smith's fifth book on revenue, and much of it may have been planned, if not written, while in France. But his theories come from another source, and demand another explanation.

Smith was not the only Englishman who failed to understand or to appreciate the Physiocratic theories. As late as 1769 Hume in writing to Morellet forcibly denounces these doctrines.<sup>1</sup> And Hume surely was in a better position to understand them than Smith. The same lack of appreciation is to be found in the writings

<sup>1</sup> Burton's *Life of Hume*, Vol. II, p. 427.

of Arthur Young, who goes so far as to formulate the reasons for his opposition under definite heads.<sup>1</sup>

These writers imply, if they do not openly assert, that the Physiocrats are merely reviving certain exploded doctrines of earlier English writers. Young, for example, says that the single tax is "no idea of their own, but which is borrowed from English writers, from Locke, Decker, etc."<sup>2</sup> There is also reason to believe that the distinction between *productive* and *sterile* was derived from English sources. In an anonymous *Discourse on Trade*, dated 1704, the thought is expressed by the word, "adiaphorous." The writer divides trade into three classes: first, that which enriches a nation because the exports exceed the imports; second, that which neither enriches nor impoverishes because the exports and imports are equal; and third, that which is disadvantageous because the imports exceed the exports. He calls the second class, "adiaphorous," and says that it is of great use to individuals, but of no real benefit to the nation. Here at least is the same distinction which the Physiocrats drew. Being consistent free traders, they threw out the third class, and applied the doctrine to internal as well as external trade.

When the issue is understood, the reason for this opposition to the Physiocrats becomes plain. The English moralists were emphasizing the principles of human nature, and were opposed to every attempt to make man subordinate to or dependent upon his environment. Hume's position on this matter is very pronounced, and there is every reason to believe that Smith heartily agreed with him.

In his essay on *National Characters*, Hume asserts that "Physical causes have no discernible operation on the human mind." Nor does he think that "men owe any-

<sup>1</sup> *Political Arithmetic*, p. 254.

<sup>2</sup> *Political Arithmetic*, p. 210.

thing of their temper or genius to the air, food, or climate." In equally strong terms he asserts that "if we run over the globe or revolve the annals of history, we shall discover everywhere signs of a sympathy or contagion of manners, none of the influence of air, or climate." These doctrines are in marked contrast to the concept of environment which was coming to the front in France under the influence of Montesquieu. Doctrines giving dominant place to the environment were as popular in France as they were disliked in England. Smith shared in the dislike, and was therefore not in a mood to be influenced by the opposing school. The doctrine that the net surplus of society comes from land alone, and is due to the action of nature and not to men, struck at the very root of Smith's philosophy, and when in addition it was asserted that men unaided by nature are sterile, a group of doctrines more repugnant to Smith could not have been devised. Of what account would studies in human nature be if man were so impotent?

We are prone to misunderstand Smith because his doctrines are so closely associated with those of Malthus and Ricardo. These successors of Smith brought in ideas of environment and gave them a prominent place; but there is every reason to believe that if Smith had been alive he would have opposed the doctrines of his disciples. His treatment of Anderson, who first announced the theory of rent, shows that Smith disregarded, or opposed, all attempts to emphasize physical causes. The material on which the Malthusian law of population is based was as well known in Smith's time as in the following age. But the opposition to all views involving the assumption that men are influenced by "air, food, or climate" prevented the formulation of the law.

These facts show in what respects Smith was open to French influence, and in what respects he was not. From the Physiocrats and from his own observations in France

he obtained a fund of information about the economic condition of France, and he returned home with a heightened interest in all practical affairs. These new impulses doubtless started him along the road to economics, but it takes a long and painful evolution to transform a moralist into an economist. Smith did finally come over, but he was nobody's convert. He became an economist by accident, not by design.

There is a popular notion that the *Wealth of Nations* was planned and largely written while Smith was in France. It is assumed that when he speaks of being at work on a book, he is referring to the *Wealth of Nations*. The *Lectures* at Glasgow show, however, that his economics were firmly imbedded in his theory of jurisprudence, of which they were but a minor part. It must have been only after a long, steady development that he acquired a mental attitude which permitted these two topics to be separated. In the meantime, he would naturally have collected material and written on both topics. The manuscript of the book on jurisprudence, destroyed before his death, was doubtless begun in France and completed during the first years after his return to Scotland. There is no indication that Smith underwent any revolution of ideas that would have broken up his first plan of a general treatise on law and government. It was only the steady accumulation of material and the opening up of new topics of interest that in the end compelled him to lay aside his legal studies and to confine himself to economics. We must search, therefore, in the period subsequent to his return to Scotland for the epoch-making events that transformed him into an economist. The *Wealth of Nations* must have been shaped by the current events in England, or at least by those events in which Smith acquired an interest after his return. Of these the discussions about the improvement of land and the rising price of food deserve a first place. The increase in the

price of food first attracted attention after the short crop of 1757, and during the next fifteen years was the source of a long series of pamphlets. Many of Smith's chapters show the influence of this protracted controversy. The social philosophy of the classical economists is largely based on the steady rise in the price of food. Had Smith planned and written his book in France, or even soon after his return, he would not have seen the importance of these fresh facts. There is also no reason to suppose that until after his departure from Glasgow he knew much of the great transformations in English agriculture. Scottish agriculture had not yet been improved. A Scotchman could find as much that was new in England as in France. ✓

These English facts and discussions were the common source from which both Smith and the Physiocrats drew their material. When the original sources of information were so ready at hand there was no reason why Smith should study English events and ideas through the Physiocrats. The difference between him and them was not in the material used, but in the fact that they centred their political economy around the land problem, while he made the principles of human nature the centre of his discussions. He succeeded better than they, because more problems of the day could be explained by the principles of human nature than by the influence of the environment. Had the Physiocrats lived a generation later, with its new facts and events, they could have held their own against Smith, and perhaps could have got the better of him.

The way in which the *Wealth of Nations* was constructed is now evident. Smith's *Lectures* are made up mainly of what becomes in the *Wealth of Nations* the first part of Book I., on the division of labour as the cause of cheapness and plenty; and of Book V., on revenue. These two parts were closely associated in Smith's mind, and it is not likely that they were separated without great effort and much hard thinking. Doubtless his increased

interest in practical affairs led him at first to expand these parts by inserting those digressions of which he was fond. In this way the greater part of the *Wealth of Nations* could have been written without any change in its plan. There was a time, I think, when the work was not divided into books. That part which is now Book IV., on the "Systems of Political Economy," was then merely an introduction to the body of the work. It has always seemed odd to me that the history of political economy should be inserted in the middle of the treatise, but the *Lectures* reveal the probable cause of this arrangement. The mental development that enabled Smith to separate the theory of production and distribution from the practical discussions about revenue came after the book had been once written; and when the division came he preferred to keep the history beside the practical part. The theoretical part was too new to need any history.

This reconstruction, in my opinion, came very late. If the book had appeared in 1770, when there were reports that it was ready for the press, I doubt if it would have resembled in form the book that finally appeared. There would probably have been a long, overgrown introduction discussing the theories of earlier economists, while the body of the work would have contained all his facts about present economic problems. Nine-tenths of the *Wealth of Nations* could have been written before the final transformation took place. Much of the first two books was evidently used first in some other connection, from which it was torn in the final reconstruction. When the right ideas came, Smith need not have written fifty pages of new matter to put the book into its present form.

Smith's theorizing falls into two distinct periods. The one about the division of labour, cheapness, and free trade was thought out when the *Lectures* were written; the other, about capital and distribution, was among the latest additions to the *Wealth of Nations*. Between these

two periods a long interval elapsed during which Smith was engaged in collecting material on practical affairs. The problem for interpretation is to discover what started this second epoch of reasoning. The discussion of capital ought logically to have preceded that of the division of labour and kindred topics. The fact that capital is second in order of treatment shows that it was thought out later than the other. This the *Lectures* show us to have been the case. The same evidence will also show that in the book on Stock the third chapter, on Productive Labour, was written after the first two chapters. This arrangement should have been reversed as was done in John Stuart Mill's *Political Economy*.

If Smith had taken his ideas on capital and distribution bodily from the Physiocrats, he would naturally have stated them in the order in which they have been placed by subsequent economists. We must assume, therefore, what other evidence seems to prove, that these ideas were acquired, not as he was beginning to write, but just before the book was printed. They were patched on to the rest of the book, but not coördinated with it. To account for these additions, we must look to events later than Smith's visit to France.

The starting-point of the change is to be found in the commercial crisis of 1772. The Duke of Buccleuch was largely interested in one of the failing banks, and he seems to have made his former tutor, Adam Smith, one of his advisers in settling up the bank's business.<sup>1</sup> The knowledge thus acquired of banking, money, and capital Smith put to a practical account. This particular bank had been started for the purpose of promoting improvements, but its founders' false notions on financial topics soon involved the bank in difficulties and finally caused great losses. The study of the affairs of this bank forced

<sup>1</sup> Rae's *Life of Adam Smith*, p. 255.

home on Smith the difference between capital and money. Money can circulate goods, but capital alone can start productive enterprises. Public-spirited dukes may lend their names and their credit to new undertakings, but they cannot promote enterprises except by their frugality. Scotland can become prosperous only by saving and parsimony. These facts were plainly in Smith's mind when he wrote the first two chapters of the Second Book on Stock, and he often refers to them for illustrations. His love of Scotland and his interest in the Duke of Buccleuch had turned his thoughts in a new direction.

This same patriotism was the starting-point of another, even more important discussion. Hume in his history had expressed the opinion that a poor nation with cheap food and labour can supplant its richer competitors for trade. It was a common notion that rich nations were ruined by their trade with their poorer rivals, and that when the poor countries become wealthy they in turn would be displaced by newer nations who were yet poor. Such concepts fell in with the accepted belief that nations rose, came to maturity, and finally decayed because of old age. The use that Hume made of this doctrine aroused the opposition of Dean Tucker and led to a protracted discussion.<sup>1</sup> Tucker revolted against the notion that "trade and manufactures, if left at full liberty, will always descend from a richer to a poorer state as a stream of water falls from higher to lower ground." The law is not in harmony with the divine plan by which all things work together for the continuous progress of the race.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Tucker's *Four Tracts on Political and Commercial Subjects*.

<sup>2</sup> "Can you suppose that Divine Providence has really constituted the order of things in such a sort, as to make the rule of national self-preservation to be inconsistent with the fundamental principle of universal benevolence, and the doing as we are done by? For my part, I must confess, I never could conceive that an all-wise, just, and benevolent Being would so contrive one part of his plan to be so contradictory to the other as here supposed." — TUCKER'S *First Tract*.

Tucker asserted that "a poor country where raw material and provisions are cheap and wages low could not supplant the trade of a rich manufacturing country where raw material and provisions are dear, and the price of labour high." In proof of this proposition he showed that the advantages of an abundant supply of capital more than counterbalanced the higher price of raw material and food. Hume might reject this argument because he had no natural theology to defend, but it could not but be attractive to Smith, who was as ardent an advocate of a divinely planned harmony as was Tucker. Smith was also interested in showing that full liberty in trade and industry would injure no nation. As we know from the *Lectures*, his argument was based entirely on the advantages of freedom for labour. We now have an equally strong argument for freedom based on the advantages of capital. Smith had shown that the division of labour was a cause of cheapness and plenty. We find another cause of these blessings in the abundance of capital. The two acquirements thus supplement each other, Tucker being as much a eulogist of capital as Smith had been of labour.

The theory of distribution which Smith adopted seems to have had its origin in the discussions about the improvement of land. The landlords did not work their land nor furnish the capital by which it was improved. In making up the accounts of estates, therefore, the labour and interest expenses were kept distinct from the gains of the landlords in the shape of rent. As it was generally assumed that the growth of rent was the index of national prosperity, an endeavour was made to keep it distinct and to emphasize its importance. When practical men admit three elements in their bookkeeping, this principle will soon find its way into theoretical discussions. Such was the case in a discussion on the causes of the increase of population, in which William Bell and William Temple took part. In 1756 an essay

by the former extolled agriculture and pointed out the dangers of commerce. In the reply of the latter, the theory of distribution, afterwards accepted by Smith, is stated. "I can," he says, "most clearly perceive that the value of all commodities or the price is a compound of the value of the land necessary to raise them, the value of the labour exerted in producing and manufacturing them, and of the value of the brokerage which provides and circulates them. Now to vary or alter these a thousand ways, the labourer can receive no advantage, unless it be at the expense of one or both of the other two."<sup>1</sup> There is also an appendix to this essay, in which Temple divides the national income into three parts, the return from rent, brokerage, and labour. The only difference between this statement and that of Smith is that Temple uses "brokerage" where Smith uses "profits." When Smith once became interested in capital and appreciated its importance, it was not necessary to go to France for a theory that had already become a part of English economics.

This new thought breaks up the original plan of Smith's book. In the older parts he had accepted the common view that cheapness depended on the price of labour, and it, in turn, on the price of food. The value of commodities is thus made equal to the value of the food used up in producing them. This doctrine cannot, however, be accepted if the use of capital is a cause of cheapness. Value is now determined by three elements, — the price of labour, the price of capital (interest), and the price of raw material (rent). This theory of value compels Adam Smith to separate his theory of production from that of revenue. The discussion of wages profits, and rent, which he inserts in the First Book, is not a theory of distribution, but merely a discussion of

<sup>1</sup> *A Vindication of Commerce and the Arts*, Sec. VIII.

the component parts of the price of commodities. His main problem is to settle the question raised by Hume and Tucker as to how prices "are affected by the riches or poverty, by the advancing, stationary, or declining state, of society."<sup>1</sup>

There is reason, therefore, to believe that this new tendency to theorize was excited in Smith by Tucker's tracts and the financial crisis of 1772. Then for the first time was he able to break away from the notions that subordinated political economy to jurisprudence. Revenue ceased to be the centre of his system; and by divorcing from it his theory of prices, he was enabled to group together the doctrines which have since been recognized as the backbone of political economy. They are arranged in an artificial order, and show the way in which Smith approached the subject; but they are so closely related that subsequent writers easily put them in a natural order.

There is yet another doctrine to add, or at least to place properly, before Smith's system is complete. The way in which the doctrine of productive labour is tucked into the Second Book, after the discussion of prices, distribution, and capital, shows that Smith came upon this doctrine later than upon the other doctrines of the group. Prices, distribution, and capital are not made to depend upon productive labour as they would have been if Smith had seen its importance before he formulated other doctrines. In the second chapter on Stock, Smith contrasts "such goods as are likely to be consumed by idle people who produce nothing" and the "stock of materials, tools, and provisions which maintain and employ an additional number of industrious people, who reproduce, with a profit, the value of their annual consumption." Smith would not have used the terms "idle people" and "in-

<sup>1</sup> See *Wealth of Nations*, the close of Chap. VII, Book I.

dustrious people”<sup>1</sup> if he had been at that time familiar with a more fitting term. *Productive labour* must have come into his vocabulary after this paragraph was written.

To understand this final transformation of Smith's thought, we must follow his development rather than that of economic literature. Like other English moralists aroused by the writings of Mandeville, he devotes in his *Lectures* a section to refuting the doctrine that spending is not injurious if it is done at home. The *Fable of the Bees* had assumed that consumption was the cause of industry, and that luxury and vice were necessary to stimulate consumption. This doctrine was revived in a more refined form by Sir James Steuart, in whose *Political Economy* “luxury is looked upon with a favourable eye, and every augmentation of superfluity is considered as a method of advancing population.”<sup>2</sup> The industrious providers and the luxurious consumers, according to Steuart, were “children of the same family and under the care of the same father.” Steuart's method of proof is ingenious. He separates society into two parts,—the industrious providers and the luxurious consumers,—and makes them mutually dependent. For some to save others must spend. It is thus for the interest of the State to encourage both classes and to preserve a proper balance between them. This thought of a balance of production and consumption is evidently derived from that of a balance in foreign trade. It is applied, however, in an original way, and leads to valuable results. Steuart's favourite term is the “balance of work and demand,” and he assumes that a nation is in a sound condition only when demand and work are equal. A balance of income saved cannot benefit the nation, but

<sup>1</sup> These phrases, “idle people” and “industrious people,” are also used in the *Lectures* to express the same contrast. See p. 210.

<sup>2</sup> Book II, Chap. XV.

must either be locked up in chests, made into plate, or lent to foreigners.

Smith has said somewhere that although he never mentioned Steuart's name, he replied to everything of importance that Steuart wrote. This gives us reason to believe that he had Steuart in mind when he wrote the chapter on Productive Labour. No one had so clearly stated the issue, nor dwelt on it so fully, as Steuart. There is also internal evidence that Smith had studied Steuart and was influenced by his ideas and terminology. Steuart's "balance of work and demand" becomes in Smith a "balance of produce and consumption."<sup>1</sup> Steuart thinks a nation prosperous when produce and consumption are equal, while Smith asserts that a nation advances only when the produce exceeds the consumption. The amount consumed thus becomes revenue, while that saved becomes capital. This new contrast is made the centre of the discussion of productive labour. Capital supports industry; revenue supports men in idleness. "Where capital predominates, industry prevails; wherever revenue, idleness."

Throughout the whole discussion, Smith is emphasizing the advantages of parsimony and the evils of prodigality. He must, therefore, have had in mind writers who, like Steuart, had made industry and consumption the source of prosperity, and not those who, like the Physiocrats, merely denied the name productive to those who created no surplus. Smith occupied a middle position between Steuart and the Physiocrats. To Steuart, all labour was equally productive; to the Physiocrats, only agriculture was productive. Steuart thought industry the source of prosperity; the Physiocrats regarded prosperity as a gift of nature in the form of an agricultural surplus; while Smith, as was his habit, sought an answer in the principles

<sup>1</sup> *Wealth of Nations*, end of Chap. VIII, Book IV.

of human nature, and found it in the instinct to save. Smith evidently regarded the problem of productive labour as an old one, to which both Steuart and the Physiocrats had given a wrong solution. This is why he gave so little credit to the Physiocrats and why he was not conscious of any debt to them. Whatever value he found in their theories came very late, and only after his book was practically complete. Then he inserted a reply to Steuart in the book on Stock, and added a chapter to his history of the Mercantile School, in which he exposes the errors of the Physiocrats. In no other chapter are these doctrines referred to, although their importance is so great that he could not have avoided the use of both the terms and the ideas of Physiocratic discussion if he had been familiar with them. He may have thought that his statements in the Introduction were sufficient to indicate the importance of the Physiocratic doctrine, and if so he was right, for no one since has had any difficulty in recognizing their importance or in assigning them to their proper place.

If this interpretation of Smith's development is correct, all the theories found in the *Wealth of Nations* were known before it appeared. We must account for their hold upon a man of Smith's type. His primary interest lay in the principles of human nature associated with moral science. Smith takes these principles from their moral settings and illustrates their operations in the field of economics. The *Wealth of Nations* thus became a new type of natural theology and gained a hearing because it satisfied the same feelings that natural theology did. The old optimism was based on the thought that wickedness is always punished. The moralists never ceased to bring forward illustrations of the final retribution that came to evil-doers. The new economic optimism was based on the thought that the righteous are always rewarded. They get, it is claimed, the good things of

life and in the end inherit the world. The same thought is present in both cases. It is illustrated in different fields because changes in the environment had caused one group of facts to disappear and had put another group in their place. Smith was thus the means of reconciling men fitted for the old environment to the new environment in which they found themselves. But for him the reaction against the new conditions would have been more severe and England might have missed the opportunities for development that had been opened up.

The improvements in economic and philosophic thought paved the way for the religious awakening associated with Wesley and the rise of Methodism. Depending as it did on inborn motives and religious enthusiasm, this movement, as commonly viewed, is far from the field of economics. Many of its most striking phenomena are, indeed, difficult to explain; yet, as often happens, the facts that made the deepest impression on contemporary observers are of least value in explaining its enduring features. The important contributions of Methodism to the development of thought are due not to the doctrines of Wesley nor to the peculiarities of the sect he founded, but to the influence he and they exerted on the religious ideas of the whole race. The test of the power of a given sect or school is the changes it makes in other people's ideas. Writers who influence only men of their own type have no place in the history of thought. We can, therefore, with propriety overlook both those early features of Methodism which died out as the movement progressed, and those peculiarities of present Methodist organizations which have failed to become general. The effects of Methodism on other religious bodies are the phenomena most worthy of study. Stripped thus of all but its salient features, the connection of Methodism with economic events is plain. The peculiarities of Methodism

might have shown themselves in some other age, but its rapid spread and enduring success demanded the economic environment of England in the eighteenth century.

A study of the religious condition of the English people at that time must begin with the plagues that had ravaged the land for several centuries. While Puritanism was in the making, plagues did much to create the ideas and sentiments of the people. Regarded as a sign of God's wrath, the plagues tended to keep alive the primitive religious feelings by which every evil or disaster was directly connected with God's providence. Of even greater importance were the great economic changes caused by the plagues which fell heavily upon the lower classes, and oftentimes almost wiped them out. Doubtless, even when the plagues were at their worst, there was always a fringe of what we should now call the slum element, but this small minority escaped attention in a society whose general standards were high enough to resist such diseases. Society was thus raised far above its normal level by the constant destruction of its lowest elements. Puritanism became possible only because high standards of life and character were necessary to existence under the then prevailing conditions.

The disappearance of the plagues and the downfall of the Puritans came together. Five years after the restoration of Charles II. came the last of the great epidemics from which England had so long suffered. It was then possible for the lower classes to increase, and the improved economic conditions stimulated their growth. The result was an emphatic reduction of the level of society and the creation of a type of labourers that earlier conditions would have exterminated. This downward tendency of society was strengthened by the ravages of consumption which became the scourge of the dwellers in cities, whose indoor life deprived them of pure air and

light. The upper classes could not escape consumption as readily as they had the plagues. Their ranks were thinned slowly but surely, and those that escaped had their vitality and energy so reduced that they did not exert as much influence as formerly. Disease after 1660 thus forced society as much below the normal level as prior to that date it had raised society above it. Society rises when the elimination is on its under edge, and sinks when the elimination is on the upper edge. When this latter condition is coincident with peace, security, and economic prosperity, a rapid increase of the low and shiftless classes is sure to follow. Such a change in the condition and character of the English people was certain to affect their religious ideals and observances. The belief in God had rested mainly on tangible evidences of his wrath. So long as plagues, famines, wars, and similar disasters were of frequent occurrence, it was easy to keep religion in the foreground, for every one felt the need of some means to propitiate the Being who caused so much suffering and distress. Good times and exemption from disease, however, allayed these fears. Religion would have been discredited if it had not found a new means of enforcing its claims.

The movement of population into the new regions, due to agricultural and industrial improvements, tended to weaken the hold of old ideas. Many of the old restraints which were of a local nature disappeared when settlements were made in places without religious associations. There were few churches in these new regions, and as the clergy had no missionary zeal, new-comers were left to their own devices, so that a reckless, careless spirit developed, which encouraged dissipation and extravagance. All new societies begin their career with an epoch of degeneration. Rapid economic changes created in many parts of England the same social conditions that prevail in the frontier settlements of America. Both

regions were ripe for a reversion that would again awaken the normal ideals of the race. It is not at all remarkable that both Wesley and Whitefield should have begun their work in America. Here, the new evils were more pronounced, and the remedies more clearly visible. But when the restraints that had smothered religious activity were once thrown off, England offered the better opportunity for missionary effort, because its population was more concentrated and its clergy more indifferent.

The suppression of religious feelings and religious activity was one of the effects of the downfall of the Puritans. Their energy and activity made so painful an impression on the following century that every one avoided such manifestations of feeling as would bring up the thought of the Puritans. The evils attributed to religious activity were called "enthusiasm," and the opposition to it was so great that it acted as a barrier to efforts to extend the influence of the Church. Clergymen might write philosophical essays or defend the divine rights of kings, but earnest work among their parishioners aroused against them the strong prejudices created by the memories of earlier times.

Although defeated and despised, the Puritans had impressed on religious thought certain ideas from which the succeeding generations could not break away. All superstitious observances had been suppressed, a new concept of Sunday created, and old social amusements abolished. These changes repressed activity, forced people to live more completely in their homes, and thus made them less social. Superstition was doubtless bad, but it at least permitted an expression of the inner self and a type of activity natural to primitive men. The social games and amusements were sensual, but they gave vent to the natural craving for activity, and satisfied energies which had no other outlet. The new restrictions on activity, like the opposition to enthusiasm, compelled the English

people to be more passive and inert than was natural to them. When nature is restrained and suppressed in one direction it finds an outlet in another. It was, therefore, only a question of time when some movement to restore the equilibrium disturbed by past conflicts and prejudices would begin.

The increased regularity of economic life demanded by the new industries also tended to repress the naturally restless spirit of Englishmen. The division of labour narrowed individual activity and compelled labourers to confine their attention to single processes. Day after day the same monotonous acts were repeated, without any of the relief which comes from variety in work. At the end of each day the weary labourer sought his bed without any chance to relieve by activity the suppressed motor tendencies for which his economic life had no use.

As economic life grows narrower or steadier, a craving for intenser activity in other fields is created. This necessary complement, to be efficient, must utilize the disused motor tendencies no longer needed in the economic world. As each new environment forces the race to develop new motor reactions suited to its conditions, older reactions are thus left free, and there follows a degeneration unless some group of higher motives arises to utilize them. When great economic changes throw out of use motor reactions which have formerly been necessary, the first outlet for the restrained activities is usually found in dissipation. Success in the economic world gives increased income, which is wasted in those forms of dissipation giving the readiest vent to feelings and motives not in harmony with the new economic world. The thoroughly dissipated man has no feeling of suppressed activity; his vices compensate for the monotony of his economic life. These left-over tendencies, though satisfying, are destructive; in the end the race must react against them. Thus a new complement to the economic life is created by a religious and

social revival. A social man has more activities than an unsocial man, and the intenser feelings of a religious man drain off the surplus energy that might otherwise be wasted in dissipation. If a new round of activities is to be created supplementary to the intenser but narrower activities of the economic world, the social and religious movements must work together. I shall try to point out how the new religious movement supplied both these ends, and thus proved itself to be the proper complement to the industrial changes of the eighteenth century.

The new economic conditions I have described formed the background of the new religion, and were the cause of its success. The peculiar form taken by the revival was mainly due to the activity of two men — Whitefield and Wesley, who, though differing widely in their character and mode of expression, were good complements, and together accomplished a work in which either one alone would have failed. Wesley was by far the greater man, but the type of religion that he alone would have tried to impress on the people would have been too crude to command a general following. His family was superstitious, and thought the house haunted by a goblin, while Wesley himself believed in the casting of lots, and frequently during the earlier part of his career resorted to this means to determine his policy. He also regarded earthquakes not as natural phenomena, but as direct manifestations of God's power intended to indicate some judgment on men. His sermon on the earthquake at Lisbon shows the extent of his superstitions.

Naturally of the order of prophets, Wesley would have been in his element if he had lived in a period of great distress, and had his preaching enforced by a series of wars, famines, plagues, and earthquakes. In such periods prophets flourish, and Wesley eagerly sought for any event that seemed to indicate that the wrath of

God was about to be poured forth. As an illustration, notice how carefully he examined into a slight earthquake at Whitson Cliffs, Yorkshire. But, fortunately for the world, he lived in an age of the greatest peace and security. The plagues that had so long ravished England were things of the past, the religious wars had ceased; invasion had lost much of its terrors, and for England at least wars were too far away to have any influence on public opinion. Prophets were never at a greater discount than at that time, for there was a superficial optimism, upon which the croakers of evil could make no impression. Look where the prophet might, he could find no cloud big enough to attract public attention. It must be remembered that Wesley's work was done before the French Revolution, an event which opened up a new field for prophets. The new race of which Carlyle was a type finds in social disorders, political revolutions, and economic strife, material upon which to base its predictions; and when this fails, the supposed evils of socialism and agnosticism are thrilling enough in themselves to arouse the prophetic spirit. Taken together these events and tendencies have opened up a new field which a host of prophets have tilled. But Wesley had none of these later opportunities.

A religious movement at that particular moment must have relied on other resources. Fortunately, there was a man at hand whose inclinations differed from Wesley, and who like other of the Calvinists was a wonderful painter and could reproduce in his hearers' minds the striking pictures of his own vivid imagination. Whitefield differed from his predecessors in that he visualized the scenes of another world, while they had used their powers to picture long past events of this world. The central picture of the earlier Calvinists was the covenant and the assembled host of Israel at the foot of Sinai. Whitefield's central picture was of the final judgment, in which the whole race stood before the judgment bar of God. His predecessors

dealt with Hebrews in distant ages and places, he pictured the Englishmen of his day in the same direct relation with God in which the earlier Hebrews had stood. Hell and the final judgment were made as real as if they were parts of the present environment and were seen by the naked eye.

I state these facts to emphasize the difference between Whitefield and Wesley. Whitefield was a visualizer and dealt in *made* phenomena. Wesley was an observer and naturally needed *real* phenomena, such as plagues, wars, and earthquakes as the starting-point of his work. He expected God to create the events that were to be used in changing men's hearts. Whitefield, on the contrary, relied more fully on himself, and by a shrewd use of his power of visualizing created the impressions that were to influence men's conduct. When I say that Whitefield dealt in made phenomena I do not mean that he used tricks. These are resorted to only by men who have not the visualizing power well enough developed to enable them to call up complete pictures of the events they wish to depict. But the fact that such charges were made against Whitefield shows that he was using a means of moving men that was of his own making, and hence could be easily counterfeited. Earthquakes and plagues cannot be made to order, and if not created at an opportune moment, the mission of prophets depending on them fails. But as there are no such limits in the field of the imagination, men can go much farther by their own activity and accomplish more results.

It required a man of Whitefield's type to bring about a religious awakening; but had he worked alone there would have been only a momentary excitement, a strong reaction towards earlier ideals and standards. The forward movement of religious thought was due to the guiding hand of Wesley, and his influence, recognizable in every permanent feature, alone saved the movement from failure.

I infer that Whitefield would have failed, because he was a Calvinist possessed of the sympathies and mental attitude characteristic of that belief. Calvinism is a vigorous plant in the right soil, but out of its own peculiar environment it fails to take root. The time had passed when in any pure form it could exert a dominant influence on English thought. It flourished in an age when industrial success and scientific knowledge were intimately connected with religious thought, and the Calvinist succeeded because he had a better knowledge of his environment and more industrial energy than his opponents. But when industrial energy and forethought were transformed into capitalism, and knowledge of the environment became science, it was evident that the intellectual side of Calvinism had given birth to two independent movements, whose force was to be felt in the eighteenth century. Then it was that the capitalist and the scientist, though of a common descent, became so independent that they offered no support to the religious element with which they were originally united. The growth of the spirit of toleration also took from the Calvinists another of their advantages. They had distinguished themselves in persecution, and by their example had done much to create the lofty spirit of their age. When persecution ceased, weaker and less fertile leaders gained control of the Church, from whom no religious awakening could be expected.

Besides the reasons already stated, the failure of Calvinism was due in large part to the peculiar character of its controlling principle, the doctrine of predestination. A belief in predestination implies a spirit of resignation—a mental attribute characteristic of women. In their relations to husband and family, they must put up with unavoidable evils and accept with resignation conditions and decisions against which they cannot successfully struggle. All these facts combine to create the mental attitude

of women, and their spirit is reflected in religion whenever society is confronted with evils beyond control.

The attitude of men is different. They are naturally optimistic, for they have more control over the conditions and events upon which their welfare depends. Man's will is dominant, his misfortunes are mainly self-created, and if he suffers he seeks to remedy the evil by changing his character or environment. A feeling of resignation is fatal; he best succeeds who believes in his freedom, and fully accepts responsibility for his acts. When religion reflects this attitude it emphasizes the power of men over their environment, and becomes Arminian. Unavoidable evils foster, even in men, an attitude of resignation; while unnecessary evils stir up, even in women, a spirit of revolt. The environment and the economic conditions thus determine what attitude will be dominant in a given society, and what type of religion will do the most for its elevation.

Keeping in mind the force of these statements, the relation between Puritanism and Calvinism is made manifest. In the age of wars, plagues, and general economic disturbances, it did seem as if an overruling destiny controlled human affairs. Then with the discovery of America came about an industrial change, the effects of which were more noticeable in the women than in the men—a natural result when we realize that men take to an industrial life only as a last resort, while women are economic by nature.

As the Englishman in early times was possessor of a sensual and easy-going disposition, he by himself would never have become dissatisfied with the established order of things. It was the wife who strove to break up the communal pleasures and to substitute those of the home; and it was she who bore the burden of the severe exertion that was necessary for those more economic forms of enjoyment. The women cooked and scrubbed; worked

in the fields ; spun, wove, and made the clothes ; taught the children and cared for the men.

The industrial awakening took place during the period when England was afflicted with the plagues, which could be successfully resisted only by cleanliness, and the burdens which cleanliness imposed fell entirely on the women. Under the prevailing conditions it was a tremendous task to scrub the floors, clean the houses, and keep the clothes and bed linen in a sanitary condition. Men did not help in this work ; and if a woman failed, the plagues soon found out her deficiencies, and ended the existence of the family. It is not difficult to see the causes for a rapid extermination of women of a non-industrial type. The eagerness of women for economic goods and home life forced an evolution which gave them intenser pleasures and increased their social importance ; but as mothers they had more to endure, and thus their natural spirit of resignation was intensified. Women became more womanly in temperament as their lives became more industrial.

These changes could not but affect the attitude of men also. Those families thrived best whose men reflected in a measure the feelings that inspired the wives. The practical domination of woman was a necessity of the industrial situation, and those who accepted her domination as inevitable, and felt the inspiration of her ideals, became better husbands, and strengthened by their influence the tendencies that led the nation into an industrial life. I do not mean that the Puritan fathers consciously subordinated themselves to their wives, but that they were as a rule a slow, plodding set who accepted the judgment of that sex which thinks more quickly and has truer instincts.

In very early times, when education was mainly a training of the eye, ear, and hand, a boy came under the influence more of his father than of his mother, and acquired manly instincts, and a disgust for the ways and mental

attitude of women. But with the development of an intenser industrial life, boys were thrown more with their mothers, and received from them the greater part of their education. As soon as the Bible was translated, and catechisms and other printed lore displaced oral tradition, the teaching of religion and morals also fell largely into woman's hands. Every advance in education and family religion increased the importance of women. It is, therefore, no wonder that mothers exerted a dominant influence over their sons, and that a type of womanly men arose, who accepted the standards and ideals of their wives and mothers. By womanly men I do not mean effeminate men, but those who have inherited the temperament of their mothers, and have been dominated by their mothers' influence and example. These "mothers' boys" are as pure in speech as in conduct and seldom give violent manifestations of anger. They endure rather than resist pain and evil, and hope that distant rewards will requite them for present suffering. Such men have a deep religious spirit, and are the material of which martyrs are made.

The Puritan revolution brought men of this type to the front. Never before had a race of men so consciously accepted woman's standards and striven so earnestly to make their lives as pure as woman's. The Cavaliers, on the other hand, were plainly controlled by men's concepts and ideals. There was an open disregard of women and of womanly influences. They were as plainly moved by the natural impulses inherited by men from the distant past, as the Puritans were inspired by the new ideals that women were beginning to impress on the race. Perhaps the Puritans were not fully aware of the influence that women exerted, but they were not irritated by pressure exerted by women, nor did they hesitate to follow paths which women pointed out. The more consciously a womanly man recognizes the source of his inspiration, the

more likely is he to do himself justice, and to advance the cause to which he is devoted.

Whitefield was a man of this kind, while Wesley was wholly free from woman's influence. As a student the former was influenced by Wesley and the group of manly men that created the Methodist movement, but when he followed his natural inclinations he was dominated by a woman. In the ensuing theological controversies the real issue lay, not between Whitefield and Wesley, but between the latter and the Countess of Huntingdon. The struggle, therefore, was between the manly and the womanly elements in religion, and the manly element won because it harmonized with the tendencies of the eighteenth century. The objective evils of the new century were few, chiefly relating to the use of increased incomes and opportunities. Under these circumstances a religion which inculcated a spirit of resignation would have been fatal to progress, since men had to be impressed with the importance of choices and with man's power to make them.

This condition calls forth the manly instincts in men, by forcing them to free themselves from the mental attitude which womanly teachings create. Womanly women make the good better by raising social standards, but they do not redeem the bad who fail from lack of decision and will. Manly men have strong wills and delight in exercising them; they seek to influence their inferiors, and to impart to others their own self-control. Natural missionaries, they succeed whenever the chief cause of social degeneration is found in a defective will power. If Methodism checked the growing supremacy of women, it raised the standard of men and brought to the front a better type of religious leaders—men whose wills were too strong to be influenced by women. This was an evil which brought its own compensation, for a more primitive type of woman tended to survive, who performed the duties of motherhood more easily.

If the non-Wesleyan elements in the religious revival have been correctly stated, we are in a position to emphasize duly Wesley's real work. Though there is a Wesleyan activity and many Wesleyan mannerisms, there is no Wesleyan philosophy nor any peculiar word pictures so characteristic of Calvinism. The reason for this is that Wesley was like others of his age, an observer, measuring mental phenomena by their outward manifestations. With him a feeling that did not reveal itself in action and deeds counted for nothing. The only indications of a change of heart that he would accept were sensible conversion and outward signs. No conversion was complete unless accompanied by a change of activity.

In adopting this standard Wesley made a greater change in religion than he was probably aware of. The earlier manifestations of conversion were objective; Wesley emphasized their psychic nature. The fact that a person belonged to the church and had gone through certain forms and ceremonies was no longer accepted as an evidence of a change of heart. Certain conscious states and an emotional expression of the self were demanded. Methodism made people conscious of their emotional nature and educated them in its manifestations. Every one, it taught, must have an assurance of his salvation, and to have this he must recognize and manifest certain well-known motor feelings. A mere belief or a sensory knowledge that created no measurable motor reactions was not enough to free a person from the bondage of sin.

If a Christian of the old type had been asked, as Wesley was fond of asking, "What is your assurance of salvation?" he would at first have been puzzled by the novelty of the question. But if he thought the matter out, he would probably have replied, "The peace and security I enjoy, and the worldly goods God has bestowed on me." The older tests were material and national. God punished the nation when He was displeased, and hence national peace

and prosperity were taken as indications of a reconciliation with God. This idea is found also in the Old Testament, which abounds in examples where the material welfare of individuals is made the measure of God's good will. Another test would have been freedom from disease. If all these tests were favourable, few if any Christians before the time of Wesley would have doubted their salvation. If people were particularly pious and wished to assure themselves of especial or exceptional favours, they gave alms, helped the sick, went on pilgrimages, fasted, said a certain number of prayers, or fulfilled other tasks which the customs of the age favoured. These objective standards of excellence held an honoured place in church history. But they were all brushed aside by Wesley or at least delegated to a very subordinate place, and, instead, certain mental states and especially the manifestation of psychic excitement were emphasized. It is of course an exaggeration to say that by the new method religious feeling was measured by the palpitations of the heart, changes in the voice, and sudden explosions of suppressed feelings. But so closely connected are these manifestations of mental excitement with any violent outing of the inner self, that it is no wonder external changes of a physical nature were often mistaken for the internal changes so much desired by the convert. These outward manifestations at least helped to call the attention to the personality of the believer instead of to his deeds. When the field of observation is changed from outward to inward objects, the delicate psychic phenomena otherwise overlooked come into notice.

The cruder manifestations of mental excitement soon passed away, but the attitude of self-examination remained. Subjective standards of perfection were thus acquired which displaced the earlier objective standards. Such great changes could not have taken place if corresponding economic changes had not confined the economic activity of individuals to a narrower sphere and thus left many

internal promptings to activity without any appropriate vent. Suppressed tendencies and disused motor reactions are the key to the phenomenon of conversion. Each mind is a bundle of motor reactions created by previous economic conditions. When a new environment throws a given reaction out of employment, unrest is felt until some new use is found for it. A conversion is the creation of a new set of associations by which this old reaction is made to respond to new stimuli. When this change takes place under excitement there is an instantaneous conversion. A self-examination discloses a suppressed motor tendency, and then a great mental strain makes this motor tendency respond to the new feeling which is demanding some mode of expression.

If the activity of Englishmen had not been unduly restrained in the time of Wesley, this conversion of motor reactions to new uses could not have taken place. Methodism simply utilized a fund of activity for which other outlets were denied either by economic conditions, moral scruples, or inherited prejudices. The opposition to enthusiasm suppressed religious activity. The Puritan raid against vice destroyed communal pleasures and cut off the social intercourse incident to large gatherings. The new industries confined the activity of each individual to narrow channels, and family life became so absorbing and so intense that social matters were neglected. Calvinistic religion was mainly a family affair, and the Church of England also emphasized the individual relations of priest and communicant too much to encourage a social religion. Wesley shrewdly utilized social customs for religious ends by encouraging large gatherings. In the place of fairs, May days, and other sensual events, he introduced religious organizations, which gave the same activity and satisfied the natural cravings for society. Wakes, revivals, and love feasts broke up the monotony of family life and made outside interests once more supreme.

This socializing of religion transferred religious teaching from mothers to a special class of men. Domestic devotion being changed to public worship, men naturally acquired the leadership, and women became listeners and learners. Family worship seemed flat and unprofitable after the excitement of class meetings, love feasts, and midnight assemblies. Home instruction also gradually fell into disuse, and children, like grown people, got their education in classes and under church control. Sunday schools, prayer meetings, class meetings, and similar social organizations, which became the centres of interest, were so much more satisfying that they overshadowed the earlier, more private means of grace. Two systems of religious instruction so antagonistic in their tendencies could not thrive in the same soil. A Calvinistic home was a self-contained unit through every part of which the mother's influence and energy were felt. But the lower classes had no homes in this sense, and mothers were too deeply immersed in the outside struggle to be able to do justice to home duties. A missionary movement was forced therefore to resort to other and more stirring means of attaining its ends, and this gave men the opportunity to appropriate religious instruction and to make it social. As the family life became narrower and more economic, the mother became supreme, controlling the family expenditures, and practically creating a new matriarchal system. This restriction of the religious activity of mothers turned their attention more fully to economic affairs and did much to bring on the social struggle for wealth now so dominant in all classes. While a few men were intensifying religious life, mothers with equal earnestness were intensifying the struggle for economic supremacy.

The emphasis that Wesley gave to psychic phenomena, and especially to motor manifestations of the self, raised up new religious ideals. The Puritan's personality was

practically coextensive with his goods; he found it difficult to separate the idea of himself from the environing conditions which determined his welfare and station in life. The same mode of thought made him think of God and Christ as inseparable from the material conditions with which men associate them. God is the enthroned ruler surrounded by the emblems of power and dignity, and served by angels and men. Christ is the suffering Saviour nailed to the cross, a propitiation for the sins of men. When men begin to emphasize their psychic as opposed to their material personality, they modify also their concept of God and Christ and picture them as psychic and not as material beings. Christ becomes the emotional Christ who sympathizes with men and suffers when they do wrong. The evil deeds of men and not the nails on the cross, are now represented as the source of His agony. To the old type of Christian the talk of 'driving fresh nails into the cross' would have been meaningless, because to him the suffering and sacrifice of Christ seemed already complete. But the thought is full of meaning to one who pictures Christ as an emotional being hurt by every fresh act of sin. Likewise such a person does not picture God as thinking only of kingly dignity and precedent, but as promoting men's welfare earnestly and actively, and as being willing to overlook the past transgressions of all in whom there is hope of improvement. Pictures of the throne and of the cross were not dwelt upon by Wesley; his God and Christ were beings of activity, feeling, and sympathy. He made them represent active forces in a world whose one thought is the salvation of men. God and Christ were thus brought near to men, the divine and the human merged into each other, and it became a matter of indifference whether Christ was thought of as the Son of God or as a perfect man. The ideal of perfection and of brotherhood with Christ was thus opened up to man. Not position nor en-

vironment, but emotion, was the measure of perfection. He was most nearly perfect whose impulses were most like Christ's; by being like Christ, men sank all differences between Him and them and became in the truest sense Sons of God. These doctrines were in the sharpest contrast with the deistic tendencies of the age which kept God on His throne behind the most distant star, and conceived of the world as ruled by cold, inflexible rules. After the destruction of His pictures in the churches Christ was almost banished from the Protestant world and was thought of as one who had done His work and received His reward.

The new psychic standards and the new way of conceiving the divine, gave a rude shock to the formal Christians of Wesley's time, who could not readily follow the curve of his thought by which these new concepts were evolved. Though he started as a formal High Churchman, and was dubbed a "Methodist" because of his insistence on a life by objective rule, in the end he accepted no criterion of a new birth except the emotional expression of the inner self. Curiously enough, the only class of religious thinkers he has not affected are the High Church people with whom he was at the start in full accord. But such is the fate of those whose thought is in a process of development. They leave their friends behind and influence those least like themselves. While in the early days of the Church it was enough to accept Christianity and receive the sacraments, and after the Reformation it sufficed to profess oneself to be a good Protestant, these objective standards were discarded by Wesley, and some evidence of a psychic assurance of salvation was demanded. It was taught that he who had no absolute assurance of God's favour was already damned, for there was no middle ground between heaven and hell. The conventional Christian was believed to be still in the bondage of sin. Up to Wesley's time the line had been drawn between the moral and the immoral, between the Christian and the sinner, between those who kept the

law and those who broke it. Under Wesley, the "worldly church member" and the non-emotional Christian who did not exhibit "outward signs" were classed with the irreligious and depraved and were believed to deserve the same condemnation. So long as objective standards of Christianity are used there are definite tests for church membership which put all who stand them on equal footing. But psychic tests are relative and intensive with no fixed degree of emotion as a standard upon which all may agree. In a progressive church there is ever a tendency to raise the standard, and to class people among the "worldly" who at an earlier time could have given satisfactory evidence of their sincerity. No matter how high the standard, a new wave of enthusiasm will change it, drawing the line so that many earnest people fall below it. The standard being set by the better element, the others are left behind and denounced even though they may be growing in grace and fulfilling the law. A psychic standard thus divides the Church into two parts.

The practical conditions which Wesley had to face forced him to emphasize this dividing line. He did not create a new church organization, but remained in the Church of England. His real work was to form a quasi-clan within this Church. Whoever in the Church paid no attention to Wesley's demands became in his eyes a worldly Christian, and as much out of God's favour as if he were irreligious or immoral. The only true Christians showed "outward signs" and entered his organization. There is no better way to express the bond that made Wesley's classes, love feasts, and assemblies so effective than to call them clans. Heshrewdly revived an old feeling that was falling into decay for want of a use. A Methodist had the same sense of superiority and the same feeling of opposition to outsiders that members of a clan have to strangers. This is the inevitable result of an emotional

standard. A growth of psychic ideals can stop only at perfection. As the believer comes nearer to Christ, His example is more forcible and real, and Christ becomes a fellow-clansman. In the clannish sense the perfect are all sons of God. While the clan-feeling binds equals together it at the same time generates a mental attitude that makes men hostile to others beneath or different from them. No matter what virtues the less emotional exhibit, the charmed circle is still above their reach.

While psychic standards have this element of danger and discord in them, this disadvantage is far more than counterbalanced by the evils such standards obviate. Objective standards depending as they do on visible differences lead to hair-splitting and creed-making. People cannot agree as to what objective facts and ceremonies are to be made standards or what relative emphasis is to be given. Every change in environment creates new standards or changes the emphasis of old ones. The loose use of words and the inexactness of all translations from original sources are also fruitful causes of discord. Psychic standards destroy all this nicety of distinction. The sensory impressions made by objective facts are many and exact, but the motor impulses created by objective facts differ not in kind, but in degree. They can be distinguished only as less or more intense. The measurement of character in terms of the emotional expression of the inner self destroys all differences except those of intensity. All those distinctions based on differences of time, space, family, power, and other environmental causes lose their importance.

By promoting social organizations and uniting worshippers in large bodies the rise of Methodism marked the decline of creed-making and sect-building. Had its triumph been complete, there would again have arisen a united church. This church would not have been universal in its influence, exerting a power over all members of the

community, but would have been a great clan — influencing its members much more than the old church, and outsiders much less, or not at all. As it is, however, the Methodist organizations have influenced other churches and have in turn been influenced by them, thus making our present combination of objective and subjective standards. Wesley's influence is most marked in the great non-sectarian organizations like the Christian Endeavour Society, the Temperance Movement, and the various religious societies for young men. Here the psychic element has almost displaced the objective standards. By these societies the emotional nature has received most cultivation, and a new concept of character has been created. But in these societies, also, the tendencies towards perfection and the ostracism of outsiders are marked. The Christian of this type pities the depraved and dissipated, but any form of cold, intellectual moralism that teaches men to depend upon themselves he despises.

It is possible to estimate the change in English thought only by uniting in one view the work of Wesley and of Adam Smith. Seldom has an age been so fortunate as to have two men of such ability working in different fields. Each was unconscious of the other's aims, and yet the results could not have been better unified if they had been consciously planned. Where one was conservative, the other was radical. Smith held firmly to the old religion of nature, and thought he had helped to substantiate its position. On the other hand, Wesley was a strong Tory, vigorous in his opposition to the cause of the American colonies and to the reforms for which Smith worked so successfully. Had the prejudices of each dominated England, the nation would have entered the present century with but little change. Fortunately, the wisdom of each bore its legitimate fruit, while their prejudices did but little harm.

Figuratively speaking, one might say that Wesley and Smith found English wisdom and tradition embodied in a temple of morality. One wing Smith tore down to get the material for his new economic structure, leaving as he supposed the other wing intact. Wesley, in ignorance of Smith's work, pulled down the other wing to get material for his new religious temple. The result was that the whole edifice — the grand temple for the religion of nature — upon which preceding ages had bestowed so much labour, came tumbling to the ground.

To put this thought more exactly, Smith divided the old moral science into economics and morality, but included everything in economics except the principle of sympathy, to which he claimed that morality should be limited. Had he been more observant, he would have known that Wesley had already appropriated the principle of sympathy from morality and made it the leading religious motive, Christ being the idealization of sympathy. Wesley, also, as we have seen, made serious inroads into the traditions and the objective standards of the English people. He thought, however, that he had left the divine right of kings and other Tory principles intact, but of these principles Smith had made short work. Thus relieved of its tradition and moral rules, England started into the next period completely under the control of the ideas of Wesley and Smith.

In the epoch preceding Wesley, morality and natural religion were held to be the same, and the study of nature was supposed to give men definite rules of action — all the light in fact that was needed for their guidance. Revealed religion was useless, if it merely reiterated the laws of nature, and it was pernicious if it increased or changed natural laws. The same thought is expressed in the writings of Rousseau. Nature is the best teacher, and contact with it gives men the principles upon which conduct depends. Nature's rules are also

eternal and unchangeable, and act in the best interests of men. That mental attitude has now disappeared. Since the time of Darwin, nature has been viewed as a remorseless force as often crushing as promoting the better elements in humanity, never acting on a higher principle than the survival of the fittest. If this be true, there can be no religion of nature in the sense that the deists used that term.

Those principles of conduct so often associated with the name of nature are formulæ that have arisen gradually out of the concrete conditions in which the race has developed. Each environment makes the formulation of certain rules of action possible and necessary. As a race passes from environment to environment, some of these rules are dropped, being no longer fitted to the social needs, but others are found still available or at least partially so. These surviving rules that are found adaptable in various social environments gain in universality and force by every change, and finally acquire such validity that they seem independent of environment, and imperative. But they do not differ in kind from concrete customs and traditions, and all of them represent the restraining influence of the past on the present, having force only in so far as past conditions resemble the present. Morals might be defined as the application of the philosophic deductions of one age to the economic conditions of later ages. We might also say that morals are rationalized customs, habits, and traditions. Either statement makes plain the part that the intellect plays in the formulation of moral rules. But this dependence of morals upon the intellect, whereby moral rules acquire their force and universality, has its attendant drawback. The intellect operates only on past experience, and its formulations, although valid for a race that has been a long time in one environment, are defective for a race that has recently changed its environment. The English race is of this

kind. Its moral formulæ arose when the environment of the race was different from the present. These formulæ represent foreign influences, and thus often prompt men to actions out of harmony with the present conditions.

Roughly speaking, there are three elements in a civilization: the heart, which represents inherited impulses that usually express themselves in a religious form; the life, which is due to the immediate economic surroundings; and the head or intellect, which reflects the influence of past conditions on the present. When great changes take place, the economic life readily adjusts itself to the new conditions. The heart cannot adjust itself without a violent struggle, but when the struggle comes, there is an immediate crisis followed by a complete conversion through which the inherited motor impulses are disassociated from the old objective stimuli, and are made to respond to the stimuli of the new environment. It often happens that the religious impulses are directed into entirely new channels by a conversion, and converts of this kind are noted for the zeal with which they accept the new views. The life and heart can thus be brought into harmony with new conditions, but there is no process corresponding to a conversion by which the products of intellectual operations can be readily adjusted. We often talk of convincing people by argument, but no one is thus convinced except on points of small importance, and by those who hold the same general views. There is a good reason for this failure. Principles, customs, and habits are never based wholly on present experience, and cannot be reversed by present experience alone. Nor is there any one set of past experiences on which they depend. They are the outcome of many groups of conditions found in divers past environments. A survey of the whole history of the race is necessary to establish them anew, or to reject them. Many of the essential elements of this race history are now absent,

and as a result principles,<sup>1</sup> creeds, and other intellectual formulæ cannot be recast even by the tribunal that established them. They die out only by a slow process, and are replaced by another process even more slow in its operations. But in the meantime the race is without the proper guidance in matters where the intellect is the best judge. Impulses and economic desires sway the race without any adequate mental restraint. This attitude of mind I call non-moral. The race may as a whole be under better conditions than before, and its immoral tendencies better checked. People may talk about principles and creeds as much as ever, but they apply them only when they conform with the dominant impulses and desires. The principles cannot withstand these latter forces, nor have the principles any power to act alone. Non-morality, if complete, means a paralysis of the intellectual forces that restrain activity.

It is possible to reach the same general conclusion respecting moral principles by attributing their decay to a psychic instead of an intellectual change. Principles do not enforce themselves. There must be some psychic response — some motor outgoing of the self by which the activity of the thinker is brought into harmony with his thought. Adam Smith asserted that the source of morality lay in the feeling of sympathy, but, as we have seen, that feeling is too intimately associated with religion to become a force by which the cold, intellectual processes can be enforced. To-day we see more clearly than Smith did that unguided sympathy is often immoral. Modern charity furnishes a good example of how sympathy may promote more evils than it checks. A feeling that needs

<sup>1</sup> Principles of this kind are often called necessary or innate. It would be better to call them irrevocable. Being created by a complex and long, continual process, they cannot be controverted except by another process equally long and complex. The people of a given age are forced to accept them along with other parts of their civilization.

the intellect to guide it aright cannot itself be the force which gives an intellectual process its sanction. We must, therefore, seek the sanction of morality in an older and more fundamental feeling. Pain gives rise to two kinds of feeling. Either a desire to approach and destroy the cause of pain which is called wrath, or else a shrinking from it which is called fear. The first of these feelings is the source of morality. Where there is no resentment at the sight of pain, morality cannot exist. The root of sympathy, however, plainly lies in a shrinking from pain. The qualities developed by it are not morality, but goodness.

These two standards, though so often confused, are in reality quite distinct. The moral man, moved by wrath, resents forcefully any deviation from accepted standards or any interference with his individual rights. The sympathetic good man endures anything rather than break with his friends. It never occurs to him to resent an evil; he bears it patiently or strives to remove it. This mode of meeting disagreeable situations is the outcome of the development of family life. According to prevailing standards the good husband never is wrathful or forceful at home. The manly man, who is always forceful and often wrathful, has not succeeded in family life so well as the womanly man, who submits cheerfully to the inevitable. Goodness as it is now understood means the qualities enabling men to get on smoothly in family life. It is a familiar saying that the test of a good husband is his ability to put up a stovepipe without swearing. That is to say, the feeling of resentment must have become impossible to him. Though the good man succeeds in family and social life, he lacks some of the motor reactions needed in the outer world. This deficiency is implied in the thought so often expressed that certain individuals are "too good to live." We never say that men are too moral to live. Goodness, being an over-development of

qualities needed for domestic happiness, lacks the evenness and breadth of morality. This narrower ideal of goodness, was encouraged by the new economic and religious influences. The economists said peace at any price with other nations, while the religious teachers said peace at any price in the family. Both thus destroyed the reactions against pain that lie at the root of moral motives. The feeling of the solidarity of responsibility disappeared when economic principles based on self-interest favoured individualism. And the religious ideals bringing the worshipper into direct contact with his God made salvation an individual instead of a national affair. The old Christian got his assurance in the covenant that existed between his nation and his God; national prosperity was the index of divine favour. The new Christian relied for his assurance on his motor outgoings, his "outward signs," as he called them, and as these were individual they had little connection with national welfare or the state of other people's minds. To have force, morality must be a general feeling, but the new religion with its psychic standards divided each community into two parts and severed their common interests. The more intense the religious spirit became, the more was its force directed against the members of the community who did not feel its influence, instead of as formerly against national foes and evils. Protestantism spent its force in national struggles. Methodism, by creating an internal struggle, weakened the old feeling of solidarity of responsibility. Like economics, therefore, it tended to create a non-moral state of mind. The new ideals of goodness and perfection influenced many persons more strongly than the old moral rules, but they influenced others less, and thus heightened the opposition between the two classes. An intensive religion, losing sight of the interests of the imperfect, demands only the success and survival of the perfect. Morality, however, being exten-

sive in its aim, is realized in equality and distributive justice. There is thus between the two tendencies an opposition which makes itself felt in spite of endeavours to effect a compromise between them.

This non-moral attitude is a marked characteristic of the classes that now dominate English civilization. Different as these classes are in many respects, they agree in showing a marked antipathy against some integral part of society. The revivalist and the temperance reformer denounce the "sinner," the "worldling," and the "drinker" in unmeasured terms, and would gladly exclude them from society. The mother unrelentingly persecutes the "social outcast," and shuts her door against women a little lower in the social scale than herself. Viewed internally, the modern home is a great blessing, but it acts as a crushing force upon those who are denied its benefits. The business man draws a sharp line between himself and his employees, and does not hesitate to exploit them to his advantage. The workman in his turn vigorously opposes those who work for less than the union rate. In public affairs the stalwart constantly sets new and bolder standards, having some new principle, doctrine, or catching phrase, the acceptance of which alone entitles other persons to a consideration. In party affairs any less degree of loyalty than his own is a cause for complete disfranchisement of the offender, and if this sign of party devotion becomes general, new tests of subserviency are set up which again make him master of the situation.

In what has nominally remained the field of morals these tendencies have been as pronounced as elsewhere. The utilitarians contended that they set forth a great moral principle, but their doctrine that the test of action is the greatest good to the greatest number is quite as capable of a non-moral application as are the doctrines and ideas of the other classes. The doctrine becomes immoral when in each application of its principle the same

minority suffers in the interest of the same greater number. And this is what happens when the tests of expediency are put upon a strictly economic basis. Those who are economically prosperous are always in that greater number whose welfare is promoted, while those poorly equipped for the battle for life are always among the minority whose interests are neglected. No sooner did the utilitarians discover their great principle than they also found that more were born into the world than could be provided for, or, as it was put, that Nature had not set enough plates at her table for all her children. They reasoned, therefore, that it was not their fault if the unprovided-for went without their dinner; and they even asserted that it would only make matters worse to divide with them. A philosophy was developed in support of this proposition, which was ever ready to be applied. In practice there has never been a class in England so remorseless as the utilitarians in their neglect of the weak. More conscious than others in their disregard of the solidarity of responsibility, they broke openly with every principle that did not favour individual interests. Their doctrine must therefore be classed with the other non-moral tendencies creating the habits of thought which have dominated the nineteenth century. They would have completely ruined the science of political economy which they fathered and attempted to apply had not John Stuart Mill broken away from their teachings. Like other influential groups the utilitarians have helped the race to realize the beauty of loftier standards and nobler aspirations, but the lesson has been at the expense of social equality.

In saying that the classes influenced by the new ideals of goodness and perfection were non-moral, I do not mean to imply that they were not conscientious; on the contrary, they were as a rule over-conscientious. Conscientiousness is a motor feeling prompting or prohibiting certain con-

crete deeds; morality is a rule of action determined by the intellect. The sanction of morality is a feeling of satisfaction derived from making one's conduct conform to general rules which promote general welfare. For morality to exist, the thought of a unified society is necessary, without which the intellect could not formulate general rules of universal validity. Conscience is a feeling of pain arising when the feeling of personal integrity is violated. A conscientious person thinks of the gains and losses to his personality; his rules and precepts relate to his own experience, and are derived from the conditions of his immediate environment. These rules therefore are more concrete than moral rules, and lose their definiteness and vigour when they are so generalized as to become social and moral. Conscientious people are fond of concrete rules that they can use dialectically and dogmatically. There can be no conscience without character and a feeling of integrity, and there can be no morality without an ideal of society by which the feeling of the solidarity of responsibility is aroused.

The new tendencies that affected England through Smith and Wesley made the people more individual, more local in their feelings than they would have been if the moral tendencies of the earlier part of the century had remained dominant. The change led to an emphasis of local conditions, a distrust of general principles, and a distaste for foreign innovations. In business life, in the home, and in religion concrete rules due to present conditions acquired a validity superior to principles and customs of long standing. Like economics, an intensive religion emphasizes present needs and evils, and adopts concrete methods of attaining or preventing them. The traditions, the ritual, and the customs of the past were discredited, and in their place arose new habits of thought and rules of action which harmonized more fully with new conditions. England steadily differentiated herself

from her past and from other countries, but her people became individual and forceful as they became less cosmopolitan. The new religion and economics thus brought many more blessings than evils. Had Englishmen at the close of the century been less concrete in their thought and less local in their habits, they could not have played the part they did in the conflicts opening the new epoch, to which we must now turn.

## CHAPTER V

### THE ECONOMISTS

FOR a long period France had dominated Europe. In the same sense that to-day we say Paris is France, then France was Europe. There civilization and culture were centred, and the French language and manners were everywhere accepted as standards. As the development of French industrial conditions preceded that in other parts of Europe, population reached its normal level in France sooner than elsewhere. The limits to a country's growth are set by its area and physical conditions. As France practically reached these limits at an early date, it had a large, well-concentrated population, whose services and resources could be utilized in struggles with other states which were poorly developed and occupied by scattered, loosely organized races, devoid of national feeling.

Comparing the physical resources of France and Germany, one wonders that France so long dominated Germany, for Germany had then, as now, superior physical advantages. But the German government was slow in developing these advantages, and the obstacles to social progress prevented her people from utilizing them. She was therefore an easy prey to French intrigue and ambition. But in the eighteenth century France had so nearly reached the bounds set by her physical conditions that her progress became slow, while the other nations with less developed resources came forward by leaps and bounds. In Germany, and more especially in England, the progress was marvellous, and the old disadvantages

were steadily overcome. Large tracts of land were brought into cultivation, roads were improved, cities grew rapidly, the industrial arts of all kinds made great progress, and with these changes came a steady growth of population and wealth.

The supremacy of France was necessarily affected by these changes. Sooner or later France was doomed to yield and shrink to her natural position on the map of Europe. Pluck, bravery, and organization may win single campaigns, but they cannot withstand a steadily growing deficiency in economic resources. A brave, enterprising people could not accept this fate without a struggle; but it speaks well for France that it took all Europe a century to reduce her to her proper position. Sedan, however, was inevitable from the start; for France could not resist the evils that flowed from the loss of her economic superiority. The account of this struggle against fate makes a brilliant episode in history, with thrilling details, capable of being presented in a series of vivid pictures. Its importance has been overestimated, however, for it teaches only the simple lesson that a nation cannot successfully struggle against great economic disadvantages.

These thrilling details and vivid pictures influenced especially England, because of the peculiar state of the public mind at the time. I have pointed out the great transformation in national thought that had taken place, and the gradual acquisition of a non-moral attitude, which did not please those who retained the old standards. They believed the nation was approaching moral and social ruin, and to prove their case they sought the facts and events furnished by the disorganized state of French society. That the wickedness and vice in France were the causes of her decline seemed to them self-evident, and it was equally evident to them that England would soon suffer a similar fate unless public opinion and private conduct were altered.

I have also called attention to the lull in prophetic activity that occurred in the early part of the century. The plagues, famines, religious wars, and other evils with which prophets are wont to enforce their lessons had ceased. Even Wesley's zealous search for signs of God's wrath was rewarded with nothing more than the Lisbon earthquake and the sliding of a Yorkshire rock. He and others of his class were compelled — much to their advantage — to resort to other means of promoting moral reform. The French Revolution, however, gave new life to the prophetic spirit. The bloodshed, the crimes, and the social disorders in France created a new feeling of insecurity, for all these seemed to show that the spirit of innovation, moral turpitude, and disregard of law were bearing legitimate fruit.

The prophets and the moralists in England, having thus a common cause, exploited the crimes and social disorders of France in order to oppose reforms they disliked, and to popularize their own remedies for English ills. Unfortunately the English people knew but little of France, and this little they learned from blood-curdling histories or heard on the boulevards of Paris. They were unable to interpret correctly the passing events in France. In spite of all that has been said, no nation ever met an unavoidable disaster more courageously, or bore its evils more nobly. Other nations under like circumstances have lost their vigour and allowed their civilization to decline. In the face of defeat France, however, has steadily improved her civilization, increased her frugality, and developed her resources. Her moral progress compares favourably with that of other nations; and the loss of life in her revolutions, of which much has been made, was less in amount than an epidemic of smallpox would have caused. It is a craving for excitement that home events will not satisfy, and a desire to substantiate doctrines not justified by English experience that induce Englishmen to take

a false view of the evils against which France has struggled, and to force relatively unimportant facts into the foreground.

For the real causes of the changes during this epoch we must look to another quarter than Paris, for town life merely reflected changes that country conditions had created. The struggle in France was really a struggle for wheat. Every social problem in some way took its rise in the condition of the wheat market, a fact made clear by examining the curve that represents the price of wheat during the epoch. The deficiency in the supply of wheat was first noticed in 1757, when a remarkably short crop forced up its price, and the situation did not improve with the better years that followed. The price continued to rise, and the abnormally high value was maintained for over a century. England, instead of exporting wheat, began to import it, and as a consequence the commercial relations of all other nations were altered.

It will make my thought clearer to compare this wheat curve with the curve that represents the decline of the power of France. The upward movement in the price of wheat began in 1757 at the opening of the Seven Years' War, during which France lost her American colonies and witnessed the beginning of her decline. The price of wheat finally dropped to its normal level in 1873, two years after the final conquest of France by the Germans. In a rough way the wheat curve and the curve representing the power of France correspond during the interval. I speak of this only to show how deceptive were appearances, and how plausible was the belief that French events were the real causes of the changes that were taking place. The revolution in commerce, industry, social philosophy and in national ideals would have gone on just the same if France had submitted quietly to the inevitable loss of power and to the rule of the Bourbons. She did not alter the course of history by her bold struggle for supremacy, but simply made history more interesting.

To understand how a single product could acquire such an importance that the history of an epoch could be made by its scarcity, the reader must be familiar with English social philosophy. Wheat had long been a leading crop in England, and had been accepted as the measure of wages and of welfare. Probably wages were paid in wheat before the use of money became general; it may be that at an earlier time wealth was measured in wheat just as in other countries it was measured in cattle, land, or similar commodities. Certainly these commodity standards had been long in use and were generally accepted. It is impossible to understand the reasoning of Adam Smith without knowing his view of the importance of this commodity, for his reasoning is that all value is measured in labour, but labour in turn has its value fixed by the price of wheat. Thus his whole economic philosophy turns on the value of wheat. He reasons even more rigidly, for he assumes that each labourer's family consumes a peck of wheat a week, so that a nation can have no more weeks' labour than it has pecks of wheat. The harvest is a wheat harvest, and it is the result of the capitalists' forethought. As all the advances of capital are at bottom only pecks of wheat, there can be no more labour employed than there are pecks of wheat stored up from the last harvest.

These assumptions appear again in his reasoning about the benefits bestowed by capital upon labour, which is as follows: A capitalist must use his capital in a way advantageous to labourers, since he, like all others, can but consume his peck of wheat a week, and for the rest of his stock he can find no use but in employing labourers. When the wheat comes on the market it is certain that all of it will pass into the hands of the labourers, and be consumed by them in exchange for their labour. The only way a capitalist can injure labourers is by setting some of them to work producing luxuries, instead of producing

wheat. But this is no present evil, for work will be as plenty as ever while the present crop holds out. But in the reduction of the succeeding wheat crop lies the real evil, for then the demand for labour must fall off. This is the essence of the famous wage-fund theory.

It is not my purpose to examine the validity of this reasoning. Its importance consists in the fact that it was generally accepted, and that wheat was talked of and reasoned about as if its cultivation were the only national industry. Men's capacity for consuming goods was measured by their capacity to consume bread; and as this capacity is nearly the same in all men it was assumed that all men were practically on the same footing in industrial affairs. Though capitalists had more responsibilities than labourers, and were the guardians of the national supply of wheat, nevertheless when the wheat was ready for consumption they got only an equal share with the others. Every man had enough, and no one could well eat more than enough — a philosophy of equality which, once perceived and visualized, made men eager to put the theory into practice. As the struggle for equality was a necessary consequence of this idealization of bread, the French Revolution must be regarded as a veritable bread riot.

In earlier times the English people cooked before an open fire, and consequently the food was soft and moist. The superiority of wheat became very marked when ovens made a dry preparation of food possible. Besides, it was the only one of the cereals that was easily raised with yeast, and wheat bread made much better toast than other breads — the importance of which fact was apparent as soon as tea came into general use. The use of porridge, soup, and soft foods became a mark of inferiority, and every one sought to make the change to bread and other oven-baked food. The result was that wheat bread became the standard of comfort and stood for a qualitative diet as clearly as porridge and soup did for a mere quan-

titative one. These dry foods were supplemented by the better malt drinks that were coming into use. Thus the oven and the brewery worked together in producing a qualitative diet and a new standard of comfort.

In the third quarter of the eighteenth century English economic ideas were hospitably received in France along with other foreign ideas. The difference between French and English development is largely due to the fact that France received and assimilated the results of two English epochs of development at the same time. The intensity of religious prejudices kept France from feeling the force of the sceptical and analytical ideas of the Lockian epoch until long after they had spent their force in England. The doctrine of liberty also belongs to the earlier English epoch ; but its perception was delayed in France, and so became associated with the ideal of equality. England struggled for liberty in one century, for comfort in the next, and for equality in a third. France struggled for all three at once ; hence the fierceness of the struggle and the boldness with which these revolutionary ideas were conceived. The orderly development by epochs, which permitted England to pass successfully through great changes, did not take place in France. The reasoning of the French revolutionists depended upon foreign facts and events much more than did the reasoning of the progressive party in England. The French broke with the conditions of their own environment to a greater extent than did the English ; and as a result they lacked the steadying influence that environmental conditions exert.

The squalor and poverty that existed in France before the Revolution have been so often exaggerated that it is thought the Revolution was due to a lack of food. This is a mistake, for French economic conditions, like those of Europe generally, had been improving for a century. If economic progress in France was less marked than elsewhere, it was because France started into the cen-

tury in advance of other nations, and had already passed through some of the stages through which other nations were to pass more rapidly. The cry for bread was not a cry for food, but for comfort. As the people improved their condition, growing tired of onions, cabbage, and soup, they demanded the same standards as the upper classes. The salient fact of the standard carried with it all the complementary facts, for with the desire for bread would come all that is needed for its best consumption.

A revolution created by economic causes is usually misinterpreted because it is forgotten that progress and not poverty breeds discontent. People who are really starving are satisfied with anything that fills the stomach. Contentment hinges upon a quantitative standard which brutes as well as men can feel. Comfort rests upon an intensive or qualitative standard, having no objective measurement, and with a rapid upward movement out of all proportion to the means of attaining it. If the standard of a typical family demand four hundred and fifty dollars, and their income is four hundred dollars, the addition of fifty dollars to their receipts will not make them satisfied. They will want at least five hundred and twenty-five dollars to make them comfortable, for each addition to income raises the standard beyond the means of gratification. Prosperity thus increases the struggle for income and spreads social discontent. Every addition of  $X$  to the national income enlarges the wants of the people by  $X$  plus  $Y$ . It is the endeavour of the people to get this  $Y$  that creates the revolutions. The poor, assuming that the rich have this extra  $Y$ , raise the cry to get rid of the drones and to give the whole national income to the workers. The funded surplus in the form of income from lands and stocks and bonds, largely in the hands of a leisure class, gives colour to the view that the poor are wronged. The existence of this surplus, however, makes

it possible for the income of the common people to receive an addition greater than the whole amount added by prosperity to the national income; and that is what happens in periods of great industrial change, whether brought about by peaceable or by violent means. In each successive stage of social progress the so-called drones receive a smaller per cent of the national income, so that the incomes of the workers increase more rapidly than their productive power. A compromise is thereby effected which temporarily satisfies the conditions of progress and ensures internal quiet.

This theory of prosperity throws light on the motive of the French revolutionists. The increase of their productive power being too slow to give the desired comfort, they were forced to grasp at the funded income of others. As the political condition of France at the time permitted the easy seizure of the funded income, quiet might have been quickly restored but for the new relations in which France stood to the other European nations. It is to be remembered that there is an international as well as a national surplus. When the French people were taking the funded surplus from their lords, better economic conditions enabled other nations to appropriate a larger share of the international surplus to the detriment of France. The French people thus lost by the relative decline of France a large part of the surplus taken from their leisure class. This fact and not the internal struggle brought on the real Revolution, which made marked changes in the map of Europe. The French, failing to secure at home that net increase of income demanded by the new standard of comfort, sought to take by force the increased income that other nations, because of their improved economic conditions, were enjoying. The home struggle proved easy, but the external struggle was a failure and ended in exhausting the resources of France. The day had gone by when France could dominate Europe.

The economic character of the struggle is made clearer by a comparison of the economic conditions of England and France. The great industrial inventions in England were beginning to show their effects in the growth of population and in an increased demand for food. Their larger incomes permitted her people to bid successfully against foreign nations, and especially against France, where the increase of productive power was relatively slow. The food imported by England was usually in the form of wheat — the one rare thing for which there was a general demand. It thus happened that just at the time when France wanted more wheat to raise her standard of comfort, England outbid her and took the coveted grain. To say the least, England was always first supplied, and France got what was left. In bad years England took a share of the French wheat, leaving the French towns without a proper supply; and in good years, when prices were low, French country people were in distress. So in either case there were suffering and discontent in France.

When two nations stand in such economic relations, there is brought into operation that portion of economic theory called the "potato philosophy." The advantage of a high standard of life and of the consumption of rare articles of food consists in the fact that a nation gets the rare articles, or at least as much of them as she demands. The nations at a disadvantage take what is left of the better food, supplying the deficiency with coarser and cheaper articles of consumption. If the better and rarer articles of the first nation are short in amount, the superior income of its people enables them to outbid their rivals among poorer nations, taking from the latter their own food supply. The most prosperous nation is thus enabled to supply its people with the best there is, and all suffering must be endured by its weaker rivals. These facts have often been pointed out in the relations

that exist between England and Ireland. The superior incomes of the English people enable them to draw the best food from Ireland, while if there is a shortage in either country the Irish suffer. The Irish have starved even when the island was producing more than enough good food for all its inhabitants. The people of the nation economically the strongest always sit at Nature's first table, the other nations taking their turn in the order of their economic strength and getting what their superiors leave. The French people, who had long sat at this first table, were now compelled to yield their places to the English and accept a second place. They were thus put in the same relation to the English in which the Irish have long stood, and the French might have suffered as severely as Ireland had they not resisted the change so vigorously. They could not drive the English from their superior position, but they did not take so low a place in the world's market as they would have taken, if they had followed the example of Portugal or Ireland, and become feeders of the English.

The struggle in France was thus forced on her by her changed economic condition. The cry for liberty, equality, and fraternity was prompted by the thought that there was bread and comfort for all, and that everybody might sit at Nature's first table. It was ineffectual because it was not in harmony with facts. The productive power of Europe at that time was not great enough to make all its inhabitants comfortable, nor was its wheat crop large enough to permit all to live on bread. The great wars decided definitely that the English should have the bread and the first table. The French lost, partly because it was too late for them to dominate Europe, and partly because they stood for ideas that could not be realized. The spread of French ideas was limited to that part of western Europe in which the people were striving to secure a bread diet. So much of Europe was contented

merely to live that a demand for comfort could not make an effective social upheaval.

Although, through the changes in English thought associated with Adam Smith and Wesley, the moral philosophers lost their commanding position, their influence endured, and men of their temperament and mental habits occupied prominent places during the succeeding epoch. At first glance it is difficult to select and classify them, their factional quarrels concealing their common qualities and making their peculiarities appear more important than they really were. It may seem misleading to put together the names of Paley, Bentham, Godwin, James Mill, Newman, Carlyle, Ruskin, Charles Kingsley, Gladstone, and Herbert Spencer. Yet in a classification of Englishmen, made according to their fundamental characteristics and psychic manifestations, such men all go into one group.

The Calvinists were the dominant, or, at least, the most imposing element in English life, until met by the vigorous, conscious opposition of those influenced by Utopian ideals. These two classes did not oppose each other as sects holding different opinions about particular measures, but their views of life and its purpose were the basis of the disagreement. We might say that the Calvinistic attitude is characteristic of the feminine mind, and the utilitarian of the masculine. With the Calvinists, woman has had much influence; with Utopists, however, she has had little to do. Mothers have clung too closely to "home" ideals, and have dreaded too much the temptations of the outside world to feel the force of the ideals which the Utopists have presented. The first thought of the woman is of her home; that of the Utopist is of the world and the general good. The two mental attitudes clash at almost every point, the effects of the opposition appearing in a thousand forms. In religion the Calvinist gives the first place to the covenant between God and

men, and puts himself in too close touch with God to care much about his relations to men or the future of society. To the Calvinist the world is not a place for pleasure, but a place for trial and tribulation, while the main question of the future is, which of the "vials of wrath" God means to pour out next. A believer in total depravity cannot consistently believe in social progress. Such a man has crude ideas of civilization and culture, and no faith in deep social forces which reduce temptation, gradually making men's lives more happy and natural.

The ideal of social progress was always upheld by some in the Church, for many of those who emphasized its power did so in the belief that it was the only means by which social progress could be promoted. They had the ideal of a happy, peaceable people, guided in the right path by a united Church. Although this ideal was revived among the Protestants, naturally less emphasis was placed on the part the Church was to play in its realization. The new school advocated a natural theology, making the peace, happiness, and progress of men the great end of the divine plan; and so confident were they of this doctrine that they attempted to discover the will of God by measuring the happiness of men. These attempted determinations of God's will by objective standards turned the movement in a new direction and extended its influence. When schemes for the measurement of happiness were once proposed, they were applied in political and social as well as in religious affairs. A general principle was thus acquired which, when separated from its religious source, was made the criterion by which religion itself was judged.

While this development towards utilitarianism was going on, there were many who held tenaciously to the original position and tried to develop it in harmony with church ideals, or at least continued the opposition of the older moralists to material measurements of happiness. There have thus arisen two distinct schools : the economic utili-

tarians, who accepted the practical philosophy for getting on in the world, and elevated its maxims into moral rules ; and the philosophic Utopists, who preserved the traditions and moral attitude of past ages. Differing as these two schools do in many of their principles and measurements, they yet have the same general attitude and show the same traits and habits of thought. They agree in making human happiness the end of action, and differ only as to the means of measuring it and of valuing its different forms. Both put social and general interests above local and personal interests, recognizing the unity of society, and also in some form the solidarity of responsibility. Of still more importance is the fact that both have an ideal of a social Utopia, which they hope to realize, some through religious organization, some by political unity, and some by coöperation ; yet in all cases the distant Utopia, whether hidden or revealed, is a cherished picture and a source of inspiration — a lovely theme to which the thinker is ever fond of returning. The perception of this Utopian ideal is the cause of another peculiarity — a marked aversion to the present, and to the characteristics of the dominant class in present society. Any one who dreams of a glorious future feels sorely the defects in present social arrangements, and tries to make some person or class responsible for them. He thus vibrates between vivid denunciations of what is and splendid anticipations of what is to come. And the present seems darker as the Utopian ideal grows more clear. As to what is wrong in the present, and what the Utopia shall consist of, there is no agreement, and about these matters the bitterest of feuds have arisen ; but for all that the participation in these future hopes and present denunciations is the surest mark of a Utopist. There is not much difference at bottom between Cardinal Newman's opposition to present tendencies and Herbert Spencer's, nor did Newman's ideal of the future church differ as much

as might be supposed from Spencer's state of unalloyed happiness. A few alterations would change the denunciation or ideal of the one into that of the other.

There is another Utopian peculiarity which is plainly due to the influence of Newton, whose discoveries tended to develop a school of optimists who fix their eyes on the distant future and overlook or neglect the needs, suffering, and misery of intervening ages. This is because the Newtonian reasoning enables men to measure and fix objects at a great distance from themselves, both in time and in space, helping them to picture great and distant events in a simple form, and encouraging them to overlook details—a form of long-range reasoning which is especially attractive to Utopists. They like the boldness and dash of Newton's thought, making it a model in their own field. Economists used to be charged with cultivating a disposition that enabled them to sit at "Nature's feast," and look with indifference on those who had neither seats nor food. Just so can a Newtonian optimist brush aside the claims and rights of the countless ages which intervene between the present and the realization of his ideal and disregard centuries as readily as the economists disregarded individuals.

The Utopists are also at one in the emphasis they place on progress by influence as opposed to what we now call progress by breeding or selection; and they all have the boyish hope that every one can be elevated and made to participate in the glorious future of the race. But there is no agreement as to the means by which the desired end can be reached: some believe in the potency of reasoning, some in guidance of nature, some in religion, and others in the power of artistic ideals. In spite of the failures which have followed every attempt to realize this faith, manly men have clung to it with a desperate hope which even the new plan of progress has not effaced. Breeding and selection grate on the feelings of Utopian idealists,

*This was  
long before  
new*

for it places serious limits to their ideal. No one thing is more plainly the outcome of a moral attitude than a belief in the power of influence to elevate mankind — a belief which is the attitude of the Catholic Church and of the High Church movement generally. Religion in this form influences to some extent every one in the community. The religion of the Calvinists influences a part of the community powerfully, and the rest not at all, or perhaps even detrimentally. Its strength is due not to its general influence, but to the breeding that elevates the good and the selection that destroys the bad.

Besides these general peculiarities there are others which belong more especially to the philosophic and religious Utopists. They unite a love of the past and of foreign ways with their Utopian dreams and see the essence of the future, or at least a forecast of it in some foreign elements that they are striving to introduce into their own civilization. They are foreign hearted and cosmopolitan, wishing they were born in some other land, or at least in some other age. Carlyle strove to Germanize English literature. Newman wanted a foreign religion; the High Church party desired to reëstablish old forms; artists strove for the foreign and antique; and Herbert Spencer appeals to foreign facts even when home ones would seem to serve better. In evolutionary reasoning facts are of importance in proportion to their distance from us. The present is judged not by its own evidence, but from the most distant standpoint available.

These men are also strongly disposed to accept antinomies and to attempt to reconcile opposites. The logical severity of the Calvinists is absent. The manly man relies on the strength of his will, deceiving himself into thinking that things which can be held together in thought by sheer will power can also be united logically. But reasoning and willing are different mental attributes, and the manly man overestimates the latter. He succeeds

only in casting over himself and his followers a spell which is quickly broken, and then people wonder how they ever came to accept such reasoning. Mr. Spencer has given some good examples of created oppositions and attempted reconciliations, which make a prominent feature in all his books. The same tendency is seen in all the philosophic Utopists from the *via media*, for which Newman struggled so long, to Gladstone's attempt to reconcile national unity and home rule.

This type of Utopists possesses other peculiarities, due to defeats incurred at the hands of the popular party, and to the opposition of the economic utilitarians. A losing party always clings to some desperate hope; its weak-kneed and indifferent members yield, so that those who are left in the struggle have a clearer vision and are ready for bolder undertakings. The Calvinists and Liberals were gaining steadily in public confidence, and were filling public places with their adherents. Feeling that something must be done before all was lost, philosophic Utopists were ready to grasp at straws, and easily convinced themselves that their ideals were embodied in every reaction against popular tendencies. Notice the eagerness with which Carlyle during the American Civil War seized the idea of uniting the West Indies and the Southern States, and making a centre from which "heroes" could work out their plans. Again, Newman's hope of making an effective opposition to popular tendencies through the unification of the Church was equally visionary. The same illusive hope inspired Herbert Spencer when he broke in on the plan of his philosophy to write his *Data of Ethics*. The new ethics proved as slight a barrier to the popular movement as any of the earlier schemes. Like the others, it merely showed the faith of Utopists in remote ideals and their proneness to misinterpret and underestimate the force of present tendencies.

The mental attitude of these men can be best under-

stood by comparing it with that of the French Utopists of the same epoch. The French were constantly defeated in their efforts to retain their earlier supremacy. Out of this fact grew the instability of their government because each faction in turn tried with the same ill success to resist the forces that were crushing France. Each new failure inspired some new hope in another direction, making a party which strove for its realization. The steady defeat of national aspirations thus forced a series of revolutions, each of a more desperate character than its predecessor. In England the government was stable because it was controlled by the popular party ; but in their thought the defeated philosophic Utopists show the same breaks in continuity and the same revolutions that the French nation displays in the field of politics. English thought was in a constant state of eruption, popular leaders were converted and reconverted. No one felt sure that the "hero" he trusted could be relied on. There was hardly a prominent man who had not changed his attitude on public questions and disappointed his ardent followers. The explanation is that public men were educated in one school of thought, while the average man was forced by his economic condition into another. The heroes of the day struggled, grasped at straws, and revolutionized themselves to save the cause to which they were attached by education and instinct. But all in vain, for the popular party gradually crushed all opposition and forced the "heroes" to fall into line or to retire.

The desperateness of the situation was further increased by the successes of their natural allies, the economic utilitarians. By a queer combination of circumstances the Benthamites had amalgamated with the new school of economists, subordinating their utilitarian ideals to the practical programme of the economists. This programme with which the name of Ricardo is associated, not only was definite, but also had an alluring logical ring ; its prop-

ositions were based on generally accepted facts, and its reasoning charmed every one with logical instincts. But on the other hand the picture it presented of the future of society was dismal. Men must always lack food, poverty must increase with progress, and social Utopias become impossible. This picture was as repellent as the logic of the arguments by which it was supported was attractive. The philosophic Utopists could not accept the picture; and though they could not pick flaws in its logic, they revolted against the leading features of the economic programme. Their feelings are best expressed by the exclamation, "How dreadful, but how plausible!"

Thus the orderly development of the philosophic Utopists was blocked by the Benthamites. It was not possible for the former party to change popular tendencies; but a philosophy might have been created if they had not been deceived into supposing that economic utilitarianism was philosophy itself. Many of them thought of it as a sort of religion.<sup>1</sup>

They were thus shut out of both the orderly paths of development. If men are in harmony with popular tendencies, they may by immersing themselves in practical life become leaders in its progress. Even in opposition to popular tendencies, a philosophy can be created which will aid some new generation to carry on its struggles more consciously. In either case safeguards are thrown about men making them steady, conservative, and practical. But when both these roads to progress are closed, each seeming equally to lead to destruction and social ruin, nothing remains but to take to the "woods," every man for himself. This is an attractive undertaking for manly

<sup>1</sup> "There is a Providence which rules this earth, whose name is neither Political Economy nor Expediency." — CHARLES KINGSLEY.

This statement implies the truth of the doctrine of the moralists that the ways of God are discovered by their reasonableness, and also that the logic of political economy is so reasonable as to resemble the will of God.

men with strong wills, but it seldom produces any permanent effect. The brilliancy of the efforts may astound, but social progress is too complex to be promoted by aimless dashes, no matter how great the vigour or how lofty the motive. Such individual efforts make good reading, but not history.

To the economic utilitarians, however, in spite of the snares and pitfalls into which they fell, a more important place must be assigned. If they failed to establish utilitarianism, they at least improved its logic, and made its measurements definite. These results were the outcome of their use of the popular bread philosophy as a basis for their reasoning. When bread is regarded as the staff of life, and every one is assumed to live on bread alone, it becomes easy to measure happiness by the quantity of bread each one consumes. Bentham utilizes this reasoning to make the measurement of happiness definite. "To every particle of the matter of wealth," he tells us, "corresponds a particle of the matter of happiness." No one would accept this reasoning, if he were not thinking of bread as a concrete expression of wealth, and of bread eating as the sum of happiness. Take away the definiteness of the bread philosophy, and the proposition would be meaningless. Who, for example, could deceive himself into thinking that each particle of cloth, beef, or wine produced the same quantity of happiness. The difference in the qualities of these articles is too great, and the quantities of them that different individuals consume, are too varied to permit of such a deception. Wheat bread, however, is qualitatively the same, and there is little quantitative difference in the amount that men can consume. It is easy, therefore, to think that each particle of bread contains a "particle of happiness," and that the sum of happiness is the same as the amount of wheat. To this the economists added the doctrine of the wage fund, which asserts that the quantity of wealth a nation pro-

duces is limited by the quantity of food that has been produced and stored up. As it was assumed that this food is wheat, the wheat crop becomes the measure both of wealth and happiness. All other standards can be dispensed with ; one material measurement suffices for every situation.

It would not have been possible to unify the programme of the economists with that of Bentham if his social standard had not been so low. He seems to have thought much of living, and nothing of comfort, and at a time when all England was striving for the pleasures of home life he was thinking only of security, which he made the first principle of law, above that of equality. He asserted that the advantage of abundance was not that it made comfort possible, but that it secured individuals against periods of scarcity. The prudence he recommended was that of Joseph, who stored up food in the years of plenty against the years of want. There was, however, no thought of social progress. If a nation, he says, of five thousand people has food for ten thousand, it should not increase its numbers, — a piece of practical advice, on the strength of which the reader expects him to say that this abundance can be used to make the people happier and more comfortable. But of this he is not thinking. The extra food should be stored away so as to make its owners secure in time of want. Practically his reasoning comes to this, that men do not differ in happiness except as they differ in the security they have for their future. Their stomachs are of the same size : if full, they live ; if empty, they die. It is this emphasis of security that causes him to overlook the intensity of pleasures. Pushpin is as good as poetry if it costs as much. Particles of wealth all have particles of happiness attached to them, and if they are sold in time of want, they will buy equal quantities of bread and embody equal quantities of security. Wealth is either bread or the power to buy bread. If pushpin is

as good as poetry, codfish balls are as good as beefsteak, and a soup dinner is as good as chicken pie.

It is needless to expand such a philosophy or to explain why it was repugnant to men of culture. Bentham's idea of pleasure was negative; yet he was so clear and steady in his reasoning that he convinced men intellectually, although their hearts revolted against the programme he outlined. It is no wonder that the philosophic Utopists rejected a programme in which there was no place for their ideals; but in doing so they were forced then to oppose philosophy and to lose the restraint that it puts upon men. Opposing as they did both the reasoning of the economists, and the plain common-sense attitude of the popular party, nothing was left for them but wild schemes and visionary plans. It takes more than brilliancy to put such schemes into working order; and each attempt was followed by failure, and then by fresh attempts of an equally futile character.

In the meantime the popular party went its way practically without leadership, yet crushing all opposition by the weight of its numbers. Whether as Calvinists, Methodists, liberals, or capitalists, they all stood for home ideals, and cared little for the culture of their opponents. If they lacked the necessary elements of a higher civilization, it should be remembered that they were shut out of the universities; and if they lacked leaders, it was because the leaders of popular movements had been persecuted out of existence. For all this England paid heavily in the first half of the present century when popular movements could no longer be suppressed. A few concrete demands had forced their way into the popular consciousness, and to these demands men clung tenaciously, in spite of the higher ideals for which the "heroes" were striving.

In one respect the Utopian ideal was not a failure. It brought on a conflict with the economists, the influence of

which on the development of thought has made this epoch particularly notable. Certain writers, unable to see the difference between a social Utopia and the practical politics of the day began to apply the abstract principles of a Utopia to the solution of the concrete problems of the day. Building of Utopias is an innocent amusement, so long as the Utopias are not confused with actual governments; but when the builders insist on contrasting the evils from which men actually suffer with the pleasures connected with the ideal society, a conflict between the advocates of Utopias and the defenders of the existing social order becomes inevitable. The only question is where and when the conflict will break out.

To understand the position of the two parties, we must return to the controversy started by Mandeville. He had held that man was nothing but skin, flesh, and bones, through which the internal passions manifested themselves. Wealth was the means of gratifying these passions, and hence to the production of wealth the energies of men were directed. To create work this wealth must be consumed, and hence vicious indulgences that wasted wealth were necessary to public welfare. Hume made this philosophy more definite by asserting that the passions created the only motives that influenced the will. The moral philosophers, however, had turned the edge of Mandeville's argument by changing the definition of vice, and by showing the good effects created by the motive of self-interest. Hume's argument was withdrawn, or at least so modified as to lose its importance before a conflict was aroused over it. The real issue was thus not fought out, but was left in abeyance until it should appear in some new form. The moralists, soon losing sight of the assertion that men were passionate, went on talking about the reasonableness of man's conduct as though this first premise had been proved. They soon became thoroughly optimistic, and talked as if the

millennium had really arrived. This pleasant vision had to be destroyed and Malthus was the accidental cause of its destruction. I say accidental, because he was more a moralist than an economist. He tried to avoid trouble by admitting moral considerations, and thus obscured the real issue. At bottom there is only one issue, although it may be framed in many forms. The reader should bear in mind that I am not trying to prove or disprove the law of population, but only to show the part it played in the development of English thought.

To do this we must look at social problems from the standpoint of men living at the beginning of this century. We must understand the optimistic and Utopian attitude of the one party, and the determined adherence to actual conditions of the other. The differences are not merely those of fact and logic, but of character and mental traits as well. A struggle between types of men was thus brought on, which continued during the whole period. The clearest issue was whether men are controlled by reason or by passion. The old definition of reasoning was adhered to, although the type of reasoning had become more economic and inductive; and passion still meant those uncontrollable outbursts of primitive men which lead to great indulgences and vicious acts.

The passion to which Malthus refers was not of this kind. In his mind passion may dominate men who are never dissipated or irregular in their habits, and women who lead the purest of lives. The moralist could reply to Mandeville that the passions to which he refers are man-made and due to depravity — departures from God's plan for which He is not responsible. But the sexual instinct upon which Malthus bases his argument is a necessity, and any resulting evil is due to defects in God's plan for which He alone is responsible. In this new alignment of the forces the very basis of natural religion was assailed. What Christian doctrine could stand if God is the cause

of misery and vice? It was also asserted that limitation of the food supply prevented the support of the natural increase of population. Not only was man made wrong, but nature itself was badly constructed. If population increased geometrically, while food increased arithmetically, what before seemed to be the best of worlds was proved to be the worst.

The new doctrine was also repugnant to the moral feelings. As population cannot increase faster than the growth of the food supply, the extra population must be cut off in some way; the only choice is between war, famine, and social disorder on the one hand, and disease, crime, and vice on the other. Peace, security, and other blessings of civilization are no aids. If these improvements cut down the death-rate, it is raised again by the increase of disease and vice. Progress at bottom only means an increase of poverty. The more people there are, the less is their comfort, and the poorer is their food. It should be remembered that Malthus did not seek to prove that ignorant, vicious men must necessarily suffer from a lack of food, or that they increased too rapidly for public good. These propositions would have aroused no opposition. The natural theologians would have been glad to acquire an argument so much in harmony with their thought that God's plan provides for the progress of society and for the supremacy of the good. The Utopists, against whom Malthus was directing his arguments, derived their concept of the future of society mainly from the natural theologians. They made men reasonable, intelligent, virtuous, and industrious. The members of the new commonwealth were to combine all the religious, political, moral, and economic virtues. If such a community breaks down, or is reduced to poverty, then virtue has no reward. Thus is presented a plain issue which once seen must bring the economists and the moralists into conflict. Malthus tried to avoid the conse-

quences of his reasoning by adding moral restraint to his list of checks to population, but the more consistent and resolute of the economists kept the original issue in the foreground; and even if they had not done so, the natural theologians would have been compelled to answer the obvious objections which could now be made to their system of thought. The new doctrine had to be disproved or shown to be consistent with the divine plan for social progress.

The economists not only held to the original position of Malthus, but also strengthened it. His first argument was based on the necessity of food and the limited area of the land upon which it could be grown. Stated in this way the doctrine asserts an ultimate opposition between the possible food supply and the possible inhabitants of the world. There are, however, as the moralists pointed out, no necessary present evils, and the future evils may be too far off to be worthy of notice. Surely there could be no immediate danger when so much of the best land of the earth was unoccupied. But the position of the economists was strengthened by the general acceptance of the doctrine that wheat is the only proper food for civilized men. While food might increase indefinitely, the increase of wheat was slow and difficult. The price of wheat at the time of the Malthusian controversy was abnormally high, and economists, in the idea that these conditions were permanent, could easily sneer at the claims of moralists that the food supply was indefinitely great. If food was abundant, why was its price so high, and why were so many people on the verge of starvation?

The economists also improved their position by showing the need of capital to produce food, and especially to produce the much-desired wheat. The supply of food might potentially be unlimited, and yet the actual supply could not be enlarged except as the quantity of capital

applied to its production was increased. The growth of population is checked, not by the potential supply of food, but by the actual increase of capital. There is always a lack of capital, due to the fact that so few persons are able and willing to save. As the number of workers exceeds the amount of work to be done, there is always a struggle for work—the only means by which food can be obtained.

The argument of the economists was not complete until the law of diminishing returns was established. This law assumes that the application of increased quantities of capital and labour to land will not yield proportional returns. If ten men in a fertile field produce two hundred bushels of wheat, twenty men will not be able to produce four hundred bushels, and the return for forty men's labour will fall far short of eight hundred bushels. Assuming, therefore, that the best land yields twenty bushels of wheat to the acre, an increase of population will force farmers either to cultivate poorer land, or to put additional men on the land already in use. In either case the return per man will be less, and the incomes of typical families will be reduced. Should population continue to increase, every one would finally be reduced to want. Intelligence, integrity, energy, forethought, and other moral qualities are not safeguards against the evils of overpopulation; they may delay but they cannot prevent the inevitable poverty and misery which face all increasing societies. The virtues of men cannot remedy the defects of the material conditions under which they are created.

It matters little whether or not these arguments were sound. They were generally accepted, and even those who rejected them were compelled to face the issue raised by Malthus. Every one saw that progress does not remove poverty and misery, and was forced to modify his concept of human nature so as to explain the newly per-

ceived facts. It was not difficult for reformers on the Continent to prove to their satisfaction that the government was the cause of poverty; but these arguments had not much force in England, where, men being free and the government inactive, the strength of human passions could be more accurately tested. While there might still be great differences of opinion as to why men act badly, there was a general conviction that the passions are the real causes of the existing social distress. If men were not purely intellectual beings, some modifications in their nature must be made before the golden age of perfect-equality could be reached. Thinkers were ready for some theory of evolution when it was discovered that progress intensifies the poverty of the inefficient, making them an increasing burden to their superiors. At length it was asserted that equality and progress are opposed to one another, and that a nation must choose between them. If the masses of men, it is said,<sup>1</sup> were to perceive their true interest, they would stop the progress of society to attain equality. A strict application of moral rules in favour of the lower classes would certainly prevent progress by checking the removal of the less efficient portion of society.

Fortunately no such application of moral rules could be made. Progress is a higher law than equality, and a nation must choose it at any cost. A lack of progress would eradicate the efficient and prudent as certainly as the presence of progress crushes the inefficient and thoughtless. Progress was thus compelled to follow the lines laid down by Adam Smith and Wesley and to favour non-moral social standards upheld on the one hand by concrete economic rules harmonizing with the immediate environment, and on the other hand by intensive feelings that made men discontented with any-

<sup>1</sup> See Kidd's *Social Evolution*, Chap. III.

thing short of perfection. Malthusianism was another blow at the old objective morality based on the assumption that men were to be moved only by premises and rules. It is not surprising, therefore, that the doctrine excited an intense opposition, which continued until it was clearly shown that the eradication of the vicious and inefficient is a better check on immoral practices than all the formulated rules of conduct that can be devised.

The advance in economic thought made by Malthus is a legitimate continuation of the work of Adam Smith. The pessimistic tone of the new doctrines might not have pleased the founder of the science, but he would have recognized at least a similarity in the attitude, methods, and reasoning of his disciple. It is usually assumed that Ricardo was also a follower of Adam Smith. He did not, however, regard himself as a disciple, and the harmonizing of the two systems of thought was not his work, but that of his successors. Had Smith lived to see the Ricardian transformation of political economy, he would have sympathized not with the Ricardians, but with their unorthodox opponents.

Ricardo, it should be remembered, was a Jew, a converted Jew, it is true, yet even his conversion did not make him a believer in that natural religion which was a second nature to all Englishmen. The striking thing about Ricardo's reasoning is the absence of colouring due to the presuppositions of natural religion. He saw merely the economic world into which England had entered, and his unswerving logic is not so much a positive acquisition due to a superior mind as it is a negative result of not appreciating that picture of the universe to which Englishmen clung so ardently. His system is simple, and the motives he recognizes are few, because he has no thought of England's past, or of

the intellectual atmosphere its civilization had created. Though very different in temperament and education, he more nearly resembles Mandeville than any other thinker of his time. The simplicity and the clearness of these two writers were due to the fact that, being foreigners, they saw only the objective England. Ricardo was not a cold logician of the Calvin type. He was one of the best of observers, and his strength lay more in his rejection of what he did not see than in any superiority of his reasoning. He was an observer by instinct and a reasoner by accident.

The real successor of Adam Smith was Malthus, and if it were desirable to follow the line of succession further, the American economists would have the precedence. Diffuse and illogical as Carey often was, his system would have pleased Smith far better than that of Ricardo. Some of Carey's generalizations would certainly have delighted the heart of Smith, as they are the legitimate outcome of his own way of viewing social progress. If Smith could have read a library of the works of his followers, in my opinion he would have been best pleased with Professor Clark's *Philosophy of Wealth*. No recent book has so revived the spirit of the master, or kept so free from the local influences that have made Ricardianism offensive to men with social aspirations and ideals.

I say these things, not to lower the position of Ricardo, but to make it intelligible. He has unquestionably the important place in the development of the science that his admirers claim for him, but this importance is justified on other grounds than those they emphasize. The separation of economic thought from natural religion was inevitable, and so was a conflict between the two; yet the opposition was not in logic, but in matters of fact. A good observer and a consistent thinker was needed to turn men's attention from old schemes of social progress,

to schemes more in harmony with the new conditions upon which progress depended.

The influence of Ricardo is due to the fact that he presented a new concept of society. Adam Smith and Malthus viewed society primarily as an agricultural community, assuming that the mass of the people lived in the country and obtained their support by cultivating the soil. For such a society land problems have a supreme place. The rent of land is the only recognized form of social surplus, and its increase is looked upon as the index of national progress. Some capital is in use, but the amount is so small that its importance is not recognized. The loaning of money is regarded as an evil mainly because the borrower so often uses what he gets not to improve his productive power, but to buy luxuries and to indulge in dissipation. The sources of income in an agricultural society are mainly rent and wages, of which rent is thought the more important because it represents the surplus of society. If the landlords are prosperous, this surplus is diffused through society and every one partakes of its benefits.

The industrial development of the eighteenth century created a new way of estimating national progress. The growth of cities attracted attention, and every effort was made to heighten their prosperity. The one thing needed to do this was the increase of capital. Buildings, machinery, raw material, finished goods and other products of labour were thought of, not as distinct objects, but as forms of capital. Viewed in this way the two factors in production are labour and capital, and the two forms of income are profits and wages. The dependence of production on nature is lost sight of; the importance of saving and the security of the saver are put in the foreground. Capital in the new economy takes the place that land had held in the old agricultural society, and the social surplus is changed from rent to profits. Prosperity

now has a new measure. It is determined by the condition of the capitalists instead of, as before, by the condition of the landlords. In an agricultural society wages are contrasted with rent; in the new society wages are contrasted with profits. Business men make the rate of profits the criterion of prosperity in the same way that agriculturists make the increase of rent the test of prosperity.

Both these standpoints are defective and overlook essential facts, yet they are the natural outcome of the social conditions from which they arise. Ricardo was so immersed in the new industrial world that he was not conscious of the agricultural world demanding attention. I say this in spite of the fact that his name is associated with the theory of rent, and that we think of him first of all in connection with land problems. This later development is, however, easy to explain if we obtain the right clew to his starting-point. The central fact of his system is the connection between the price of food and the rate of profits. Upon this connection all his reasoning turns; it is never lost sight of even in his most advanced theories. The cause of low profits was the first economic problem to attract Ricardo's attention, and here he departed from the explanation that Adam Smith had offered. Smith thought the fall of profits was due to the increase of competition. Producers strove to undersell each other, and as they increased in number, they reduced prices to hold their markets. Ricardo saw that a general fall in values was impossible. If every one sold his goods twenty per cent cheaper, his real gains would be as great as before, if he also bought everything for twenty per cent less than formerly. No one would be driven out by this change, which merely indicated a fall in the value of money.

If a fall of prices checked competition, it must be that the values of some articles did not fall with the general decline of values. The perception of this fact caused

Ricardo to divide commodities into two classes: those that are freely produced, and those that have some limitation to their supply so that increased quantities can be produced only at increased cost. Of the latter class, food is the main article. If it rose in price as the prices of freely produced commodities fell, then it was easy to account for the fall in profits of which producers complained. At this time the French wars caused a high price of food, which a tax on the importation of wheat still further increased. Here, then, was a ready explanation of the evil from which industry suffered, and the remedy was equally plain. The tax should be taken off, and the markets of England should be made free. Ricardo followed out the logic of his position and became a free trader. National prosperity depended, he thought, on industrial prosperity, and this in turn depended on the rate of profits. Cheap food was necessary for a high rate of profits, and hence a tariff on food was a hindrance to national prosperity. By this reasoning the interests of the industrial classes were put in opposition to those of the agricultural classes. The prosperity of the latter depended on the high price of wheat, and they would be ruined or at least injured if the tariff on food was removed.

The issue was now clear. Was it better for society that the surplus of society should take the form of rent or of profits? A high price of wheat made the landlords wealthy; a low price was equally advantageous to the capitalists engaged in industry. This new issue engaged the attention of Malthus and Ricardo, and in the subsequent controversy the science of political economy was further enriched by the discovery of the law of rent. Malthus, viewing national prosperity from an agricultural point of view, wished to justify the corn laws. He contended that rent was a creation of new wealth, and hence was a gain to the owners of land without being a loss to

other classes. The increase of population demanded the production of more food, and more food could not be obtained without cultivating poorer land. The rise in the price of food of which Ricardo complained was a natural consequence of the increase of national prosperity. The price of food could not be lowered except by causes that at the same time would reduce population and check prosperity. Rent was therefore not a burden, but a blessing, a spontaneous gift of nature due to the high productivity of the best land. No one was injured by it, and every one indirectly gained by the prosperity of the landlords.

This reasoning did not satisfy Ricardo. He would not admit that rent was a creation of wealth ; it was merely a transfer of wealth from the industrial classes to the landlords. The losers were the employers of labour who must now pay a higher price for the food of their labourers without receiving any compensation. This high price of food put forces into operation which transferred the surplus from the capitalists to the landlords. The employers were impoverished by the exact amount that the landlords were enriched.

Ricardo thus maintained his original position, and even strengthened it by new and better proofs. The law of rent made the proof of his theory of the relation of the price of food to profits more complete. He now saw that the high price of food was a natural consequence of industrial progress, and that his theory of profits was not merely a rule of thumb applying to English conditions, but a general law of nature. Originally he had sought to prove that the corn laws were bad, in the belief that their abolition would restore the rate of profits to its former high level. This hope he now gave up, but he had the satisfaction of proving deductively the well-known historical fact that the rate of profits falls as nations grow in wealth. His main thesis was not changed by the dis-

covery of the law of rent. It gave him merely a better proof of a theory already developed from the concrete conditions of the England of his day.

This proof was still further generalized by the discovery of the law of diminishing returns. The law of rent had shown that the rate of profits must fall when the increase of population forced poorer land into cultivation. The new law revealed the fact that any application of additional capital to land yielded a diminishing return. Increased prosperity tended to lower the rate of profits, and thus to stop the growth of capital. So prosperity worked to check itself, and any nation, no matter how energetic and prudent, must eventually come to a stationary state long before the essentials of a high civilization were worked out. Malthus showed that a perfect society would break down because of the pressure of population. The law of diminishing returns proved that no such society could be established. The motives that make men prudent and enterprising are gradually weakened by the fall of profits until at last they lose their force entirely; and society is thus left without any basis for further progress.

After the discovery of the law of diminishing returns it was perceived that an economic philosophy had been created. The several concrete propositions of which the new political economy was made up could be more readily proved by making them appear to be deductions from the law of diminishing returns, than by stating them as independent propositions, and offering for each one the inductive proof on which it was originally based. It thus happened that the last law to be discovered was placed first, and the earlier laws were made dependent on it. This transposition always takes place when a science changes from an inductive to a deductive form. This instance is specially notable because the whole development took place in so short a time, and all the material for a study of its transposition is so completely at hand.

It is a mistake, however, to assume that the deductive reasoning with which we are now so familiar was the work of Ricardo. He was a true economist, working from the concrete facts by which he was surrounded, and gradually broadening his generalizations as his study of the facts became more complete. The new economic philosophy was the result of a union of the economists with the utilitarians who were led by Bentham and James Mill. The economists who had a definite programme wished for concrete changes in English laws and social conditions. Bentham and his followers had a principle and a formula, but no applications or content. They believed in pleasure, but had no idea of what it was or how it was to be attained. They were earnest opponents of a needless infliction of pain, and on this ground demanded a revision of the criminal law. Carried away by their enthusiasm for Newtonian reasoning, they believed that each science had some one principle from which all its subordinate parts were derived. They hoped to make utility the great principle in all moral and social affairs, but thus far they had been able to do nothing more than to state their theory clearly. They could discover no applications that would make utility a practical standard by which to judge concrete measures. It is easy to see the value of the new economics with its potential philosophy to men who were too abstract and too theoretical to study at first hand the new industrial phenomena. In Bentham's huge volumes there are millions of words, but he never once attempts a study or a presentation of facts. He has one general proposition which he tries in a thousand ways to make definite, but without success, because he knew little of the age in which he lived. Although James Mill is more concise, his dogmatism and his love of Newtonian reasoning kept him equally far from the facts upon which the reforms he hoped for must depend. The work of these men would have resulted in

nothing but platitudes if it had not been for a lucky contact with Ricardo and Malthus.

It is often said that Ricardo was a disciple of James Mill, but there is little to prove the assertion. Ricardo had worked out all of his concrete propositions before he met either James Mill or Bentham, with the transformation of economics into a philosophy he had little to do. Doubtless the transformation would have taken place without the aid of James Mill and Bentham, but it would not have been so sudden or so complete. From the time the economists and utilitarians united, the practical programme was Ricardo's. By adopting his ideas, Bentham and James Mill really became his disciples. It is therefore proper to attach the name of Ricardo to the measures and doctrines which the united group advocated; but it is a mistake to assume that he reasoned in the bold deductive manner which later became fashionable. The errors and advantages of this deductive reasoning came from Bentham and James Mill. It was their contribution to that new economic philosophy which was destined to revolutionize English thought.

To appreciate the revolutionary character of the economic philosophy of Ricardo and his followers, and to contrast their point of view with the traditional one, we must review the whole intellectual struggle of the eighteenth century. The natural theologians who were the dominant party of that time used sweeping deductive arguments to uphold their position, while their opponents were a group of men whose reasoning was concrete, and who regarded religion and morality from a common-sense view which arose out of the conditions of their immediate environment. In England the scientific point of view was not yet created, and it was not until after the epoch of which I am now writing that its influence on any great question of the day was perceptible. What little there was of science assisted

the natural theologians because the Newtonian reasoning was so deductive. Even the doctrines of Newton were accepted very slowly, and in the middle of the century the popular text-books still rejected them or put them in a form which hid their importance, an instance of which is found in the self-congratulation of Wesley that Newton's system had been overthrown by a popular writer. The situation was changed early in the nineteenth century; for then the same doctrines were not only received, but were eagerly put forward as the models of good reasoning. By that time even economists, political reformers, and other concrete thinkers had absorbed the elements of Newton's position, and as a result transformed their concrete propositions into abstract formulæ. Men began to see a controlling principle for the concrete propositions of social sciences, just as they realized the vital importance of the law of gravitation to the already familiar deductions of natural philosophy. For the first time the natural theologians were met on their own ground with arguments fully as sweeping and deductive. As the older philosophy was theological, so the new was economic and social in its content, although neither party was as yet affected by what we now call science, except in the form of its arguments.

Bentham seems to have been the first to catch the Newtonian idea and to utilize it in his schemes of reform. He did not originate the doctrine of utility so intimately associated with his name. He was the first, however, to apply the doctrine deductively, and to hold rigidly to the consequences flowing from it. Pleasure and pain were given a place in social reasoning, similar to that of gravitation in physical science. In practice, however, Bentham's utilitarianism was negative, for he emphasized the removal of pain more than the acquisition of pleasure. This emphasis was due to his interest in law and in penal institutions. The positive or pleasure side of his scheme he

never developed, because in his long life there was not time enough to carry through the reforms in his chosen field. The only positive doctrine he upheld was that of security, which he placed above equality; it was for this reason that he did not come into practical opposition to the ruling classes of his day. An aristocracy had little to fear from a man who made security the first principle of law. Bentham's long-range deductions would have disturbed no one of themselves, and hence would have had little influence.

As Ricardo's position and power were due to qualities which Bentham lacked, the latter's work was excellently supplemented by that of Ricardo. Ricardo was a practical man, and well equipped as to the facts of the new economic world. He was not naturally a deductive reasoner, and the reputation he has acquired in this regard is due to accident rather than to design. He succeeded in making great generalizations, not so much from what he knew, as from what he did not know. On the one hand he did not feel the force of English natural religion, and on the other hand he was a city man who, until late in life, knew nothing of country conditions. These two facts, which made the economic world seem simple, made bold deductions easy for him. Others saw what he saw; but they were kept from using the knowledge thus acquired deductively, because of their theological prejudices or their bias for an agricultural society. Left to himself Ricardo, like Bentham, would have been an innocent theorist about whom no practical man would have bothered himself. His two great theories would have dealt with money and free trade, and both might have been adopted without any serious change in public opinion. The man who brought the ideas of Bentham and Ricardo down from the clouds, and fashioned from them practical instruments of reform, was James Mill, who, more than any one else, created the new economic philosophy, and made its influence felt. We can,

therefore, justly regard him as its representative, and examine its contents in the form he put them.

The peculiarities that made James Mill influential came from the fact that he was a Calvinist by birth and retained through all his life the characteristics for which men of this type are remarkable. That he discarded religious notions early in life is of little consequence so long as he retained the mode of thought and manifested the mental traits he had inherited. Calvinists are noted for the strict way in which they reason, and for the boldness with which they carry their principles into details. Disliking exceptions and compromises, they readily accept disagreeable conclusions if these seem to be deductions from general principles.

This attitude is a development of the clan life of primitive times. The highest development of clans is reached in isolated mountain regions, where the food supply is limited and the opposition of interests between man and man is greatest. There results an inevitable hatred of all outsiders and an intense attachment to all local resources upon which survival depends. Security is obtained by keeping others away and by destroying as many of their resources as possible. So long as these feelings remain, objects of hatred are as essential as objects of pleasure. Security and happiness seem impossible until the hated thing is destroyed. Primitive instincts prompt such men to gain their ends through the destruction of others. After a higher form of civilization has influenced men of this type, they retain their earlier characteristics of thought. An extension of the concept of the clan makes it include their religious comrades, or in national affairs their nation. In the improved economic environment into which the clan has come, women begin to exercise charity. The man still hates strangers, but his wife feeds them at the back door. Gradually the wife's instincts become dominant and are accepted as a part of religion.

The original Calvinist was a man of this type, restrained by the love of God and by charity towards men. His philosophy was bad, a remnant of times when every man's hand was against his neighbour. As most pains then came from antagonistic men, a philosophy that justified wholesale destruction was the only one that ensured survival. But the evils of this philosophy were neutralized by charity, a love of God, and a respect for His revealed word. The Calvinist was thus always convincing himself by his philosophy that he ought to do dreadful things, but rarely doing them because of the restraints of his religion and his wife. After fully justifying his position on theoretical grounds, he finally gave in to his wife, or found some Scriptural passage that checked his activity.

I explain in this way the mental traits of many men, who have thrown off the faith in which they were reared. When a Calvinist rejects God, the primitive characteristics of the race again come to the front; he has a primitive philosophy without the restraints of Christianity. In the case of James Mill there was more than this, because the economic philosophy that he accepted under the influence of Malthus made him reject charity as well as religion. It was an article of the new creed that charity was a mistake, if not a crime. To aid the people who did not have reserved seats at Nature's feast not only did them no good, but even injured others who had better claims. Men are not responsible for the lack of food that creates suffering, and they injure society if they try to relieve this natural result of overpopulation. The creed of James Mill was thus Calvinism minus God and charity, and when carried to its logical results, revived a mental attitude found only in a pure pain economy. The new economic philosophy pictured the world in the same way that a primitive man pictures the cramped valley where he was born. When men left these limited areas, they thought that they had acquired unending possibilities of

better things. The new world was so different from the old that the opposition of interests between men seemed to have disappeared. But the theory of population, the law of rent, and that of diminishing returns destroyed this pleasing prospect, and forced men to picture the world as if it were no better than a narrow mountain valley with limited resources. The more men increased in numbers, the greater became the opposition of interests and the struggle for food. The primitive philosophy of earlier days was again justified, as the only creed for men whose logical instincts were not restrained by religion or charity.

James Mill was a leader in this movement. His friends, like Bentham, felt that his interests were self-centred, and that his motives to activity were prompted not by what he loved, but by what he disliked. There is no evidence that when he gave up religion he abandoned the modes of thought in which he was educated. He carried out the Calvinistic philosophy without making the exceptions that enlightened Calvinists were accustomed to make. His utilitarianism was thus nominal. His own son admits that he had "scarcely any belief in pleasure," and that "he deemed very few of them [pleasures] worth the price which, at least in the present state of society, must be paid for them." He looked on all attempts to intensify the existing pleasures with "scornful disapprobation." The motives for activity and the sources of his real pleasures lay in his opposition to the classes and the doctrines he hated. Being a radical and a democrat, his opposition was directed primarily against the English aristocracy. He hoped for progress by means of a levelling process which would bring all men into a state of equality.

This early antagonism to aristocracy was increased by his acceptance of the economic doctrines of Ricardo. The aristocracy were at the same time the landlords, and thus received the greater part of the land rents. Ricardo

taught that rent was not a creation of wealth, but a transfer of wealth from capitalists to landlords. Maintaining that profits fall as rents rise, he argued that the growing income of landlords was due to the higher price which the poor pay for bread. Thus was acquired a new reason for hating the aristocracy, who were not only the political masters of England and ruled it for their own advantage, but who also shaped its economic policy for the promotion of their own interests. By adding the thought that the clergy were their natural allies, obtaining incomes from the rent of the land also, the three objects against which the energies of the Radical party were directed became merged in a single class which controlled the Church, the State, and the land. James Mill was thus able to draw up a practical programme which applied the theories of Bentham and Ricardo to a living question; but by destroying the breadth of view which these theories tended to create, he stopped their further development.

The attack on the aristocracy began in the first Reform Bill, and ended in the adoption of Free Trade. The government fell into the hands of the newly formed class of capitalists which was mainly made up of Calvinists who kept the old forms of thought, and the opposition of interests characteristic of clannish life. The creed which James Mill taught and the machinery of hate which he set in motion were thus directed against the labourers, and not as he had intended against the aristocracy. His programme formed a good excuse for increasing profits and extending trade at the expense of those whom industry and trade are supposed to aid. Along with the rise of profits, rents and tithes went up, thereby unifying the interests of the aristocracy, the clergy, and the capitalists. The new economic creed thus destroyed the basis on which the popular party rested, for it left the labourers without grounds upon which to resist the aggressions of their masters. This situation must be grasped in order

to understand the mental attitude with which John Stuart Mill began his work. No wonder he asserted that the great industrial improvement had not aided the labourers, and that he was despondent over the prospects of social progress. The philosophy of hate had to be discarded and a true utilitarianism substituted.

The creed of the economic utilitarians neglected too many elements of human nature, and broke too radically with the history of the race to be enduring. Although the new creed aroused enthusiasm and aided in the reformation of abuses, it did not contain the elements of progress. The needed development was given by the younger Mill whose whole life was a conflict between the motives created by his education and those that harmonized with the natural bent of his character. The latter motives gradually asserted themselves at the expense of the former, and thus there was effected a development in English thought which brought into harmony two tendencies in English character that had been previously antagonistic. Ideas and doctrines become effective only when they are adopted by a certain type of men as a means of advancing their active interests, or of harmonizing these with the interests of other types of men. This transformation of ideas into effective social forces usually takes place long after the period of discovery or formulation, so that such ideas are of more importance to the distant future than to the age in which they become known. Mill's peculiarities lie in the fact that he had the education fitted for men of one psychic type, while he really belonged to another type. His father, who guided his education, was a good example of a manly man who made his way by the force of his will power, and carried out his convictions with remorseless energy. The son, however, was by nature a womanly man in the sense that I have used this term—perhaps the best example of such a man

history has given us. His early life was passed in a world from which women were practically excluded, his companions being manly men. But he soon showed his need of womanly advice and inspiration, and broke with his old friends to get them. This fact would have been of no consequence in a society controlled by manly men, but in England at this time the popular party were largely dominated by womanly ideas.

The Calvinists had been influenced by the ideals for which women stand, and, since Wesley's death, the Methodists exhibited the same tendencies. The latter were as pronounced advocates of home ideals as the Calvinists, and were well known for their opposition to dissipation and vice. The two wings of the popular religion thus tended to come together. The Methodists accepted in the main Calvin's theology, while the Calvinists caught Wesley's spirit, and gave up their opposition to his formulation of the doctrine of free will. There was, therefore, in the tendencies of the two sects a harmony which showed itself in all public questions. They formed the backbone of the new Liberal party, which they forced to accept their standpoint and to champion their ideas. This popular religion, however, was no nearer a utilitarian standpoint than that of the old Calvinism. Its leaders opposed any indulgence in pleasures, and had no concept of a social Utopia to be reached by the gradual development of society. Their philosophy was based on the thought of avoiding pain, and their logic was deductive and dogmatic. Mill had the temperament of this popular party, and with their education would have shared their feelings and prejudices. He represented an element which could be united with the popular party, but many readjustments were necessary on both sides before any harmony was possible.

Mill began life, he tells us, with one object, — to be a reformer. The word "reformer" has always been made

to mean a corrector of abuses, and Mill's statements show that this was the sense in which he understood it. A reformation is a return to some primitive ideal, and not a development or an evolution. The satisfaction of a reformer is in the destruction he causes; and when this destruction is complete, and primitive conditions are restored, or a *tabula rasa* prepared, his work is done. The crisis in Mill's life came when he saw the inadequacy of this programme. To punish enemies, to overthrow bad doctrines, to remove old prejudices, affords but a temporary pleasure to one who has formed a utilitarian ideal of the future of society.

Bentham represented merely the negative side of utilitarianism. Society was to be improved by burdening the evil-doer until he ceased to do wrong. He had no plan for so increasing the pleasure of doing good deeds that they would be freely chosen. Equality was to be secured by reducing the advantage of those whose happiness represented more than one, rather than by increasing the pleasure of those whose well-being represented less than one. The economic philosophy increased these negative aspects of progress by making it depend on the cutting off of the weak and inefficient. The new programme might be summarized by saying that all above the average man were to be removed, because they were oppressors of the less fortunate; while those below the average were to be destroyed, because they were a burden on the more fortunate. Could this programme have been realized, society would have been without any progressive forces. Appreciating this, Mill became dissatisfied with his earlier plans. His education had given him no ideals by which positive pleasures were to be increased; but through the mental depression which followed his disappointment, he gained a concept of positive pleasures. The study of Wordsworth's poetry seems to have given him the first notion of pleasures that do not depend on an

opposition of interests between men. In a love of nature there is no zeal for destruction, nor does one man's pleasure interfere with that of others. There is also in the love of nature no place for that bread philosophy which assumes that particles of happiness are associated with particles of wealth, and that what one man gets is at the loss of some one else. A second influence in this direction came from Sterling, with whom Mill became intimate, and still more important was the influence of the new group of French socialists led by Saint-Simon. Mill had been taught to regard work as painful, and to view all economic effort as disagreeable. He was soon made to see that work itself might become pleasurable, and that a society could exist in which the pleasure of consumption was not counterbalanced by the pain of production.

While it is impossible to determine the exact effect on Mill's thought of these and other influences, the net result is plain. Mill acquired a new ideal of social progress, and adopted a new plan of attaining it. Had the new ideal come to him as suddenly as the old one disappeared, there would have been a mental revolution, and a new start, perhaps, along the lines of the philosophical Utopists. But he was held by his logical training, so that the form of his thought remained suited to a negative utilitarianism long after he had acquired positive ideals of pleasure. So long as the destruction of the bad, the weak, and the inefficient is the end of reasoning, it will be boldly deductive and *a priori*. Social surgery is a crude process, and sharply drawn lines are the best means of effecting it. When men reflect on the process and try to justify it, they accept rigid premises which conform to prevailing prejudices, and adhere boldly to the consequences. Social reasoning starts from deductive premises, and remains deductive as long as negative notions of progress prevail. But when positive ideals are acquired, social reasoning assumes an inductive form. Pleasures are concrete and

are matters of experience; men realize them only through inspection and observation.

Mill felt the force of this fact as soon as his mental crisis had destroyed his confidence in negative utilitarianism. He now lost his interest in those *a priori* discussions of political questions which had been his chief joy; but it was only after a long struggle that he could so recast his logical notions as to justify purely inductive reasoning. He never broke entirely with the methods of his father, but he advanced far enough along the new path to show others its possibilities.

To appreciate the logical problem which confronted Mill, we must recognize the character of the scientific activity of his day. Practically there were but two recognized sciences. All physical science was included under natural philosophy, of which the Newtonian laws were the dominant element, and what people knew of this science was limited to the bold deductions of astronomy and kindred topics. Striking deductions like that concerning the speed of light, or like those upon which a navigator on a long voyage depended, attracted attention and became the standard by which all proof was judged. In moral science the supremacy of political economy was equally marked. The sciences which were not absorbed in political economy or refuted by it were regarded as too hazy and uncertain to deserve attention. The bold deductions of Adam Smith and Ricardo had made *a priori* reasoning as well known in moral topics as Newton's method was in physical science. Deductive reasoning was never more popular than when Mill began his work, and, like every one else, he was under its spell.

Mill's original position is presented in an early essay on the Definition and Method of Political Economy,<sup>1</sup> written

<sup>1</sup> *Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy*. Essay V, On the Definition of Political Economy, and on the Method of Investigation proper to it.

while he was still under the influence of his father, and published before the *Logic* was planned. Like others of his day, he had but two sciences clearly in mind, and he talks of the distinction between political economy and physical science (natural philosophy) as if they were the only sciences in existence. Practically he was right. There were well-defined rules for making nations wealthy and for describing the courses of planets; but other topics of investigation were too little known by the public to exert any influence on logical methods or to have their field defined. Political economy had become moral science, because all social, moral, political, and psychic considerations have an influence on the creation of wealth. There was no part of the old moral science that the phenomena of wealth did not reach. All social facts thus became a part of political economy, and were judged by its standards.

James Mill had defined political economy as the economy of the state in contrast with the domestic economy of the family. A domestic economy included everything relating to private life; so political economy included all that related to public affairs. The son goes even further, and calls it the science relating to the "moral or psychological laws of the production and distribution of wealth," thus bringing not only moral but mental phenomena within the scope of economic investigations. He also says that "it traces the laws of such of the phenomena of society as arise from the combined operation of mankind for the production of wealth." Surely no broader field could be asked than this. It amounts to what we should now call an economic interpretation of society. Economists of course admitted that social affairs might be considered in other lights than those of political economy, but no one treated them so in practice. If rigid economic laws failed to work out all right, economists did not think it necessary to modify their premises. They

admitted the possibility of disturbing causes, and assumed without investigation that some of these had created the discrepancy between the theory and the facts.

Filled with such ideas, Mill spent his time in drawing distinctions between science and art, between the abstract and the concrete, between a *priori* and a *posteriori* methods. The *a priori* method is, he claims, the only method suited to the study of first causes. When these are once determined, the theory of disturbing causes is to be used to discover secondary causes overlooked in the original investigation.

These statements clearly show Mill's mental attitude when he began to write his *Logic*. His scheme was to strengthen social speculations by showing that the method of investigation used in them was that used in physical science. But as all he knew of social speculations was confined to political economy, and his knowledge of physical science did not extend beyond the Newtonian laws, it was practically a scheme to strengthen the position of political economy by showing that its method was the same as that used by Newton, which he supposed was the basis of all physical investigations. Had he carried out his original plan, the *Logic* would have contained little more than a book on definitions, a second on demonstration, and a final book — to which the other two would have been an introduction — on the logic of the moral sciences, with illustrations and methods taken from political economy.

The scope of the original plan can be best determined from the first six chapters of the *Book on the Logic of the Moral Sciences*. Here his ideas have changed but little from what they were in the early days when he was a disciple of his father. The latter part of the book, which is on the different methods of investigation, is of later origin: He seems to have acquired the first thought of several methods of investigation only after

reading Macaulay's review of his father's *Essay on Government*. This thought was not fully developed, however, until he had read Comte's *Philosophy* and had discovered the difference between deductive and inductive sciences through a study of chemistry.

To get at the central thought of this new attempt to put social studies on a scientific basis, we must return to the efforts of Hume in the same field. The chief opposition to social studies came from the popular belief in the freedom of the will; for it seemed impossible to justify reasoning on social topics so long as it was asserted that the wills of men were under no fixed law. Hume had tried to meet this objection in a direct manner by a study of the passions, where he hoped to show that the actions of men followed laws as plainly as other events follow the causes that precede them. But this attempt broke down, and Hume retracted much that he had written about the control of the passions. He never gave up the original thought; his influence and example were on the side of law in social topics, and stimulated his followers to fresh efforts. Mill took up the problem, hoping to do what Hume and others had failed to do. The *Logic* may be readily divided into two parts: the shell or formal part, in which Mill tries to complete the work of Hume, and lay the foundation of a broad social science based on the study of character; and, second, the new theory of induction born of his own studies in the methods by which new truths are discovered. Like other writers of great books, he meant to do one thing, but, following the natural curve of his thought, he accomplished something different from what he expected.

In the shell of the book the discussion centres around the free-will controversy. Mill differs from Hume in that his starting-point is the Hartleian metaphysics as expanded by his father into a theory of the mental pro-

cesses. Hume's studies lay primarily in the field of the passions. He made a fairly good statement of the laws of the association of ideas, but he did not raise them into a science of the rational process, as was done by Hartley and James Mill. Hume thought primarily of the passionate man, while John Stuart Mill had in mind the intellectual man. It was necessary for both to refute the doctrine of free will, and this fact brought the formal part of their work into harmony. In Hume's time the physical sciences were not advanced enough to render much aid to believers in the reign of law. Almost every one was superstitious, and believed that God was still constantly working miracles. Of what use would it have been to give illustrations from physical science to Wesley, who believed that his father's house was haunted? Hume was therefore compelled to contest the validity of miracles, and to prove the reality of law in human affairs by citing examples taken from the actions of men when controlled by passion. Taking advantage of the advance in physical science, John Stuart Mill attempted to prove the presence of law in moral science by the fact that the reign of law in physical science is universal. He further wished to prove that the method of proof used in political economy and in the psychology of his father was the same as that used in physical science. These two points established, the foundation of the moral sciences was laid. Using the *a priori* methods with which he was familiar, he could now construct a science of character upon a sure foundation.

His knowledge of physical science was limited to the Newtonian laws as they were popularly understood. It seemed easy, therefore, to prove that all scientific reasoning was *a priori*, and by accumulating proof of the universality of physical laws to establish the presumption that law was also universal in social science. Like others of his day, he started practically ignorant of what was

being accomplished in scientific circles. There was not then, as now, a united body of scientific investigators. Each man worked by himself, knowing little of the progress of co-workers in his own field, and nothing of the situation in related fields. No one took time to investigate the methods of investigation he was using, and few foresaw the outcome of their own work. Mill, therefore, found that he was in a new field, the material of which was greater than in the old, and different from it. His interest in the methods of discovery became so great that he abandoned his original plan, and devoted several years to the collection of new material that threw light on the methods of inductive sciences.

In this way his *Logic* acquired a content different from what he had intended. He started out to provide an introduction to the moral sciences, but he soon lost sight of this end in his desire to create a theory of induction that would be independent of *a priori* methods of proof. He had meant to complete the work of Hume; he was now animated by the hope of finishing that of Locke. Just as he was completing the latter task, the philosophy of Comte revived his interest in his original problem, and gave him fresh hopes of solving it. In consequence a double purpose runs through his book. The shell, as I have called it, represents the influence of his early education and sympathies as modified by Comte, and the content gives the fruit of his own studies stimulated and turned into new channels by the works of Dr. Whewell.

The valuable part — by this I mean the part that has influenced subsequent thought — lies in the content. Before Mill's time the English public had no conception of science as we now understand the term. Of chemistry and the new physical discoveries but little was known, while biology and geology were still in the realm of fancy, all their facts being open to dispute. Mill collected these facts and investigated the method by which the new in-

ductive laws were discovered. In making this investigation his early illusion, that *a priori* methods alone were scientific, was dispelled. Even the facts of political economy and psychology appeared to him in a new light. The old *a priori* method, renamed the geometrical method, appeared to him as an error into which rigid reasoners were likely to fall. His new method was a compound of induction and deduction. First, there is a purely inductive generalization based on experience; this generalization is then used as a premise for deduction, and finally the conclusions reached through this deduction are verified by fresh inductions.

It is easy to see where Mill found the suggestion of this method of research, although for good reasons he covered up his tracks. He found it in the well-known Ricardian law of rent. Here was a typical example with which Mill had long been familiar — a plain induction, followed by a bold deduction with plenty of verifications. The method of Ricardo was thus raised by Mill into a general law and illustrated by many newly acquired scientific facts. He had begun his scientific studies with the purpose of getting material to justify the method which his father used in the *Essay on Government*, and which he himself expected to use in his studies of character; he ended in an exaltation of economic laws. He hoped to use physical laws to strengthen moral laws; instead, he elevated the position of the inductive laws of physical science by applying to them the forms that had been worked out in economics.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It will be asked, if this is the source of the deductive method, why did not Mill use economic illustrations? In what I have called the shell of the book he still hoped to strengthen the position of the moral sciences by showing that their method was the same as that of the physical sciences. Had he proved his law by economic examples, as well as physical, he could have derived no prestige for its application in the moral sciences. To convince his readers wholly by scientific examples, and then to confront them with the fact that the Ricardian doctrines and his new

I call attention to these facts, because they furnish such an excellent illustration of how the methods, concretely worked out in one science, become modified and generalized as they are applied in other sciences. Mill's two great models of reasoning were Newton and Ricardo. He expected to expand and strengthen the social sciences by accumulating illustrations of the use and the success of the *a priori* method in the physical sciences. Coming to these perfectly fresh, he was surprised to find a mass of new material, based on reasoning which did not conform to the Newtonian model. Carried away by these new discoveries, he soon came to regard them as the best examples of inductive reasoning. He dropped for the time being the thought of strengthening the social sciences, or perhaps it is better to say that by a natural evolution of his thought the larger concept of a general inductive logic displaced his earlier and narrower plan. But the discipline of his economic studies remained, and dominated his thought in its new form. His new theory of reasoning was thus Ricardianism generalized and stripped of its economic associations. The effect of this change was different from what Mill had anticipated. By showing that the supposed method of Newton<sup>1</sup> was not the real method of discovery in physical science, he destroyed in a large measure the

science of ethology used the same method, aroused an enthusiasm for social laws that otherwise was impossible. Mr. Bain, while collecting examples for Mill, asked him why he did not use psychological illustrations. If Mr. Bain had been an economist, he would have wondered still more why Mill did not use economic illustrations. The reason for Mill's refusal is evident in both cases. The body of moral science as he knew it was made up of psychology and political economy. To have proved his general laws by them, would have prevented him from claiming any support from physical science in his endeavours to elevate the standing of the moral sciences.

<sup>1</sup> The reader must remember that we have to do here with the popular notions of the Newtonian method, such as the people were getting from text-books and from men who used it to strengthen their *a priori* method of reasoning on social affairs.

prestige which the reasoning of his father and other Benthamites had enjoyed.

As soon as the difference between the old *a priori* and the new deductive methods of reasoning was seen, the public began to distrust economic reasoning because its advocates so often claimed that it was wholly *a priori*. Even Mill does not seem to have had a clear idea of the change he had wrought. After the publication of the *Logic* he permitted the publication of his early *Essay on the Method of Political Economy*, which upheld the old views in an unmodified form. In the *Logic* he assumed that economic reasoning forms an exception to the general method of the social sciences, and in his projected science of ethology he still expected to employ the psychology and the methods of his father. It is no wonder, therefore, that for forty years after the publication of the *Logic*, *a priori* methods were associated with economics, and that that science had to bear the brunt of the objections to such reasoning.

In the meantime the real method of Ricardo, put in a broader form and illustrated by copious facts from the new inductive sciences, had become the recognized method of physical science. In this way Mill hurt the cause in which he was interested; but this injury was more than compensated for by the way he elevated the tone of the new sciences and changed the popular notion of their worth and their character. I do not see that Mill influenced scientific men either in their methods or their modes of reasoning: they have gone their own way, and have continued to use poorer methods than those he advocated. This has been the natural result of a subsequent course of events which neither Mill nor any one else could have foreseen. It was not science, but men's notions of science, that he altered. A new ideal of proof and reasoning was created, which affected men not in their strictly scientific studies, but in their general opinions. I doubt if we can

yet say what the true method of discovery is. Thinkers and workers seem to reach their results in as blind a fashion as before. Mill's influence is greatest in fields far removed from those in which he naturally expected to be a force. Perhaps his influence is greatest in theology. The old dogmatism received a death-blow as soon as the public accepted the new ideal of proof. There is no other field in whose subsequent development Mill's canons have been followed more carefully or with better results. A man who had no theology influenced all theologians. Such are the results of thought moving in a curve.

While these changes in Mill's notions of the method of science were going on, a disturbing element appeared in the form of Comte's *Philosophy*. Mill's original motive was to gain prestige for social studies by showing that their method and reasoning were the same as those of physical science. But just as he was ready to write the book on the *Logic of the Moral Sciences*, Comte convinced him that the method of the social sciences was not what he had supposed it to be. He was also made to see the difference between social science and political economy. Mill now believed that the general social science—sociology, as Comte called it—was to use the historical or universal deductive method, and its laws were to be determined by empirical observations based on history. From the operation of this method Mill excluded political economy, where the *a priori* method was to be retained. After this change in Mill's opinion the two parts of the *Logic* no longer hung together, and if the analogies derived from the older physical sciences had any truth in them, they counted against the new scheme.

The reader must keep in mind that in Mill's day the body of social science lay in political economy, and economic doctrines gave to social studies all the prestige they enjoyed. When Mill admitted that the economic method was out of harmony with the general method of social

science, he not only damaged this prestige, but he threw grave doubts on the method and the results of the economists. But worst of all were the effects of the emphasis he placed on the new social sciences, — ethology and sociology. Political economy was at least in existence, and embraced many widely accepted doctrines ; the new sciences were yet to be made, and, unfortunately for Mill's reputation as a prophet, are still to be made. After a couple of years of vain endeavour to establish the hoped-for science of ethology, Mill let the matter drop, and no one has since renewed the attempt. Nor has sociology fared much better. Until recently it was made up of a few analogies derived from biology, and even now it is not far enough advanced to obtain general recognition, nor to have its method well defined. In spite of his strong bias in favour of the new sciences, Mill was forced to return to the study of political economy, and subsequent writers have been compelled to follow his example. The analogies from physical science with which Mill hoped to strengthen the reasoning in social science have thus been a snare and a delusion, doing much to discredit social studies. Even before Mill's death the new school of scientists using his method were contending that the social sciences were not definite enough to be regarded as sciences. This scientific school was logical in the contention that if the conformity of economic reasoning to that of physical science was a proof of its validity, the lack of such conformity was evidence of its unscientific character. The fact is that Mill's diversion from the natural trend of his development by Comte so weakened the credit of social studies that they have not yet recovered, nor can they regain their standing until the crude analogies derived from physical science are discarded. The bias of physical studies hinders every one who goes from physical to social science. The method of social science must be determined from its own problems.

If we turn to the other great analogy relied on by Mill to establish the position of the social sciences, his failure is equally apparent. Like Hume, and other early writers, he regarded the doctrine of free will as the great hindrance to the progress of social science. If the reign of law was completely established in physical matters, the belief that it prevailed in social affairs might be included. But the methods of proof which were advocated in the body of the *Logic* would not establish this doctrine. Reasoning from particular to particular may give proof of a general law, but cannot create a universal law; nor can a universal law be established by the concrete deductive method. Therefore Mill was compelled to resort to a method of proof, which he admits to be invalid when used to prove particular propositions.<sup>1</sup> The only proof he offers of universal causation is that of simple enumeration. Perhaps this method will establish the doctrine in physical science, but it cannot be accepted as a universal law, so long as many facts in social science have not been shown to follow particular laws.

Mill wanted this law of universal causation to overcome the objection so often urged that social facts had no law. The method of simple enumeration will not meet this objection, because the facts held to be without a law must be enumerated with other facts, and if this is done the enumeration will give no decisive results. I do not say that the law of universal causation cannot be proved. I mean merely that simple enumeration will not prove it so long as many facts seem to follow no law. Particular laws must be established throughout social science before a simple enumeration can be decisive; and while objection is made to these particular laws, the evidence of the general laws has not weight enough to establish them. The laws in social and moral science must be proved from their own

<sup>1</sup> See Book III, Chap. XXI.

evidence before an analogy from physical science has any weight, and if they are so proved, the analogy is not needed. It is therefore a waste of effort to seek to establish the validity of social laws by physical evidence. These laws must justify themselves or remain open to objection and ridicule. Mill's long-range reasoning has not helped the social sciences a particle. On the contrary, by deceiving investigators through weak analogies, he has frustrated their efforts to advance the social sciences, and has to this extent lessened the confidence that men had in their possibilities. But the fact is that no general law of causation is needed to establish the position of the social sciences. If we confine ourselves to those actual laws that have been discovered, and have an acknowledged validity, they will all be found to come under one head. Men must have pleasure and avoid pain in order to live. To secure pleasure they must have food, and must conform to the conditions of its production. Pain is so largely the effect of production that other causes can be overlooked, and to avoid pain men must coöperate in production in ways that involve division of labour. To say that a man has no freedom because he must seek pleasure and avoid pain, is as loose reasoning as to say that he is not free because he falls when he loses his balance. The need of food limits man's freedom, just as the law of gravitation prevents him from flying. But neither fact proves any universal law of causation. Though the laws of pleasure and pain have been put forward as the basis of moral law, they are not of a moral nature; they are simply the law of social causation. The field of pleasure and pain is the field of the social sciences, or at least of all of which we know anything. Until this field is thoroughly explored, and its limits defined, the larger problem of the human will must remain unsolved. Mere analogies have no weight in unexplored regions.

Mill soon put his theories of the social sciences to the

test, and in his later writings we see how they work. The scheme to create a science of character was abandoned, and no work along the lines suggested by Comte was ever attempted. For Mill, at least, his *Logic* was a failure in so far as it claimed to be a method of discovery fitted for the social sciences. It is interesting, however, to examine his *Political Economy* and see what methods of proof he used in this great work. In it, what I have called the shell of his thought is broken through. The *Logic* had excluded problems involving the human will. Physical causation was made supreme, and a simple enumeration of facts was deemed sufficient to establish the reign of physical forces. If this thought were carried over into social science, as doubtless Mill intended to do in his unwritten *Ethology*, physical laws would also be supreme in that realm. Instead of doing this, he draws a distinction between the laws of production and those of distribution. The laws of production, he tells us,<sup>1</sup> partake of the character of physical truths. There is nothing optional or arbitrary about them. But the distribution of wealth is a matter of human institutions, depending upon the opinions and feelings of men ; so laws of distribution are not "real laws of nature," for they "depend on human will."<sup>2</sup>

Mill endeavours to reconcile this new opinion with his former position by saying that the opinions and feelings of men are not matters of chance, and that they belong to a larger and more difficult subject. But it must be remembered that this more difficult subject—the science of character—Mill had just given up as hopeless ; and until he or some one else shows what are the laws of character, the empirical fact remains that the actions of men are, to use his own words, "optional" and "arbitrary" in matters of distribution, and that human institutions are

<sup>1</sup> See the opening of the first chapter on "Distribution."

<sup>2</sup> See *Autobiography*, p. 246.

outside the realm of physical law. When Mill made a distinction between the theories of production and distribution, he definitely broke with the theory he had advocated in the *Logic*. He would not have made such a distinction unless moved by an influence that had not been felt when the *Logic* was written. It was Mrs. Taylor, subsequently Mrs. Mill, who changed his view of the laws of distribution, inducing him to limit the operation of physical laws to the realm of production. He was fond of emphasizing the fact that the "human element" in his writings came from her, and that his own contributions were limited to the abstract and purely scientific parts.<sup>1</sup> This means that up to the time he came under her influence, he had looked merely on the physical causes of social phenomena: a view which his education created and his early associations tended to strengthen. Another concept of society and of social law appeared for the first time in the *Political Economy*. Inspired by the hope of social improvement, he deserted the plan laid down in the *Logic* and adopted a method of reasoning which did not conform to any of the models he discussed.

This new plan can be seen by contrasting the reasoning on production with that on distribution. In the former he brings out clearly the influence of physical facts and the conditions which they impose on the production of wealth. But even here he is not free from the new influence that is acting upon him. In summing up the influences which physical causes exert on production, he admits that there is an antagonistic principle in the progress of civilization which, if it cannot counteract the dominant physical forces, can at least modify and delay the results they would otherwise produce. The operation of pure physical laws thus not being admitted in production are readily cast aside altogether in distribution,

<sup>1</sup> *Autobiography*, p. 247.

and in their place are substituted some social forces well worthy of study.

Mill's *Political Economy* can be readily divided into two parts. His purpose in writing it was to reproduce and strengthen the body of economic doctrine associated with the name of Ricardo; and also to restate the doctrines of Adam Smith, harmonizing them with the doctrines of Ricardo. The inductive portion of the work is taken mainly from Adam Smith, while the deductive comes from Ricardo. In restating these writers, Mill is simply an editor anxious to put their doctrines in the best light. The views are their views, and the method is their method. To get at his own contributions and method, we must strike out all the portions of his *Political Economy* which reproduce the ideas of Smith and Ricardo. When this is done, Mill's contributions come under such heads as the influence of civilization, communal and private property, socialism, coöperation, inheritance, bequest, peasant proprietors, the unearned increment, the stationary state of society, and the future of the labouring classes.

The method Mill used in explaining these doctrines of his own stands in marked contrast to the methods of Smith and Ricardo. Mill's own doctrine can scarcely be said to be proved if the proof is to be judged by the canons of his *Logic*. So plain is this failure that many writers claiming to be Mill's disciples have left these parts out of their works, thus narrowing the science to the physical laws and the environmental conditions upon which earlier writers based their reasoning. Some have even gone so far as to cut out of Mill's *Political Economy* the parts they dislike, and to fill up the vacant space with reasoning and topics more to their fancy. There has thus arisen a reactionary school that would confine the science to what it was before Mill's day, and a progressive school that would enlarge the new elements and extend the method of presentation to other topics. It is

plain that Mill introduced a new type of reasoning which, whether good or bad, has ever since its introduction become increasingly popular, and on this ground, if on no other, it deserves an examination.

The chapter on "Property" is the best illustration of the new method, because it is so placed as to heighten the effect the method produces. This chapter stands immediately after a long, close argument concerning the theories of production. Only a trained student accustomed to close reasoning can follow that discussion, especially in the last few chapters. The ordinary reader reaches the end of the book on "Production" tired and somewhat confused as to the bearing of what he has read. When he turns to the chapter on "Property," he experiences a sudden feeling of relief. The close reasoning of the earlier chapters disappears, and in its place there comes a clear, vivid statement of new concepts. The new ideas are not so much proved as clearly presented. One sees a new type of society and new social institutions, and is delighted with ideals which he had never thought of before, and an effect is produced that would not have been felt had the reader not been wearied by the dry, abstract chapters that preceded. The abstract study has put him in a mood to appreciate the new ideals. The average person thinks of nothing but the concrete environment which has to be analyzed into its elements before social ideals are created. The reasoning may not have been convincing, but it has given him a new power which, when applied to the new ideals, enables him to appreciate them. So the main result of abstract economic reasoning is to increase the power of analysis which is utilized in forming social ideals. The union of close abstract reasoning with a clear presentation of ideals invests the reasoning with the lucidity of the ideals, and the ideals with the plausibility of the reasoning. The reader imputes to the one what he gets from the other. Convinced by reasoning that he per-

haps does not quite understand, he regards the evidence of the new ideals as convincing, although in reality the ideals have been only clearly presented.

Mill's contributions to political economy are not mere reasoned products, but are the creation of certain social ideals so blended with the older economic reasoning as to become indistinguishable. Political economy, thus raised above the level of a mere study of environmental facts, has become a concrete form of idealism. The forcible books since Mill's time have followed his example, and strengthened the idealistic tendencies he stimulated. Such books unite reasoning and ideals as he did. Their initial chapters are drills in close reasoning, followed by a clear presentation of the ideals the writer wishes to attain. Henry George's *Progress and Poverty*, and Karl Marx's *Capital*, use Mill's plan, and a host of other books are written in the same fashion. The reasoning is not always of the same character, but it serves the same purpose by creating a state of mind in which ideals can be appreciated. Economic reasoning has proved to be the best drill in abstract reasoning that has been devised, and has, therefore, contributed more to the growth of idealism than any other discipline.

There are many justifications on logical grounds for this new form of reasoning. A disposition to believe is formed by creating a pleasurable ideal, and this disposition is strengthened by inductive proofs showing the harmony of the ideal with the actual conditions of society. The first step is an analysis instead of an induction. The second step by which the ideal is formed corresponds to the hypothesis necessary in all deductions. The final step is a verification, as in the deductive method. The form of the thought is not radically different from that which Mill advocated in his *Logic*. But the new argument is more deductive because it assumes that a pleasurable ideal is in harmony with social tendencies, and

hence capable of realization. There is much to be said in favour of this proposition. Pleasure is an index of adjustment to the environment; pain, of a lack of adjustment. If an ideal creates pleasure and a tendency toward its realization, the persons moved by it will be eliminated from society if the ideal is out of harmony with facts, but will be aided if it does accord with them. The power to appreciate and to get pleasure out of an ideal, shows that it agrees with the fundamental psychic tendencies of the individual, and in so far as these are in harmony with the environment his appreciation affords proof that the ideal accords with the ultimate environmental conditions by which his psychic tendencies were created. A perfectly adjusted being must get pleasure out of true relations, and be pained by false ones. In such a being the pleasure of perception is a test of truth. To put this in theological language, that which pleases God is always true, good, and beneficial. Heaven is not a place for argument. A well-known doctrine in natural theology teaches that God wills the happiness of men. The converse of this proposition is that whatever gives permanent happiness to men is the will of God, and hence conforms to the true relations that please God and are maintained by Him.

Both theological and utilitarian arguments tend to confirm the claim that the permanently pleasurable and the perfectly true harmonize. The inductive premise from which Mill's concrete deductive method starts is derived directly from the facts of past experience. The corresponding premise in the new concrete ideal method is derived from human nature; that is, from the psychic qualities which past experience has created. Human nature must correspond to the experience that formed it. In the degree, then, that men are adjusted to the environment, is the power to get pleasure from an ideal a proof of that ideal's correctness. A perfect mental

mechanism would not allow ideas to be held apart that are united in nature, nor those to be united that should be apart.

Whatever may be the value of the concrete ideal method of reasoning in social affairs, there can be no doubt that it was introduced by Mill, and that it has remained the favourite method of social reasoning. We cannot discuss even the present monetary difficulties of the world without raising silver and gold into social ideals, and testing the value of monetary reforms by correspondence between facts and these ideals. Nor is there any doubt that Mill acquired this method under the influence of his wife. His native bent, or at least the bent given him by his education, was for abstract reasoning. Mrs. Mill, on the other hand, had a strong tendency to reason concretely, and possessed a vivid imagination, by which concrete facts were elevated into ideals. "Her mind," Mill tells us, "invested all ideas in a concrete shape, and formed to itself a conception of how they would actually work." This is exactly that method of idealization which I have described. He admits his own weakness in this respect by saying that "those parts of my writings, and especially of the *Political Economy*, which contemplate possibilities in the future as such, when affirmed by the socialists, have in general been fiercely denied by political economists, would, but for her, have been absent, or the suggestions would have been made much more timidly and in a more qualified form."<sup>1</sup>

Mill was right in his estimate of his wife's abilities and of her influence on him. Any opposite judgment is based on the thought that Mill's services were mainly in abstract science. In this field, however, he largely reproduced the ideas of others; and though he did

<sup>1</sup> *Autobiography*, p. 248.

this work well, it does not account for his place in English thought. Most of his abstract reasoning has long since gone to pieces. It is the "human element," which he says came from his wife, and which certainly was absent in his earlier writings, that has made the revolution in thought associated with his name. He ended his *Logic* intent on completing the work of his father and of Comte. The new influence, however, gave him a relish for ideals, and forced him so to modify his reasoning as to give them a place. The concreteness of woman's thought was thus united with the abstractness natural to men, and a new method of reasoning created which united both methods. Not only in the *Political Economy*, but also in his works on *Liberty*, *Representative Government*, and *The Subjection of Women*, his power lay in the ideals he created and in their harmony with experience. Only after her death did he fall back into his natural or earlier state of mind and write *The Examination of the Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton*.

This concrete ideal method of reasoning in social science is the same in essence as that which Calvinists were using in religion, and was due to the same causes. Calvinistic arguments are valuable, not for their conclusions, which are often bad, but for the abstractions, which admit of idealization. The bold, clear ideals of God and His "plan" could not be formed or appreciated by persons who thought only of their concrete surroundings. The abstractions of theology thus pave the way for religious ideals. Woman's influence has made these ideals concrete and given the tone to Calvinistic doctrines. Manly men never like Calvinism. It is the creed of women and those they influence. Mrs. Mill was fortunate in being the first womanly woman who turned her attention to social science. In doing so she created in it just those changes that Scotch theology has gone

through, and gave to social science the tone and concreteness that Calvinism has given to religion. Social science was thus taken out of the group of abstract and environmental sciences in which Mill hoped to place it, and put into the group with theology, English ideals of liberty, and Rousseau's political principles. A method that seemed barren of results when tried in isolated cases, proved to be the only method of increasing social knowledge and of testing the validity of social reforms.

Thus far this chapter has been devoted to the upward curve of thought from the new economic basis. I shall now turn to the downward curve from theory and philosophy to fact. Where shall we find a philosopher strongly moved by the inherited instincts of the race, who seeks in the new material of the age an outward expression of the ideas that inspire him? Naturally we should expect to find such a man among the philosophical Utopists of whom mention has been made; but they were too reactionary and too much opposed to the drift of events to make the inductive studies needed to discover how the things they revered were embodied in the tendencies of the time. The development of the downward curve of thought was thus delayed until it was too late for it to exert an influence on the upward curve of thought. Therefore, the two movements were isolated and apparently hostile. The conciliation that came later does not belong to the period under discussion.

Although the name of Darwin is associated with this downward curve, on the face of things Darwinism seems to be an upward movement. In the importance of his work Darwin occupies a position similar to Adam Smith, who was at once the last of the moralists and the first of the economists. Smith's theories are transformed moral doctrines, while his inductive facts are the beginning of a new type of studies. He thus ends one period and be-

gins another. In the same way Darwin is the last of the economists and the first of a new school of biologists. He is deductive as an economist, and inductive as a biologist. Like Smith, he completes one period of thought and opens another.

To show that Darwin was an economist, we must divide his doctrine into two parts as found in his first essay.<sup>1</sup> The economy of food and its effects on organisms are strictly economic phenomena, and the doctrines deduced from them are legitimately a part of economic theory. Every animal has its economy in so far as its existence depends upon its food, and these economies, when generalized, become the elements out of which economic theory is created. The mutability of species, however, and the conception of common ancestors are biologic and inductive. The modification of species might be predicted from the limitations of the food supply or changes in the food, but such conditions could not show that two independent species were originally one. Darwin found deductively that peculiarities in the food supply caused variations; but to complete his theory he was compelled inductively to show how present facts and the history of creation indicated that the various species had common ancestors. The first part of his work was easily done, but the second demanded years of investigation and a multitude of facts. When the result was published, it excited great opposition and compelled the biologists to work for years to establish its truth. Naturally, therefore, this biological part of the investigation grew in importance at

<sup>1</sup> In Darwin's original sketch, written in 1844, the first part treats of "variation of organic beings under domestication and in their natural state"; in the second part he treats of "the evidence favourable and opposed to the view that species are naturally formed races descended from common stocks." Though these two parts are blended in his *Origin of Species*, the separation in the earlier sketch shows that they once stood apart in his mind, depending on different facts and conditions. (See *Life of Darwin*, Vol. II, p. 12.)

the expense of the economic. There is thus given to Darwinism a seemingly inductive character that it does not really possess.

To bring this out clearly, I shall restate the first part of Darwin's argument, connecting it with the economic theories to which it belongs. It is based upon four distinct propositions :

- 1st. The limitations of the food supply.
- 2d. The rapid increase of each species.
- 3d. The variability of descendants.
- 4th. Evolution through the pressure of numbers.

The first two propositions come directly from Malthus, and show the close connection of Darwinism with the problems Malthus raised. The third was also a well-established economic principle, for proof of which Darwin depended on the economic literature arising from the attempts to improve cultivated domestic plants and breeds of stock. Agricultural experiments of the preceding century furnished Darwin with the necessary proof of this important principle. Experiment had also shown that the steady development of breeds was possible, but this fact had not been properly used in the discussion of human progress. Economists and other students of social affairs had been blinded by their belief in Hartleian psychology, and misled by their study of ancient history. The doctrine that all knowledge is due to an association of ideas caused them to assume that the development of each individual came from his sense impressions, and was not dependent on past conditions or heredity. The decay of nations in ancient history seemed to sanction the belief that men were degenerated by civilization, and this belief made students blind to the steady progress of modern nations. A belief in progress and improvement was, however, common among the natural theologians, and was the main cause of their opposition to the Malthusian theory.

At least one of these natural theologians saw the bearing of the principle of population on progress, and called it the main pillar of civilization.<sup>1</sup> He saw that the struggle for food was the cause of the upward tendencies in mankind. "The order of things," he says, "in which the human race arrives at the highest degree of improvement, and has the widest scope for moral and intellectual perfection, is inevitably, and with some trifling exceptions, universally established by the operation of a single principle and the instinctive force of a single natural desire."<sup>2</sup> "The operation of this principle (of population), filling the world with competitors for support, enforces labour and encourages industry by the advantages it gives to the industrious at the expense of the indolent and extravagant."<sup>3</sup>

When Darwin began his work, the deductive arguments based on the limitations of the food supply were familiar, and inductive evidence was at hand to support them. The need of the time was not for new arguments or more proof, but for a bold generalization which would comprehend all the concrete propositions and extend their application to new fields. Where others failed, Darwin succeeded, not because he was a better observer, but because he was free from presuppositions which would narrow the scope of his theorizing. Not being of the schooled economists, he could use their facts and arguments without the limitations created by economic traditions. There is a mythical Darwin as well as a mythical Ricardo. Ricardo was naturally inductive, a good observer, and familiar with the economic facts of his day; but aided partly by circumstances, and partly by the

<sup>1</sup> Summer's *Records of Creation*, 1816. In a supplement to his fifth edition Malthus called attention to this work, and accepted the theory of progress it outlines.

<sup>2</sup> Vol. II, p. 27.

<sup>3</sup> Vol. II, p. 172.

mental traits of his followers, his inductions were quickly changed into bold deductions. The inductions on which these theories were based being soon lost sight of, Ricardo was set up as a model deductive reasoner. In the case of Darwin the opposite happened. His deductions based on the work of the economists came first, but years of inductive work was needed to establish the doctrine of common ancestors. Inductive thinkers naturally rallied to his aid. The new inductive facts were so extensive, and so absorbed the attention of biologists, that the earlier deductions of Darwin were neglected, and he is thought of mainly for his inductive work. I am not criticising the view of the master that the disciples in either of these cases have taken. There is much to justify their position; but their example shows how easy it is for the work of a great thinker to be misunderstood, even by those who should best understand it.

In the case of Darwin this wrong interpretation is partly justified by the effects of the long delay that took place between the perception of the new truth and its presentation to the public. It is much harder to trace the order and connection of a writer's ideas if he waits twenty years before publishing them. Had Malthus thought over his doctrine for a like period before giving it to the public, probably we should never have known what causes excited his thinking. The later editions of his *Principles of Population* became increasingly inductive, and showed less connection with the Utopian ideals that stimulated his first thought. If Darwin had written out his theory in the first flush of its perception, it would probably have been as deductive as the first edition of Malthus. That Darwin was a bold theorizer is shown by the fact that he thought out his theory of the origin of coral reefs before he saw one, and his early love of Paley's books reveals the same characteristic. His son also says, "It was as though he were charged with theo-

rizing power, ready to flow into any channel on the slightest disturbance, so that no fact, however small, could avoid realizing a stream of theory, and thus the fact became magnified into importance.”<sup>1</sup> It is facts like these that show that he was a philosopher making a downward curve in national thought, and not an observer on an upward curve. He was an economist, because his instincts were strongly racial, and in his time economic ideals and methods dominated English thought. Even his travels did not modify his thoroughly national spirit. His foreign facts were the outcome of his own experience, and not clippings from the reports of other travellers. He enlarged English experience without breaking from the insular habits of thought peculiar to Englishmen. In this he differs from the later generation of biologists, who became cosmopolitan in their point of view and in their sympathies. He could see a foreign fact as if it were a part of English experience. They judged English facts on the basis of their foreign experience, thus making the far off the interpreter of the near at hand.

The change which the biologic habits of thought have introduced can be made plain by contrasting these habits of thought with those of the economists. Economic theorists, viewing foreign events by home standards, looked on foreigners as if they were Englishmen, and expected the introduction of English institutions, ideas, and methods to cure foreign evils. It never occurred to them that what had been successful in England might fail elsewhere. The opposite defect shows itself in the reasoning of Darwin's successors. The doctrine of common ancestors turned their attention to foreign facts and to primitive conditions. The habit was acquired of judging the present and the English by distant facts and ancient records. The natural result of the acceptance of the doctrine of

<sup>1</sup> *Life*, Vol. I, p. 179.

evolution and the emphasis of common origins was the underestimation and neglect of English facts and experience. The economists looked on foreigners as Englishmen, because they knew little of the former and much of the latter; so the biologists were inclined to think of men as animals, because they studied animals more than men. In thinking of apes as the ancestors of man, the biologists were prone to overlook the ways in which the descendants differ from their supposed ancestors. The bias of the economists came from an overestimation of the near at hand; that of the biologists came from a like overestimation of the far' off. Both schools have thus fallen into errors which the future must rectify.

While these changes were foreignizing science, an opposite movement was nationalizing literature and art. The causes that were making English poetry insular, patriotic, and national had been long in operation, but they were hampered by the undue emphasis which English education gave to foreign civilizations. Nations whose development is slow and regular have immense advantages in the refinements of civilization over nations like England that pass suddenly from barbarism to social security and prosperity. It was natural and necessary that refinements like literature and art should be imported from countries in advance of England. It is difficult at best to import manners and modes of thought; but when they are opposed to the trend of internal progress, a strong opposition is met from native purists. Unfortunately, the ideals of literature were not in harmony with native English tendencies. The result was that Classicism never took root in England except among those who were under foreign influences or were sensually inclined. Classicism was the interest of a class whose members separated themselves from the tendencies of the popular national movements.

The opposition of the Puritans to art and literature was

a necessary consequence of their tenacious adherence to English ways and ideals. Had the art and literature of that day been the outgrowth of home conditions, a long and fruitless struggle might have been avoided. The Puritans were right in their distrust of the particular forms of art then received, although wrong in assuming that these forms were all that were possible to art. Home instincts revolt against the sensual communal pleasures, and a steady, economic life is opposed to that which we now call Bohemian. A people whose existence and prosperity depend upon the ceaseless activity of its men and women, cannot accept the social ideals of nations whose main end is rest and quiet.

The ideals of the classicists were imported from hot countries where activity is disagreeable ; the labour is done by slaves or by those who do not participate in the benefits of progress. The ideas were also those of nations with a clear climate where an inactive life was agreeable. Very little clothing and shelter were needed, and the bounties of nature made the food problem of relatively small importance. Rest, peace, and the placid enjoyment of objective conditions were naturally the chief end of existence. Where bodily activity is restricted, sensual activity becomes dominant and is closely associated with every form of pleasure. Women are not thought of as companions in work and life, but as sources of sensual gratification. The conditions in England would not admit of the realization of such ideals. The climate was harsh, damp, and chilly, the soil was unproductive, the winters long and dreary, and there were no slaves. Only an energetic people, willing to work and ready to endure hardships, could thrive under these disadvantages. The women could not be mere pretty pictures or useless play-things ; they must possess even more energy and forethought than the men. So the classical school could not find native encouragement for the ideals they admired,

and were forced to seek the realization of their hopes not in England, but in sunny Italy and other distant lands more favoured by nature. This fact made them travellers, and when they returned they were foreign-hearted and cosmopolitan. There was thus an ever-widening breach between them and the home purists, who measured everything by local standards. The more the purists dominated at home, the more marked became the foreignisms of the classical school.

In time, however, a new movement in art and literature arose in sympathy with native instincts, and brought to its support the classes that had previously opposed art because of its supposed sensual and ritual tendencies. This art grew out of new relations to nature created by economic progress. The older concept of nature may be said to be chaos relieved by a few exceptions. Milton, for example, represents the universe as a disagreeable waste out of which God had rescued a few spots like heaven and earth. This concept originated in a desert country, where dreary sands separated the few fertile spots. It was easy to domesticate these ideals in England, when the few spots under cultivation were separated from each other by many dangers and difficulties. In early times the horrors of the country terrified every one: the roads were bad, robbers abounded, and even the danger of starvation was not absent. Nor was it possible to enjoy nature in quiet while dangerous animals were still at large. Wolves were a great pest in western Europe, and made any form of outdoor life, except hunting, practically impossible. Furthermore, outdoor life was disagreeable in cold countries for the greater part of the year, owing to the lack of proper clothing and shelter. People dreaded the winter and the mountains because both were associated with cold and hunger. The blazing indoor fire gave the only protection from these evils and created the only ideals harmonizing with winter

conditions. Woollen clothing and better houses at length remedied the evils of winter. People learned to enjoy rather than dread the open air and the fresh breezes. Close houses and confining work also brought on lung diseases, which made a life in the open air not only enjoyable, but necessary. Economic changes thus forced the English people into a new relation to the world about them, and by giving peace and security to outdoor life, rendered this life in the open air a pleasant relief from the routine and confinement of their daily life. But the climate is not warm and dry enough to allow the inactive enjoyment characteristic of southern regions. To counteract its dampness and chilliness, sports, mountain climbing, and other forms of intense exertion, in harmony with that large expenditure of energy which is normal to an Englishman, became popular.

In the South a love of nature takes the form of receptive impressions and rest, while in England it excites activity and creates a desire for obstacles to overcome. The sentiments of an Englishman were thus brought into harmony with the activity created by his environmental conditions. He did not need to go out of his own country for the stimulus and pleasure that his nature craved. When a man and his environment harmonize, foreign ideals may be displaced by a native art.

A new motive for the development of taste was aroused by the inventions that stimulated choice in the ordinary details of life. Calico printing gave to each maiden the power to choose appropriate colours for her clothing, and thus furnished object-lessons by which every one profited. The art of dressmaking is promoted by cheap materials. When a suit of clothes lasted for years, and only coarse home weaving and dyeing were known, practically no variety was possible, and no development of taste could result. The clothing, ornaments, and houses were the outcome of dominant local conditions, from which no one

could break away. Choice became effective when mechanical contrivances made goods from the general market cheaper and superior to the local products. Doubtless mechanical art is a low order of art, but it may become an æsthetic force by exciting choice and breaking through the monotony of local conditions. The chromo, the photograph, bric-à-brac, and cheap textiles have excited feelings that would otherwise have remained dormant.

Dependent on economic changes, English art developed in the direction that these changes permitted. Cheap travelling, good roads, warm clothing, and well-built houses furnished the conditions necessary for outdoor life and for an admiration of the English type of nature. The industrial improvement acted in a like manner on the cultivation of choice. English art has thus become associated with activity and choice. Imported southern ideals of rest and the receptive impressions that develop ideas of form and colour have not made a corresponding progress. In spite of the strong foreignizing tendencies at work in England, an Englishman's notions of æsthetic ideals are vague except where they have been excited by his local environment. He loves activity, and delights to exercise the power of choice and to observe the choices of other people. But here his interest ends, and prejudices begin that shape his notions in other fields.

This new attitude was reflected in the English poetry of the early part of this century. The classical notions of rest and repose gave place to ideals of activity. Nature, ceasing to be a dreary chaos, became an animated personality, an object of love, and an incentive to activity. The ballad literature also excited activity and revived the fading national spirit. Men were no longer ashamed of enthusiasm. Their desire for activity caused them to break through the restraints set by foreign ideals and models. They became domestic, loved the beauties of their own region, cherished its history, and were proud of its peculiarities.

These changes quickly affected religious thought. God became identified with nature conceived as the whole external world. He was no longer thought of as a mere creator of oases like heaven and earth. A mountain or a sunset aroused thoughts of him as well as a compass, a garden, or other marks of intelligence and civilization. Evil spirits no longer had a chaos in which to reign, but vanished when every part of the universe began to manifest equally the glory of God. Everything that excited activity had now an equal claim for admiration and respect. The pleasing activity of the ballads soon affected the tone of the hymns. Instead of expressing a desire to be with God and at rest, a new ideal appeared. Christians were represented as having the same energy, activity, and personal force that the characters in the ballads had, but the Christians used these qualities to advance their religion and not for personal ends. The deeds of the early ballad heroes were not such as could be made models, but their activity and earnestness stimulated desires that could find vent under the then existing conditions only in Christian work. The poets thus exercised an influence that under other circumstances could not have been expected. Naturally, a recitation of primitive deeds, and a laudation of violent measures would tend to cause a reversion to primitive ways. They created an ideal of activity and energy, however, that every one applied to those concrete modern problems in which he was interested.

The later poets strengthened this tendency by creating a concept of innocent pleasures connected with an active life. The Puritan reaction aroused an opposition to active pleasures by associating dissipation with them. Home pleasures were those of rest and repose. Activity meant work, six days of which demanded a complete rest on the seventh. The poets modified this concept of life by idealizing many of the pleasures to which religious opposition was most intense. People who would never have allowed

their daughters to dance about a Maypole, were made to feel that some recreation was needed to vary the rigour of every-day life, and were also made to appreciate the feelings of those who craved some such pleasure as dancing. The poets did not succeed in reviving past conditions or in embodying their ideals in concrete forms; but they destroyed the notions that non-economic activity was a waste of energy, and that communal pleasures were sensual and sinful. By this time most of the early amusements were matters merely of tradition. They had been thoroughly rooted out by the strong opposition of the Puritans and their successors. It was possible therefore to idealize them, and to associate them with other activities and sentiments than those that originally accompanied them. Beneath each picture given to us by recent poetry there is some ideal of activity or of choice that harmonizes with the new sentiments dominant in the race. Poetry as well as economic theory and religious philosophy has helped the race to become abstract in thought and to form ideals. Poetry emphasizes the utilitarian element more than the others do, and thus makes it more easy to see what the process is by which ideals are formed. The poets have been the chief agents in rectifying the errors about pleasures into which the economic utilitarians fell. Bentham assumed that happiness was connected with material objects, and that there was a unit of pleasure for each unit of wealth, thus making it easy to sum up pleasures. It was the influence of poetry that made Mill reject this unnatural simplicity and recognize differences in intensity of pleasures, and by this recognition he destroyed the possibility of estimating pleasures on any arithmetical basis.

Intense pleasures cannot be broken up into parts of equal value. A pure pleasure can only be environed, that is, it can be made concrete only by picturing it in connection with objects and activities that make it enjoyable. In this process there is an abstraction, because

all elements of pain are shut out ; in reality sources of pleasure are rarely so blended as to heighten their mutual effects. Each pleasure, which is thus intensified by its concrete environment of associated pleasures, becomes a motive for activity, and has a social value in proportion to its intensity. Poets avoid argumentation, but they use the same mental processes and attain the same results as successful workers in social science.

The Oxford Movement is a further development of the ideals and the methods that inspired the poets. On the face of things the representatives of this movement seem dogmatic and dialectical, and therefore far away from the utilitarian tendencies of the poets. But arguments and conclusions that are prompted by social feelings are of value for the power of abstract thinking they promote, and this in turn is valuable for the materials it gives for the formation of new ideals. We are therefore little concerned with the doctrines they defended or with the cogency of their reasoning. All these may be accepted or rejected, as the reader prefers. The ideals, however, have endured, exerting considerable influence on the progress of religious thought.

The leaders of the Movement, filled with the belief that the foundations of the Church were shaken, and its aims and ideals lost sight of, turned from the existing Church to the Church of the past for a basis upon which to rest their doctrines. The activities and forms of the early Church were idealized in the same way as the rough local manners of the early times were idealized by the writers of the border ballads. The Protestants, to justify their secession from the Catholic Church, emphasized the errors and misdeeds of the earlier Church. For those who believed that for fifteen centuries the Church had been mainly in the wrong, and that during the last three centuries the vast majority of Christians had still con-

tinued to follow evil guides, there could be no concept of a holy Catholic Church guided by divine wisdom.

Painful events may be pictured concretely; evil men may be thought of as princes and rulers; bad institutions may be graphically described and held up as awful examples, but they cannot be idealized. When the concreteness of these things is lost by making them over into abstractions, their power and vividness is gone. Pains lose their terrors when their causes no longer affect the senses. But a pleasant thought can be environed by abstract concepts of an agreeable nature and raised to an ideal. It was natural that when English Protestantism felt itself no longer in danger from Catholic aggression, the evils due to it should gradually be lost sight of. When the need of emphasizing its evils was no longer felt, the beneficent elements of the early Church became prominent, and were even made a basis for further progress.

The leaders of the Oxford Movement doubtless thought that the actual Church of the fathers corresponded to their conception of it. They were too abstract as thinkers, however, to treat an old institution in a truly historical spirit. Making abstractions here and there, clipping a bit from this or that writer, and selecting pleasing usages, forms and customs, they united all these concepts and ceremonies into a harmonious whole, which became to them the ideal Church. Their reasoning illustrates the concrete ideal method used by all social reformers. The verification in their case was the discovery that the Church of Rome was the embodiment of their ideal. Here, again, we see the effects of the process of social idealization. Had they started out with a study of the actual Church of Rome, they would doubtless have seen its bad and not its good side. But having idealized the early Church by rejecting all discordant and disagreeable elements in it, they were in a favourable state of mind to do the same for the actual

Catholic Church. The one drill in abstract thought aided the other. Newman and others never seem to have examined the actual working of the Catholic Church or the evils it often caused. They passed from the ideal of a past church to the even nobler ideal of a united future church, and assumed that the Church of Rome would be the one as it was the other. Whatever our judgment on this identification of the Catholic Church with the Church of the future, it is evident that this latter concept was made a part of English thought by Newman and similar writers. Protestantism appeared too absorbed in the concreteness of its sects to rise without external aid to the lofty ideal of a united church.

The real source of the subsequent success of the High Church party lay in that English love of choice and activity to which the poets also appealed. The usual Protestant service is too quiet and too passive to accord with English nature. The long sermons had an interest so long as they were historical, and kept fresh in memory the evil deeds of the Catholics. A great emphasis upon prayer is necessary in evil days when disasters, disorders, and privations are of frequent occurrence. Prayer is the attitude taken by religious enthusiasts when the hopelessness of human effort becomes apparent. The older attitude toward God was one of praise, and men are inclined to adopt it in time of prosperity, pleasure, and optimism. Prayer may be said to be a motor collapse; praise a motor outburst. The one comes naturally in states of exhaustion and depression; the other is a natural outlet of surplus energy.

It is not possible for men in normal conditions to remain long in that attitude of depression which excites prayer. Nor can such conditions frequently return except in an unfavourable environment. The normal service of a well-fed, active people must be one of praise. Surplus energy is natural in prosperity, and an outlet for it is a human need. Calvinism, which arose in a period of depression,

danger, and trouble, laid strong emphasis upon prayer, and this tendency was kept alive and strengthened by the great evangelical revival. The spirit of prayer became imbedded in the very heart of religion, and could not be thrust out. Protestantism could not readily rise out of the concrete conditions that gave it birth. But when the religious and political troubles that disturbed England ceased, a service of praise was bound to appear, and the Oxford Movement was the agent through which it came. Its leaders did not succeed in carrying the Church of England over to Rome; but they created an ideal of a united church, and gave an impetus to services of praise that has influenced all religious denominations. They thus became one of the forces that were impressing utilitarian standards on English thought.

While this struggle was going on in the Church of England, by which the Church was idealized and its service reorganized on a utilitarian basis, a corresponding change was elevating the ideals of the Calvinists and the Methodists. The old or Catholic concept of the Christ was that of a propitiation for sin. He was thought of as an innocent sacrifice enduring intense suffering for the sins of others. This concept is best visualized as the Christ on the cross. The crown of thorns, the piercing wounds, and the flowing blood represent in a concrete form the agony He suffered as a martyr. The effect of this terrible picture is individual. We think of Jesus as a substitute enduring the punishments that justly belong to us as individuals. The suffering Christ is in too great agony to think of others. We cannot imagine so much pain without a concentration of thought, for the time at least, on the physical self that bears it. The Catholic Christ represents a moment of agony too intense to be enduring. Christ on the cross cannot be idealized; it must always remain a concrete picture.

The Methodists brought to the front a new concept of the Christ, which has been raised into a social ideal. The great revivalists thought of the Jesus, not as on the cross absorbed in His own suffering, but as engaged in missionary work. He is, they taught, ever present, and ready to aid the sinner, always following him up and pleading for the cause of righteousness. This Christ is a brother of men and is active in their interest. The Methodist picture is thus not an instantaneous photograph of the Saviour at a single moment, but an idealization of the form of activity all men should take toward their race. So Jesus becomes an example and a model for imitation, representing the qualities in men that bind them together and elevate them into a higher social unity.

The qualities and activities associated with the Christ are those of a mother who has a tempted son to protect. We associate power with God, but not with Jesus. He is like a mother, a pleader for the right, but not a judge. He is assumed to have a mother's willingness to forgive, and the long-suffering patience that mothers show in cases that seem hopeless to others. The Catholics keep the Christ as a concrete picture, their idealization of woman being associated with the Virgin Mary. In the Methodist concept of Christ womanly qualities are also idealized, but they are so elevated and refined that they have lost their mere womanly associations. In Methodism the goal of man's development is to acquire qualities now seen plainly only in women. It might also be said that the Catholic Virgin represents the young mother, and hence manifests the careless, thoughtless attitude of youth. Methodism has idealized the mature mother whose interests are centred in a tempted son. Thus stripped of all worldly associations, the ideal of woman can be united with the highest of beings.

This ideal is plainly the result of the influence of the womanly man on religion. The "mother's boys," who

make her word their law, and who try to ingraft on themselves the qualities she possesses, readily remodel religious concepts to reflect all that is admirable in actual life. To such men the good is not a powerful but a persuasive force; and they create their concept of the divine personality by attributing to it the qualities they most admire in the best of human beings. In their minds, love of mother and respect for her wishes are the only road to the highest ideal of Christ.

While the womanly man was changing the racial ideal of Christ, the womanly woman was modifying our concept of God. In the English home the position of the father and mother has gradually changed. The father, ceasing to be the defender and ruler of the family, has become the source of its economic support. Mothers thus relieved from arduous outdoor work concentrate their attention on the home and its management. Money getting is the father's first duty; money spending is that of the mother. Women have thus practically usurped the control of affairs which formerly belonged to men. A father under these circumstances becomes the source of bounties, and not the source of power. Children think of him not as their ruler, but as the giver of good things. When this thought is generalized and applied in religion, God as the Father of all becomes the source of blessings. We no longer think of Him as an engine of vengeance to be used in crushing enemies. We call on the State for that. Nor do we think of Him as a God of wrath ready to destroy us for our misdeeds, but He becomes a generous Father, providing for the wants of His children. As soon as the duties of the earthly father are so differentiated that he becomes the cause of an economic surplus, a new meaning is attached to the thought of a heavenly Father. The God of olden times was thought of as a just God who gave men exactly what they deserved, no more and no

less. No one now expects God to be just in this sense. We expect from Him the same surplus that earthly fathers freely give. In this way our new social relations have led to the revival of an old concept of the Deity which prevailed before the conflict of races turned Him into a God of hate and vengeance. Clannish notions of God are due to the fierce opposition of interests created by overpopulation in congested districts. In still earlier times, when there was room for all, God was thought of as a source of bounties and as a guide who brought His followers into contact with the best of regions and goods. This shepherd God is revealed in many of the oldest parts of the Scriptures, and especially in the Psalms. When the Psalmist said, "The Lord is my shepherd," he had the same thought that modern economic conditions have revived. The influence and dominance of the womanly woman in our homes made God again visual and personal by giving a new meaning to the word "father" and raising it into a race ideal.

The old religious philosophy tried to determine the nature and qualities of God, and to make from them bold deductions concerning the affairs of men. Religious leaders now try to perform a more modest task; they seek to establish not the real nature of God,—this is beyond our present powers,—but such concepts of Him as beings of our mental capacity can appreciate. An ideal of God is less than the reality, because it is a concrete visualization of some phase of His character. But several such views blended into one give to men a nobler idea of Him than any attempted analysis of his whole nature. Each type of men idealize the particular qualities appealing to them, and the joint result becomes the race ideal.

Three distinct types of character have contributed to the race ideal of God. The manly man thinks of Him

as animated nature; the womanly man pictures Him as Christ; while the womanly woman visualizes Him as the source of bounties and blessings. Each of these ideals harmonizes with some element in the experience of the race, and together they stimulate the motor tendencies manifested in religious life.

Recent religious literature shows that the perception of these ideals is modifying the arguments of theologians, and making them conform to the concrete ideal method of reasoning which social thinkers have used so effectively. Arguments about the possibility of miracles and of an incarnation no longer receive the attention formerly paid to them. The recent lives of Jesus make Him vivid and real by showing that He did what a divine person would be expected to do. They thus form a verification for those who already have an ideal of Him and a hope that He was a real person. Men with social instincts and habits of thought are more influenced by this method of presentation than they would be by metaphysical arguments. Race ideals are kept alive, not by reasoning, but by the motor power created by their perception. So long as these ideals have a social value and a possible verification in the history of the race, they will be perpetuated, even if their metaphysical basis is insecure.

## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUDING REMARKS

IT is not my intention to discuss current problems. I doubt if any of the attempts to philosophize about our present conditions will yield results of permanent value. We seem to be in the initial stages of a forward movement, but we have not passed through the many reversions which new epochs occasion. We have not yet had a Hobbes or a Malthus to begin the epoch, to say nothing of the subsequent upward and downward curves of thought. But there are certain results of preceding epochs that will assist us in forming a judgment of the probable future movement of thought. We have also certain hints as to the economic conditions that will dominate the immediate future and create the economic pressure out of which the movement of thought will proceed.

In the three epochs I have described the great cause of development has lain in the opposition between home and communal interests and pleasures; and the great result has been the reconciliation of economics and religion. The stock ideals of the race, those energized by well-tried motor reactions were religious; while the new ones that were being made by the pressure of existing conditions were economic, of that type which we now call utilitarian. Men in whom the old religious instincts were strong were suspicious of pleasures, and sought to develop a conscious morality based on past conditions. The economic utilitarians, however, distrusted religious motives and sought to substitute motives related to present activities. The old and the new instincts of the race were thus

brought into a conflict, which resulted in the downward and upward curves of thought. But this opposition has gradually disappeared because of the changed position forced upon the two parties. The leading economic instincts have now become as thoroughly racial as are those of religion. The instincts and doctrines of industrialism have been ground into the race by the force of circumstances as powerful as were those that created the religious feelings and ideas. With a large part of the race the industrial motives are now as spontaneous and forceful as any of the older stock reactions that find an outlet in religious activity.

On the other hand religious concepts have become utilitarian. A long and bitter struggle was necessary before religious ideals acquired a utilitarian concreteness, but this has at last been so thoroughly done that no reversion to the religion of a pain economy is possible. The change from an extensive to an intensive religion has hastened the reconciliation of economics and religion, for it put religion upon an inductive basis and made its rules and policy harmonize with the conditions of the present environment. Religious leaders, no longer deracialized by education, are dissatisfied with foreign platitudes and commonplaces. Their maxims and rules are of home growth, and the evils they emphasize are those of present society. The struggle for the supremacy of the home has made them as economic and concrete as the utilitarians whom they once so heartily denounced. There are not to-day two programmes of reform, the one economic and the other religious; the groups of instincts that excite religious and economic activity are the same. The classes that lead in the economic world are at the same time the classes earnest in religion. So true is this that many complain that the Church is dominated by the capitalists, and has sunk to be their tool. Be this as it may, the fact remains that the opposition between the two groups of instincts has

disappeared. Religion has gradually divorced itself from asceticism, and utilitarianism from sensualism, until the two occupy the same field and have the same rules of conduct. The religious and the economic motives and ideals are felt by the same men, and the forces that make society economic also make it religious.

This union of the two dominant groups of instincts and ideals has given a distinctive character to English civilization. On the one hand the local and peculiar has been subordinated to the general and national; on the other hand there has been a marked differentiation from foreign nations and standards. We are no longer cosmopolitans who wish to merge our civilization in that of the world. We think of ours as the civilization, and seek to impress our standards and ideals on others. There has never before been so large a body of people with practically the same standards and ideals. The unity is not merely one of language and tradition; it is motor as well as sensory. We not only read the same books, see the same sights, and obey the same law, but we also react in the same manner against the evils of the environment, have the same group of sympathies, are prompted to activity by the same wants, and seek to realize the same ideals and social ends. The unity of older nations was sensory. Men were held together by a common language and environment. Activity was stirred up by appeals to the native rocks and hills, and to other environmental objects of common interest. The English race has no common environment. The local peculiarities of the regions they occupy are as diverse as the earth permits. They have no Rhine to guard nor Mecca to preserve. The local has everywhere been subordinated or so idealized as to lose its sensory reality. There is not a concrete golden age to recover, but a social Utopia to attain.

The unity of the race is thus not environmental but psychic. The race ideals and social standards are not the

mere reflection of external conditions, they are the products of psychic activity. We do not all have the same stream of ingoing impressions: the likeness is in the outgoing stream of activity that these impressions excite. The pressure of past events has made the race susceptible to the same sentiments and has created the same mental reactions. These traits and motives determine the national character, and give to the race ideals a supersensory form that lifts them above the concrete conditions of the present or the past. The ideals can become a reality only in a Utopia that provides a sensory environment in harmony with the motor outgoings of the social self.

This harmony has become as real in our religious life as in other social matters. There are, it is true, many denominations with many different rituals and creeds, but beneath these remnants of the sensory environments of the past lie the tendencies that appear when the national character shows itself in activity. These motor reactions are alike in all Christians. The same feeling of charity succours distress, the same misery is felt when men are depressed by sin, the same hopes inspire activity, the same religious ideals raise men out of their local environment, and the same sermon pleases, no matter from what pulpit it is delivered. The idealization of religion has taken it out of its historical and sensory settings, and made it like the national character—a motor tendency that can find a new concrete expression only in the Utopia the race is striving to realize. The more the active side of Christianity is emphasized, the clearer does the real unity of the Church appear. Viewed in this way, there is an English Catholic Church with as definite characteristics as the Roman Catholic Church in the Middle Ages. Protestants no longer fear a reversion to an earlier religion.

The concepts of the new Christianity are thoroughly inbred, and we cannot depart from them except by some disaster that would destroy the unity and the supremacy

of the race. If religious and other social ideals were merely associations of sensory ideas, they might be easily destroyed and replaced by new ones. Reversion to earlier conditions or conversion to abstract schemes of philosophy having no economic antecedents might then be effected by mere argument or by appeals to objects and ceremonies that please the senses. But the truly social ideals have a motor mechanism by which to express themselves, as well as a sensory mechanism by which they are impressed. These motor reactions are due to the slow growth of heredity, and are changed with no less difficulty than the physical organism. It was perhaps once an open question whether we should have fingers and toes, or be hoofed like horses. But fingers and toes once acquired cannot be changed into hoofs. If some other form of being were needed to master the conditions of future environments, man would disappear and nature would try to make a new superior being out of another animal. The psychic evolution is just as definite as the physical; when a step in advance is once taken, it cannot be reversed. If the step does not prove of permanent advantage, the race dies out, and men of a more primitive type try to meet the conditions in some other way.

The English-speaking race is definitely committed to certain religious and economic ideals and standards. The success of these means the success and the supremacy of a race; their failure to meet the conditions of a world environment would mean that the race will disappear as other races have done under similar circumstances. Our progress and ascendancy depend on decisions that have already been made. Upon their correctness hangs the future welfare of the race.

Judged from this standpoint, the influence of science on national thought will be found to be different from what might be anticipated. Had the scientific discoveries of

the nineteenth century preceded the age of the Puritans, methods of reasoning and habits of thought might have been acquired that would have made the English character different from what it now is. The decline of objective morality might have been prevented, a love of foreign facts and ways might have kept the race cosmopolitan in spirit, and the visualizing power, created by the religious transformation, might have been replaced by better powers of observation. In short, a sensory development might have continued that would have made men moral and æsthetic instead of religious and economic. But now that the race has acquired the power of visualizing, the love of ideals, the desire for subjective standards, and other motor peculiarities, it is impossible for sensory ideas, no matter how clearly presented, to regain their former ascendancy. As a race, we no longer see the world as it is, but as we make it. We are not satisfied with a bare reality, but struggle for some Utopia created by our fancies. The contest between religion and science, as represented by the agnostics, is thus a crude struggle between two types of men. With regard to many of their differences, it matters little which party is in the right: the truth of doctrines and creeds is of no vital importance. The real issue is whether a further development of the sensory powers is of greater social value than the further growth of the motor powers. Do we need greater ability to observe, and a closer adjustment to objective conditions, or do we need that better expression of the self which ideals, Utopias, and social standards encourage?

The decision on this question is determining present racial development, and will determine that of the immediate future. I do not mean that there is a permanent opposition between the two tendencies. The distant future will doubtless develop a man who will combine great sensory and motor powers, but for a long period the two will not develop coördinately; more likely each in

turn will develop as the economic conditions demand. Agnosticism and kindred views cannot transform the national thought unless the need of sensory analysis is greater than the need of motor vigour. Before modes of reasoning that have a purely objective basis can be brought back, the observer must displace the visualizer. There is no evidence that this is being done. Economic conditions have favoured motor development, and so long as these continue unchanged, religious and social ideals will hold their own in spite of any objections that may be urged on purely sensory grounds. Requisites for survival have preëminence over mere matters of fact.

If we take the evidence presented by the periods under investigation, the influence of science has been exerted mainly on the methods of reasoning. It seems to have had little power to change by any direct means the dogmas, traditions, and ideals of the race. Changes in these respects are to be accounted for on other grounds. Yet each new epoch has adopted new methods of reasoning about its creeds and ideals and new ways of presenting them. The dominant or favourite science of the day has been the model, and determined men's ideas of the nature of proof, and other sciences have tried as best they might to make their evidence conform to the accepted standard.

In the first part of the nineteenth century every proof to be worthy of attention had to conform to the Newtonian standard. There had to be two primary forces whose effects were first worked out, and then a lot of disturbing causes were considered afterwards. At present the popular notions of proof have swung to the opposite pole. Great masses of concrete facts must be collected beneath which the theories of the collector are submerged. Facts are now supreme because biology has become the model science, and students are forced to work and reason according to its methods. Yet the real opinions of men have not been altered. If the mass of obtruding facts be pushed aside, it

will be found that the skeleton of men's thought — their real opinions and creeds — has undergone but little modification, and such changes as have taken place are due to the dominance of new types of men, and not to the new opinions of any of the older types. The older types now appeal to a new evidence to prove the same doctrines they would have proved in another way a couple of generations ago. For a time it did seem indeed that the new facts were all on one side; but when men holding the older views were convinced that new methods of proof had come into vogue, they found means of presenting the old ideas in a new guise. Downward curves of thought from ideas to facts are readily created when the need of them is once felt. New methods of reasoning are not so important as they seem. They change only the form of presentation and leave the content of thought unaltered unless a change also takes place in the inherited instincts of the race or in its economic environment.

It is in this latter field that the great influence of scientific progress is felt. Science has little power to alter national thought by direct means, but it has great power in creating new economic conditions, and these modify the national thought. It is not the opinions and beliefs of scientific men that change public opinion, but the effects of their discoveries on the environment. A great invention changes the conditions of survival and allows a new type of man to succeed. This new man has not the mental habits of his predecessor, and reasons and acts differently. Public opinion is changed by economic conditions permitting some new class of men to dominate society, and not by the rules of evidence or creeds of the men whose discoveries made these changes possible. Suppose, for example, that a group of scientists should discover some permanent cure for the fevers of the tropical regions. The resulting modification of the conditions of survival would render possible a new type of man in the

tropics, and cause radical changes in opinion and in mental traits. But these changes would be entirely independent of the opinions and beliefs of the scientists making the discovery. The real question is, what habits of thought, what creeds and ideals have a social value under the new conditions? These new conditions will create the beliefs and motor reactions of those who live under them, and nothing else will have any influence. The opinions of Jenner had no influence on those whom the discovery of vaccination saved to society. He simply altered the conditions of survival, and these conditions worked out their natural effect by giving men views that harmonized, not with Jenner's beliefs and modes of thought, but with the new environment.

It is often said erroneously that the Royal Society destroyed superstition. The opinions, beliefs, and experiments of its members were unknown to those who indulged in superstitious practices. The cure was effected before people read the papers of this worthy institution or listened to its lecturers. Superstition died when men got regular employment and three meals a day. The habits of thought creating superstition come from an irregular life and from the impossibility of predicting future events or of providing for future needs. As the cause of superstition lies in the defects of the environment, it cannot be argued out of men so long as these defects continue to impose certain habits of thought upon them. With changed conditions superstition disappears because the type of men who follow superstitious practices are at a disadvantage. The men that now survive need no Royal Society to convince them of the folly of superstition, for the pressure of economic conditions imposes upon them contrary habits of thought.

We are now having a fair chance to test this theory of the dominant influence of scientific habits of thought on public opinion. Dyspepsia is becoming prevalent, and this

disease destroys the regular connection that exists in sound persons between eating, digestion, and assimilation. A dyspeptic never knows whether the food he eats will be assimilated or turned into noxious compounds that will cause him pain. He is in the same uncertainty with regard to the effect of what he eats that the primitive man was in with regard to his ability to get something to eat. The result is the same in both cases. In the dyspeptic uncertainty creates superstitious beliefs and a willingness to use quack remedies. He is always trying new nostrums, and is filled with queer notions of the most arbitrary sort. He is a victim of superstitious fancies akin to those which tyrannized over his untrained ancestors. If all men should become dyspeptics, superstition would be as rife in a century as it was in the Middle Ages, in spite of Royal Societies and other scientific bodies. They could help the race, not by their opinions on superstition, but by discovering some relief for dyspepsia. The tests of survival, not the opinions of scholars, determine the course of events and the development of thought.

Socialism is a compound of two elements with one of which its connection is inherent and with the other accidental. A social Utopia is a race ideal that inspires activity. But the form of this Utopia is never definite; it does not represent the actual and the real. When better conditions open up new possibilities, bolder visualization enlarges the Utopia until it is farther off than before. Its power over men increases as it becomes less real and more remote. It grows in vividness as it loses its concreteness. Bold thinking is based on a few material elements, and even these are arranged in forms unknown to actual life.

Much of the force of socialism comes from the perception of this Utopian ideal. Its chief characteristic, however, is an over-emphasis of the mechanical aids that promote progress. Men are charmed with the thought of

having everything done for them, and love to picture a social mechanism that will supply wants without those individual cares that are now so harassing. This mechanism, whether social or physical, is a device to reduce activity and to allow more time for the enjoyment of sensory impressions. If this mechanism were complete, men would become sensory microbes immersed in a stream of impressions. Suppose the ideal pictured by Mr. Bellamy, in his *Looking Backward*, were realized, and that the social mechanism were so complete that a man lying in bed might, by touching a button, listen to sermons, operas, and dramas, or illuminate the walls of his room with the finest products of art; suppose further that his meals were served in a mechanical way, and that some device were discovered to supply every want—would such a passive state satisfy men for any length of time?

It is easy to see the source of this ideal. Even religion is not free from it. A haven of rest is perhaps the first ideal of men in a world of trial and trouble. It is a reaction inevitable in all who live in an intense pain economy. The sole conscious end is to get rid of pain, to live in ease and experience pleasurable sensory impressions. To make production mechanical is to give that relief from activity which a tired man craves. To him work is misery, rest is happiness. It is not surprising that a Utopian picture of rest is pleasing in an age where so many men suffer from overwork.

The ideal attracts two classes of men: those who need rest, and those who crave sensory gratifications. It is repugnant to those who want activity and an opportunity to exercise their wills. A love of activity and a desire to overcome obstacles do not harmonize with mechanical contrivances to displace effort and to make life monotonous by forcing it to run in fixed grooves. The opposition between these two ends appears in the struggle between the capitalistic and the socialistic instincts. Economic institutions

reward push and enterprise. Equality and liberty do not stand so high in public esteem as energy and decision. In the business world the executive man has an advantage over the man of refined perceptions and emotions. Capitalists want power and activity more than enjoyment. Survival thus favours the growth of motor power, and checks that sensory progress which would make men hair splitters in logic, fact mongers in science, colour enthusiasts in art, and democrats in politics. Wealth getting is the best outlet for the pent-up energies that do not find an outlet in these other fields.

Rest ideals cannot be dominant in a society where activity and vigour are the first requisites of survival. The gradual removal of the conditions of a pain economy reduces the attractiveness of these ideals, and puts in their place racial ideals that harmonize with our religious and economic activities. Objects that inspire activity are more concrete than those that excite the senses. We are pleased with colour, form, and other abstract qualities, but instinctive action is aroused by enemies, lightning, the national flag, and the sacred cross. The great essentials of the environment alone inspire activity. The general and unessential objects of sense perception remain matters of indifference. These conditions produce, not a socialism that is cosmopolitan and mechanical, but a concrete society with intense racial feelings and strong antipathies.

The English have not a keen love of humanity at large, but only of that part of humanity which belongs to their own race; and not indeed of all that, for a citizen who does not live up to race standards is disliked more than a foreigner. They respond only to those definite principles that have been developed by the struggle through which this race has gone, and new principles are added only as new struggles force a racial decision. These principles are, therefore, not mere sensory concepts that please by their exactness; they are motor activities formed by the

pressure of the environment. A society in this form is more concrete and motor than socialism, and reversion from the tendencies that strengthen it is impossible so long as the economic conditions favour a further development of the motor powers.

A reversion from our religious instincts and ideals becomes agnosticism. Socialism is a like reversion from the economic instincts that have created recent progress. Both result from an overdevelopment of the sensory powers, and would revive habits of thought that have been abandoned by the active part of the race. Since these tendencies to revert are not powerful enough to bring the race back to its earlier condition, we must look for the characteristic features of the coming epoch in the further development of the economic forces that have made the changes of the last three centuries. Until these forces have fully worked themselves out, and the economic adjustment has become complete, subsidiary tendencies must remain in abeyance, for they can make no headway against the elementary forces that determine survival.

From the evidence that has been presented it seems that this adjustment is about half-finished. The changes in religion and economics have been frequently pointed out. There has also taken place a marked transformation in logic and psychology. We do not reason and feel as our ancestors would have done under similar circumstances. In practical politics a like modification of methods and means is apparent. The motives of men in public life, and their habits of thought on public questions, are radically changed. Our amusements have also been so modified as to lose their former sensuality. The elevation of women and their freer entry into social life have narrowed the field in which the contact of the sexes is marred by a sensual taint. Many modes of enjoyment are now innocent that in earlier times would have been debauching. The

active sports of outdoor life have also been adjusted to climatic conditions. They drain off the surplus vitality, which, when pent up, makes men sensual. Communal life, therefore, is not beset by those perils which aroused the opposition of the Puritans.

Great as these improvements are, there are many fields in which no modification of primitive standards has taken place. Morals remain unchanged, except in so far as the loss of the feeling of the solidarity of responsibility has lessened the hold of objective morality. There have been no additions or serious modifications of accepted moral principles by English writers. Ethical teachers still repeat the old rules of thumb that pleased our distant ancestors, and fail to see that the normal life of to-day demands the pruning of dead formulæ. Literary men have stood aloof from the popular movements that have revolutionized England. The only exception is the poetry of the early part of this century. But this has not been enough to cure the poets of that love of reversion and of prophecy which breeds an antipathy to the normal tendencies of an economic life. Artists are deracialized by their education so long as they get their inspiration and ideals outside of their native land. Doubtless the sunnier clime and bolder scenery of the South come nearer perfection than those of the duller North; but as long as artists are foreign-hearted, a natural environmental development of æsthetic standards is hardly to be expected. We must be content to occupy a subordinate place in art while foreign types of character and foreign environments are idealized in the work of our artists. A racial development must take its root in the racial characteristics and in the phases of nature with which the race is familiar.

In English philosophy there is scarcely any vitality. Foreign methods and standards have completely superseded the native schools formerly in vogue. In education matters are even worse. No class have been more abject in

their acceptance of foreign standards, or done more to denationalize their students, than schoolmasters. In theoretical politics and law little real development has taken place. We have not even generalized and coördinated the few principles that were wrought out in primitive times. These might have sufficed had the race remained in its earlier local environment; but now that it occupies the best portions of the world, a fresh development of political thought is needed to meet the complexity and diversity of the new situation. On every hand there is evidence that the old traditions, precedents, and constitutional limitations are failing to work as they should. That the race is succeeding is not due to its political creed, but to the influence of economic and religious forces. Upon an examination of the principles on which the Irish question in England, or the money problem in America, is discussed, it can be readily seen what trouble such principles would cause if they were not held in check by other considerations, and yet these problems are small in comparison with many the race must solve before a readjustment can be made to the conditions of an enlarged environment. Think of the difficulty of governing half the world on principles that are fitted for a country town!

The reader should remember that by the plan of this discussion only internal evidence has been admitted. I have confined myself to English sources and facts. I have made no comparison with foreign nations, nor any endeavour to use them as models by which to measure English social progress. It is assumed that we are adjusted to the present environment in which great changes in thought have occurred since we entered it, and that the same forces will drive us to make similar changes in fields where foreign standards or primitive ideas still prevail. Yet so long as colleges try to inspire higher ideals by forcing students to learn Greek, so long as teachers of ethics endeavour to reform the slums by instilling the

platitudes of ancient moralists, so long as novels incite women to break with home life, so long as historians persist in the apotheosis of the French Revolution, and prophets in the prediction of social upheaval and degeneration, it can hardly be said that adjustment to present conditions is complete. If these be permanent tendencies, the influence of the present environment can never be fully revealed in history.

The third and last of the epochs we have discussed had its main problems set by the condition of the wheat market. The upward movement in the price of wheat began about 1757, and the great fall in its price began in 1873. The latter date may be said approximately to end the epoch. Not only did the fall in the price of wheat begin at that time, but there occurred also a general fall in prices that has apparently not yet ended. The late epoch was as a whole a period of rising prices, and the reasoning of the epoch was based on the limitations of the production of food and other raw materials by which the rise in prices was necessitated. The system of economics associated with the name of Ricardo would not have developed but for these limitations and their effects on the increase of population and the progress of society.

The present epoch is as plainly an epoch of cheapness as that was an epoch of dearth. Then population outstripped the increase of food. The increase of food now so far surpasses the increase of population that a market for food can scarcely be found. Then the rising price of food made agriculture prosperous, and seriously cramped the working population of the towns. Now the farms are being deserted, and the country people are flocking to the cities in order to share in their increased prosperity.

Many of these changes are due to the fall in the price of sugar. Its cheapness has so modified the food supply

that we can be said to have a sugar diet in the same sense as the eighteenth century had a bread diet. The increased cheapness of many articles of food has opened up almost unlimited possibilities for a future increase of population. The plants from which sugar is extracted are amazingly prolific. Their production requires but little labour, and as they grow in parts of the world of which but little use has been made, they do not interfere with the production of other food products as did the demand for wheat. When the people of the civilized world lived on wheat, they were confined to a narrow belt of land in the temperate zone. Now they have practically the whole world in which to expand, and there will not be a permanent shortage in the food supply until the population of the world has increased many fold. In the meantime we shall have a forced cheapness that will alter many of the essential facts in the struggle for economic supremacy. The change is especially important to the English race; having felt most severely the high prices of the earlier epoch, they now have an abnormal cheapness forced on them through an uneconomic competition by other races. Cheap food and a sugar diet, therefore, make the conditions out of which the thought movement of the present epoch will proceed.

Liquor is necessary with plain food, especially when a large use is made of vegetables. Such food would be unpalatable but for a free use of pepper, salt, vinegar, and other condiments; it is pleasant only when some liquor is used as a complement. The old diet was thus essentially a liquor diet, the liquor being its main source of pleasure. Food was prepared so as to heighten the pleasure of drinking, and the dishes that would do this best obtained popular favour. Men ate to drink, and did not drink, as they should have done, to aid the assimilation of food. The cheapness of sugar now enables a satisfactory diet to be obtained without the use of alcohol. The sweet dishes

are essential parts of each meal, and about them the other foods are arranged just as in earlier days they were coördinated with alcoholic beverages. Moreover, sugared fruits and sweet drinks are used to satisfy the thirst instead of the sour, bitter liquors of former times.

This change has already gone so far that a large portion of society has adjusted itself to it. So long as a liquor diet was essential, people put up with the many evils incident to it without much complaint; but when it was no longer necessary to health, a reaction against its evils was inevitable. The drinking man is no longer the cheap man in production. A sugar diet is less costly than a liquor diet, and he who lives on it has an advantage in many branches of production. The displacement of liquor-drinking men is going on steadily, and in the end will be so complete as to drive intemperate men from desirable occupations. The clashing interests of these two classes will be a feature of the next century's development. We are apt to look at temperance problems from a moral point of view. The real issue, however, is economic, and it will work itself out with little regard for other considerations. The temperance movement is sure to grow, and temperance instincts and habits will be acquired by the same economic pressure that created the earlier psychic changes in the race. Political and moral notions acquired in other environments will be crushed out or modified to meet the new conditions.

This change is, however, only a phase of important modifications in the conditions of survival. Progress is determined by the types of men that are eliminated. Under past conditions this elimination has been mainly due to undernutrition, or, to use simpler language, starvation. When the food supply is limited and the increase of population is rapid, the less efficient members of society fail to secure enough nutrition to keep themselves alive. Where death by starvation is not the direct result of the inability

to secure food, the underfed are especially liable to disease. When the struggle for food ceases to be individual and leads to a conflict between tribes and races, the well fed have an advantage and usually force their underfed opponents to the wall. Famine, disease, and war thus lead in the main to the elimination of the underfed, and these evils were the great scourges of mankind in past ages when the food supply was limited. Progress has been caused by the evils of undernutrition. The well fed have survived; their instincts and their habits have created the economic society in which we live. But conditions of this kind are now past. The English race is well fed, the diseases of poverty are fairly well under control, and war is now of so little importance that it has ceased to affect the conditions of survival. We are at a standstill and would continue to be so if the evils of undernutrition were the only causes of elimination and progress. They are too nearly overcome to exert a dominant influence.

There are, however, many indications that progress by elimination has not ceased, but has only changed in form. Formerly the underfed failed to survive; now it is the overfed among whom the elimination is taking place. The ideal of health is to obtain complete nutrition. Overnutrition as well as undernutrition weakens the body and subjects it to evils that make it incapable of survival. The plethora of food now enjoyed induces men to eat and drink more than their systems can stand. Temptations to indulgence are so great that few are able to withstand them. There is thus a reduction in vitality that leads to disease. Our appetites are stronger than they need be to secure survival under present environing conditions. Under the old conditions the stronger the appetites the better, for they created the motives that led men to keep up the struggle for food. As a whole the man with the keenest appetite survived. Now this keen appetite is plainly a disadvantage. A reduction of the point

of satiety is the only way to restore the equilibrium between the desire for food and the needs of the system.

The line of complete nutrition must be reached but not crossed. When this line is not reached, undernutrition cuts in on the lower edge of society and raises its level. When the line is passed overnutrition weeds out the overfed. The latter condition cuts in on the more efficient part of society and tends to lower its level. Just as consumption in the time of the Puritans took its victims from among the most advanced classes of the nation, so to-day apoplexy, heart failure, Bright's disease, and other diseases born of high living check the progress of those classes in whom the hope of civilization is centred. The primary influence of overnutrition is conservative; but for its effects changes in our instincts, habits, and institutions would have been more rapid than they have been. To speak concretely, drunkenness would have lessened much more rapidly if dyspepsia had not proved so great a counter evil.

Yet in the long run the evils of overnutrition will benefit the race. When all are well fed the inactive man suffers most from its evils, because he does nothing to work off or to put to use the extra nutrition he has received. An active man is less subject to the evils of overnutrition and can more easily throw off its effects. The inactive and stupid will be eliminated and the vigour of the race will be increased. Those stolid, sensual constitutions that have been so marked a characteristic of the middle class of society must gradually disappear. The dominant type will be more nervous in temperament and have an increased ability to stand the strain and the excitement of an active life.

In men this change toward activity is already partially worked out. The effects of overnutrition are less apparent in them than in women, among whom is seen a reverse tendency toward inactivity. Men have also passed over

to a sugar diet less completely than women. The typical evils of overnutrition are therefore more clearly seen among women than among men. In the same way that we look to men for examples of dissipation and vice, so must we look among women for the best examples of the new evils of overfeeding. Ease and inactivity do not harmonize with the overnutrition and overstimulation to which women are subjected, and hence the process of elimination must work a crude cure by cutting off those who indulge too freely. When men are eliminated, it is usually done by some striking process. Dissipation, war, disease, careless exposure, and other causes of destruction attract attention, and excite horror or sympathy. Until the present epoch the elimination of women has been dependent to a large extent on the fates of husbands and fathers. Women survived or perished as their defenders succeeded or failed. Under these circumstances there could be but little modification in women. Men developed because the less fitting types perished; but the most perfect of women would fail if joined for life with an incompetent man. Progress is impossible if dependent on the accidents of marriage.

These conditions are now reversed. The overnutrition of women decreases their fertility. It is said that all female animals become barren when overfed. There may be some general law that makes fertility depend on the amount of nutrition. Its decrease, however, may be mainly due to the overstimulation and nervous excitement that modern society forces upon women. In any case the loss of fertility is plain; families rapidly die out if they utilize to the full the advantages given by economic success. It matters not, therefore, how efficient husbands may be, families will not endure to affect the future of the race if overnutrition and consequent nervous disorders make wives barren. Women do not often come to violent ends nor fall victims to low forms of dissipation, yet by a

slow but effective process they cause the extermination of families.

Society must in the future draw a dividing line between fathers and mothers on the one hand, and the sterile on the other. The latter class, already a prominent feature of our civilization, have instincts and feelings peculiar to themselves. But as they are not an enduring part of society, their acts and feelings cannot be taken as an indication of social change or of the development of thought. What fathers and mothers think and do affects the history of the race. The deeds and fancies of steriles are of interest only to themselves. They are easily excited, are carried away by fads and novelties, and make mountains out of events that are but mole-hills to the enduring part of society. These racial suicides who are free from the permanent influences upon which survival depends, can deviate from those conditions and rules of conduct to which fathers and mothers must adhere. They thus have short-lived careers, often with a temporary influence out of all proportion to their real importance.

These steriles can be most readily recognized by their activity and emotions in art and literature. Fathers and mothers have not yet become artistic, and are too active to indulge much in novel reading. The taste of the average mother seldom rises above the level of bric-à-brac and chromos, while the father is quite content with his newspaper. Modern literature and art have made little impression on them. Strong tendencies toward art are shown in many minor products associated with the ideas of comfort, but these tendencies remain mere adumbrations because the developed products of art have no influence on survival. So long as æsthetic feelings are a useless variation unconnected with the prominent motives making men active and vigorous, only rudimentary forms of art are possible. The natural growth of artistic sentiments is prevented, just as sheep prevent the growth

of trees on land fitted for forestry. Long before the Protestant reformation, the sentiments and feelings that created it were active. But the celibacy of the clergy and nuns cut off in each generation those in whom the religious and moral sentiments were strongest. In consequence society could not develop in harmony with the tendencies of the age. A strong tendency may thus exist for a long period without apparent results. New instincts acquire a social value only by promoting ideals and standards that excite activity. Artistic tastes will not be gratified on a large scale until the utility of art exceeds its cost. Unartistic men control industrial organizations, the churches, and public affairs, because they are more active, and while they are in control churches, railroad stations, and public buildings will be constructed with but little regard to their looks. All this would be changed if artistic and literary ideals promoted activity. The men they influence would then control social and industrial organizations and could determine the form of buildings and other objects, if the net gain of their activity to society was greater than the additional cost of making their environment pleasing. Under present conditions, however, art is associated with leisure and is confined to galleries and museums, which ordinary people see only on holidays. It is thus sought chiefly by the inactive and overfed, who seek a relief from monotony by sensory stimulations. Pleasures that do not promote adjustment are detrimental, and those who indulge in them are sure to be eliminated. We are thus breeding against art and not in its favour. The classes affected by it are so differentiated from the racial standards that they cease to meet the conditions on which survival depends. They become sterilized and leave the world to those who adhere more fully to racial standards. Artists and writers, therefore, are made at the present time by education and conversion, but not by breeding. So long as this situation continues, there can

be little net progress in art. Each new generation of artists rises out of the same inartistic conditions, develops in the same way, and dies out by gradual extinction.

The cause of this seems to be the sterilizing effect of art and literature on women. The change from the restricted environment of mothers to that opened up by literary and artistic ideals is too great to be undergone without danger. A race can try the effects of new measures on men, for they are capable of great modifications; but women cannot safely be experimented with in the same fashion. Deracializing influences act on women as dissipation does on men. These influences affect the future of the race not by what they do for it, but by the elements they take out of it. The elimination of sensual men, and of women made inactive by art, literature, and a sugar diet, are the prominent causes of modifications in the national character.

These changes will be accompanied by a revolution in political thought and activity. The irreconcilable differences that for two centuries have kept the stalwarts apart from the sensualists and clingers, have enabled the mugwumps to govern the race and to shape its political policy. They could place the aggressive parties against each other, and as no one party was powerful enough to dominate society, compromises followed that put the control of affairs in the hands of the mugwump minority. The love of law and order was too strong to permit extreme measures, and the control by a third party seemed better than the triumph of opponents. A series of these compromises has created the political traditions of the race and enabled our institutions to survive under conditions in which they would otherwise have broken down.

But these conditions are passing away. There has been a steady decrease in the relative numbers of sensualists and clingers. The latter class is fast disappearing and will

doubtless be extinct in a couple of generations. One cause of this eradication is the gradual breaking down of the local environments that kept people true to inherited traditions. General customs and habits are inimical to the modes of life that create clingers, and the growth of individualism has destroyed the personal loyalty that made dependents true to their local masters. But more important yet is the crushing force that capitalism and the liquor interests have exerted. The employer exploits without mercy those classes that are attached to the locality in which they live. An open market for labour can be maintained only by the labourers being willing to move freely to new regions for trifling differences in wages. Men without local attachments and family ties become transformed into sensualists on whom morality and religion have little hold.

It would thus seem that the sensualists are becoming the dominant class. The power represented by the liquor interests may for a time continue to control political parties as it does at present, but the period when this can be done will probably be short. Drinkers, like the clingers, are being exploited by their masters, and the same causes that are crushing the clingers will, in the course of time, crush out the drinkers. The liquors served to the masses are becoming poorer and stronger; the accompanying vices are less disguised and more deadly. The home and the saloon as types of life are growing more and more distinct, and a combination of the two is ever more difficult. Employers hesitate about placing drinking men in responsible positions, and thus from a lack of income, if for nothing else, the latter are being forced into social conditions that make survival increasingly difficult. And even if the sensualists could withstand the liquor evils, the new sugar diet would affect them disastrously. Men may overeat or overdrink; but when the two excesses are combined, the strongest of constitutions gives way. Drinking men, to succeed, need

a coarse diet, scanty clothes, and open houses. A rugged man in direct contact with nature can throw off immense quantities of alcohol, but if he eats sweets, dresses warmly, and spends his time in the close, bad air of a saloon, the alcohol remains in the system and works injury.

We are scarcely aware of the ways in which drinking eliminates those to whom it has become habitual, because this class has been recruited by different means from outside sources. In one sense it is true that our ancestors were hard drinkers. There was no temperance society to check the growth of the habit, and nearly every one at times took more than was good for him. But the lack of income made these sprees only occasional indulgences, and life in the open air helped to throw off their effects. The drunkard as we know him is a new phenomenon, and we must study his chances of survival as we find him under present conditions. Occasional spreeing attracts more attention than hard drinking, yet the latter is more dangerous and greatly lessens the chance of survival. So long as the sensualists have the class of clingers from which to recruit their numbers, it is hard to determine their enduring qualities. It is still harder where large numbers of foreign emigrants swell the sensualists' numbers. But for the race as a whole this source of replenishment has been cut off or soon will be. Then the exploitation now going on among the sensualists will become apparent, and their powers of holding their own will be thoroughly tested.

It is not probable that the sensualists can survive, even if the evils from which they suffer are not increased. A steady increase of these evils, and a more pressing and short-sighted exploitation by those who profit from men's appetites, is bound to come, and upon these changes will follow worse social conditions and a higher death-rate. Appalling as these evils are, and powerful as are the classes who support them, I am inclined to believe that

we are much nearer their end than most people think. Sensualism cannot hold its own under present economic conditions. It and its supporters will collapse as soon as the supply of outside recruits is cut off. The race will probably have sensualism well under control by the close of the next century. The campaign that has lasted for centuries will thus come to an end, and the energies of reformers can be devoted to other problems.

With two of the social classes practically out of the way, the problem of supremacy and the direction of social reform will depend upon the relative strength of the stalwarts and mugwumps. In a direct contest between them there can hardly be a doubt that the stalwarts will win. From the very conditions that create their peculiarities the mugwumps cannot become a numerous class. They thrive only in protected positions where they escape contact with the bustle and the struggle of the outside world. Direct contact with nature demands a motor development and blunts the sense for fine distinctions. The essentials for survival and the means of securing them are usually so plain that they are readily recognized and soon become instinctive. Men of action are stalwarts in temperament, and chafe under the restraints of fine-spun distinctions. The man in the field is always in opposition to the diplomat in the home office. Stalwart principles control the one and mugwump red tape the other. A new environment and new situations to be exploited develop motor vigour; a well-known environment, where all vital questions have been decided, promotes sensory discrimination and a love of details. Both classes of men are necessary to high civilization; but in periods of progress men of action must have undisputed control. No nation can artificially increase the number of protected positions without endangering the conditions on which its success depends.

It thus seems that the stalwarts will be the dominant

element among the progressive classes of the race. Mugwump success at compromise has been due to the pressure of sensualists and clingers who did not want change and progress. As these classes decrease in numbers, the mugwumps must fight their battles with their own strength. This they are beginning to do, but even if they are joined by the two non-progressive classes, they cannot succeed if the stalwarts are united. At present the stalwarts fail from lack of leaders and from the fact that the traditions of the race are against them. Their own standards are not yet clearly enough defined to create a unity of action. They are therefore at present only a potential force; time and the trend of future events will convert them into a controlling force.

The character of this coming stalwartism is clearly defined by the history of the race. New movements create nothing; they only convert old forces into some new form. The instincts and motor reactions that already exist do not disappear or radically change their manifestation. They simply operate in some new direction. Using this point of view, and aided by the light that the behaviour of stalwarts throws upon their probable future conduct, we may venture on several predictions. The stalwarts can be regarded as democrats only in so far as we crudely contrast an aristocracy and a democracy. They are with the democrats in their opposition to any class above them and to inherited customs and limitations that are supported only by past experience. The stalwarts are equally opposed, however, to any class below them and to all that hold other standards than those of stalwartism. A race that has gone through Calvinism cannot become truly democratic. Turn the attention of men with this spirit toward social affairs, and they at once arouse an opposition between themselves and some integral portion of the community that does not adhere to their standards. There will always be somebody to favour and somebody to exclude.

The old contrast of the elect and the damned becomes in social life an opposition between the standardful and the standardless. This contrast transforms society into a sociocracy in which character is a criterion of citizenship. A man is not a man until he is something more than Mandeville's objective unit of flesh, bones, and passions.

The stalwarts will also exalt women and accept their standards. They are domestic, and will show to an increasing degree the effects of the steady pressure that mothers are exerting on society. Manly men are still unreconciled to the trend of our civilization, and if they marry, seldom make choices that perpetuate the race. The happy unions are between the domestic man and the womanly woman. By this tendency the standards and ideals of the race are forced to become less manly and more womanly. The qualities that have been recognized as peculiar to woman, or more especially to mothers, are becoming racial. Rugged independence and marriages dictated by fancy reduce the chances of survival. It must not be assumed, however, that these changes will force women to enter into economic life more fully than at present. As a whole, the womanly woman is becoming less instead of more economic. The real lesson of our progress is that happy unions are formed by making men more willing to give rather than by making women more capable of earning. Family life demands either a psychic change in men or a physical change in women, and thus far history has shown that it is easier to make the former change than the latter. The same tendencies will doubtless continue at least in the immediate future, making husbands more subservient and wives less economic.

The success of the stalwarts will weaken the force of constitutional limitations and race traditions. Loving the ideals and standards that express the needs of to-day stalwarts decide what is right by appeals to their own feelings, and distrust objective standards which are out

of harmony with the aspirations and ideals they cherish. They are easily moved by definite programmes that can be expressed in forceful maxims, or readily visualized as ideals. Among these may be mentioned territorial expansion, a world supremacy of the race, a forceful application of racial concepts of industry and political rights to inferior races, strong antipathies to all who fall below or differ from accepted social standards, the subjection of husbands, total abstinence, fixed standards of wages and comfort, the diffusion of wealth, and the racializing of education. In what direction stalwart energies will be turned is yet to be determined by the course of events; but that many of these ideals will be realized during the coming century, or at least struggled for, is hardly open to doubt. The modifying forces, if any there be, must come from some other quarter. The past conditions of the race have made the psychic qualities of the stalwarts too definite to be changed much by any internal development.

Curves of thought have their origin in the opposition between inherited tendencies and the tendencies a new epoch is creating. Men in whom old tendencies are dominant revert toward primitive forms and ideas, while those in whom they are weak readily accept new conditions, and out of their concrete manifestations develop forms and ideas that harmonize with the new environment. The downward curves of thought represent the struggle of the stock ideas and motor reactions to impress themselves on the new social conditions; the upward curves represent the endeavour of the new enviroing conditions to control society.

The past struggles of the race have been the result of the downward curves of religious thought and the upward curves due to new economic conditions. These struggles have now ceased. The economic and religious tendencies are practically the same, and in the future they will to-

gether make the upward curve from the concrete toward the abstract and philosophical. Religion is no longer made active by the stock motor reactions that have come from the distant past. The change from objective to subjective standards has given it intenser modes of manifestation, but it has destroyed the connection with reactions excited only by objective sensory means. The primitive type of mind as it survives to-day is analytic, realistic, and rational; it holds tenaciously to objective standards, and dislikes ideals, impulses, enthusiasm, and other subjective phenomena that have been ground into the race by the later economic and religious development.

Perhaps it will be fairer to call the older objective mode of thought the manly, and the newer subjective impulses the womanly. The manly man suffers from having his impulses associated with dissipation. The long, bitter struggle for the supremacy of the home has compelled the race to oppose every symptom of other tendencies. Manly men have not liked these restraints; they have, therefore, been forced into open opposition to society, or, if they have nominally acquiesced in social standards, they have not made marriages that tended to perpetuate their kind. The man of this type carries in him the primitive characteristics of the race in so far as they have survived. The domestic man is a product of the last three centuries, and in him the earlier traits of the race have been lost, or have by conversion been put to new uses. We cannot, therefore, look to the domestic man for any reversion that would be the starting-point of a downward curve of thought.

The marked traits of the more primitive manly man are his objective standards and his realistic habits of thought. He is an observer, and not a visualizer. He takes his start from sensory facts and uses them as premises in reasoning. He has as a result become analytic, rational, and finally agnostic. There are other forms,

however, in which the same traits show themselves, some of which are so antagonistic that they seem to reveal another type of man. They are, however, at bottom similar, the differences being due to the kind of reversion that has taken place. When the manly man is active in religion, he emphasizes objective morality, and loves the historical and the ritualistic. If he enters politics, he holds tenaciously to the legal, the constitutional, and the traditional. He is a realist in art or literature, wants nothing but facts and statistics if he becomes an economist, and is rational and sceptical in philosophy. All these standards are plainly objective, and are attractive to men of whom a sensory development has made good observers. We must expect them to struggle for forms of thought in harmony with their dominant traits, and in so doing they will create the downward curve of the present epoch.

The main course of this new curve will probably lie in art and literature. Formerly the tendencies to revert showed themselves in religious thought. Now successful preachers are men of a normal type, and their sermons are plain statements of the utilitarian motives for good conduct. The prophets have gone over to literature, and with them are all in whom tendencies to revert have made primitive ideas dominant. A more chaotic aggregate of instincts, ideas, and motives could hardly be imagined than those that are now pushed to the front under the guise of literature and art. Into these fields the discontented manly men are most inclined to enter, and here their inclinations have freest scope. It is also possible for them to oppose popular tendencies more efficiently here than elsewhere. They have the ear of the public, and can present the objective realistic elements of life in their most attractive form.

In the opposing or upward curve of thought are the united religious and economic tendencies that are now making their influence felt in the form of modern stal-

wartism. They represent the economic, the womanly, the subjective, and the ideal. Activity and enthusiasm will be their leading characteristics, and these will naturally manifest themselves in the pursuit of bold ideals. Definite concrete social standards will be put forward, and, if adopted, will create a crushing disability to all who deviate from them. If these tendencies show themselves in literature and art, they will be so idealistic as to seem unreal to those who accept objective standards and love to picture matters of fact. There are few limits to the fancy of those who accept subjective standards and have marked powers of visualization.

We are not entirely in the dark as to the forms these curves will assume, for in the past epoch there were strong tendencies toward creating them. Carlyle and Ruskin had the instincts that would have created a downward curve of thought if the situation had been favourable. The forward movement on a new curve of thought was cut short by the French Revolution of 1848. English thinkers of all kinds were upset by this event, which brought about a reversion that made their subsequent writings of little permanent interest. Defective and short-lived as this curve was, it enables us to see quite clearly its natural direction, which an examination of subsequent writers tends to verify.

The manly man with his realistic tendencies will do his best work, not in literature or art, but in economic reform. Starting in one of the former, he tends toward the latter. He carries the methods, spirit, and modes of thought that have been acquired in the one field over into the other, and thus is able to do what those in the economic field have not the inclination nor the motive to do. The failure of the educated economists to create reforms in their own field is due to the fact that they are too much taken up with details to see the

general principles upon which reform depends. A man with a strong will, but with little knowledge of facts, is more likely to succeed. Since economic reform has lagged far behind the possibilities of improved production, it matters less what reform is instituted than that the scheme entered upon should be strictly adhered to and faithfully carried out. Reform is, therefore, more a matter of will than of knowledge. A man with courage and decision has great advantages over the economic scholar, who is trammelled by tradition and an unwillingness to break through social restraints. Abortive as were the efforts of Carlyle and Ruskin to realize their ideals of reform, they still represent the type of men from whom reforms will come. The near future will probably see a downward curve of thought created by men of their class that will do for economics what Wesley's ideas did for religion.

The upward or reverse curve will be from economics to literature. There was a period in Mill's career when his wife's influence carried him far over into the field of art and literature. Had his book on socialism been completed, some of these literary tendencies might have been realized, or at least carried far enough to enable us to see the direction in which his thought was moving. Although this development was cut short, some of his disciples have done work that helps us to see what Mill might have done. Perhaps the writings of Henry George best show the literary and idealistic tendencies at work in economists, whose curve of thought is upward. Bellamy's *Looking Backward* belongs to the same class, as do also the works of literary men who began as journalists. Defoe could not have written *Robinson Crusoe* if he had not brought to that work a ready knowledge of economic facts acquired in his earlier work. All these writers agree in idealizing the concrete facts of every-day life and in setting up clear motives for activity. Whether these books

be accepted as literary and artistic productions, matters but little. Their main value lies in the curve of thought they reveal. Sooner or later men with stalwart instincts and education will break over the line that separates economics from literature and art, and then a new movement in these fields will begin that can end only in their transformation. Bold vivid ideals and visions of a future Utopia are sure finally to assume a literary form and to create pictures that can be made objective only in art. Milton and Bunyan have shown what stalwarts can do by visualizing. We are approaching a time when this spirit will have freer scope, and then we should have works of greater boldness and imagination than any that modern literature and art have so far given us.

In the epochs we have discussed English literature and art have not realized their possibilities because one set of men have had the literary and artistic taste, and another the imagination and power of visualization. The realistic and the ideal tendencies have been seldom united in the same person. This defect will be remedied if the curves of thought of the present epoch force the realist into economics and the visualizer into literature and art. These latter will then lose their foreign taint, and the blending of the two types of men that will follow the transference of their respective fields will secure better results both in reform and in art. The present epoch may thus end the struggle that has been going on for centuries between the environmental and the inherited instincts, and give the race an adjustment that will enable it to realize its highest ideals.

Natural theologians have in the past put the emphasis of their arguments on the nature and the essence of God, and have felt satisfied if these concepts have been made secure. Their assumptions once granted, a rigid train of reasoning proves all the desired corollaries. Theologians

are thus induced to stake everything on their premises. If they prove God to be an essence and the cause of nature, there is no need of resorting to the less obvious evidence gained by experience. I do not wish to disparage these bold deductions, yet it must be admitted that the type of thinking on which they depend is becoming foreign to the English mind. The native philosophy by which these doctrines were upheld has completely broken down, and the German philosophy to which recent thinkers have resorted has not made much headway against the obstacles that foreign thought must always encounter. As the student can get the standpoint of foreign thought only by a drill that isolates him from his natural environment, he is rendered incapable of exerting an influence on the race of which he should be an integral part.

Another disadvantage is that the natural theologian's concept of God is not one about which there is much controversy. God as Nature is a well-established racial ideal. If it is admitted that God always acts in harmony with Nature's laws, the doctrine that He is the cause of Nature is not of so much importance as it might seem. The source of Nature's laws is less important than the way they act. If they are never modified for the advantage of the life they support, the field of ultimate causes is of little moment to beings interested in particular events. Under these conditions it is of more importance that God is the Father of all life than that He is its cause.

The laws of the relations of life to life furnish evidence of what the conditions are upon which permanent life depends. We know that life is preserved and modified by life. We can also affirm that life is elevated by the sacrifice of life. There is also an equally plain sacrifice of higher for lower life showing itself in every advanced society. The best of our kind live on after death in the influence they have upon those more imperfect than themselves. If the sacrifice of the lower life for the higher is

evolution, the sacrifice of the higher for the lower is incarnation. This principle, which is always active, might be called the teacher's ideal, for it is revealed most clearly and generally in the instruction of the young. Parents try to put themselves on a level with their children, and to assume characters and modes of thought in harmony with those they would elevate. The teacher becomes a child in order to make of his pupil a man like himself. The more successful the reversion, the surer is the child's development. That a reversion from the complex to the simpler forms and modes of thought is the surest means of elevating the low is a general principle showing itself wherever higher life comes in contact with lower life. Throughout the social world there is a sacrifice of the higher for the lower, and of the lower for the higher, giving as a result a far more rapid development of the enduring part of society than could be obtained by any other process.

Natural theologians have looked on the incarnation of Christ as an event outside the pale of natural religion. They reasoned that if the incarnation is a fact, it must be proved by miracles or other events that violate the natural law on which they based their proof of the being and essence of God. They were thus inclined to doubt the historical facts on which Christianity is based, and many of them were content to remain mere deists. And yet, if we accept a social point of view, there is nothing more natural than the principle upon which the incarnation is based. It might well be called the first principle of natural religion, for a tendency toward incarnation is manifest in all forms of life. If that tendency were absent, it is doubtful if the elimination of the unfit could do much to elevate life and to mould it into better forms. Christ is a complete realization of an ideal toward which higher life is striving. We have, therefore, plainer evidence of His reality than of doctrines about the essence

of God. Motives felt by all life and tendencies showing themselves in all societies must be a part of God's nature and must manifest themselves in His dealings with men.

Miracles are not independent evidence of Christ's divinity. They are verifications of a principle, the basis of which is found in every being. Hume's famous argument against miracles would not now be accepted. The course of nature as shown by past experience gives no absolute assurance that a future event may not follow a law hitherto unknown. The new event as well as those of the past must be considered in determining the laws of nature. Reasoning, though based on the known, extends somewhat into the unknown. There is always the possibility that new facts may overthrow or modify previous inductions. English thought has, therefore, become sceptical of universal propositions. Within the realm of logic the inductive canons are given increasing weight, and these are grounded on the theory of probability. There can never be, however, two probabilities. One or the other is excluded by the conditions of the case. When a probability has been established, we assent to it and act on it.

Reasoning belongs to the sensory side of the mind and is based on sensory distinctions. It can establish probabilities, but nothing more. Assent is motor; it is that which changes a judgment into activity. A conviction is not a certainty, but something that provokes activity. A judgment cannot cause habitual activity unless it harmonizes with the conditions of the environment. Bad judgments in the end eliminate the person who acts on them. Thus activity puts a probability to the test, and if the test stands, the habitual assent to it becomes a conviction. In this way our firm beliefs are based on a union of sensory and motor evidence. The sensory facts establish a probability; the motor response creates habitual activity.

While there may be a multitude of sensory states due

to different degrees of probability, only four motor tendencies can result from them, — doubt, suspense, presumption, and assent. There is doubt when the probability is against the assumed fact; there is suspense when the evidence is well balanced; there is a presumption when a given result would harmonize with the laws to which similar objects are known to conform; there is assent when the result would follow from what we know of the object in question. Belief is the union of presumption and probability.

We cannot go beyond assent and belief, because habitual activity is the only direct test to which a judgment can be put. Men in action do not wait for absolute proof to justify their acts. They have before them a series of events and facts which they treat according to the partial evidence of them that they possess. Their convictions, being due to activity, become fully formed when a clear probability appears. The needs of activity have thus formed the axioms of thought, and in every judgment relating to the concrete environment in which instinctive action is demanded have given to a probability the weight and position of a reality.

The probable is thus the real in local conditions. A broader axiom, however, applies to the general conditions of the universe which are superenvironmental.<sup>1</sup> If the limitations of time and space are withdrawn, the possible becomes the probable, and hence the possible becomes the real. It is, for example, improbable that a given planet in another solar system should have rings like Saturn, but

<sup>1</sup> The reader should remember that in the sense I have used the term, the environment is concrete, made up of the aggregates of matter and force that condition particular forms of life. Not all nature, but definite parts of it, environ life in given regions. The seen and the known are only concrete forms of nature. They do not reveal its general condition. The superenvironmental is limited only by the possible. It is not the supernatural, but the fully natural. Any environment must be, to some degree, abnormal when viewed from the standpoint of Nature's possibilities.

it is probable that there are planets with rings. So, also, it is improbable that a given fixed star should be a double sun, but it is probable that there are double suns in the unexplored regions of space. In the whole universe, within all the time it has existed, every possible combination of matter has doubtless taken place. On the theory of probability even the slightest possibility will in time become an actuality. The universe has had the time and the conditions necessary for the realization of all its possibilities, and we must suppose each of them to have become somewhere and at some time a reality. There can, therefore, be no valid objection urged to a given combination except that it is impossible. The possible thus becomes in the universe at large the probable, and hence by an axiom of thought the real.

Under the old concept of life this axiom would not hold. It was assumed that the different forms of life were created by a fiat, and that changes from one form to another were impossible. If, therefore, a given form of life did not exist at the beginning, it could not come into being later. Under these conditions the existence of a given form of life could be proved only by experience, and the absence of direct evidence would be a justification for doubting its reality. This presumption against unknown forms of life is destroyed by the new concept introduced by Darwin. If life is sustained and modified by life, given forms of life can be altered into any possible form. We can, therefore, say of unknown forms of life, as of combinations of matter and force, that in the universe at large the possible is the probable, and hence the real. If permanent life is possible, we have a right to affirm that it is a reality. Concrete objections to the scheme of natural religion have no weight unless the person advancing them wishes to make some particular form of life, or combination of matter, a part of the necessary construction of the universe. In this case he must

prove that by direct evidence his particular scheme is probable.

The laws of reason do not treat of mere possibilities, and hence they need a supplement which can be deduced from the general conditions of the economic world. Adam Smith long ago showed how peace might be secured by an appeal to economic motives. The division of labour so increases man's productive power that every one has a direct interest in the welfare of all those with whom he makes exchanges. In old times it was assumed that the interests of nations and traders were opposed, and that each was aided by the misfortunes of others. The new doctrines advanced by Adam Smith disproved this assumption and created an ever-strengthening bond between nations and individuals.

Dean Tucker presented an equally forcible argument showing the benefits of capital, which I shall restate to show its bearing on national religion. The use of capital is due to the fact that a quantity of work done in a series of days is more productive than if completed at one time. If men wait until they are hungry before seeking to supply their wants, their food is limited to the fish, berries, or wild game in their locality. To live in this way a few people must have an immense tract of land. A series of efforts extending over a period of three months allows the production of a crop of wheat by which a much larger number of people can be supported. Another series of efforts on iron and coal gives these people tools; a third, in clay banks and forests, enables them to build houses, and still another in cotton fields furnishes them with clothing. The longer and more diverse these series become, the better are the wants of men supplied and the greater the number of people a given region can support. The change in each of these cases is produced by a series of efforts, without which no transformation of products is possible. The attention of observers is usually concen-

trated on the capital because by its use the necessary exchanges are made through which the results of each day's work are carried over to the next. A reaper, however, represents only a partially made loaf of bread, and a loom but a half-made coat. Society has determined to make bread and coats in the best way, and the work has gone far enough to produce a reaper and a loom.

Our prime interest, however, is not in the capital but in the psychic changes that its use makes in men. Certain qualities are demanded, and those who do not have them will be eliminated. The necessary qualities will thus be thoroughly inculcated in the surviving element of society. There must be a confidence in the unseen. The end of a long process, or even its pressing need, is not seen or felt when it is begun. No one can complete such a process by himself. He must have faith in other people, and they must have confidence in him. There must also be a high estimate of future welfare. Devotees to present happiness will not take the time from present enjoyments to prepare for the future. The use of capital also inspires hope. A pessimistic man will not risk his goods in the uncertainties that production involves. He is, therefore, displaced by men of a more sanguine temperament, who have faith in the possibilities by which nature educates men. All these qualities, strengthened by the use of capital, become race qualities by the steady pressure that capital exerts.

When the increase of productive power has given an abundant supply of commodities, a third class of economic motives still further modify the characters of men. So long as the great evils with which men had to contend were due to undernutrition, a selfish man had an advantage over unselfish men. The more he concentrated his efforts on himself and his immediate interests, the more likely was he to obtain the needed means of support. Change, however, the condition of society by an increase

of its productive power, and this selfishness becomes a source of danger. An abundance of goods makes over-nutrition the great social evil. Those are now eliminated who centre their efforts too much on themselves. If three-fourths of a working-man's income will suffice to give him complete nutrition, and he uses his whole income for self-gratification, overnutrition will weaken and in the end destroy him. With the increase of productive power there is but one way by which men can maintain their vigour. They must gradually add to the time they devote to the welfare of other people. A law of increasing altruism is thus involved in the increase of productive power. The same conditions promote activity and increase vigour. The inactive cannot throw off the effects of overnutrition so well as the active, and are under greater temptations. The selfish do-nothings who seek for stimulation and gratification through inert sense impressions are thus weeded out, and society is transformed into a higher civilization by the vigour and altruistic activity of the survivors.

There are thus three groups of laws from which the premises of natural religion are derived. The laws of life show how it may be elevated to its highest forms. The laws of reason show how possibilities and probabilities may become realities. The economic laws show what qualities must be impressed on men in the struggle for that higher civilization which the conditions of the environment permit. To gain this higher social state men must become active, hopeful, altruistic, and full of confidence in the unseen about them and in the future before them. A purely sensory development with an undue emphasis of the present, the seen, and the immediately felt, will not meet the conditions of progress. We thus have the laws of life showing that its highest possibilities may be reached through the interaction of life on life, and the laws of reason showing that if no limitations of time and space are

set, all possibilities are realities. We have, thirdly, economic conditions that create a hopeful, active man, who believes in these possibilities and strives to realize them. A race with this temper may fail to prove that a permanent life is possible, but they cannot help believing that it is. The less hopeful, the less confident, and the less active will always be among the number that do not survive. Hope, faith, and activity cannot be the condition of success in all environmental determinants of survival without creating that mental attitude which leads men to approach the superenvironmental problems based on the possibilities of the universe. Even if a permanent life is impossible, every new form of life as it appears must believe in the possibility of a permanent life, and struggle for it. The same concrete conditions will create the dominant qualities of life, and they will determine its attitude toward all that lies beyond the seen and felt. The forms of all life can thus be predicted. We may even know what life on distant planets is attempting to do, though we have no sensory evidence that these efforts are a success.

If we examine the processes of nature to see what evidence they afford of a divine plan for the elevation of life and the attainment of moral ends, we must not confine ourselves to some one department. Not the laws of life, nor of reason, nor of economics, reveal the complete plan on which God works. Any one of these by itself would fail to substantiate an adequate scheme of natural religion; but taken in conjunction, they show a plan that each alone is unable to reveal. We have material evidences of the upward tendencies in life, but not of the possibility of a permanent equilibrium. Reason can convince us that probabilities are realities, and that in the universe at large possibilities are also realities; but it throws no light on the possibilities themselves. Economic conditions, however, cut off the hopeless and the faithless; and thus the

only men that survive have mental qualities that compel them to believe in the possibilities that life and reason point out. The restricted knowledge of life and the shortcomings of reason are remedied by making hope, faith, and activity necessary elements in men's characters. If the goal of human progress is never reached, it will not be because of any defect in the plan upon which God works in nature. The conditions of life and the characters of men have in them all the elements demanded for the full attainment of every ideal.

If this view of the scope of natural religion be accepted, it covers the same ground and emphasizes the same principles that revealed religion does. Natural and revealed religion do not supplement each other, but merely approach the same truths from different standpoints and uphold them with different evidence. The narrower field of the old natural religion was due to the emphasis of God as Cause. But God as Life enters into many more relations with men, and His presence is revealed in many more ways. The whole of nature and the whole of man, active as well as passive, can be called upon for evidence of God as Life, and this evidence will contain all the elements that are contained in revealed religion and will emphasize the same facts, hopes, and possibilities. Natural religion is not merely a religion of knowledge, nor revealed religion merely a religion of faith. Nor does the one tell merely of a God in nature and the other of a God incarnate. The principle of incarnation is an essential tendency in all life, and is revealed wherever the higher types come in contact with the lower. It is as natural a manifestation of God as justice, reason, or mercy. The incarnate God exhibits in the concrete what the God of nature reveals in slowly working processes. The will of the one is the will of the other. Revealed religion is thus not an extension of natural religion to new fields, nor merely miraculous exhibition of God's

power. It is a verification of the premises that natural religion has established. Had no plan of salvation been revealed and no incarnation taken place, our conception of God would have fallen short of the requirements imposed on higher life. He would have been less noble than we have a right to expect. But as it is, revealed religion gives a double verification. It shows that life is as high in form and quality as nature permits, and that life has attained the permanent equilibrium for which all its forms are striving. More than this is not necessary; anything less would be complete failure.



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